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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis addresses the conflict traditionally found within moral philosophy between 
deontological and utilitarian schools of thought. Using the example of the serious moral 
ambivalence experienced by individuals who are deciding whether to end or continue a 
difficult pregnancy, it is argued that this ambivalence is the result of both absolute principles 
(such as the intrinsic value of human life) and outcome based considerations (such as the 
desire to avoid causing pain and suffering) appearing to be morally reasonable, while also 
being fundamentally opposed: Each course of action is at once morally defensible on the 
basis of its own reasonableness, and, conversely, reprehensible due to the reasonableness 
of the other. This lived experience of moral ambivalence is directly reflected by the tension 
between deontology and utilitarianism as it occurs at the moral philosophic level, where the 
deontological emphasis on the unconditional rightness of certain principles is seen to be at 
irreconcilable odds with the utilitarian emphasis on the attainment of certain ends. The 
thesis’ central claim is that such ambivalence strongly indicates that human morality is 
neither exclusively one type or the other, and that both types of moral property are in fact 
reasonable, and thus have moral value. It is theorised that accounting for this dual 
reasonableness would lead to the most accurate and helpful representation of the human 
moral experience – but that the philosophic ‘divide’ between the two types of principle has 
led to an either/or situation, which has largely prevented this sort of understanding from 
being developed.  
The thesis argues that Victorian philosopher Henry Sidgwick developed a view in which 
neither deontological nor utilitarian principles can be fully realised without reference to the 
other, precisely on the basis that both can be found to be ultimately rational. This thesis aims 
to revitalise that theory – represented by the term ‘Rational Benevolence’ - to show that 
Sidgwick reconciled the divide between absolute and end based principles in such a way 
that the relationship between them becomes a ‘synthesis’. In this synthesis, deontological 
and utilitarian concepts are both seen as essential components of morality, that combine to 
form a dynamic whole in which the value of each principle is both indicated and naturally 
limited by the value of the other, on account of their respective rationalities. It is argued that 
this provides a more comprehensive understanding of the reality of the human moral 
experience, and better moral justification for either course of action in situations of complex 
and sensitive ethical decision making. 
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THE PROBLEM OF MORAL AMBIVALENCE 
 
REVISITING HENRY SIDGWICK’S THEORY OF RATIONAL BENEVOLENCE AS 
A BASIS FOR MORAL REASONING, WITH REFERENCE TO PRENATAL 
ETHICAL DILEMMAS 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
0.1. The Problem of Moral Ambivalence: ‘The Parental Predicament’ 
 
In a hospital in “Exampleland”, twelve pregnant women are meeting with their 
doctors1. The women/families are not connected to each other in any way, except on 
two criteria. The first is that this pregnancy is, before any other considerations, a 
wanted pregnancy. The second is that, given a certain situation in which they find 
themselves, each of them will be making a decision as regards the future of that 
pregnancy. The thesis begins from the difficulties of these decisions, and the 
observation of the divergence in chosen courses of action, which is demonstrated by 
the following six possible scenarios:  
• Parents A1: Receive a positive result from a prenatal test at an early stage of 
the pregnancy that indicates the child will be severely disabled; they consider 
their options, and decide to terminate [the pregnancy]. 
• Parents A2: Receive the same result at the same stage of pregnancy; they 
consider their options, and decide to continue [the pregnancy]. 
                                                 
1 Couples are usually assumed in the examples here, purely for ease of reference, but it is not 
necessary to the example that all of the pregnancies include both biological parents.  The mother may 
be single; it may be a same sex relationship; it may be a situation in which only one or neither is the 
biological parent. In fact, all of these variations may well be directly relevant to the particular 
circumstances of that pregnancy. One criterion that is important however is that this is an actual in 
utero pregnancy, in which the/a mother has conceived. The thesis does not necessarily exclude the 
concept of pre-implantation embryonic screening, and this context will be briefly addressed in light of 
the thesis’ findings in the conclusion - but this practice does not generally involve the same moral 
intensity as actual pregnancies, and is therefore not as relevant to the moral ambivalence that is 
central to my arguments here. 
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• Parents B1: Receive a positive result from a prenatal test at an advanced 
stage of the pregnancy that indicates that the child will be severely disabled; 
they consider their options, and decide to terminate. 
• Parents B2: Are in the same situation as B1; they consider their options, and 
decide to continue. 
• Parents C1: Have a healthy pregnancy, but they already have a child who is 
seriously disabled and requires a very high level of care; they consider their 
options and decide to terminate. 
• Parents C2: Are in the same situation as C1; they consider their options and 
decide to continue. 
• Parents D1: Are informed that the foetus itself is healthy, but the physical or 
mental health of the mother is at risk; they consider their options, and decide 
to terminate. 
• Parents D2: Are in the same situation as D1; they consider their options, and 
decide to continue. 
• Parents E1: Are informed that the foetus is healthy, but they are extremely 
poor, and already have four other children; they consider their options, and 
decide to terminate. 
• Parents E2: Are in the same situation as E1; they consider their options, and 
decide to continue. 
• Parents F1: Both the parents are fourteen years old. They consider their 
options, and decide to terminate the pregnancy.  
• Parents F2: Are also fourteen years old. They consider their options, and 
decide to continue with the pregnancy. 
These are only a few examples of the sorts of difficult situations in which parents 
could find themselves during a pregnancy. Into this equation we can insert an almost 
infinite amount of variations, and different problematic circumstances and factors that 
could bring the continuation of a pregnancy into question2. The point of the examples 
                                                 
2 The father may be seriously ill, for example, or the parent(s) may have other dependents such as 
elderly parents, and feel unable to also have a child while in that situation. There is also the question 
of degrees of severity of a situation – the degree of severity of a prenatally diagnosed disability (which 
sometimes cannot be detected, as is the case with Down’s Syndrome), or degrees of poverty, or 
degrees of the mother’s ill health. See also the Reproductive Review, 22nd April 2015, which 
published the statistic that in 2014, 70 women had abortions in the UK after suffering Hyperemesis 
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however is to draw attention to what they do all share in common. This is a grave 
ambivalence regarding the future of the pregnancy3. Each pregnancy is (in these 
examples) theoretically wanted, but in each case there are also good grounds on 
which to consider whether or not to actually continue. Defined in plain terms the two 
positions can be summarised as on the one hand a desire for the life of that 
pregnancy, and on the other a concern for the welfare of one or more of the parties 
involved - or for the quality of the lives involved. The resulting ambivalence between 
the two is a highly complex blend of emotional and ethical considerations, in which 
each course of action has different values, different qualities, and different bases for 
justification, and in which these values, qualities and justifications for both appear 
                                                 
Gravidarum, a serious type of morning sickness. Although a few of the pregnancies were unplanned, 
the majority were wanted. 
3 There are clearly many individuals who will be excluded from these examples on the basis that they 
do have a strong inclination towards one course of action or another. The grounds for this are often 
religious, although not exclusively; even outside of religious circles, there are fierce debates over the 
moral status of the embryo, many believing life to begin either at conception, or at least at the point in 
the first trimester of pregnancy at which the embryo is thought to have developed enough to be able 
to feel pain (see Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1993), 135-
174; Michael Tooley, ‘Personhood’, in, Peter Singer and Kuhse (eds.) Companion to Bioethics 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing: 2009), p. 129). At the other end of the spectrum, many individuals will 
feel that they are responsible for not bringing a life into the world that is likely to have little potential for 
flourishing, or freedom from pain and suffering. (This responsibility may be felt privately, as in the 
majority of cases in which parents want to avoid bringing this sort of distress to their own 
children/families, or more publicly, by those who believe that now the technology that allows this 
avoidance is available, there is actually a wider social moral obligation to use it (see John Harris, 
‘Clones, Genes, and Immortality’, in, Wonderwoman and Superman (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 
1998), p. 328; John Harris, Enhancing Evolution; The Ethical Case for Making Better People 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press: 2007) ; John Harris, ‘Enhancements are a Moral Obligation’, 
in, Nick Bostrom and Julian Savulescu (eds.), Human Enhancement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011) p. 131 ; Julian Savulescu, ‘Why We Should Select The Best Children’, in, Bioethics, Vol. 15, 
No.5/6 (2001) 413-426). Then there is the position of the disabled community’s critique on abortion, 
which holds that to terminate pregnancies on the grounds of disability is discriminatory, and simply a 
form of disguised eugenics. See Tom Shakespeare and Anne Kerr (eds.) Genetic Politics: From 
Eugenics to Genome (Cheltenham: New Clarion Press, 2002); Daniel Kevles, In the Name of 
Eugenics; Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1995); David Galton, Eugenics; The Future of Human Life in the 21st Century (London: Abacus, 
2001); Jonathon Glover, What Sort of People Should There Be? (London: Penguin Books, 1984), 
and, Choosing Children; Genes, Disability, and Design (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006); Phillip 
Kitcher, The Lives to Come: The Genetic Revolution and Human Possibilities (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2001); Nick Agar, Liberal Eugenics: In Defence of Human Enhancement (Oxford MA: 
Blackwell, 2004). 
In short there may be a myriad of different reasons why parents are not ambivalent, and the vast 
majority of these are justifiable, as the thesis will indirectly show, through the argument that both 
courses of action can be found to be right simultaneously. All that is important here is that as they do 
not experience the ambivalence which I am using to demonstrate the point that both courses of action 
can be found to be right simultaneously, they are not included in the sorts of examples listed above, 
and therefore are not directly relevant to the thesis.   
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equally relevant to the situation4. In scenarios that are otherwise identical, two 
fundamentally different courses of action appear to emerge as the ‘right’ thing to do.  
In the context of prenatal decision making, there is a further contributing factor to 
this already very sensitive situation as it is experienced by individuals at a private 
level. This is that both the continuation and the termination of difficult pregnancies 
are independently supported – often very vocally - at the public socio-political level5. 
Although the institution of individual autonomy is designed to protect parents’ 
                                                 
4 Clearly, this ambivalence is both emotional and moral. It is the personal and subjective emotional 
sense that both courses of action are somehow right that informs the position of moral ambivalence, 
but any objective moral sense that both courses of action are right will in turn intensify the emotional 
uncertainty. Given the moral philosophic character of the thesis however, this emotional and ethical 
ambivalence will generally be referred to as ‘moral ambivalence’.  
5 Societal pressure on individual ethical decisions is not limited to the issue of abortion, but it is 
particularly noticeable – and the opinions particularly strong – in this context. Parents frequently report 
that they encounter the influence and weight of other viewpoints while making their own personal 
decisions. In an interview with Jane Fisher, Chief Executive of British charity organisation Antenatal 
Results and Choices (ARC), 12th December 2013, Ms Fisher confirmed to me that parents who seek 
the services of ARC often feel the expectations of society for them to choose either this course of 
action or that, and the subsequent sense of judgements, even more acutely than they feel their own 
beliefs on the matter. Ms Fisher also spoke about how the ARC building is often targeted by 
protestors from the pro-life movement, who bring babies to their protests, as if ‘somehow implying that 
we don’t know what newborn babies look like’. This has frequently caused great distress to pregnant 
women who are at ARC at the time, using their services to decide on whether or not to continue their 
pregnancies. Ms Fisher also referred to what she terms as the ‘disney-fication’ of certain genetic 
conditions that were once held to be serious but that now - with better treatments, better social 
integration between disabled and non-disabled communities, and the societal de-stigmatising of 
certain conditions - society generally considers to no longer be good grounds for abortion. The most 
obvious example is Down’s Syndrome: Many individuals with Down’s Syndrome lead independent, 
fulfilling and largely normal lives, and society recognises this. However, the severity cannot be 
predicted in utero, and individuals with Down’s Syndrome may have serious heart conditions, and/or 
very limited capacity for learning or independence, and many other health problems. The ‘disney-
fication’, that Ms Fisher refers to, is the failure of this more ‘tolerant’ society to recognise that Down’s 
Syndrome is still for many a debilitating, life limiting and distressing condition.  
On the other side of the debate, Ms Fisher also reported that many parents have admitted to feeling 
judged by their friends or family for continuing difficult pregnancies where the health or life of the 
future child is in question, when it appears as though they are simply willingly bringing a child into the 
world to suffer. They are told that they could ‘easily try again’, that they could/should avoid the 
trauma, or, most worryingly, that it would avoid great financial costs to the parents, and even to health 
services.   
There is also evidence to suggest that some healthcare professionals in this area, especially genetic 
counsellors who advise on possible outcomes where a genetic condition is concerned, are not acting 
impartially, and are in fact advancing their own views to parents on the course of action they should 
take (see Merryn Ekberg, ‘Maximising the Benefits and Minimising the Risks Associated with Prenatal 
Genetic Testing’, in, Health, Risk, and Society, Vol.9, No.1 (2007), 67-81, and, ‘Second Opinions: The 
Old Eugenics and the New Genetics Compared’, in, Social History of Medicine, Vol.20, No.3 (2007) 
581-593; Tony Fitzpatrick, ‘Before the Cradle: New Genetics, Biopolicy, and Regulated Eugenics’, in, 
Journal of Social Policy, Vol.30, No.4 (2001) 589-612; Tom Shakespeare, ‘Losing the Plot’? Medical 
and Activist Discourses of Contemporary Genetics and Disability, in, Sociology of Health and Illness, 
Vol.21, No.5 (1999) 669-688; Amos Shapria, ‘Wrongful Life’ Lawsuits for Faulty Genetic Counselling’, 
in, Journal of Medical Ethics, Vol.24, No.6 (1998) 369-375); Christy Roberts, Laura Stough, and Linda 
Parrish, ‘The Role of Genetic Counselling in the Elective Termination of Pregnancies Involving 
Disabilities’, in, The Journal of Special Education, Vol.36, No.1 (2002) 48-55). This seems to occur 
particularly when the counsellor believes the ‘best’ course of action would be to end the pregnancy.  
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decisions from interference by others, very rarely do we make our decisions in a 
social vacuum, and any pressure or stigmatisation that parents encounter from either 
position only serves to intensify the difficulties of which they are already aware6.  
Taken overall, I refer to this contribution of private and social factors to the 
serious ambivalence that can arise between two justifiable but fundamentally 
opposing courses of actions regarding the future of a pregnancy, as the ‘Parental 
Predicament’. The context of the Parental Predicament provides, I believe, one of 
the most compelling examples of human moral ambivalence – and it is the cause of 
this ambivalence that provides the thesis with its foundational claims about morality 
from which its main aim is developed. This cause of ambivalence is now examined in 
the following section. 
 
0.2. The Significance of Moral Ambivalence: Two Types of Moral 
Consideration as ‘Reasonable’ 
The word ‘ambivalence’, as representative of the ethical and emotional state of 
affairs in the Parental Predicament, has been chosen purposefully here. To be 
ambivalent does not, contra to some popular usage, mean to have little or no opinion 
either way, but rather to hold two strong but different opinions at the same time - as 
is demonstrated by the divergent decisions made in the Parental Predicament. In 
broader moral terms, that divergence translates into two types of moral 
consideration. The first – the desire to continue the pregnancy – reflects a 
recognition that there are certain fixed principles that are felt on some intuitive or 
instinctive level to be inviolable and universal, and as such to be ‘right’ in an absolute 
sense. In this case the inviolable or absolute value is that of human life, or a potential 
                                                 
6 In terms of evidence that parents do feel this way, there is an extensive amount of academic and 
clinical literature. See Paivi Santalahti, Elina Hemminki, Anne-Marie Latikka, and Marrku Ryynanen, 
‘Women’s Decision-making in Prenatal Screening’, in Social Science and Medicine, Vol. 46, No.8 
(1998) 1067-1076; Issac Rabino, ‘Genetic Testing and its Implications: Human Genetics Researchers 
Grapple with Ethical Issues’, in, Science, Technology and Human Values, Vol. 28, No.3 (2003) 365-
402; M.H. Parker, K.L. Forbes and I.Finlay, ‘Eugenics or Empowered Choice; Community Issues 
Arising from Prenatal Testing’, in, Australian and N. Zealand Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, 
Vol. 42, No.1 (2003) 10-4; and V. Seavilleklein, ‘Challenging the Rhetoric of Choice in Prenatal 
Screening’, in, Bioethics, Vol. 23, No.1 (2009) 68-77, as just some examples of such literature. Also 
see below for my argument that autonomy is an incomplete solution to the problem of moral 
ambivalence, precisely because of its function in allowing for freedom of opinion and speech.  
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human life7. The second position – which demonstrates concern for the welfare or 
quality of life of the relevant parties – reflects the inclination to consider what the 
outcome, or the consequences, of an action might be, and to decide on the course of 
action accordingly.   
Both of these viewpoints are, as noted above, equally valid. But it is my view 
that it is actually the space between the two apparently justifiable positions that is far 
more revealing of the reality of the human moral experience than positions that 
defend exclusively either one course of action or another. This is because, I argue, 
the two positions are simultaneously valid because they are both simultaneously 
reasonable. By ‘reasonable’ here I mean of sound judgement, objectively or 
impartially justifiable, and that the principle or course of action is intrinsically 
defensible by appeal to nothing but itself, i.e. it is not contingent on anything further 
for its justification8. Principles that are reasonable in this way are, in short, 
unconditional. Applying this definition to the two positions in the Parental 
Predicament, a decision to continue a difficult pregnancy is reasonable because the 
desire to continue and preserve a human life has intrinsic, or unconditional, value in 
itself, without needing to refer to further reasons for that value9. An eventual decision 
to end a difficult pregnancy is reasonable because the action of avoiding bringing 
pain, suffering, or a threat to welfare of any kind also has intrinsic and unconditional 
value of the same kind. The fact that both positions share this kind of 
reasonableness is, I argue, the actual cause of moral ambivalence, and the deeper 
                                                 
7 It does not actually matter here whether the parents believe the unborn child to represent a whole 
human life at this stage, or only a potential one; it only matters that they are ambivalent about the 
weight of this absolute value when compared to the weight of outcome-based values. In this way, the 
thesis avoids the problematic ‘beginning of life’ moral debate, in which it is disputed exactly what is to 
count as ‘human life’, and where – in a stage of pregnancy or even pre-implantation – this is thought 
to become applicable. Parents may even believe that life does begin at conception, and still be 
ambivalent regarding their course of action in a very difficult pregnancy. Equally, parents might 
believe that ‘life’ begins at a later stage in pregnancy, and yet still be ambivalent regarding the earlier 
stages. I emphasise here the vast scale of positions, and the variable degrees within those positions, 
that could constitute the situation for individuals in the Parental Predicament.  
8 Aside from this cursory definition of reasonableness, I do not mean to presuppose here a formal, 
ultimate definition of what is ‘reasonable’. It is actually part of the thesis’ remit to argue for a wider 
understanding of what is morally reasonable. Nor do I mean to assume here that I am right that both 
of these positions are reasonable. Many would obviously disagree with that insinuation. However, I 
am working from the point of view of moral ambivalence, and it is my view that this ambivalence is 
caused by the equal reasonableness of two types of moral principle – the thesis goes forwards on this 
premise, which I will aim to justify it via appeal to Sidgwick’s understanding of the relationship 
between ‘reasonable’, and ‘right’.  
9 See Samuel Scheffler, ‘Morality and Reasonable Partiality’, in, Brian Feltham and John Cottingham 
(eds.) Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press: 2010)  
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explanation of why both courses of action appear to be valid, or why they both 
appear to be right10. Because both types of moral consideration can be described as 
reasonable in this way i.e. as not needing reference to anything further for their 
validation, both naturally form an integral part of our moral processes – as indeed 
they are seen to do, in grave ethical dilemmas such as the Parental Predicament. 
‘Ambivalence’ thus represents the fundamental premise of the thesis, which is this 
observation that in situations of great emotional and moral intensity, that intensity is 
often caused by the conflict not just between two apparently valid courses of action, 
but between two courses of action – or two types of moral consideration - that are 
both defensible on the basis that they are both reasonable, both in some way right, 
and that are both relevant to the human moral experience.  
To define moral ambivalence as the situation in which two positions are 
simultaneously reasonable has another implication, aside from supporting the view 
that both types of moral consideration – absolute-principle based and outcome 
based – are right11. This must also be addressed in order to gain a full understanding 
of what is meant when it is said that both positions are reasonable. It is the 
paradoxical but necessary inference that if each position is right, and yet they are 
fundamentally opposed to each other, then each position must also be, to some 
extent, wrong. It would seem impossible to maintain that life has an absolute value, 
and also to maintain at the same time that life depends upon certain quality-based 
                                                 
10 ‘Right’ here is intended mainly to represent how the parents might describe the situation. I do, 
however, mean to suggest that there is a certain truth, or certainty, or fact in both of those positions, 
as demonstrated by their respective reasonableness, and that this does indicate a certain rightness. 
This implies that I am adopting the position in which reason and ‘rightness’ are related. As this was 
Henry Sidgwick’s position, it is also mine. I am aware however that the use of the word ‘truth’ as 
representative of what is meant by ‘reasonable’, and therefore ‘right’, is more problematic when it 
comes to the matter of whether there is a link between ‘truth’ and moral justification. Jurgen 
Habermas famously argues that truth and moral rightness are not the same thing (Habermas, Truth 
and Justification (Cambridge MA: MIT Press: 2003). Steven Levine, however, agrees that truth and 
moral rightness can be linked (Levine, ‘Truth and Moral Validity: On Habermas’ Domesticated 
Pragmatism’, in, Constellations, Vol.18, No.2 (2011) 244-259). I am actually not arguing specifically 
for that link. I use ‘truth’ here as a superficial way of describing what I mean by reasonable, but 
ultimately I argue – via Sidgwick - that it is only principles that have been established via a process of 
reasoning that can be called morally right. 
11 By ‘absolute-principle’ I am referring to the ‘fixed principle’ position, which holds that certain 
principles such as ‘do not kill’, are always right; I do not mean that only these principles are 
unconditional, because as I have been arguing – and as I will argue overall in the thesis - it is my view 
that certain outcomes (such as the avoidance of suffering) are also unconditional. The terms ‘absolute 
principles, or ‘absolute value’ are simply used to denote the moral idea that certain rules are always 
right, as distinguished from the moral idea that certain outcomes are right – as despite their shared 
unconditionality they do represent different ethical approaches, and in order to understand this to be 
the cause of moral ambivalence we require a way of identifying the two positions. 
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conditions, such as freedom from pain, or the ability to flourish. The two types of 
moral principle therefore appear to be mutually exclusive, with each reasonable 
position also incurring wrongness precisely from the reasonableness of the other. To 
act on the values of one course of action is, essentially, to ignore the moral values of 
the alternative.  
At a purely practical level of the Parental Predicament, the two positions are 
of course mutually exclusive; either one or the other will be decided upon, and there 
is no ‘middle ground’ in this situation12. However, the overall crucial point that I wish 
to maintain here about moral ambivalence is that it is a fact – as is the existence of 
those two types of moral consideration, which conflict to create that ambivalence. It 
is very difficult to deny that both types of moral consideration do appear in our moral 
thought processes; simple introspection on the part of most people will reveal 
inclinations towards both absolute principles and outcome based moral principles. 
Furthermore, it also seems undeniable that both are important, that both types of 
moral consideration carry significant and persuasive values - and that they often 
appear together, in relation to the same issue13. I argue overall then that both types 
of moral consideration are at once simultaneously reasonable – and incontrovertible.  
 
0.3. Moral Ambivalence, and the Problem of the ‘Divide’ In Moral Philosophy  
It was my aim in the previous section to argue that as both types of moral 
consideration are reasonable, they are both an inevitable part of our moral 
processes – and that this is both logically and empirically the case. But, I argue, 
there is a major obstacle to the acceptance of this understanding of human morality, 
                                                 
12 The two positions might not be mutually exclusive in all contexts however – and it may be possible 
in some situations to find a way in which the values of each position are both accounted for in a moral 
judgement. This will be addressed in the conclusion, in light of the thesis’ findings.  
13 I suggest a thought experiment here, that I believe supports my claim that both absolute values and 
outcome-based values are often active in the process of making a moral judgement at the same time. 
This experiment involves imaging a scenario in which a motorist is driving on a motorway when a 
pedestrian appears in front of them. I theorise that the first impulse of the motorist would be to swerve 
to avoid hitting the pedestrian, because the initial instinct is to avoid killing someone, which is an 
absolute-value based response. However, I suggest that the next – and almost simultaneous – 
impulse would be the realisation that swerving into the neighbouring lane would very likely cause a 
huge accident, which would almost certainly kill more people, and that this is an outcome-based value 
response. As this ‘pedestrian on the motorway’ scenario involves the fact that the motorist/thinker is 
travelling at speed, and would therefore have little time for prolonged thought or deliberation, it is 
intended to demonstrate a) just how quickly the two moral impulses can appear alongside each other, 
and b) thus the natural co-existence of these different but equally valid and important moral 
inclinations.   
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and it occurs in moral philosophy itself. In the following section I outline this problem 
as it occurs in moral philosophy, and argue that it is synonymous in its cause with 
moral ambivalence as presented above. I then contextualise the problem in terms of 
the failure of individual autonomy to provide a solution to the ambivalence of the 
Parental Predicament. 
 
0.3.a. The ‘Divide’ in Moral Philosophy: Ambivalence Between Theories  
 
Within moral philosophy there are two dominant interpretations of how to define what 
is moral14. These are a) the deontological school of thought, which originated mainly 
with Immanuel Kant in the 18th Century and which maintains that moral value lies 
only in the performance of categorically prescribed, unconditional, and non-
consequentialist moral duties, and b) the utilitarian school of thought, introduced in 
its most recognisable form through the work of Jeremy Bentham and J.S. Mill, which 
argues that moral rightness is to be found not in actions themselves per se, but in 
the attainment of certain non-moral ends, such as happiness, or other ‘goods’15. 
Each school of thought has a long and varied tradition in which it has experienced 
support and decline, revisions and additions – and both are essential to any 
understanding of the moral philosophy of the 20th Century, and of the modern day. A 
                                                 
14 They are not the only interpretations, but I argue that they are the most important/relevant to my 
arguments here. 
15 These are very broad interpretations of those terms.  It is especially possible for confusion to arise 
over the term ‘deontology’, as technically ‘deon’, or ‘duty’, could be used in any system of ethics in 
which one adheres to duties or rules of some kind – and these rules could be of a utilitarian kind. (An 
example of this very point is provided by father of utilitarianism Jeremy Bentham, whose seminal work 
of moral philosophy was actually entitled ‘Deontology’, on the basis that he perceived the securing of 
happiness to be the ultimate moral duty). For this reason, I have mainly avoided referring to the 
deontological position as ‘duty’ based. For the purposes of this thesis, the terms deontology and 
utilitarianism are understood in the following ways: Deontology is taken to refer to school of thought 
(associated mainly with Kant) in which morality lies in certain fixed, absolute principles held to be 
categorically right without reference to any consequences. As these are most traditionally called 
‘duties’ as per the term ‘deontology’, where I do use the language of duty, it is this deontological 
understanding that is meant. Utilitarianism is taken to be the system of ethics that places moral value 
in non-moral ends, such as Happiness, or good, and in which actions are right or wrong in as far as 
they do or don’t produce those outcomes, or consequences. ‘Classical utilitarianism’ will refer to the 
doctrine as it appears under Bentham, Mill (and occasionally Sidgwick, although I dispute that 
Sidgwick can be considered a classical utilitarian, as I will argue) – the first definition I gave may be 
called ‘traditional’, or ‘standard’ utilitarianism’, and is intended to embody the typical features of 
utilitarianism as it generally appears in all other utilitarian theories since Bentham and Mill. 
For consistency, these two moral positions will now generally be referred to as ‘absolute-principle 
based’ and ‘outcome based’ respectively. 
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serious problem, however, lies in the relationship between them. Deontology and 
utilitarianism clearly represent positions that are fundamentally incompatible; the 
placing of intrinsic moral value in certain categorically prescribed actions themselves 
is prima facie irreconcilable with the argument that moral value lies in non-moral 
ends, and in the conditional actions that secure those ends. Yet both moral schools 
lay claim to being able to explain the truth of human morality, and in these claims 
they are both robustly supported, by the decades’ worth of moral theorists who have 
defended them. That is, deontology and utilitarianism appear to present two valid 
interpretations of morality, that are also mutually exclusive – and the relevant moral 
philosophy has thus presented the two positions as being fundamentally divided16.  
This divide, it will be noted, is an exact model of the very situation just outlined 
in the previous section - that situation in which there seems to be within the human 
moral experience two equally reasonable moral impulses that are fundamentally at 
odds with each other. Translated into the direct terms of the Parental Predicament 
(and many other ethical conflicts), the view that human life has intrinsic and 
unconditional value represents the fixed or absolute-principle deontological position; 
the view that it is intrinsically and unconditionally right to avoid outcomes that will 
involve pain, suffering, and threat to welfare represents the utilitarian position17. It is 
clear then that the ‘divide’ between deontological and utilitarian understandings of 
morality at the philosophical level directly reflects the divide between competing 
reasonable moral considerations as they occur in the lived moral experience; the 
divide is, essentially, another form of moral ambivalence. 
 
 
0.3.b. The Problem of the ‘Divide’: Autonomy and the ‘Illusion of Choice’  
 
                                                 
16 An outline of this ‘divide’ appears in the literature review. Although the purpose there is to examine 
how and where Sidgwick’s work has been used throughout the years, the thread of the divide 
between deontological and utilitarian positions naturally emerges as well, as this is the framework of 
moral debate throughout which the place of Sidgwick’s work is traced.  
There have, over the years, been theories that have aimed to unite deontological and utilitarian 
considerations, and some have had moderate success, in some ways. As these theories are a part of 
the field to which this thesis is directly relevant, they are outlined below. 
17 I argue that this conflict does not just pertain to the Parental Predicament, but to the majority of 
ethical dilemmas. So many answers to the moral question of ‘what ought I to do’, fall either into the 
category of obeying universal and absolute moral principles, or the category of acting in such a way 
that the best outcome will be secured.  
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The main practical solution to the prevailing conflict between absolute-principle 
based and outcome based moral considerations has been to implement freedom of 
choice. The Parental Predicament is again the best example here. Current 
healthcare policy in this area aims to manage the divergence between equally 
defensible courses of action by emphasising individual autonomy, the socio-political 
framework which defends the right of individuals to make their own choices while 
other individuals are also allowed to make theirs18.  
At first glance, individual autonomy gives the impression of being a highly 
effective tool for a situation in which there are two alternative positions on the same 
matter. But something crucial is missing from autonomy as a solution to the problem 
of moral ambivalence. Firstly, autonomy has nothing of substance to say about the 
actual decisions themselves. What is overlooked by autonomy in this context – as 
vital as the concept is for a free society – is that precisely what is revealed by 
parental ambivalence is this fact that parents are morally and emotionally unsure of 
which decision to make. The personal internal struggle experienced by those parents 
is not in any helpful way addressed simply because the choice is theirs to make. 
Furthermore, autonomy itself can actually cause a problem in the context of serious 
ethical dilemmas. The dual positive and negative angles of liberty entrenched by 
autonomy mean that the liberty that allows parents the freedom to choose the course 
of action best for them is precisely the same liberty that allows the free expression of 
other opinions. For a context in which opposing views are often propounded so 
vociferously, this arrangement is hardly going to provide a solution. Social pressure 
has already been noted above as being part of the Parental Predicament – but 
framed in terms of autonomy, it becomes clear that in the absence of a moral 
philosophic means of understanding human morality to be comprised of both 
absolute-principle-value and outcome-value (or deontological and utilitarian) aspects, 
autonomy can give no meaningful practical guidance beyond simply defending each 
course of action separately. And this, ironically, is precisely part of what causes that 
problem in the first place. 
                                                 
18 Autonomy, by its very nature, has a dual function that appears to make it perfect for the task of 
defending private, personal choice. There is positive autonomy, which accounts for a person’s 
‘freedom to’, and negative autonomy, which accounts for the person’s right to be ‘free from’ 
[interference from others]. 
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Ultimately then, I argue, the choice provided by the framework of autonomy is 
little more than an illusion. Because both positions are valid, both positions are going 
to appear in autonomy, juxtaposed just as they are without it. The endless circular 
tautology in the Parental Predicament between how far each type of value is relevant 
and how far the limits of the alternative are relevant is directly reflected by that 
question inherent in the institution of autonomy, of how far individual choice should 
be protected and how far it should be endorsed19. For this reason, autonomy also 
directly embodies and reflects the ambivalence as it occurs at the moral 
philosophical level. Autonomy is undoubtedly important, and it should form a part of 
any ethical policy implementation, but it is a framework only, and not adequate by 
itself to provide a defence of the ethical decisions made within it. In plain terms, 
autonomy on its own simply leaves the door open to the perpetuation of moral 
ambivalence as it appears at a public level. 
 
 
0.4. Challenging the Divide: Reconciliation and Synthesis Between 
Deontological and Utilitarian Principles of Morality 
Given all the observations made above, the question must now turn to how best to 
address this lived and inter-theory moral ambivalence. I have argued that its cause is 
that both absolute and outcome (or deontological and utilitarian) considerations of 
morality are reasonable, in that they both account for valid ethical and emotional 
concerns. It has also been seen that these concerns appear to be fundamentally 
incompatible, and that this leads to situations of painful and protracted deliberation - 
in which individuals in the contexts such as the Parental Predicament are also left 
vulnerable to the effects of public ambivalence. I have argued further that there is, at 
the level of moral philosophy, a divide between deontological and utilitarian 
properties of morality that is directly symptomatic of the divide as it is seen in lived 
experience: There are two theories that defend two compelling arguments as to what 
is moral, and these arguments are prima facie divergent. Not only then is moral 
ambivalence as it occurs in lived experience difficult enough in itself, but the moral 
                                                 
19 Within political theory, again, autonomy itself can offer nothing. It is the precise role of autonomy to 
paradoxically both ensure limits and to remove them, to allow free choice but to check it. It justifies as 
much as it limits, and limits as much as it justifies. 
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theories that inform the various values only further compound the very problem that 
they aim to address. Whereas there have been some theories that have aimed to 
unite the two types of moral property to some extent, these have only been partly 
successful; the divide still pervades moral philosophy, and it is still affecting ethical 
theory in a variety of contexts20.  
I argue that this opposition between deontology and utilitarianism as it occurs at 
the moral theoretical level is erroneous. I have aimed to show in the above 
discussion on ambivalence that the two types of moral consideration are both 
fundamental, reasonable, and, as such, irrefutable aspects of human moral decision 
making, and I argue on this basis that to interpret morality to be exclusively one or 
the other is an inaccurate understanding of the reality of that morality. I therefore 
argue in the same line that the deontological and utilitarian understandings of 
morality that represent those moral considerations at the academic philosophical 
level are also both reasonable – and therefore also that to argue exclusively for one 
position or the other is an inaccurate understanding of the reality that they are trying 
to represent. The opposition between them is therefore also unhelpful as a means of 
informing important decision making frameworks such as autonomy, and of 
supporting the individual difficult ethical decisions being made therein. For as long as 
they are posited as separate views of morality, the endless oscillation between them 
will simply continue. As Henry Sidgwick pointed out, “…if there are different views of 
the ultimate reasonableness of conduct…it is easy to see that any single answer to 
the question ‘why’ will not be satisfactory, as it will be given only from one of these 
points of view, and will always leave room to ask the question from some other’21. 
                                                 
20 Despite his own optimistic description of utilitarianism being the purest form of deontology, political 
philosopher Will Kymlicka draws attention to a distinction that still exists between deontological and 
utilitarian theories, and that has been made all the more palpable by the developments in ethical-
political theory, such as an increase in global concerns, and the advances in health care. Kymlicka 
concludes that the question of whether the ‘right’ or the ‘good’ (thought to be represented by 
deontology and utilitarianism respectively) is to take priority is still ‘a central dividing point of 
contemporary political theories’. See Kymlicka, ‘Liberalism and Communitarianism’, in, Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol.18, No.2 (1998)181-203. 
Alasdair MacIntyre, in a paper in 2013 entitled ‘Having Survived Academic Moral Philosophy of the 
Twentieth Century’ (in, Fran O’Rourke (ed) What Happened in and to Moral Philosophy in the 
Twentieth Century (Notre Dame, Indiana: Undpress: 2013) – the title of which is telling enough – also 
states that utilitarianism and Kantianism are, ‘with some rare and sophisticated exceptions’, still 
presented as ‘incompatible and rival standpoints’, in which adhering to one simply means rejecting the 
other. 
21 Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (London: Macmillan: 1874) I:I:6 
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In the next two sections I give an overview of how I propose this dual 
reasonableness should be accounted for, and therefore how this divide should be 
addressed. This is done in preparation for the next half of the chapter, which 
contains the details of how this possible solution is to be drawn from the work of 
Henry Sidgwick.  
0.4.a. The Idea of Reconciliation   
 
It is my view that there is only one point from which to begin speculating as to what 
the solution to the theoretical ambivalence between deontology and utilitarianism 
might be – and that this is present in the very fact of moral ambivalence itself. It is, 
quite simply, the acceptance that both absolute-principle based and outcome based 
properties of morality are relevant to the human moral experience. To deny that 
either is important or relevant is, as I have argued above, wrong both factually and 
theoretically– and taking this position has clearly not been effective, either 
philosophically, or practically. It is for this reason that I have specifically been using 
the language of ‘division’ to refer to the state of affairs between deontology and 
utilitarianism. ‘Divide’ is intended to convey the idea that there was – and still is - in 
human morality actually a whole of which deontological and utilitarian principles are 
constituent parts. And if this is the case, the suggestion is that there is a means 
through which those parts, which have been so widely and for so long held in direct 
contention, can be reconciled. 
It must be asked, however, what is meant by ‘reconciliation’, and why this 
notion is important when it would also be possible to simply present a better defence 
for each course of action separately. There is one answer to both of these questions 
- for by ‘reconciliation’ I do not mean that a better space is created for each position 
to simply co-exist independently of each other. Giving a better philosophical defence 
of termination or continuation of difficult pregnancies respectively could arguably give 
autonomy better resources with which to defend parents deciding on either course of 
action, but this would not improve the situation. Defending each course of action 
independently not only offers nothing new, but it fails to address the enduring tension 
between deontological and utilitarian moral theories by failing to address the reality 
of the human moral experience – that reality that is demonstrated by the dual 
reasonableness that causes ambivalence. It it this dual reasonableness that needs 
to be accounted for – and the more specific fact that both moral impulses are often 
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(in situations of grave moral ambivalence) present in our moral processes 
simultaneously. For what I argue is indicated by this simultaneous reasonableness is 
the fact that each type of moral property somehow depends to some extent on the 
values of the other. On this basis, I argue that the most effective way to account for 
this dual reasonableness of absolute-principle based and outcome based moral 
properties is not to defend the reasonableness of each independently, but to argue 
that they are actually in some way inherently connected. It is this point that is the 
most important for the concept of reconciliation as I am using it here, for it points to 
the more specific understanding of what I claim that reconciliation involves. This is 
the idea of there being - between deontological and utilitarian principles of morality – 
an actual synthesis, in which the two types of moral property are no longer seen as 
mutually exclusive, but rather as mutually informing.   
 
0.4.b. Reconciliation as a ‘Synthesis’  
 
My argument for there being a type of relationship between duty-based and 
outcome-based moral properties that could be called a ‘synthesis’ is drawn from the 
observation made about ambivalence above, that the simultaneous presence of two 
reasonable types of moral value must mean that the reasonableness of each type of 
moral consideration will place limits on the extent to which the other type is 
reasonable. I argue that this suggests that there is a fundamental connection 
between the two properties – a way in which they operate essentially as two parts of 
a larger whole. But this relationship is not just a negative one (which would 
eventually lead us back to the same stalemate of the current situation). Where the 
reasonableness of each moral value limits the other, the view could be reversed - as 
the situation of equal reasonableness was reversed to show how it leads to the 
limiting of each position - so that the relationship can be viewed positively, as one in 
which the reasonableness of each moral value actually supports the other. In such a 
relationship, the values of each type of consideration are not only crucial to the 
restriction of the other, but also to the validity of the other. In this way, they are truly 
mutually informing. The relationship is a dynamic and interdependent one, in which 
each moral property has value, a specific identity, and, crucially, a role in supporting 
and limiting the other. It is this understanding of the relationship that is intended by 
the use of the word ‘synthesis’. This is not merely a relationship of incidental co-
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existence, but one in which components combine to form something else – in this 
case, a more inclusive and comprehensive understanding of the human moral 
experience. This is, I argue, the only way to hold both deontological and utilitarian 
principles in such a way that they are not continually in contention (as a mutually-
limiting-only relationship would allow for), but are both seen to be vital and 
functioning parts of a whole that represents the reality of the human moral 
experience. Deontological and utilitarian properties would not be presented as simply 
being the same – each principle must remain independently valid in order to bring to 
the synthesis its own crucial moral properties. But where the nature of ambivalence 
suggests that neither deontological nor utilitarian moral principles are adequate by 
themselves to describe the full range of the human moral experience, a synthesis 
between them allows each to brings its own independent value, while itself only 
being fully realised by the value of the other. Within such a synthesis, the two types 
of moral property would thus remain different, but they would no longer be divided.  
It is this understanding of morality, in which the traditional boundaries 
between deontological and utilitarian are largely dissolved, that would, I argue, offer 
to moral philosophy a more complete and accurate theory of human morality that is 
not constrained by either the values or the deficiencies of just one moral position. It 
is also a theory that is truly different to those that simply defend one course of action 
or another, and to those that have united utilitarian and deontological properties to 
some extent, but ultimately on the basis or terminology of either one position or the 
other.  I theorise that a true synthesis between the two, like the one just described, 
would go a significantly further way towards ending the perpetual oscillation between 
them, and argue that this in turn could more effectively inform institutions responsible 
for preserving the necessary freedom of choice, such as individual autonomy22. 
There is one last point to note about this idea of synthesis. This is that the 
argument for the mutually informing nature of deontology and utilitarianism might be 
accused of containing an obvious saltrus in demonstrando, in that just because two 
                                                 
22 Naturally, both courses of action would also be defended independently, even thought this is not 
the main aim of the synthesis. But despite it not being the main aim, this is important too, given that 
ultimately in situations such as the Parental Predicament there will come a point at which either 
course of action will be taken - and there can be no ‘middle-ground’ between deciding to end a 
pregnancy, and deciding to continue it. As essential as I believe a synthesis between deontological 
and utilitarian moral concerns to be, it is, for that reason, just as important that those decisions are 
protected – and I do believe that the synthesis provides this protection, by default of its arguing for the 
reasonableness of both. 
 25 
positions limit each other, this does not necessarily mean that they validate each 
other. But this mutual validation is precisely the aspect of the relationship between 
deontology and utilitarianism that I aim to develop in this thesis. I believe that this is 
possible, and that it is the relationship already demonstrated by the mutual limiting of 
the two types of value that strongly suggests it, as I argued above. Finally, I argue 
that this relationship for the mutual validation between deontological and utilitarian 
properties of morality can in fact be built on the basis of their shared 
reasonableness, and that the work of Henry Sidgwick provides this very model, in his 
theory of Rational Benevolence. 
 
0.5.  Henry Sidgwick, and the ‘Diversity of Methods’ 
 
In 1874, a Fellow of Trinity College Cambridge and lecturer in classics published a 
book in which he aimed to address the great variety of principles, codes, values, and 
beliefs that comprise the moral decision making of ordinary people. The book was 
The Methods of Ethics23. Its author was Henry Sidgwick. Vast in scope and 
meticulous in its investigations, The Methods was instantly received as a classic24. It 
is to this day recognised both as a masterpiece in its own right, and as one of the 
most seminal works in 19th and 20th Century western philosophy. At the time of its 
publication, Sidgwick was just thirty-six years old25.  
 For as long as Sidgwick has been a presence in moral philosophy, he has 
almost unanimously been considered to be a utilitarian – a classical utilitarian, in 
fact, in the tradition of Bentham and Mill26. Sidgwick’s work certainly followed theirs 
                                                 
23 References to The Methods throughout the thesis are abbreviated to ‘ME’, and all references are to 
the 7th edition of The Methods (1907) unless otherwise indicated by a number appearing after ME. 
The only exception to this is where reference is made to ME’s various prefaces, where it will appear 
as ‘ME: x’, for example. Direct citation of ME appears in the volume’s own roman numeral and page 
number format, i.e. I:III:33. 
24 Even most of its critics admitted that it was exceptional for its depth, breadth, and attention to detail. 
See Hastings Rashdall ‘Professor Sidgwick’s Utilitarianism’, in, Mind (1885) Vol.10, No.38 (1885) 200-
226; James Seth, ‘The Ethical System of Henry Sidgwick’ in Mind, Vol.10, No.38 (1901) 172-187, and 
in particular C.D. Broad Five Types of Ethical Theory (Paterson, N.J: Littlefield Adams, 1930). 
25 The Methods was not Sidgwick’s only work, although it is certainly his magnum opus. Sidgwick was 
a political theorist and a social reformer, as well as an economist, an active member of debates on 
sexual politics and the rights of women, and a devotee of parapsychology. He wrote Principles of 
Political Economy (London: Macmillan and Co.) in 1883, The Elements of Politics (London: Macmillan 
and Co.) in 1891, and Practical Ethics (London: S. Sonnonschein) in 1898, among a huge amount of 
other articles and essays.    
26 R.M. Hare, Richard Brandt, William Frankena, John Rawls, Alasdair MacIntyre, Peter Singer, and 
Brad Hooker are just a few of the important theorists who believe Sidgwick to be a utilitarian, although 
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in terms of chronological order of influential works in this area of moral philosophy, 
and given Sidgwick’s self-confessed alignment with Bentham on the definition of 
utilitarianism, his utilitarian status is entirely understandable27. Epistemologically 
speaking, Sidgwick was an intuitionist - and this intuitionism too is thought to be 
utilitarian in nature28. However, a cursory reading of the prefaces to the first two 
editions of ME, and of ME’s introduction itself, reveals something that should give 
immediate pause to the trend of simply labelling Sidgwick a utilitarian. This is 
Sidgwick’s expressly made point that he is beginning his investigations in ME not 
from one position in particular that he will then defend, but precisely from a position 
of disinterested impartiality29.   
                                                 
some of them do add caveats to that definition. An outline of utilitarian and other readings of Sidgwick 
appears in brief below, and in full in the next chapter.  
27 Sidgwick’s moral theory can also generally be described as a dictate to aim at the general 
happiness, and on this basis too it is entirely reasonable that Sidgwick is interpreted to be a utilitarian. 
I do not specifically dispute here that he is a utilitarian of sorts. I do, however, argue that he should 
not be exclusively classed as a utilitarian, and that his utilitarianism is only established on a very 
specific and deontological basis. I make the outline case for this below – and in the thesis overall.  
28 See David Phillips, Sidgwickian Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2011), Thomas Hurka, 
British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to Ewing (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2014); Antony 
Skelton, Henry ‘Sidgwick’s Moral Epistemology’, in, Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol.48, No.4 
(2010) 491-519 and ‘Sidgwick’s Philosophical Intuitions’, in, Ethics and Politics, Vol.10, No.2 (2008) 
185-209; D.D. Raphael, ‘Sidgwick on Intuitionism’, in, The Monist, Vol.58, No.3 (1974) 405-419; 
Robert Audi, The Good in the Right (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 2004).  
Intuitionism, which generally holds that that moral propositions are self-evident and capable of being 
apprehended without reference to a process of reasoning, was among the dominant forms of moral 
epistemology from the 1700s (to the 1930s). But it is probably Sidgwick who entrenched it as a 
‘method of ethics’, listing it as he did with the two other main methods, hedonistic utilitarianism and 
rational egoism. For Sidgwick, intuitionism is integral to how we come to know the moral principles 
that make up the ‘morality of common sense’, but Sidgwick’s use of intuitionism is wide, varied, and 
sometimes inconsistent. Sometimes he argues that moral truths can be directly intuited, at other times 
he is mistrustful of such intuitions, and argues that they must be scientifically examined, and 
systemised. Intuitionism also appears in his accounts of all three ethical methods (common sense 
morality, utilitarianism, and rational egoism) and provides the means through which Sidgwick 
ultimately takes the step of arguing for congruence between at least two of those methods, as I will be 
arguing here.  
Further to this point that Sidgwick deduced more than one moral principle from intuitionism, Phillip 
Stratton-Lake points out that ethical pluralism, in which there is an ‘irreducible plurality of basic moral 
principles’ with no principle taking precedence over another, is often considered to be a feature of 
intuitionism - but because not all intuitionists are pluralists he discounts it from his formal definition 
(Stratton-Lake, Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2002). The two 
intuitionists who he references for evidence of this non-pluralism are G.E. Moore, and Sidgwick. It is 
not my primary aim in this thesis to directly expound the details of Sidgwick’s intuitionism, but I do 
disagree with Stratton-Lake on this point. Sidgwick’s personal account of the development of his 
ethical view (see below) very clearly shows Sidgwick accepting two fundamental intuitions – one 
deontological and one utilitarian – which were to become the central pillars of his moral theory. On 
this basis I also disagree with Phillips’ and Hurka’s interpretations of Sidgwick’s intuitionism as being 
purely utilitarian. See below, and the literature review.   
29 See Sidgwick’s claim in the first preface that ME is ‘an examination, at once expository and critical, 
of the different methods of obtaining reasoned convictions as to what ought to be done’ (ME: v), and 
the later passage, “I have wished to put aside temporarily the urgent need wShich we all feel of 
finding and adopting the true method of determining what we ought to do; and to consider simply what 
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This impartiality on Sidgwick’s part as regards an ethical system is itself 
important to the claim I will be making throughout the thesis that Sidgwick should not 
simply be considered a utilitarian, as it is this that I believe leaves room for Sidgwick 
to present not just one moral theory that he was aiming all along to endorse, but one 
that actually seemed to develop naturally from his investigations into the various 
methods. But it is also important for emphasising Sidgwick’s real motivation for 
writing ME, which accords directly with my starting premise of moral ambivalence. 
Sidgwick began ME from his observation that there is a plurality of moral principles 
employed by individuals, and these principles seem to be relevant either at different 
times or at once, and that they often conflict, both for individuals and between 
them30. There is, Sidgwick remarks, a ‘diversity of methods, applied in ordinary 
thought’ (I:I:6). Sidgwick mentions this existence of varying and conflicting moral 
principles repeatedly throughout the introduction, with phrases such as ‘the varieties 
of human conduct’ (I:I:2), ‘the diversity of answers which we find manifestly declared’ 
(I:I:6), ‘…the unphilosophic man is apt to hold different principles at once, and to 
apply different methods in more or less confused combination’ (I:I:6), ‘different views 
of the ultimate reasonableness of conduct’ (I:I:6), ‘the different practical principles’ 
(I:I:6), ‘men commonly seem to guide themselves by a mixture of different methods’ 
(I:I:12), and, perhaps most significantly, ‘the original vagueness and ambiguity which 
lurks in the fundamental notions of our common practical reasonings’ (I:I:13)31. All of 
these principles are, Sidgwick says, at one time or another ‘satisfactory to the 
common sense of mankind’, but only, he notes, ‘as long as they have the field to 
themselves’ (I:I:14). He summarises these observations on the last page of the 
introduction with a striking series of questions, clearly intended to invoke 
                                                 
conclusions will be rationally reached if we start with certain ethical premises” (ME: vi). He also claims 
at various points throughout the introduction (I:I:12, 13, 14), that his only aim is to expound as clearly 
as possible ‘the different methods of ethics”, that he found “implicit in our common sense reasoning”. 
See also the preface to the second edition, where Sidgwick reasserts the fact, in the face of his critics 
(presumably F.H. Bradley) that he is not writing ‘as an assailant of two of the methods…and a 
defender of the third’ (ME: x). The significance of this originally intended neutrality – and the move 
away from it Sidgwick made in order to give his own moral theory, is discussed in chapter 4. 
30 During the period in which The Methods appeared, philosophy – both academic and popular – was 
highly confused. The outline as to why has already been given above in the discussion of the origins 
of the divide in moral philosophy: Kant’s theory of absolute moral principles and duties had clashed 
dramatically with Bentham and Mill’s positing of outcome of action being the only measure of moral 
value. Within this existing melee, other related issues – such as hedonism itself, egoism, rational 
egoism, intuitionism and virtue - were also being debated. Sidgwick wrote in direct response to this 
academic confusion, as well as the confusion in lived experience, and it is for this careful clarification 
and systemisation that ME was held in such esteem at its publication, and for a long time after.  
31 See also I:VIII:100-102 for the idea that all of these approaches are included in our ‘reasonings’. 
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introspection on the part of the reader: 'When I am asked, “Do you not consider it 
ultimately reasonable to seek pleasure and avoid pain?”, "Do you not intuitively 
pronounce some actions to be right and others wrong?”, “Do you not acknowledge 
the general happiness to be a paramount end?” “I answer ‘yes’”, he says, “to all 
these questions. My difficulty begins when I have to choose between them…’ 
(I:I:14)32.  
 There is then one primary raison d’etre for Sidgwick’s writing of ME, and it is 
not his desire to defend utilitarianism. It is, quite simply, the situation common to the 
experience of all people - of moral ambivalence33. 
 
0.5.a. Sidgwick’s Argument for Dual Reasonableness, and the Hope for 
Synthesis 
 
Firstly then, Sidgwick is relevant to my arguments about moral ambivalence because 
he makes the very same points about there being more than one moral principle that 
seems to have a degree of truth, and yet these principles often conflict with or even 
directly contradict each other. But Sidgwick is relevant to the arguments made above 
in an even more significant way. This is that he argues the cause of the confusion to 
lie in the fact that these diverse principles all seem to have a claim to being 
simultaneously reasonable. He begins the introduction by defining ‘a Method of 
Ethics’ as any rational procedure by which we determine what individual human 
                                                 
32 He gives this answer from his own point of view, but it is clear that he believes himself, even as a 
philosopher, to represent all people on this point.  
33 Sidgwick’s concern was with how philosophy was to go on in a climate in which definitions and 
theories of morality, the discussions over its dictates and nature, the apparent rightness or wrongness 
of all of them, and the experience of the ordinary human being were so utterly disordered. Appearing 
amongst the midst of the voices, theories, viewpoints and theorists all clamouring for prominence at 
this time, a visual impression that we might have from the first few pages of The Methods is of 
Sidgwick wading in to the fray, holding his hands up for everyone to just be quiet for a moment. 
For the task he had set himself of untangling this confusion of methods and principles, Sidgwick was 
ideal. As an academic and as a man, he tended to labour under the permanent conviction that there 
would always be another viewpoint, or another opinion, that might need to be considered. As his 
brother-in-law Arthur Balfour said: “Of all the men I have known, he was the readiest to consider every 
controversy and every controversialist on their merits. He never claimed authority; he never sought to 
impose his views; he never argued for victory; he never evaded an issue.” (Sidgwick and Sidgwick, 
1906: p. 311) See also the mission statement of The Sidgwick Society, set up in 1983 by Marcus 
Singer, which states itself to have been founded out of admiration for the character of Henry Sidgwick 
and the way he practiced philosophical inquiry: Careful, cautious contemplation, considering all points 
and every possibility, along with his resolute aim at truth and clarity, and clarified understanding” (in, 
Marcus Singer’s introduction to Sidgwick’s Essays on Ethics and Methods (Marcus Singer, (ed.), 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2000), p. x.  
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beings ‘ought’ – or what it is ‘right’ for them – to do’ (I:I:1), and the language of 
‘reasonable’ appears with noticeable frequency throughout the chapter (for example: 
“when a man asks ‘why he should do’ anything, he commonly assumes in himself a 
determination to pursue whatever conduct may be shown…to be reasonable’ (I:I:5), 
‘the common practical reasoning of men generally’ (I:I:6), ‘rational ultimate ends’ 
(I:I:9), ‘our common moral reasoning’ (I:I:14))34.  
On closer inspection however, Sidgwick points out, the methods themselves are 
actually quite different.  There is the Intuitional view, which Sidgwick defines as the 
position that holds moral rightness to lie in unconditional duties which are binding 
without qualification and without regard to ulterior consequences (I:I:3,8; see also 
I:VIII:98, 100); the view that rules are valid so far as their observance is conducive to 
general happiness (I:I:8); and the view that the proper end of individual action is 
private happiness (I:I:10). These three views essentially represent the three main 
‘methods’ of ethics, that between them cause the confusion Sidgwick observes. 
Quite clearly, the first two viewpoints represent the deontological and utilitarian 
positions respectively, that were outlined above35. But despite the differences, these 
positions still, for Sidgwick, share that common denominator of appearing to be 
reasonable. This is absolutely crucial to the arguments that Sidgwick will go on to 
develop throughout ME – for it is within what actions can be called reasonable that 
Sidgwick gives his definition of rightness. Further to this, and even more significantly, 
when Sidgwick first specifically discusses what is meant by ‘right’ he does not 
immediately give a traditionally consequentialist-utilitarian definition of ‘fit to an 
ulterior end’ (I:III:26). In fact, he initially negatively defines rightness in the distinctly 
un-utilitarian terms as not simply fit to an ulterior end. For Sidgwick, rightness 
                                                 
34 As Sidgwick himself would admit much later, the question of conflicting reasons – of different 
principles that seemed nonetheless to be equally right - never left his mind as a philosopher. See also 
J.B. Schneewind for his elucidation of Sidgwick’s starting point that ‘we have a unique, irreducible 
concept of ‘being a reason for’, as it applies to desire and action’ (Schneewind, Sidgwick’s Ethics and 
Victorian Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1977) 303-4. 
35 The last method is egoism, or rational egoism, to give it the full name Sidgwick assigned to it. 
Egoism was to prove the greatest challenge to Sidgwick’s notion that moral principles could possibly 
be assimilated. For Sidgwick, what it is ultimately rational to do appeared to apply just as much to 
individuals aiming at their own happiness, as it does to aiming at the general happiness. This problem 
became known as the Dualism of Practical Reason (hereafter DoPR) and it infamously dogged 
Sidgwick for most of the rest of his life. See below for a brief discussion of the DoPR, and why it is 
legitimate to ignore it for the purposes of my argument in this thesis. Also see below for my 
justification of the link between Sidgwick’s definition of ‘Intuitionism’ in this sense, and the 
deontological position.  
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actually lies in what can be proven to be ultimately rational – in either certain moral 
duties thought to be unconditional and thus intrinsically right in themselves, or in 
certain ends that can similarly be proven to be ultimately rational. But both of these 
cases – certain actions or certain ends – share that non-consequentialist basis of 
rightness. Here, Sidgwick’s definition of right as being that which is reasonable 
actually accords very closely with Kant’s strictly deontological argument for the 
relationship between rightness and Reason36. And Sidgwick agrees further with Kant 
that the recognition of something as ultimately reasonable will, for rational creatures, 
naturally bring about the impulse to pursue it; that is, it incurs an ‘ought’37. The 
pursuit of what is recognised to be ultimately rational thus becomes, for Sidgwick, an 
unconditional categorical imperative – and in this takes on the quality of rightness as 
Sidgwick understands it. Of course Sidgwick differs from Kant in ascribing the 
categorical imperative not just to certain moral actions (duties), but to the adoption of 
certain ends, also considered to be ultimately rational, such as the Universal Good, 
or ‘Happiness’38. But in both cases, he says, we do not ‘get rid of the dictate of 
reason’ (I:III:36). That is, Sidgwick attributes reasonableness, and ultimately 
                                                 
36 I am following Sidgwick’s lead in capitalising ‘Reason’ here (and throughout the thesis), in order to 
make clear that this term refers to the faculty that is essential for determining moral conduct, as 
Sidgwick describes it.  
Sidgwick justifies his use of ‘Reason’, and its relationship to ‘rightness’ that I am also assuming in this 
thesis, at I:III:34. He states here that does not mean to prejudge that all moral judgements are derived 
from a process of reasoning, or universal principles, admitting that we often deal with moral situations 
on a more case by case basis. However, according to Sidgwick this implies the ‘moral sense’, which 
in turn suggests ‘feelings’ - and feelings cannot truly be in error, objectively speaking, however much 
they may vary from person to person. Sidgwick therefore elects to use ‘Reason’ to ‘denote the faculty 
of moral cognition’ (I:III:34). This faculty tends to generate general rules, to which individuals appeal 
when our moral judgements are confused, unclear, or conflicted. ‘Reason’ is thus the mechanism 
through which we discern what it is ‘right’ to do (see I:III:35). 
37 For the full discussion of the relationship between Sidgwick’s work and Kant’s, see chapter 2. 
38 There is, however, is evidence to suggest that actually this might not be so ‘obviously’ un-Kantian 
as it might first appear. Kant’s definition of ‘highest good’ is also ‘happiness’, but only, he stipulates, 
as conceived by rational agents (Critique of Pure Reason,1781 6:5-7). As will be seen in chapter 2, 
Sidgwick is extremely specific about the establishment of Happiness as a rational end, and about how 
it is only this prior establishment of ultimately rational ends that can make the means to those ends in 
any way ‘right’. Where they do differ is that the pursuit of Happiness is not for Kant an additional duty, 
but simply the sum of all other duties (Critique of Pure Reason, 1781: 6:5). The emphasis on 
unconditionality, and the relationship between that and the ‘ought’ of moral duty, in Sidgwick’s 
definition of rightness forms a significant part of my argument made in chapter 2 that Sidgwick could 
be called a deontologist to some extent. There has also been some literature – the work, for example, 
of Mariko Nakano-Okuno (‘Sidgwick and Kant’: On the So-Called Discrepancies Between Utilitarian 
and Kantian Ethics’, in, P. Buculo, R.Crisp, and B. Schultz (eds.) Henry Sidgwick: Happiness and 
Religion (Catania: Catania University Press: 2007) 260-332) - arguing for greater similarities between 
Sidgwick and Kant than might commonly be assumed. This literature provides important support for 
my argument that Kantian ideas have a distinct influence in Sidgwick’s work, but the argument has 
not yet been made that Sidgwick could actually, on these grounds, technically be called a deontologist 
(or even a Kantian), or attention drawn to the specifically Kantian basis of his utilitarianism.   
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rightness to both deontological and utilitarian considerations39. This strong emphasis 
on Reason, and the subsequent dual ‘rightness’, will be at the heart of Sidgwick’s 
own moral theory.  
When outlining in I:I the approach he has decided to take to the methods of 
ethics, Sidgwick states that ‘we cannot regard as valid reasonings which conflict’, 
and that ‘two conflicting rules of action cannot both be reasonable’. Sidgwick is right 
that this would not seem to conform to the definition of ‘reasoning’. He also 
postulates that when two methods conflict, one or the other must be modified or 
rejected (I:I:6). But Sidgwick does also consider another possibility.  He 
acknowledges that we tend to feel some need to harmonise these alternatives 
between which – so far as they cannot be reconciled – the human mind 
seems…forced to choose’, and that mentally at least, the human mind itself will 
attempt a synthesis (I:I:12) between these practical maxims. The result is usually a 
‘confused blending, or a forced and premature reconciliation’, and writers who have 
attempted such systems have usually ‘proceeded…without adequate analysis’40. 
Although Sidgwick denies that he will be attempting an actual solution to the 
difficulties and conflicts between the methods, he does express two points of hope 
pertaining to this idea. The first is that he hopes to ‘afford aid towards the 
construction of such a system’; the second is that ‘we cannot but hope that all 
methods may ultimately coincide’ (I:I:14). And these passages appear alongside 
Sidgwick’s language of reconciliation, and synthesis. Where Sidgwick did not see 
grounds for reconciliation, this was between egoism and the other two methods. As 
for the deontological and the utilitarian positions however, Sidgwick will not, in the 
end, divide them on the basis of their shared appeal to Reason - but actually unite 
them on that very basis, in his own moral theory. It is my view therefore that 
Sidgwick’s hope for these apparently valid and yet conflicting reasonings to 
                                                 
39 In Sidgwick’s final work before his death in 1900, Practical Ethics, he gives a particularly 
illuminating statement regarding his view of Reason, and its primary role in establishing moral 
obligation: “Moralists of all schools have acknowledged….that broad agreement [reason] in the details 
of morality…Well, my view is that we ought to start with this broad agreement as to the dictates of 
duty…the first principles on which duty may be constructed as a rational system, to make this general 
agreement somewhat more explicit and clear than it is in ordinary thought…” (Sidgwick, Practical 
Ethics, pp. 6-7). 
40 Nor, Sidgwick points out, have attempts to disguise the differences worked; this tends to result in 
nothing more but heightened controversy later on. As Sidgwick succinctly summarises, ‘Thus we get 
on the one hand vague and hazy reconciliation, on the other loose and random exaggeration of 
discrepancies; and neither process is effective to dispel the original vagueness and ambiguity which 
lurks in the fundamental notions of our common practical reasonings’ (I:I:13) 
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ultimately coincide is actually fulfilled, and that it is embodied in his theory of Rational 
Benevolence.  
 
 
0.5.b. ‘The truth lies between these two conclusions’: Sidgwick’s Moral Theory 
of Rational Benevolence  
 
It is clear then from even I:III that Sidgwick has a very definite understanding of what 
is right. If we then follow the progression of ME, a process other than an 
investigation into what people do do and think begins to emerge – a process in which 
Sidgwick begins to argue for what people ought to do. That is, ME does – despite 
Sidgwick’s original claim to impartiality– actually contain a normative moral theory41. 
This is brought about by Sidgwick perceiving there to be that fundamental 
connection between those deontological principles and utilitarian principles, which is 
established by his argument that both types of principle are ultimately rational. I have 
already stated that this fundamental connection is at the centre of Sidgwick’s moral 
theory, but the construction of that theory – i.e. the process that leads to Rational 
Benevolence - is also important. In I:III it is seen that Sidgwick believes the moral 
cognition of Reason to generate general rules, or moral obligations. In I:VIII, 
Sidgwick then draws out what he considers to be the three forms of the Intuitional 
method, the second of which – dogmatic Intuitionism – represents that collection of 
rules (also understood to represent the deontological position, and also called the 
morality of common sense)42. These rules are not, however, by themselves 
adequate to provide a full system of moral guidance. This is firstly because those 
                                                 
41 What is meant by ‘moral theory’ here is a set of statements or principles used to explain moral 
standards, and/or a system of guidance for implementing those standards. The explanatory capacity 
of a moral theory pertains mainly to meta-ethical theories, and the guidance capacity to normative 
theories. I project that Rational Benevolence qualifies under both of these types, although the aim of 
the thesis is mainly to develop the meta-ethical aspect, rather than the normative. The normative 
value of Rational Benevolence is, however, briefly explored in the thesis conclusion.  
42 It is here that we see Sidgwick’s direct connection between dogmatic Intuitionism, or common-
sense morality, and his identification of the Intuitional method as representing the deontological 
position. Sidgwick unambiguously states at I:VIII:98 that he takes the ‘distinguishing characteristic of 
the Intuitional method’ to be that there are ‘certain kinds of actions unconditionally prescribed without 
regard to ulterior consequences’ (which obviously delineates this position from the utilitarian position). 
My argument that Intuitionism in ME represents a deontological (and often recognisably Kantian) 
position, and my subsequent point that this type of Intuitionism (represented by a capital ‘I’) is actually 
a crucial part of Sidgwick’s own epistemic intuitionism (represented by a small ‘i’), appear in chapter 
2. The need to delineate these two uses of intuitionism in this way is explained below. 
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rules still only make up ‘an accidental aggregate of precepts, which stands in need 
some rational synthesis’, but – more seriously – it is because they are not actually 
self-evident. That is, they are not ultimately rational first principles43. For this reason, 
they do not incur an ‘ought’, and are not ‘right’ in the absolute sense that Sidgwick 
means by that term. 
Having drawn this rather gloomy conclusion, Sidgwick then states – in a passage 
that is highly revealing of the direction in which his theory is going to go - that in the 
search for ultimately valid and true moral principles ‘we shall find, I think, that the 
truth lies between…two conclusions. There are certain absolute practical principles, 
the truth of which…is manifest; but they are of too abstract a nature, and too 
universal in their scope, to enable us to ascertain by immediate application of them 
what we ought to do…; particular duties have still to be determined by some other 
method’ (III:XIII:379)44. Next, in a chapter entitled ‘Philosophical Intuitionism’ (which 
was the type of epistemological intuitionism Sidgwick predicted would be necessary 
in the end), Sidgwick turns his attention to what can actually be called self-evident – 
to what can be called ‘right’ in the absolute sense. It is important to note here that he 
does not simply abandon the idea of Intuitionism’s self-evident principles. The first of 
Sidgwick’s own self-evident principles is an inverted form of Kant’s universalising 
maxim, which Sidgwick calls the principle of Justice. Being self-evident, ultimately 
rational, and therefore wholly self-sufficient for its own justification, Justice is, I 
argue, a non-consequentialist principle. Into the foundational framework of Justice, 
Sidgwick then adds the logical progression to the self-evident principle of Prudence, 
which holds that it is only rational for individuals to aim at the whole of their good, 
rather than just one part of it. Again, given that this is an ultimately self-evident 
principle, Prudence is also non-consequentially right without further reference to 
anything else. Finally, Sidgwick deduces that if our own individual good, at which it is 
rational to aim, is a sum of parts, then the general good, which is a sum of the parts 
of all individuals, is also therefore an end at which it is rational to aim (III:XIII:379- 
382).  This ultimately rational general good thus incurs an ‘ought’, and becomes – as 
                                                 
43 As will be seen in chapters 2 and 4, Sidgwick believes Kant’s original universalising maxim to be at 
fault here.  
Sidgwick disputes the self-evidence of Intuitionism’s/common sense morality’s principles in Book III 
via an eleven-chapter investigation into those rules, and argues in the end that only Justice, 
Prudence, and Benevolence truly admit of being ultimately rational, and therefore self-evident.     
44 It is almost universally agreed that this ‘other method’ would be utilitarianism. I will be arguing 
against this view that utilitarianism is simply superimposed over common sense morality.  
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per Sidgwick’s earlier definition of ought and right – a categorical imperative, 
represented by the maxim of Benevolence (also called Universal Benevolence)45. 
Defined as ‘each one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as 
much as his own’, Benevolence is clearly a utilitarian principle. However, it is crucial 
to note that Sidgwick has established Benevolence on the basis of principles which 
can be seen to be predominantly non-consequentialist and thus deontological in 
nature - and that this is the only way that Benevolence can be fully rationally 
supported. That is, Sidgwick required these particular grounds in order to derive the 
utilitarian principle. Furthermore, as an ultimately rational end Benevolence itself is a 
non-consequentialist moral obligation, or duty, because – like Justice and Prudence - 
being ultimately rational it does not pertain to anything further46. It is in this way that 
Sidgwick’s moral theory ‘lies between the two conclusions’ of self-evident 
deontological principles, and the utilitarian principle. His theory includes at once a 
distinct deontological aspect, and a distinct utilitarian aspect, both of which share the 
validity given by ultimate rationality, and both of which are crucial to a full 
understanding of Universal Benevolence. More specifically then, this Benevolence – 
and this moral theory - is more appropriately represented by the term ‘Rational 
Benevolence’.  
 
 
0.5.c. Reconciliation in Sidgwick: Rational Benevolence as a Synthesis 
between Deontology and Utilitarianism 
                                                 
45 Sidgwick capitalises the form of ‘Benevolence’ that is a self-evident principle, that emerges from his 
process of deducing truly rational principles that I have just outlined. For that reason, I will also 
capitalise Benevolence throughout the thesis. Sidgwick sometimes uses Benevolence 
interchangeably with ‘Universal Good’, and for the same reasons ‘Universal Good’ will also be 
capitalised. Otherwise, ‘good’ is not capitalised. This also follows Sidgwick’s example.   
In terms of quite what Sidgwick means by this general good, he later defines it as ‘Happiness’ 
(III:XIV:391-407). Sidgwick is not always consistent about capitalising ‘Happiness’, but for the most 
part it seems as though he capitalises it when it is discussed as being the end of the maxim of 
Benevolence. Happiness will therefore usually be capitalised throughout the thesis, to represent the 
idea that it is a rational, ultimate end, as I will argue in chapter 3.  
46 As was outlined above, duty is defined here as the non-consequentialist position, in order to avoid 
the confusion that might arise between deontologically conceived duties, and utilitarian type duties. It 
is important to note that by ‘duty’, Sidgwick is referring to the non-consequentialist position. To say 
that ‘duty’ can apply just as much to utilitarian principles is actually not an entirely inaccurate 
representation of Sidgwick’s final position on moral obligation. However, I do not think that this is the 
view of duty from which Sidgwick begins in ME, or the one that he uses to establish his moral theory 
in the first place. In fact, I will argue in the thesis that his theory of moral obligation is based on a 
notion of duty, or ‘ought’, that is unconditionally and categorically prescribed through Reason without 
regard to ulterior consequences. Chapter 2 will argue this in detail. 
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I argued in the first half of this introduction that the most effective and suitable way to 
address the problem of moral ambivalence would be to develop a theory that shows 
both absolute-principle-based (deontological) and outcome-based (utilitarian) moral 
principles to be reasonable, and that the most effective way to do this is to show that 
they are actually inherently connected, in a mutually informing synthesis. I have 
given the outline as to how Sidgwick includes rational deontological moral properties 
and rational utilitarian properties together in his moral theory of Rational 
Benevolence, but it must now also be theorised as to how these principles might be 
mutually informing, as per the definition of synthesis given above. A brief overview of 
the case for the synthesis is as follows47. 
Firstly, I argue that the Benevolence in Rational Benevolence rests on prior, 
fundamental, and non-consequentialist principles – represented by Justice and 
Prudence. It is the logical connection between these principles that then also 
logically yields the utilitarian principle of Universal Benevolence. In fact, Sidgwick 
states Rational Benevolence to be the rational basis – the proof – of utilitarianism, 
without which utilitarianism is lacking the crucial, unconditional ‘ought’ which makes it 
right, on Sidgwick’s understanding of that concept48. This language of proof may 
appear to elevate the deontological properties above utilitarian ones, or, 
alternatively, create the impression that once utilitarianism has been derived from 
deontological properties it can then be held up as the ultimate moral theory, which is 
now ‘proven’. It is true that the utilitarian principle is derived from other principles – 
and it is true that those principles provide the rational basis that Sidgwick thought to 
be required for the utilitarian system. But it is not the case, I argue, that utilitarianism 
simply ‘trumps’ those principles. This is for two reasons. The first is that without 
those principles retaining their non-consequentialist properties, the utilitarian 
principle could not be established in the first place. It would be detrimental to 
utilitarianism therefore for that principle to try and simply supersede Justice and 
Prudence. Secondly, instead of the utilitarian principle of Universal Benevolence 
                                                 
47 Obviously it is the remit of the main thesis to fully develop this argument, but identifying the basic 
stages of the argument creates in turn a series of stages through which it – and the thesis – will need 
to pass, in order to present a persuasive case for Rational Benevolence as a synthesis. These stages 
appear below, where the structure of the thesis is given.  
48 Sidgwick considers this version of proof to be that which even Mill’s doctrine still lacked, despite 
Mill’s attempt to identify it. See chapter 4. 
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overriding the other two principles, it actually contextualises them. As was seen in 
Sidgwick’s claim that ‘the truth lies between these two conclusions’, there are certain 
absolute principles, the truth of which is manifest - but they require systemisation by 
another, more specific principle. It is in this way that the mutually informing synthesis 
is truly created. Where the deontological properties of Justice and Prudence are 
indispensable to the establishment of utilitarianism, utilitarianism gives those two 
principles full meaning, as part of a comprehensive moral theory. Deontological 
principles provide the proof of utilitarian ones, and those utilitarian ones fully support 
and validate the deontological principles. I argue that this result is a circularly 
interdependent relationship in which neither moral property is complete without 
reference to the other – and in which morality is neither wholly deontological (which 
might be the interpretation if we only see that utilitarianism is derived from a 
deontological basis), nor wholly utilitarian (which might be the interpretation if we 
only see that that utilitarianism then confirms the role of the deontological principles). 
The two types of moral property are not, however, simply the same. As well as each 
being informed by the other, they both also retain their own respective deontological 
or utilitarian identities; without this degree of distinctiveness, neither property can 
provide the support needed for the other, and both collapse. Thus, deontological and 
utilitarian properties are fully reconciled in an inextricable way, within this mutually 
informing and dynamic relationship. Both have value, both are ultimately reasonable, 
both look to the other for validation – and both are seen to be vital to the 
establishment of Sidgwick’s theory of Rational Benevolence. 
 
0.6.  Sidgwick as a Deontological/Utilitarian Intuitionist, and the Personal 
Document 
 
There have now emerged two major claims that are central to my overall argument 
that Sidgwick developed a synthesis between deontological and utilitarian properties 
of morality, both of which must be addressed in order to develop that argument in 
full. The first is the as yet somewhat clandestine assertion that Sidgwick was, to a 
recognisable extent, a deontologist. I recognise that this is probably the most 
outlandish claim of the thesis. But it is, in my view, more than defensible. Sidgwick’s 
moral theory of Rational Benevolence relies on a principle of non-consequentialist 
moral obligation, and this is the understanding of moral obligation that is traditionally 
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found in the deontological school. It is true that his theory of what is right being that 
which is rational allows the notion of ‘ought’ to transcend the traditional 
deontological/utilitarian boundaries of Sidgwick’s day, but, as I will argue, Sidgwick 
does not then just attribute this ‘ought’ to the utilitarian principle, and then discard its 
deontological foundations. He maintains an independent notion of non-
consequentialist duty that is in its own right essential to Rational Benevolence – 
without that particular understanding of ‘ought’, utilitarianism cannot be established 
in the first place.  
The second claim is that Sidgwick’s utilitarianism is not in every sense as 
traditional or as classical as it is often assumed to be, and that this is crucially what 
allows, and even requires, that his utilitarianism be combined with deontological 
principles. Related to, and uniting, both of these points is the issue of Sidgwick’s 
intuitionism, which it is conducive here to use as a framework for making the wider 
argument about Sidgwick’s deontological/utilitarian moral epistemology.  
There has been, over the years, some confusion over Sidgwick’s use of 
intuitionistic terminology, given that on one hand he uses it to describe a particular 
method of ethics, and on the other uses intuitionism himself as an epistemic device. 
So prevalent was the confusion in fact, that in Five Types of Ethical Theory, C.D. 
Broad introduced the term ‘deontology’ in direct response to Sidgwick, in an attempt 
to distinguish between what Sidgwick means by ‘Intuitionism’ as a method of ethics 
and ‘intuitionism’ as an ‘epistemic principle of classification’49. Given my claim that 
an unhelpful and inaccurate divide has been maintained between deontological and 
utilitarian principles of morality, and the central claim that Sidgwick’s moral theory 
can provide some kind of solution to this, it is interesting – and even ironic – that 
those very terms, and that very distinction, should have arisen (with Broad) as a 
direct result of Sidgwick’s work. But I actually agree with Broad’s classification. For 
by ‘Intuitionism’ with a capital ‘I’ (as I propose to distinguish it) Sidgwick does indeed 
mean the traditional, non-consequentialist deontological view50. But then there is the 
issue of his own epistemic intuitionism (written with a small ‘i’). David Phillips, whose 
2011 book Sidgwickian Ethics is among today’s most incisive accounts of Sidgwick’s 
                                                 
49 Broad, Five Types, 162-163. 
50 I argue this point in full in chapter 2, but here it suffices to point out that Sidgwick describes 
Intuitionism as the view that ‘conduct is held to be right when conformed to certain precepts or 
principles of Duty, intuitively known to be unconditionally binding (I:I:3), and ‘without qualification and 
without regard to ulterior consequences’ (I:I:8)  
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own methods in ME, concisely refers to Sidgwick’s particular use of intuitionism as 
‘intuitionistic utilitarianism’51. Phillips is not alone in equating Sidgwick’s intuitionism 
exclusively with a utilitarian position; Antony Skelton also does this, as does Thomas 
Hurka. I will not in any way be disputing that Sidgwick is an intuitionist - Sidgwick is 
probably more clear that he is an intuitionist than he is anything else, and his moral 
theory is clearly intuitional, epistemologically speaking. But, as I do agree that 
intuitionism is indeed Sidgwick’s main moral epistemological method, my claim that 
there is a significant deontological element in Sidgwick’s moral theory would mean 
claiming that his intuitionism is also partly deontological – and this is precisely what I 
claim. That is, I dispute that his intuitionism is only utilitarian. Sidgwick’s own 
epistemic intuitionism, that informs his theory of moral obligation, is, on my view, 
actually itself derived from the deontological, Kantian terms with which he defines 
Intuitionism as the deontological-based method of ethics. For that reason, his wider 
epistemic ‘intuitionism’ sometimes closely accords with his ‘Intuitionism’, understood 
more narrowly as representing the deontological method - and this is where I believe 
the confusion to have arisen52.  
I do not believe that this view (that Sidgwick’s Intuitionism is also Sidgwick’s 
intuitionism) has been fully considered. Phillips has argued, rightly, that that 
confusion is due to Sidgwick’s using the term to represent two interpretations of 
‘intuitionism’ (as a representation of a particular method of ethics, and the epistemic). 
Sidgwick does do this in places, but according to Phillips there is no other connection 
between the two uses. But it is more than possible to argue from ME, as I will do in 
chapter 2, for Intuitionism as representing a traditionally deontological, and even 
Kantian, position; it is also possible in ME to argue for that relationship between 
                                                 
51 Phillips, Sidgwickian Ethics, p. 11 
52 I do agree with Broad’s point that there needs to be a certain amount of delineation between, as 
David Phillips would say, the ‘moral theoretic and the epistemic’ usages of intuitionist terminology by 
Sidgwick in the later stages of ME, and it is for this reason that I propose using the upper-case/lower-
case ‘I’s, as Sidgwick himself does. It is clear at times that Sidgwick believes all three main methods 
in ME (Utilitarianism, Egoism and Intuitionism) to be informed by intuition, whereas his term 
‘Intuitionism’ is intended to only refer to one particular method (the non-consequentialist 
deontological), and this has confused matters. As Sidgwick himself admits in ‘Professor Calderwood 
On Intuitionism in Morals’ (Mind, Vol.1, No.4 (1876) 563-566) he found it very difficult to define 
intuitionism in an adequately ‘useful’ way; simply stating that ‘moral principles are intuitively known’ 
did not, for Sidgwick, distinguish Intuitionism clearly enough from Utilitarianism (p.564). However, it is 
my view that some of the confusion has arisen due to the fact that Sidgwick’s ‘intuitionism’ actually 
shares a fundamental principle with his ‘Intuitionism’. I outline this point here, and make the case fully 
in chapter 2.  
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‘Intuitionism’ and ‘intuitionism’, by claiming that Sidgwick’s epistemic intuitionism 
includes both deontological and utilitarian qualities.  
Admittedly, Sidgwick is not explicit in ME that it is Kant’s doctrine to which he is 
referring when he defines Intuitionism in that way - but he is explicit about Kant’s role 
in his work in another document53. This supplementary document is absolutely 
crucial to this understanding of the deontological/utilitarian character of Sidgwick’s 
intuitionism. Entitled ‘Professor Sidgwick’s Account of the Development of his Ethical 
View’, (hereafter referred to as the ‘personal document’, or ‘PD’), this 
autobiographical fragment was found among the manuscripts that Sidgwick had 
intended for publication along with the sixth edition of ME in 1901. Sidgwick died 
shortly before that publication, and as he had been for some time before his death 
unable to continue the revision of ME that he had started, he requested that pages 
277 to the end were sent to the press unchanged. This was overseen by his 
devotedly loyal student Emily E. Constance Jones, who also made the decision to 
include the fragment in the preface to the sixth edition. Jones describes the piece as 
being both ethically and historically ‘of very exceptional interest’, and she is 
absolutely right. In this enlightening little narrative, Sidgwick takes the reader through 
the process he underwent while searching for an ethical position to which he could 
truly adhere. The first ‘stop’ in this journey is at Kant’s universalising maxim, which 
provided for Sidgwick a fundamental intuition that he felt was required before even 
the utilitarian principle could be accepted. Later in the document, Sidgwick explains 
how the Kantian maxim combines with a utilitarian intuition, to create Sidgwick’s 
eventual position – an intuitionism that is comprised of both a deontological/Kantian 
principle, and a utilitarian one. He describes this position in these words: ‘I was an 
Intuitionist again, but on a utilitarian basis’54. 
                                                 
53 In fact, as Alan Donagan points out, the Intuitional method (associated with dogmatic intuitionism) 
which Sidgwick criticises in Book III, is actually likely to be Whelwell’s version of intuitionism (Alan 
Donagan, ‘Sidgwick and Whelwellian Intuitionism; Some Enigmas’, in, Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol.7, No.3 (1977) 447-465). I argue however that Sidgwick does retain the 
‘unconditionally prescribed without regard for consequences’ aspect of Intuitionism in his own moral 
theory – and that in doing so he actually uses Kant. See chapter 2.  
54 In the PD we do see that Sidgwick associates the Intuitionism that I will be arguing accords with a 
Kantian version of deontology with writers other than Kant – but when he makes the statement that he 
is ‘an Intuitionist again...’, he continues to capitalise the word, and we know from the preceding 
material in the document that the Kantian principle has provided him with that intuitionism. This forms 
part of the grounds on which I will argue that Sidgwick’s ‘Intuitionism’ with a capital ‘I’, is a crucial part 
of his epistemic ‘intuitionism’ with a small ‘i’.  
 40 
Shortly after this statement, Sidgwick declares ‘the opposition between 
Utilitarianism and Intuitionism was due to a misunderstanding…..I could find no real 
opposition between Intuitionism and Utilitarianism’ (ME: xx)55. And this, he says, was 
the state of mind in which he published his book – from the point of view that the 
common conflict between Utilitarianism and the deontological position could not only 
be discarded, but overcome in such a way that they are actually reconciled. 
The PD is, I believe, of the utmost importance for a full understanding of Sidgwick 
as a moral philosopher. It clearly demonstrates the fact that he attributes value to 
both deontological and utilitarian principles of morality, and that this informs his 
moral theory56. It supports the view that Sidgwick’s moral theory – and his 
intuitionism - could only proceed on a fundamental intuition that was Kantian in 
origin, and thus wholly supports my argument that there is a fundamental 
deontological element to Sidgwick’s theory of Rational Benevolence. It clearly shows 
the link between the non-consequentialism of the Intuitional position in Sidgwick, and 
the non-consequentialism in Sidgwick’s own epistemic intuitionism – a link that is 
created by the Kantian maxim, and that gives the grounds for my claim that part of 
Sidgwick’s ‘Intuitionism’ also appears in his ‘intuitionism’. It also provides the most 
irrefutable evidence that Sidgwick saw a fundamental relationship between 
deontological and utilitarian principles, and that on his view to divide them is a 
mistake57. Lastly, it gives good grounds on which to argue that Sidgwick should not 
simply be read as a classical utilitarian, who is confined to that field. Where he states 
in the personal document that he is a utilitarian, this is only on a very specific basis, 
and this is a deontological one58. I will, at various points throughout this thesis, 
                                                 
55 Sidgwick continues on to outline the reciprocal relationship between Utilitarianism and the Morality 
of Common Sense here, and these passages correspond directly with passages in ME itself, but I 
reserve discussion of this point for the main argument in chapter 4.  
56 The original document still exists today, in the special collection at The Wren Library at Sidgwick’s 
own Trinity College, Cambridge, complete with Sidgwick’s margin notes, written in his tiny, decorative 
handwriting. See also his correspondence with E.E.C.J herself. 
57 The claim that Sidgwick’s own moral theory is deontological to a degree obviously challenges 
Broad’s efforts to distinguish between Sidgwick’s deontological and teleological based methods. As 
noted above, Broad’s distinction contributed considerably to the divide between the two methods of 
ethics, and his application of it to ME naturally brought Sidgwick into the fold of theorists who had 
perceived, developed, and maintained this divide. The claim that Sidgwick’s own epistemic 
intuitionism retains a degree of deontology provides grounds for the thesis’ position that Sidgwick’s 
work – which is also utilitarian - is not guilty of perpetuating that divide, and that it actually goes a 
significant way towards reconciling it.  
58 So specific, in fact, is this basis, that I suggest that he should not be referred to as a ‘utilitarian’, 
given the suggestion of that label that this position must exclude him also being in part a deontologist. 
However, Sidgwick himself did not expressly dispute his utilitarian label, and it would therefore be 
presumptuous to do so here. I do maintain however that Rational Benevolence is not simply 
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theorise that he could also perhaps be described as a deontologist on a utilitarian 
basis. On my account of how Sidgwick developed this position into his moral theory 
of Rational Benevolence, either understanding is, I believe, credible.  
 
 
 
0.7. Sidgwick’s Place in History 
 
Despite the importance of the PD as a vital supplement to the arguments of ME, 
there is relatively little interest in the document. It is not entirely ignored; most 
Sidgwick scholars refer to it at some point (Bart Schultz, David Phillips, Peter Singer, 
and Antony Skelton, for example). But I maintain that its real significance for 
improving understanding of Sidgwick’s argument for the relationship between 
deontological and utilitarian properties of morality has not been fully realised. As a 
result, that argument as it appears in ME has also largely been overlooked in the 20th 
century– and other aspects of his work have been emphasised instead. Here, I first 
suggest the possible reasons for this. This leads on to the next part of the 
discussion, which takes account of the ways in which Sidgwick’s work has been 
recognised or utilised, and thus begins the process of framing the place for my 
arguments made in this thesis within the wider fields of both Sidgwick studies and 
moral philosophy. 
 
0.7.a Sidgwick at the Turn of the Twentieth Century 
 
Among the first factors to unfavourably affect ME’s long-term reputation was the 
period in which Sidgwick was working. British Idealism had been on the rise from the 
mid 1800s, and ME struggled to defend its hedonistic emphasis against that tide. 
T.H. Green and F.H. Bradley were particularly influential in this movement, and 
where Green sympathised with some of Sidgwick’s arguments, Bradley’s criticism of 
ME was fierce and protracted59. Even more significant was the changing socio-
                                                 
utilitarianism, and that for this reason it should be referred to as Rational Benevolence, and not as 
‘Sidgwick’s utilitarianism’.  
59 Some of Sidgwick’s contemporaries – T.H. Green included - did actually recognise the nuances of 
the position that Sidgwick presented in ME. For F.H. Hayward, the point was not that Sidgwick 
departed from utilitarianism towards intuitionism, but that ‘it was extremely difficult to classify him at 
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economic climate of this time. The turn of twentieth century, and the fifty years that 
followed it, was to be a time of great revision for both deontology and utilitarianism, 
and these modifications were often made in light of the emerging social and political 
issues. Sidgwick was, as Ross Harrison enduringly describes him, a ‘philosopher’s 
philosopher’, and ME is thought to reflect this via the dry and dull style in which 
Sidgwick apparently also lectured60. The Methods of Ethics thus seems to stand on a 
certain horizon between the 19th and the 20th centuries – the classical ‘fathers’’ 
theories behind it, and vast social, political and philosophical change spread out 
before it. As soon as those changes began, which they did immediately and in 
earnest, the deeply academic and theoretical Methods rapidly lost relevance, and 
faded into the distance. 
The Dualism of Practical Reason had also, of course, caused a problem – to 
Sidgwick at least. Although ME is certainly not remembered just for this feature, for 
                                                 
all’ (Hayward, ‘Mr Hayward’s Evaluation of Professor Sidgwick’s Ethics: A Reply’, in, Mind, Vol.11, 
No.3 (1901) 360-365). (See also James Seth (‘The Ethical System of Henry Sidgwick’, in, Mind, 
Vol.10, No.38 (1901) 172-187, who believed Sidgwick to be neither utilitarian, nor intuitionist). 
Hayward also prophesised about ME that ‘to neglect it is a philosophical disaster’, and argued that a 
reader of The Methods must approach it not expecting an answer, as such. ‘The lesson that Sidgwick 
has to teach us’, Hayward said, ‘is the difficult lesson of openness of mind, of freedom from 
dogmatism’ (Hayward, ‘Evaluation’, p. 2). See also Hayward’s ‘The True Significance of Sidgwick’s 
Ethics’, in International Journal of Ethics, Vol.11, No.2 (1901) 175-187. 
These readings of Sidgwick and their long-term effects for ME are explored further in the literature 
review. 
60 Ross Harrison (ed.), Henry Sidgwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2001) p.4. 
Despite the esteem in which many readers held ME, this rather less complimentary impression is also 
a common one. Not everyone was enthused by Sidgwick’s rigorously methodical approach; even 
Hayward admitted that ME had its dry and challenging reputation for a reason. Sidgwick’s style was 
apparently especially difficult when it came to being taught by him. Many students of Sidgwick – 
among them F.H. Bradley, G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, who represented almost all of 
Sidgwick’s critics and who would also go on to write their own moral theories – reported that Sidgwick 
told precisely one joke per lecture. As soon as it had been and gone, many of the students would, if 
they could, quietly leave (Russell, My Philosophical Development (London: Allen and Unwin: 1959) p. 
38. See also Ross Harrison, ‘Cambridge Philosophers IV: Henry Sidgwick’, in, Philosophy, Vo.71, 
No.277 (1996) 423-438.) But it is unfortunate that both Sidgwick’s lectures and ME have been 
remembered in this way. Not only is ME actually highly engaging in places, but in many other 
accounts from Sidgwick’s pupils a very different picture of him is created, both as a professor, and as 
a man. In conversation with his students, (which he preferred to lecturing) he was known to be witty, 
and gently humorous in any counter arguments. He was apparently sharp but sympathetic, and was 
loved for his candour – or, as his students termed it, his ‘Sidgwickedness’ (Bart Schultz, Henry 
Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2012) p. 68). In the 
Sidgwick archives at Newnham College in Cambridge, there is a wonderful anecdote from one of his 
female pupils, who was among the first to be reading there following Sidgwick and his wife Eleanor’s 
instrumental role in having women admitted to Cambridge University. She had received a paper back 
from Sidgwick, and was unable to read his handwriting. While everyone else in the quiet classroom 
continued to work, she approached Sidgwick, reading behind his desk, and asked if he could tell her 
what this word said. Sidgwick looked down at the word, looked up at her over the top of his 
spectacles, and said with a wry smile, but not quite loudly enough that everyone could hear “that little 
word is b – a – d - ….bad”.   
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Sidgwick the DoPR was a crisis of almost catastrophic proportions61. The very 
reason for this crisis was that Sidgwick believed himself to have failed to successfully 
assimilate all rational methods of ethics, with egoism and altruism still appearing 
fundamentally at odds. Sidgwick allowed this impression to prevail, both in his own 
mind and in his reputation, and as a result the ‘failure’ arguably overshadowed the 
success of The Methods – and obstructed any sense that he might have reconciled 
other methods62. 
Finally, I believe that one of the main reasons for the overlooking of Sidgwick’s 
reconciliation is that today ME, now in its 7th edition, is rarely published with the 
prefaces included. This is to its great detriment, for there are several passages in the 
first two prefaces (especially in the second, where Sidgwick responds to critics of the 
first publication) that could have clarified Sidgwick’s position on some important 
points63. In the absence of these brief but important qualifications, one idea in 
                                                 
61 To use Sidgwick’s most dramatic imagery, there is a ‘fundamental contradiction in our apparent 
intuitions of what is Reasonable in conduct’ such that ‘the ‘Cosmos' of Duty is thus really reduced to a 
Chaos, and the prolonged effort of the human intellect to frame a perfect ideal of rational conduct is 
seen to have been foredoomed to inevitable failure’ (ME1:473). This passage was the original closing 
paragraph of the first edition of ME. He was later persuaded to change it – but the fact remains that 
originally, Sidgwick was prepared to conclude on ME that its first word was ‘ethics’ and its last was 
‘failure’. 
62 Sidgwick refers briefly to the problem of rational egoism in the PD, stating that ‘there was indeed a 
fundamental opposition between the individual’s interest and either morality, which I could not solve 
by any method I had yet found…’ (ME: xx). But it does not seem to have the same depressing effect 
on him here as it did in his personal correspondences on the matter. David Phillips actually argues 
that Sidgwick was less successful than he (and myself) thought in reconciling utilitarianism with 
dogmatic intuitionism, and more successful in reconciling utilitarianism and egoism.  
Unlike many Sidgwick scholars, I am not concerned with the DoPR in this thesis. I follow Sidgwick in 
believing his reconciliation between deontological and utilitarian principles to be separate from the 
problem of egoism, and therefore do not consider egoism to be an obstacle to the arguments I will be 
making here. 
63 Some important evolutions can be seen in the preface to the second edition. Sidgwick states that 
he has substituted ‘well-being’ with ‘happiness’, and that in his exposition of the utilitarian principle, he 
has decided to omit the last four words from Bentham’s phrase ‘the greatest good for the greatest 
number’ (viii) – both points are indicative of his understanding of utilitarianism. He has also revised 
III:XIII, on Philosophical Intuitionism, to give more of his own views, rather than commenting on those 
of other moralists, which is significant for my argument that Sidgwick did actually offer his own 
normative moral theory, despite his originally intended neutrality.  
Related to the importance of the prefaces is the question of why, if the PD was this important to 
understanding his work, Sidgwick did not publish that document earlier. There is, as early as 1862, 
evidence from another source that Sidgwick was actually intending on a reconciliation in ME: In a 
letter to his great friend Graham Dakyns, he stated that he was ‘revolving a Theory of Ethics’, and 
‘working on a ‘reconciliation between the moral sense and utilitarian theories’ (see also Arthur 
Sidgwick and Eleanor Mildred, Henry Sidgwick: A Memoir (London: Macmillan:1906). This, along with 
the PD, might also suggest the question as to why Sidgwick began ME from a neutral position at all, 
when he already knew that he would be drawing this particular conclusion in the book. To this I argue 
that ME does begin neutrally, and that Sidgwick is right when he re-emphasises in the preface to the 
second edition (presumably in response to Bradley) that he was not aiming to defend any one position 
over another. It is simply that in expounding the deontological and utilitarian positions in the way he 
describes in the PD, he had realised that there was a fundamental connection, and making this point 
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particular has prevailed into the present day. This is of course the enduring idea that 
Sidgwick is simply a classical utilitarian. It is on this point that account can be taken 
of Sidgwick’s place in the history of moral philosophy itself.    
  
 
 
0.7.b Sidgwick as a Utilitarian in the 20th Century 
 
Despite Sidgwick’s insistence that ME was not a defence of utilitarianism, it was 
received as such – and would continue to be applied as such64. From the 1960s to 
the 1980s, for example, Sidgwick’s position was utilised to provide support for the 
‘rule utilitarianism’ that was developed in this time, most notably by Richard Brandt 
and R.M. Hare, in response to what were considered to be utilitarianism’s less 
palatable aspects65. In his development of his influential preference utilitarianism, or 
universal prescriptivism, Hare claimed to have combined ‘the merits of both varieties’ 
and he cites Sidgwick as being a particular type of utilitarian whose work provides 
support for those arguments66. Given that Hare argues for a moral system in which 
the Kantian maxim of universalizability produces a form of (preference) utilitarianism, 
his work is discussed more fully below, in terms of its relationship to my similar 
                                                 
was a vital part of his investigation into those methods – but the whole of that investigation was still 
necessary in order for Sidgwick to make his point. The letter to Dakyns, however, does suggest 
something more of a specific intent regarding developing that reconciliation in ME – and this can only 
support my theory that Sidgwick saw and argued for that reconciliation.  
64 See chapter 1 (the literature review) for a more comprehensive overview of how Sidgwick’s work 
has been read throughout the years. 
65 Richard Brant, Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall: 1959), and ‘A Theory of the 
Good and the Right’; in, Philosophical Studies, Vol.42 (1982) 119-139; R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1981). 
Utilitarianism did indeed enjoy a period of greater credibility after the appearance of Brandt’s ‘rule’ 
version. As will be seen below Hare’s formulation of a version of rule utilitarianism was also 
particularly convincing. Rule utilitarianism also continues to be soundly defended today, most notably 
by Brad Hooker whose 2002 volume Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule Consequentialist Theory of 
Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 2002) provides the paradigmatic defence of the theory. (See also 
Hooker, ‘Rule-Consequentialism, Incoherence, Fairness’, in, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
New Series, Vol.95 (1995) 19-35; ‘Ross-style Pluralism versus Rule-Consequentialism’, in, Mind, 
Vol.105, No.420 (1996), 531-552, and, ‘Rule Consequentialism’, in, Mind, New Series, Vol.99, No.393 
(1990) 67-77). It was, however, initially attacked by critics (see J.J.C. Smart, ‘Extreme and Restricted 
Utilitarianism’, in, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.6, No.25 (1950) 344-354; Smart, An Outline of a 
System of Utilitarian Ethics (Carlton: Melbourne University Press: 1961); J.J.C. Smart and Bernard 
Williams, Utilitarianism; For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press:1973); and David 
Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press:1965) on the basis that 
‘rule’ utilitarianism is simply not a viable form of the doctrine. This debate – and Sidgwick’s place in it - 
is covered in chapter 1.  
66 Hare, Moral Thinking, p.43 
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argument built from Sidgwick’s work in this thesis. Here, it suffices to note that 
Sidgwick was for this time highly relevant to the work of prominent utilitarians, and, 
ironically, that it was apparently Sidgwick’s recognition of the inadequacies of 
utilitarianism (as opposed to Bentham and Mill, who did not provide a full critique of 
the doctrine) that provided a more acceptable place from which to start building a 
revitalisation of the utilitarian doctrine.  The potential of Sidgwick’s own solution – in 
which utilitarianism might be made ‘credible’ by making it dependent on 
deontological properties in a way similar to Hare’s – was perhaps missed for this 
reason. 
At a similar time to his appearance in Hare’s work, Sidgwick was also afforded a 
meaningful place in the work of John Rawls, in Rawls’ seminal and highly neo-
Kantian work, A Theory of Justice67. As Rawls was concerned to construct a form of 
the social contract that emphasised Kant’s emphasis on intrinsic rightness, Rawls’ 
use of Sidgwick is particularly illuminating of the peculiarly flexible way in which 
Sidgwick’s arguments were perceived. Rawls recognised the importance of the 
utilitarian doctrine only as it had been expounded by Sidgwick, and Sidgwick thus 
retained his strongly utilitarian reputation – but Rawls accepted Sidgwick’s version as 
the only really serious alternative to his own theory of justice as fairness68. 
There was then, at this point in history, an emergent sense that Sidgwick’s work 
could be variously applied69. Yet Rawls had still posited Sidgwick as a utilitarian. 
Sidgwick’s utilitarian reputation survived unscathed – and was actually now on the 
rise. Hare was directly succeeded in his doctrine of preference utilitarianism by his 
student Peter Singer, and Singer, who today uses preference utilitarianism in a wide 
variety of ethical matters from bioethics to veganism (and often with great 
controversy) references Sidgwick liberally. Of particular importance to Singer’s 
utilisation of Sidgwick is his ‘point of view of the universe’ passage (see III:XIII:382), 
which Singer takes to be representative of Sidgwick’s entire moral view’70. For 
                                                 
67 Harvard: Harvard University Press: 1971 
68 See Theory of Justice, p.417, and John Rawls, ‘Foreword to ‘The Methods of Ethics’, in, Henry 
Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett: 1981) pp. v-vi. 
69 Bart Schultz himself declares his own book, Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe, to have come 
about as a direct result of this apparent flexibility in Sidgwick’s work. See below. 
70 See most of Singer’s major works – Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 
1979), How Are We To Live? (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1997), Peter Singer and Katarzyna de 
Lazari-Radek, The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press: 2014), and Helga Kuhse (ed.) Unsanctifying Human Life (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers Ltd: 2002), along with his numerous papers, articles, and essays.  
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Singer, Sidgwick appears in the capacity of an act utilitarian and, perhaps most 
controversially for the modern day - as a hedonistic utilitarian71.  
These are not the only theorists who have referenced or utilised Sidgwick, 
although these are the most significant in terms of revelatory advances made in the 
field of utilitarianism. A more extensive account of the field of Sidgwick studies is 
given in the literature review. The point I wish to make with this outline here is that 
Sidgwick has maintained a quiet but steady presence in moral philosophy in the last 
hundred years, but that the real significance of Sidgwick for moral philosophy – for 
his potential to transcend the antithesis between deontology and utilitarianism that 
was going to go on to characterise so much of the debate in moral philosophy - has 
largely been missed, due to his being interpreted as a utilitarian.  
 
0.7.c Recognition of Sidgwick’s Reconciliation 
  
Following the point that Sidgwick is almost universally considered to be a utilitarian, it 
must also be acknowledged that there has also been some movement towards 
recognising that Sidgwick perceived there to be not as stark a difference between 
utilitarian and deontological moral properties as his historical utilitarian status would 
suggest. This is also of course highly important to where this thesis fits in the field.  
J.B. Schneewind, and Bart Schultz, in their respective books Sidgwick’s Ethics 
and Victorian Moral Philosophy (1977) and Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe 
(2004), have produced two works of major historical significance for Sidgwick. Any 
new interest in Sidgwick cannot fail but be enormously indebted to the incredible 
attention that is paid to the details of Sidgwick’s life and work in both of these books, 
                                                 
71 Hedonistic utilitarianism, most commonly associated with Bentham (although Mill was also 
technically of this school) is thought to represent all of the very crudest and worst elements of the 
utilitarian doctrine. Hedonism itself is widely disparaged in general today, whether interpreted as the 
school of thought that holds pleasure to be the the most important intrinsic good, or whether used in 
non-academic terms to describe the behaviour of people who pursue pleasure at the expense of 
other, ‘worthier’ ends. I will not actually be disputing here the hedonistic element in Sidgwick’s 
utilitarianism –although I do argue that he establishes the hedonistic principle far more convincingly 
than Bentham. I do, however, wish to dispute Singer’s having attached such a direct label of 
hedonistic utilitarian to Sidgwick. Sidgwick should not, I believe, be primarily known as a utilitarian, 
and especially not as this kind of utilitarian (see my argument in chapter 3 for Sidgwick’s rejection of 
pleasure as an ultimate end). Singer’s work has been invaluable for interest in Sidgwick, and his 
regard for Sidgwick’s work is always evident – but I do maintain that the reputation of hedonistic 
utilitarian is detrimental to a full understanding of Sidgwick as a moral philosopher. 
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and between them they have widened the field of Sidgwick studies phenomenally. 
Most significantly for my purposes here, because both Schneewind and Schultz are 
also acutely aware of Sidgwick’s concern of the conflicting demands reason makes 
on morality. Schneewind pointed out in light of this that Sidgwick should not be 
accepted as a mere utilitarian. ‘It is a mistake to view the book as primarily a defence 
of utilitarianism’, Schneewind says, ‘…it is true, of course, that a way of supporting 
utilitarianism is worked out in detail in The Methods, and that there are places in it 
where Sidgwick seems to be saying quite plainly that utilitarianism is the best 
available ethical theory. From his other writings we know also that he thinks of 
himself as committed to utilitarianism, and that he assumes it in analysing specific 
moral and political issues. Yet it does not follow that the Methods itself should be 
taken simply as an argument for that position. We must try to understand it in a way 
that makes sense of its author's own explicit account of it’72. 
Schultz specifically claims Eye of the Universe to have come about from an 
investigation into how it was that Sidgwick could feature in the conflicting arguments 
of the neo-Kantians such as John Rawls on one hand and the utilitarians such as 
Derek Parfit and Peter Singer on the other73. Schultz is also clear, along with 
Schneewind, that Sidgwick is all too often read against a simple backdrop of 
classical utilitarianism, when this is not the most accurate understanding of his work. 
If Sidgwick was a utilitarian, Schultz says, “the system of utility takes in his hands a 
form so much more refined and delicate than was given to it by Bentham and James 
Mill, and is expounded with so many qualifications unknown to them, that it has 
become a very different thing, and is scarcely, if at all, assailable by the arguments 
which moralists of the idealistic type have brought against the older tradition”74.  
Awareness of this aspect of Sidgwick’s work has been growing. Mariko Nakano-
Okuno has recognised Sidgwick’s systemising of Kantian principles with utilitarian 
ones75 ; Janice Daurio reads ME as one moral theory76; Brad Hooker recognises that 
Sidgwick was ‘clearly looking for a moral system that would actually resolve 
uncertainty and disagreement’, and theorises that Sidgwick’s moral theory can be 
                                                 
72 Schneewind, Sidgwick’s Ethics, p.192 
73 Schultz, Eye of the Universe, pp.1-20 
74 ibid. p.14 
75 See Nakano-Okuno, ‘Sidgwick and Kant’. 
76 Janice Daurio, ‘Sidgwick on Moral Theories and Common Sense Morality, in, History of Philosophy 
Quarterly (1997), Vol.14, No.4, 425-445 
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understood as a form of coherentism77; Robert Audi includes Sidgwick as part of his 
recent defence of Rossian intuitionism, and uses the language of synthesis in 
reference to Sidgwick’s concern with how we might be able to identify and rectify 
errors in moral judgments78 ; Antony Skelton recognises that Sidgwick believed 
utilitarianism to be in need of a fundamental intuition79; despite presenting Sidgwick 
as a hedonistic utilitarian, Singer and de Lazari-Radek do actually, in their own moral 
theory, defend both moral objectivism and hedonistic utilitarianism – and Sidgwick is 
relevant to both positions80. Perhaps most notably, Sidgwick has appeared in the 
work of eminent scholar Derek Parfit, who himself specifically advances a 
reconciliation between deontological and utilitarian schools of thought81. All of these 
positions are important, and certainly contribute to making Sidgwick relevant not just 
to utilitarianism, but to the tension between utilitarianism and deontology. During the 
engagement with those theorists in the literature review, I argue against some 
theorists’ utilitarian interpretations of Sidgwick, and in other cases envisage that the 
reconciliation in Rational Benevolence could compliment current similar theories 
about Sidgwick’s reconciliation, or expand upon them. But I will ultimately argue that 
none of these positions fully draw out Sidgwick’s full reconciliation, I as will try to do 
here. None have recognised Rational Benevolence as a full moral theory, nor argued 
for the immediate synthesis between deontological and utilitarian properties that it 
offers. None have argued that Sidgwick’s utilitarianism – if it is to be called that – 
depends so extensively on a deontological principle that there could be grounds to 
argue for Sidgwick as a deontologist in some sense. These readings of Sidgwick, 
those that I aim to develop in this thesis, will be, I believe, the ‘author’s own explicit 
account’ of utilitarianism to which Schneewind was referring82. Overall, I hope that 
                                                 
77 Hooker, ‘Sidgwick and Common Sense Morality’, in, Utilitas, Vol.12, No.3 (2000) 347-360 
78 Audi, The Good in the Right, p.8 
79 Skelton, ‘Henry Sidgwick’s Moral Epistemology’, in, Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol.48, 
No.4 (2010) 491-519 
80 Singer and Lazari Radek, Point of View of the Universe, p.214 
81 As was the case for Hare, where Sidgwick himself is relevant to Parfit’s own moral theory is 
discussed in the literature review. Parfit’s theory itself, however, clearly offers something similar to 
Rational Benevolence, and as such it is discussed below, in terms of its capacity as a potential rival or 
challenge to the place of Rational Benevolence in the field. 
82 Sidgwick himself did not expressly dispute his utilitarian label, and it would therefore be 
presumptuous to do so here. I do maintain however that Rational Benevolence is not simply 
utilitarianism, and that for this reason it would be better to refer to it as Rational Benevolence, and not 
as Sidgwick’s utilitarianism.  
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this thesis will contribute significantly to the existing but nascent inclination towards 
believing Sidgwick to have assimilated deontological and utilitarian principles. 
 
0.8.  Rational Benevolence in the Field of Modern Moral Philosophy 
 
I have now outlined my argument that Sidgwick saw an essential and mutually 
informing relationship between deontological and utilitarian properties, and I have 
given the grounds for this argument as they appear (to me) in ME, and the PD. I 
argued that overall, Sidgwick’s moral theory can be understood by the term ‘Rational 
Benevolence’: This term effectively summarises the rationality of both deontological 
and utilitarian principles, and the fact that the Universal Benevolence, or the 
utilitarian aspect, of the theory’s title is only established on the basis of Sidgwick’s 
understanding of the connection between ultimate rationality and rightness, which 
generates an unconditional and categorical ‘ought’. I have also presented a brief 
overview of how Sidgwick has been variously read throughout the years, and thus 
largely framed the place for the arguments I will be presenting here. But there is a 
further aspect required in order to complete the understanding of this present work’s 
place, which is a consideration of the potential applications, and limitations, of 
Rational Benevolence itself. I will first posit how I believe Rational Benevolence as a 
moral theory to be able to answer the problems that were outlined at the start of this 
introduction. I will then assess how Rational Benevolence fits into the field of moral 
philosophy in general. 
 
0.8.a. Rational Benevolence and Moral Ambivalence: Descriptive and 
Normative Value 
 
At the beginning of the introduction, I described –via the Parental Predicament - 
difficult ethical situations in which two very different courses of action appeared to be 
morally reasonable, and therefore morally justifiable, at the same time. Recognition 
of this dual reasonableness was seen to lead to the recognition that both courses of 
action were also morally reprehensible, precisely on the basis of the moral values of 
the alternative view. The result is serious moral ambivalence, which I then argued 
further is actually caused by the fact that the two types of moral value being 
represented here – absolute-based and outcome-based – are both reasonable, by 
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which it is generally meant that they are both somehow unconditionally right, and yet 
appear to be mutually exclusive on the basis of that reasonableness. It was then 
seen that a traditional ‘divide’ between deontological and utilitarian understandings of 
morality has permeated the level of moral philosophy, and that this translates into a 
failure on the part of individual autonomy to offer anything of real value to defending 
parents who are in the Parental Predicament.  
I then suggested that the best approach to the situation would not be to better 
defend absolute-principle values and outcome based values separately (as this 
would offer nothing different to current approaches), but to explain the two moral 
properties as mutually informing. This reconciliation, I theorise, should take the form 
of a synthesis, wherein both properties retain their own independent value, and yet 
also rely on validation from the other, in a circularly interdependent relationship. Not 
only is this, I argue, a more holistic and realistic interpretation of the human moral 
experience, but explaining how the values of each moral property informs the values 
of the other is the stronger way to defend both reasonable courses of action in 
situations of serious moral ambivalence.  
I argue that Sidgwick’s theory of Rational Benevolence provides this very 
understanding of a synthesis between deontological and utilitarian properties that I 
have just described. Rational Benevolence shows that both types of moral property 
are ultimately rational, which directly accounts for my observation (and Sidgwick’s) 
that both types of moral consideration as they appear in lived experience are 
reasonable. More comprehensively, in Rational Benevolence a deontological, non-
consequentialist form of moral obligation (or duty) yields the utilitarian principle of 
Benevolence, which then itself also becomes a non-consequentialist moral duty, 
while also validating and confirming the roles of the principles that have constituted 
that duty. Rational Benevolence thus explains, or describes, the process of the 
human moral experience that is demonstrated by moral ambivalence, in such a way 
that neither one type of value or the other is discounted, but neither principle by itself 
is adequate for a full understanding of morality. Where I examine the potential of 
Rational Benevolence as a moral theory in full in the conclusion, I will refer to this 
theoretical-explanative function as Rational Benevolence’s descriptive value.  
I believe that the descriptive value of Rational Benevolence is important in 
itself for creating a more comprehensive and sympathetic understanding of the 
cause of moral ambivalence. But it will be recalled I said above that whereas mutual 
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limitation between two reasonable positions occurs more obviously, mutual validation 
would have to be proven – and it is my view that this is precisely what is being 
indicated by the descriptive function of Rational Benevolence. Rational Benevolence 
gives us the means of understanding at a philosophical level how the values of one 
position (non-consequentialism) actually necessarily take into account the values of 
the other position (utilitarianism), and vice versa, because in Rational Benevolence 
the two properties depend on each other - and it is this that I speculate could 
represent the normative potential of Rational Benevolence to be applied in practice. 
That is, actions could be justified morally if they could be seen to be a result of 
considering both the absolute-principle values and the outcome based values 
relevant to that particular situation in this interdependent way, i.e. if they could be 
seen to be rationally benevolent83. By the same line of reasoning, actions could also 
be found to be non-rationally benevolent, if either one or the other value is 
completely absent. That is, as much as Rational Benevolence could provide a better 
means of justifying courses of action, it could also equally provide an effective check 
on certain courses of action84. In this way, Sidgwick’s theory of Rational 
Benevolence could perhaps offer to the framework of individual autonomy, or to the 
relevant healthcare policy, a form of moral philosophy that more robustly supports 
the difficult experience of autonomy (by better understanding its cause), and also a 
practical means of being able to defend certain courses of action, and identify 
appropriate limits to others.   
 
 
0.8.b. Limits to Rational Benevolence as a Moral Theory 
 
Although it is my view that Rational Benevolence offers a defensible moral theory in 
the way just outlined in the previous section, there are some areas in which its 
                                                 
83 This appears to emerge as a very narrow form of reflective equilibrium. Although I do not argue this 
point specifically in the thesis, Sidgwick’s relevance to reflective equilibrium features in the literature 
review, and there is certainly potential for Rational Benevolence to itself be explored from this point of 
view. There is also scope for reflective equilibrium to itself be considered as a form of reconciliation 
between deontological and utilitarian principles, but I argue that this is more of a practical 
amalgamation, and not necessarily a meta-ethical one.  
84 In the thesis conclusion this theory will be tested via examples such as parents who are determined 
to terminate a pregnancy on the basis of eye colour, and parents who are determined to continue a 
pregnancy when it is certain that the child will be affected by a painful, debilitating, life-limiting and 
usually fatal condition, such as Tay Sachs disease.  
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success could be called into question. This notion of ‘success’ can be broken down 
into two levels – the practical and the theoretical.  It is my aim here to identify these 
challenges, and to formulate a response to them in such a way that they are 
acknowledged, but with Rational Benevolence still retaining a place in the field. This 
also includes a discussion of what I consider to be Rational Benevolence’s main 
competitive theories. I will begin with the practical challenges and problems, before 
addressing the objections that might be brought against the actual theory itself.  
 
 
 
0.8.b.i. Practical Limitations  
 
The first objection that might be made is that Rational Benevolence, if it is successful 
in defending two courses of action as morally reasonable, simply justifies a situation 
that already exists, regardless of any moral philosophy. That is, it could be argued 
that most decisions made in the context of the Parental Predicament – and many 
other difficult ethical dilemmas - will already be the result of careful and painful 
reflection upon two apparent types of value, and that Rational Benevolence is not 
offering anything new by describing this fact. I admit that ethical decisions are likely 
to be of that nature at the private level, but the public opinion factor of the Parental 
Predicament demonstrates that parents are still often subjected to social influences, 
that arise as a direct result of there being two very difficult but defensible courses of 
action. I theorise that explaining the cause more robustly, in the way that I argue an 
actual synthesis between deontological and utilitarian moral properties to do, may go 
some way towards protecting those decisions, however hard they remain at the 
personal level.  
Immediately following on from this is the claim that Rational Benevolence 
could never solve ambivalence. I entirely agree with this position. It is not my 
intention to ‘solve’ ambivalence; moral ambivalence is an essential part of human 
life, and is in many ways crucial to ethics in that it demands of us careful, involved, 
and considered responses to very difficult situations. Ambivalence does not apply to 
all people at all times – it is of course possible to hold definite moral views on all 
possible issues, prenatal decision making included. But where two conflicting views 
meet, with one propounding one set of values and the other another set of values, 
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this situation is reflecting the diverse range of possible approaches, and this is 
important. But this is also, I believe, where the problems start when it comes to real 
situations in which action of some kind must physically be taken – where a decision 
must actually be made. It is therefore my intention to explain the cause of 
ambivalence in the way that Rational Benevolence does, as I believe the recognition 
of the dual reasonableness of the two positions and the connection between them 
can be the only the key to providing autonomy with a more robust way of defending 
each course of action.  
 On the subject of Rational Benevolence’s applicability to autonomy however, 
there is the related problem of implementation i.e. how, exactly, Rational 
Benevolence is meant to actually be applied in practice. I have stated above that it 
could be brought in as an informant of the relevant healthcare policy, but in reality 
there will eventually be contact between individuals and those who work under these 
policies (such as doctors and genetic counsellors). Rational Benevolence is a theory 
of moral philosophy, and it would most likely have to be modified in various ways, in 
order to assimilate it with policy in such a way that it is actually workable in some real 
sense.  
Then there is the question of what rationally benevolent actions are to actually 
look like. This leads now to the first of the major theoretical objections that could be 
brought against Rational Benevolence. This is the question of how the Reason 
inherent in Rational Benevolence could possibly generate two different ‘oughts’. 
 
0.8.b.ii Theoretical Limitations: Rational Benevolence, Conflicts between 
‘oughts’, and R.M. Hare 
 
It was theorised above that moral ambivalence is due to two different positions on a 
matter of both being reasonable, and I have also outlined how Rational Benevolence 
specifically accounts for this dual reasonableness, which is what makes the theory 
relevant to this thesis. However, Rational Benevolence achieves this on the basis 
that rationality imposes an ought, and that as both deontological and utilitarian 
properties are rational, they must therefore both incur some kind of ought (which 
secures their moral value). There is an obvious problem here. If rationality is what 
imposes an ought, then how can it be said that two polar courses of action are both 
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‘oughts’?85 For this is completely irrational – and actually brings us straight back to 
the problem of moral ambivalence from which we started: One cannot believe that 
one ought to do X and that one ought to do Y, because clearly the acknowledgement 
that it is right to do something involves the acknowledgement that it would be wrong 
not to do it. The two ‘oughts’ thus preclude each other, and therefore neither ought is 
tenable – and Rational Benevolence has not yet been seen to solve this problem in 
any practical way, simply by introducing the idea of ‘rationally benevolent’ actions. 
R.M. Hare begins the development of his own moral theory in Moral Thinking 
from this very issue of the conflict between apparent oughts. Hare is a highly 
important point of comparison for Rational Benevolence. He specifically addresses 
moral conflicts from a point of view very similar to that which I made at the beginning 
of this introduction (and not dissimilar to Sidgwick’s), and proposes how they might 
be resolved (in a way dissimilar to mine). In doing so, Hare also provides one of the 
most effective and convincing reconciliations between deontological (specifically 
Kantian) and utilitarian principles that I believe to have been made to date, in the 
form of his preference utilitarianism. Here I give an overview of Hare’s moral theory, 
in order to examine his approach to moral conflicts, and subsequently the way in 
which he brings Kantianism into alignment with utilitarianism. I will then compare 
Hare’s solution to the system offered by Rational Benevolence, and address the 
problem of the apparent ‘two oughts’ in light of this.  
Moral conflicts occur, according to Hare, in situations where we seem to have 
conflicting duties86. There are many situations in which we clearly ‘ought’ to do two 
things, and we are clearly right to think that we ought to do both. But to decide that 
one ‘ought’ to do X involves the decision ‘in some sense’ that one ought not to do 
Y87. This leads to a situation in which one ought to do x and also ought not to do x, 
which contradicts the claim that ‘ought’ means ‘can’, because clearly it is impossible 
to both do something and not do it88. 
                                                 
85 It is precisely this that Sidgwick’s system allows for, as I shall try to argue throughout the thesis 
overall. 
86 Hare, Moral Thinking, p.26. See also Hare, Sorting out Ethics (Oxford: Clarenden Press: 2000). 
87 Ibid, p.27 
88 Hare’s observation of moral ambivalence is clearly close to mine – but Hare does not point to the 
apparent reasonableness that I have argued here causes moral conflict. This is because Hare 
proposes a very different solution to these conflicts, as will be seen. I have also avoided using ‘ought’ 
in the context of the Parental Predicament, and I think this is the right thing to do in situations of grave 
moral ambivalence, such as beginning of life decisions, or end of life decisions. It is very difficult to 
say someone ‘ought’ to end a pregnancy, or the life of someone for whom withdrawal of treatment or 
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Hare believes this moral conflict to arise from the fact that there are two levels of 
thinking in the human moral experience – the intuitive, and the critical. As most moral 
conflicts are the result of conflicting intuitions (or conflicting ‘oughts’), Hare’s solution 
to moral conflict – and the beginning of his normative theory – is his claim that real 
moral rationality takes place at the critical level. This philosophical logic grounds 
moral reasoning entirely in the rational, and removes it from intuitionism89.  
At the critical level of thinking, it becomes possible to see the logical properties of 
moral language - that is, what we must really mean when we speak of moral 
obligation. These logical properties of moral words are prescriptivity of moral 
judgements, overridingness, and universalizability. This condition that moral 
principles be truly universalisable is Hare’s true innovation in the field of 
utilitarianism. Universalizability requires that we are prepared to prescribe the same 
moral judgement for any other precisely similar situation, from our position of critical 
thinking. As the thinker could be in the position of any other party in the situation, he 
must make an impartial judgement that ‘does best’ for all the parties involved. This 
thinking must be rational, and based on the facts of a situation; the question of what 
is best is itself rational, and therefore the answers must be actual truths90. The only 
facts we can know of are those pertaining to the position of each individual in the 
situation to which the moral principle is being prescribed – and these facts are the 
individual’s preferences91. Through this process, impartial universal prescriptivism 
leads directly, rationally, and logically, to preference utilitarianism. An alternative and 
perhaps more accurate way to state this is that preference utilitarianism is logically 
                                                 
euthanasia has for some reason become relevant. On the other hand, Sidgwick’s theory of Rational 
Benevolence depends upon a crucial relationship between ‘right’ and ‘rational’, that is necessary for 
giving the theory a rational ‘ought’. This contradiction and its proposed solution are discussed below.  
89 The intuitive level, Hare argues, is insufficient. Hare does not reject our basic moral inclinations 
entirely; he recognises that we are taught general principles from childhood, that it is important that 
this is the case, and that they do have some role (Moral Thinking, pp. 30-39) for moral learning, 
teaching, and for when there is little time for critical thinking. Hare actually borrows Ross’s term ‘prima 
facie principles’ to represent the principles that our intuitive level of thinking presents. But this one-
level moral thinking is not completely adequate. These principles have no claim to authority beyond 
the fact that the individuals who hold them do hold them, and this may well have been affected by 
influences of any kind – prejudice, for example (Moral Thinking, p.12, p. 40). There is nothing to which 
these intuitions can refer in order to make them truly self-justifying. Hare’s thought here bears more 
than a passing resemblance to Sidgwick’s argument that common sense morality principles are 
important, and valid to some extent, but are in need of rational synthesis. 
90 Moral Thinking, pp.87-89 
91 Ibid, pp.92-106. 
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derived from universalisable prescriptivism. This is how Hare’s system completely 
incorporates Kant’s universalising maxim – and produces the same results92. 
Hare draws attention to this very point about the similarities between the results 
of his preference utilitarianism, and the Kantian system. He is among the highest 
profile philosophers to have recognised that Kant and the utilitarians have been ‘at 
loggerheads’ – but also that utilitarian and deontological principles both have ‘hold of 
a part of the truth’93. He does not believe there to be a great separation between 
Bentham’s statement “everybody to count for one, and nobody for more than one’ 
and Kant’s ‘act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it 
should become a universal law’94 – and the combination of universal prescriptivism 
with the preferences of all parties in his own moral theory clearly picks up, expands 
upon, and unites both of those maxims, with startling clarity. Whereas Hare states 
that we owe the practice of studying the formal properties of moral argument above 
all to Kant, the conclusions of Hare’s particular moral reasoning ‘yield a 
system…whose conclusions have a content identical with that of a certain kind of 
utilitarianism’95. 
There are several ways in which Rational Benevolence needs to be compared 
with Hare’s system, in order to show where still Rational Benevolence has relevance 
in the field alongside this masterful and innovative type of reconciliation96. Firstly, 
                                                 
92 Despite his firmly utilitarian position, Hare never denied that his study into the logic of imperatives 
had been inspired by Kant. He was also clear that Kant’s line of reasoning, ‘yields a system…whose 
conclusions have a content identical with …utilitarianism” (Moral Thinking, p.4). It is widely argued 
that Sorting out Ethics represents Hare as being as much of a Kantian as he was a Utilitarian – 
indeed, the book contains a section entitled ‘Could Kant Have Been a Utilitarian?’ But Hare does 
depart significantly from Kant, even on the point of universalizability and the categorical imperative. It 
simply makes no sense, to Hare, to make ‘do not steal’ a categorical maxim, and doing so would 
result in absurdities, such as preventing us from being ethically justified in stealing nuclear weapons 
away from a despot (Moral Thinking, p.164).  
93 Moral Thinking, p.vi, 4 
94 Ibid, p.5 
95 Ibid, p.4 
96 Many scholars have recognised some kind of affinity between Hare and Sidgwick. Rather fittingly, 
Richard Brandt described Hare’s preference utilitarianism as the most substantial formulation of 
utilitarianism since Sidgwick (A Theory of the Good and the Right, p.713). See also Tom Carson, 
‘Hare on Utilitarianism and Intuitive Morality, in, Erkenntnis, Vol.39, No.3 (1993) 305-331; Tim Mulgan, 
The Demands of Consequentialism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2005); Geoffery Scarre, 
Utilitarianism (London: Routledge: 1996); Roger Crisp, The Cosmos of Duty (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press: 2015); Robert Shaver, ‘Sidgwick’s Minimal Metaethics’, in, Utilitas, Vol.12, No.3 
(2000) 261, and ‘Sidgwick on Moral Motivation’, in, Philosopher’s Imprint, Vol.6, No.1 (2006) 1-14; 
and Peter Singer, Practical Ethics. Schultz specifically states that Hare ‘appropriates nearly all of 
Kant’s ethics for his own purposes’, and that in doing so he is a direct echo of Sidgwick (Schultz, Eye 
of the Universe, p.195).  Mariko Nakano-Okuno believes Sidgwick to have clarified in more detail than 
Hare the relationship between utilitarianism and Kantian ethics (Nakano-Okuno, Sidgwick and Kant, 
p.262). Daniel Jacobson points out that Sidgwick anticipated the idea of an esoteric, multi-level 
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there is a striking similarity between Sidgwick’s process of establishing of Universal 
Benevolence and Hare’s eventual procurement of preference utilitarianism. 
Sidgwick’s is a broader version (Hare’s language of preferences is more specific), 
but he began from a Kantian universalisation maxim (Justice), from which he derived 
a utilitarian principle (Universal Benevolence). Secondly, Sidgwick’s utilitarian 
principle is identified via the relation of integrant parts to each other which generates 
the Point of View of the Universe, and there is a clear parallel here with Hare’s 
argument for all preferences97. Also, both Hare and Sidgwick use a careful process 
of rationality to arrive at their moral precepts (Hare’s emphasis on the logic of moral 
language is arguably more compact and direct) – and both, of course, present a form 
of reconciliation98. There is little doubt that in many ways, Hare’s theory – and his 
reconciliation - is very convincing. As Walter Sinnot-Armstrong points out, the logic of 
his argument is very hard to argue with99. He has used logic and rationality to derive 
straight from simple moral language the vast ideas of universal prescriptivism, which 
then cogently lead to a place in which utilitarianism seems to be the only answer. 
And it fits perfectly with Kant’s maxim. In fact, Hare makes this seem like a perfect 
extension of Kant’s doctrine. For these reasons, I do not necessarily propound to be 
doing anything better than Hare. But I do argue that there are two crucial points of 
departure between my argument for Sidgwick’s Rational Benevolence which allows 
this reconciliation to do something different to Hare’s system. The first is that 
Sidgwick’s reconciliation does not, on my view, produce straight-up utilitarianism, 
and this is more useful to the ‘divide’ than a reconciliation that still produces either 
                                                 
morality, that was then fully developed by Hare in his two-level utilitarianism (Jacobson, ‘J.S.Mill and 
the Diversity of Utilitarianism’, in, Philosopher’s Imprint, Vol.3, No.2 (2003) p.2). 
97 Sidgwick’s position, like Hare’s, also incorporates both Bentham’s and Kant’s maxims.  
98 Hare is of course specific that he is aiming for a reconciliation between Kantian and utilitarian 
principles, where Sidgwick was not. Hare also specifically uses the language of ‘synthesis’ to refer to 
the amalgamation of Utilitarianism with Kant’s doctrine (Moral Thinking, p.43; see also Robert 
D’Amico, ‘R.M. Hare, 1919-2002’, in, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical 
Association, Vol.76, No.2 (2002) 129-130) despite specifically denouncing deontology itself on the 
grounds that it contains no coherent, rational account of moral thought (Hare, Rules of War and 
Moral Reasoning, in, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol.1 No. 2 (1972) pp. 166 -181). Sidgwick 
would have agreed with Hare that common sense morality (which for Sidgwick represents the 
deontological position) by itself is inadequate as a full system of ethics. Furthermore, the only 
principle from that method that Sidgwick could find to be ultimately rational is Kant’s maxim 
(which then establishes Benevolence, as Hare’s universalising factor established preference 
utilitarianism). However, it is my view that Sidgwick is actually more sympathetic to the rules of 
common sense morality (see chapter 2 of this thesis), and that this is part of what gives a 
different route of reconciliation in Sidgwick, as opposed to Hare.  
99 Walter Sinnot-Armstrong, ‘R.M. Hare, (1919-)  http://sites.duke.edu/wsa/papers/files/2011/05/wsa-
rmhare2001.pdf (accessed 18/6/2016) p.332. 
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exclusively deontology or utilitarianism. Hare’s logic of prescriptivism ‘uses’ 
universalizability to generate utilitarianism as an end result, and Hare argues for 
utilitarianism as the only possible result of the logic of moral language, and 
prescriptivism. I admit that there are passages in ME in which utilitarianism appears 
to logically emerge as the superior theory, but I argue that all of these must be read 
in the context of Sidgwick’s wider argument for the relationship between utilitarianism 
and deontology, and I will make these arguments in this thesis. I also argue that 
even if Sidgwick’s theory does eventually have to be called utilitarian in a formal 
‘moral philosophic’ sense, that the mutually and circularly informing relationship 
between deontological and utilitarian moral properties in Rational Benevolence 
would still be at an advantage for attempting to overcome the divide between them.  
Furthermore, Rational Benevolence offers something practically and substantially 
different to Hare’s, and this is crucial to the problem of moral ambivalence from 
which this thesis starts, and to the way in which I have suggested that ambivalence 
is handled. This is the potential to justify two courses of action in situations of serious 
moral ambivalence, rather than just one – which is precisely something that Hare 
rejects. On Hare’s view, the critical level of thinking will reveal that only one course of 
action – only one ‘ought’ is truly right. In short, according to Hare, ‘if your duties 
conflict, one of them is not your duty’100. He has very good grounds for arguing this 
(taking into account preferences, which are factually and thus rationally based) and 
his system thus appears to overcome the conflict between duties by revealing only 
one or the other to be the actual duty. But this position cannot truly help the situation 
of moral ambivalence, which I have argued is itself indicating something of value – 
which is that both positions are reasonable. It is my overall purpose in this thesis to 
explain and justify ambivalence by proving via Sidgwick’s synthesis how both are 
reasonable. But this does bring us back to the problem from which this section 
started, and which Hare seems to have so effectively addressed - which is that 
conflict between rational oughts is irrational. How are two reasonable i.e. rational 
courses of action to be held right, or rational, at once, when rationality and rightness 
on Sidgwick’s view incurs a categorical moral obligation? 
There are three possible ways of framing the outcome of this problem: 1) Both 
are ‘oughts’ in which case this is irrational; 2) Only one is an ought, thus cancelling 
                                                 
100 Moral Thinking, p.26 
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out the other and defeating the object of addressing ambivalence; 3) Neither can be 
established by Rational Benevolence to be an ought, in which case the justification 
for them both as being reasonable collapses. In order to address moral ambivalence, 
and in order to produce a theory that has any hope of comparing to Hare’s approach 
to moral conflicts, we need to begin from the acceptance of the equal 
reasonableness of two different types of principle. This means that only the first 
option – ‘both are ‘oughts’’, is viable. This therefore requires proving, somehow, that 
this situation is actually not irrational.  
The first part of this argument is to point out that I am actually not aiming to 
establish two independent ‘oughts’, or two independent ‘duties’. The point of Rational 
Benevolence is exactly the opposite, in that I am specifically trying to find a way in 
which the dual ‘oughts’ present in the deontological and utilitarian properties of each 
position inform and limit each other, precisely so that two reasonable positions can 
exist at the same time. This is the entire point of this exercise – to account for both 
types of reasonableness, which I have argued is at the core of so much ethical 
conflict. This is what is offered by Rational Benevolence, and this is the major 
difference between Hare’s treatment of moral ambivalence (such as it appears in 
Moral Thinking), and mine, or that of Rational Benevolence. It is Sidgwick’s particular 
argument for how Reason instils rightness in what is ultimately rational that is the key 
to this dual reasonableness – and specifically the fact that Sidgwick believes 
rightness to lie both in ultimately rational ends, and in certain ultimately rational 
actions101. It is this shared appeal to Reason that Rational Benevolence represents: 
Dual, mutually informing reasonableness, in which the reasonableness of both is 
indivisible from the reasonableness of the other. That model, I argue, then translates 
to the practical level wherein ‘rationally benevolent’ actions embody that mutually 
informing rightness. This, then, is what ‘rationally benevolent actions’ actually look 
like. And they are specifically capable of defining more than one course of action.  
It might be better to say, in light of this, that both courses of action are right, 
rather than ‘oughts’ – or even that both courses of action are ‘morally justifiable’. 
                                                 
101 This means that we have to admit some kind of consequentialist version of moral obligation into 
the equation, alongside my emphasis on Sidgwick’s deontology, but this of course is the point of my 
argument for Rational Benevolence. It will be seen in chapters 2 and 3 that Sidgwick includes the 
concept of ultimate rational ends as part of his argument for a non-consequentialist understanding of 
rightness, and then in chapter 4 that it is indeed the utilitarian principle that Sidgwick eventually 
establishes as the end of moral action. But whereas Benevolence may be consequentialist in its 
dictates, as an ultimately rational self-evident principle, it is, itself, non-consequentialist.  
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Rational Benevolence itself is the ought, the ultimately rational moral rule– then the 
mutually informing relationship between deontological and utilitarian properties can 
inform how the two related courses of action are right102. But this part of the 
discussion is highly normative, and it is not my primary aim in this thesis to establish 
a theory of normative ethics. This too, may be one of the theory’s theoretical 
limitations. As a normative theory it is certainly at a disadvantage as compared to 
Hare’s amalgamation of universalisation with preferences of interested parties - 
although I will, in the thesis conclusion, attempt to outline how universalizability might 
possibly apply to rationally benevolent actions.   
I do maintain however that whereas Hare says that moral conflict is not resoluble, 
this is not necessarily the case. Instead, I believe that the problem needs to be 
reframed. The problem has lain in the attempt to prove one position over another 
(and this will be irresoluble, on my view, which is what has led to the perpetuation of 
the moral-philosophic divide), when actually the best approach may be to recognise 
that the solution is to adopt neither one nor the other, but both. There are two 
sources of moral rationality as Sidgwick proves – the way to handle this fact is to 
incorporate it, not erase it. Rational Benevolence establishes both moral properties 
as rational and right, in such a way that they no longer conflict, but rather are both 
                                                 
102 This formula raises another possible parallel between Rational Benevolence and Hare’s work, 
which occurs regarding act/rule utilitarianism. The ‘certain kind of utilitarianism’ to which Hares refers 
(Moral Thinking, p.4) is one that is act-utilitarian at the critical level of thinking (because it leaves out 
no feature of an act which might be relevant), and rule-utilitarianism when the general prima facie 
principles used at the intuitive level are included (Moral Thinking, p.43). Hare believes the controversy 
between the two types to have arisen because the two different levels of thinking have been ignored – 
‘once the levels are distinguished, a form of utilitarianism becomes available which combines the 
merits of both varieties’. (Interestingly, it is the act utilitarian aspect that Hare states provides the 
means through which ‘utilitarians and Kant get synthesised’ (Moral Thinking, p. 43) – this is because 
of the combination of universalizability, and the consideration of all preferences of all relevant parties.) 
Given my argument that Rational Benevolence provides an overall framework through which 
‘rationally benevolent’ actions could be identified, it might reasonably be asked whether Rational 
Benevolence is also a form of two-level utilitarianism, like Hare’s. Before this question can be 
answered, it must be noted that Sidgwick’s system is actually the reverse of Hare’s. From intuitions, 
he has derived the general principle of Rational Benevolence, which could be called a general rule-
utilitarianism. Rationally benevolent actions are those that would have to consider every feature of the 
situation on a case by case basis, and therefore represent what could then be thought of as act 
utilitarianism.  I do not deny that Rational Benevolence appears to conform to this understanding of 
utilitarianism, but I do maintain that we can lift it out of rule/act utilitarianism altogether, because of the 
mutually informing nature of the relationship between them, in which utilitarianism depends on non-
consequentialist deontological properties. I also wish to direct focus away from interpreting Sidgwick 
to simply be a utilitarian, whether that is of the act or rule variety. (Brad Hooker’s ‘Sidgwick and 
Common-sense Morality’ p. 355-360 provides a particularly clear discussion of whether Sidgwick was 
an act or a rule utilitarian – see below. See also Hooker, Brad, ‘Rule Consequentialism’, The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/consequentialism-rule/>. 
(date accessed: 24/6/2016).  
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essential and irrefutable components of the human moral experience. This, I hope, 
might only add to the field of work such as Hare’s that argues for the affinity between 
deontology and utilitarianism.   
 
0.8.b.iii Theoretical Limitations: Other Rival Theories 
 
Although Hare’s reconciliatory system is probably the closest in nature to Sidgwick’s 
Rational Benevolence, there are three further writers whose moral theories also offer 
other theories that attempt reconciliation between moral principles103. They are 
framed here in terms of the challenge that they might present to the place of Rational 
Benevolence, and how I envisage Rational Benevolence to still be relevant alongside 
these sophisticated moral theories. 
 
0.8.b.iii a) W.D. Ross: Deontological Intuitionism 
 
The next writer whose theory recognisably offers a combination of deontological and 
utilitarian principles is W.D. Ross. Ross was a deontological intuitionist, whose moral 
theory – mainly presented in The Right and the Good (1930) and Foundations of 
Ethics (1939) - specifically includes elements of the two concepts thought to 
represent the opposing priorities of utilitarian and non-utilitarian positions, ‘good’ and 
‘right’ respectively104. He is a true intuitionist, believing capturing the essence of our 
moral impulses to be more important than their systemisation, as, say, Henry 
Sidgwick would have argued105. Ross rejected both ideal utilitarianism (the doctrine 
of G.E. Moore) because it holds that what makes a right act right is purely that it 
maximises good, and Kantianism universalizability, because it oversimplifies the 
reality of the moral life, and fails to take into account the salient fact that acts often 
have more than one motive (not simply the motive of what one thinks one ‘ought’ to 
do)106. For Ross, ‘common-sense morality’ – the moral perceptions of ordinary, 
                                                 
103 As I have mentioned above, the authors of these theories do actually reference Sidgwick – one of 
them extensively. These theories are therefore important to where this current works fits in the field of 
Sidgwick studies. However, as it is the remit of the literature review to assess how and where 
Sidgwick has been read, the particular relevance of Sidgwick to these theorists is covered there. 
Here, the theories are assessed in terms what they offer in comparison to Rational Benevolence 
104 See Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1930), and, The Foundations 
of Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1939)  
105 See The Right and the Good, p.19; Foundations, p.83 
106 The Right and the Good, pp.19-20 
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thoughtful, educated individuals - is the main source of what he termed ‘the data of 
ethics’. In basic terms, this ‘data’ is intuitively perceived principles that we consider to 
be right, or duties in some form. With wonderful directness, Ross points out that we 
do have these duties, but there are clearly cases in which the circumstances require 
that a certain duty is broken107. In this way, Ross too – like Hare – deals with 
conflicts between moral duties. Using the example of breaking a promise to meet a 
friend in order to bring relief to victims of an accident, Ross’ presents his innovative 
view of what is happening morally in this situation.  Ross does not concede that we 
are merely looking to what will secure the best outcome – he maintains focus on the 
nature of the duties themselves, arguing that they remain duties, but in the case of 
promise breaking vs distress relieving, we are recognising that in those 
circumstance, relieving distress is at that time more of a duty108. On Ross’ view, this 
type of duty has a morally significant value, even though it is not a ‘duty proper’; he 
refers to them as prima facie duties (or ‘conditional duties’)109. That is, they can be 
overridden, and they can be overridden on the basis that in particular circumstances, 
where duties conflict, one duty will reveal itself to be more urgent than another110. In 
concluding what right acts are, Ross states, in parallel with my observation about 
dual reasonableness given at the beginning of this introduction, that every act is 
prima facie right and prima facie wrong, and the right acts are those which have the 
greatest balance of prima facie rightness111. Whereas there is no fixed principle that 
can tell us how these intuitive duties are to operate/override each other, there are 
                                                 
107 Ibid, p.19 
108 Ibid, p.18. Ross thus specifically rejects the idea that what is right is right because it is productive 
of the most good. But he also rejects Kant’s view that duties admit of no exceptions in favour of 
‘imperfect obligations’, such as relieving distress.  
109 Ross lists six divisions of duties that are revealed by our common moral convictions – duties of 
fidelity/reparation, duties of gratitude, duties of justice, duties of beneficence, and duties of self-
improvement (The Right and the Good, p.71).  
110 Ross states: “When I am in a situation, as perhaps I always am, in which more than one of these 
prima facie duties is incumbent on me, what I have to do is to study the situation as fully as I can until 
I form the considered opinion (it is never more) that in the circumstances one of them is more 
incumbent than any other; then I am bound to think that to do this prima facie duty is my duty sans 
phrase in the situation’ (The Right and the Good, p.19). These duties are also duties at different times 
for different reasons, according to the circumstances (ibid, p.24). Ross argues that they are not 
actually different from Kant’s absolute duties, that require us to do ‘one particular act in particular 
circumstances’ (ibid, p.28), and that we know this because in cases where one duty has overridden 
another (for example, if we have had to break a promise) we still recognise a prima facie duty to keep 
the promise, and we feel compunction for having not done so. Hare also recognises the role of 
compunction and remorse at the intuitive level (Moral Thinking, pp. 28-31), but does not afford it 
nearly so much moral significance as Ross.   
111 The Right and the Good, p.41, p.46 
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four things that are intrinsically good – justice, pleasure, knowledge and virtue - that 
inform our ‘all things considered’ decisions when deciding on prima facie duties112.  
Ross’ prima facie duties presented a pioneering idea. Instead of replicating the 
sorts of attempts to affix one primary principle to human morality, Ross’s distinct 
moral philosophy is to allow for both a variety of moral requirements, or obligations, 
and the presence of intrinsic goods. In Ross’s system both the right and the good are 
the result of independent intuitions: Moral requirements therefore cannot be reduced 
to some other ultimate, fundamental principle (such as the principle of utility, or 
testing by the categorical imperative), and nor can goods be found to be second to 
some ultimate good113. As Antony Skelton pointed out, such a system seems to 
escape the insufficiencies of utilitarianism, and the excesses of deontology114. 
The Right and the Good is still held up as one of the most important works of 
twentieth century moral philosophy, and it accords well with many peoples’ 
experiences. But it has not gone without criticism. Ross himself predicted the likely 
objections. He admits that as a moral theory it is unsystematic, although it is not 
                                                 
112 Ibid, p.134 
113 Ibid, p.115, p.118; Foundations, p.19, p.180, p.278 
114 Antony Skelton, ‘On Henry Sidgwick’s ‘My Station and its Duties’, in, Ethics, Vol.125 (2014) 586-
591.It has since been maintained by many that Ross’s idea of prima facie duties is one of the most 
important contributions to modern moral philosophy (see C.D. Broad, ‘Critical Notice of W.D. Ross, 
Foundations of Ethics’, in, Mind, Vol.49 (1940) 228-239 ; A.C. Ewing, Second Thoughts in Moral 
Philosophy (New York: Macmillan:1959), and Phillip Stratton-Lake (ed.), The Right and the Good 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2002) p. xxxvii), and that Ross specifically overwrote Sidgwick’s 
argument against self-evident moral principles in such a way that it did not simply collapse back into 
utilitarianism (see Lazeri-Radek and Singer, Point of View of the Universe, p. 87), as Sidgwick’s was 
perceived to have done.  It could then possibly be argued that Ross’s system does in fact achieve 
something very like that which this thesis claims only Sidgwick achieved, which is the uniting of a 
degree of absolute moral obligation with a natural consideration for outcomes. After all, Ross 
describes goodness as ‘a salient element in the ground of [the act’s] rightness’ (Right and the Good, 
p. 47). But the opinion on Ross’s success is by no means unanimous. Lazari-Radek and Singer, for 
example, argue that whereas Ross’s system overcame problems such as the firm Kantian limitation 
on lying when a life might be saved as a result of that lie, and did so without simply looking to pure 
consequences, it could not adequately meet Sidgwick’s challenge that some promises are made, or 
some truths told or kept erroneously, and as the result of inadequate thought. They draw on W.A 
Pickard-Cambridge’s critique of Ross, in which Pickard-Cambridge presented a series of promises 
that had been made in such circumstances. Although Ross responded to each example, Lazeri-
Radek and Singer argue that he only showed how much room there was for disagreement, over 
precisely what these prima facie duties were to be (Point of View of the Universe: pp. 85-87). It is this 
confusion that is generally thought to considerably weaken Ross’s argument (see Shelley Kagan, The 
Limits of Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1989) p.17, specifically Kagan’s argument that Ross 
should perhaps have used the terminology of ‘pro tanto’, rather than ‘prima facie’). Whereas the 
general principles (from which Ross derives the prima facie duties) are meant to be self-evident, how 
we should go about deciding which duty is to be obeyed in which circumstance is not. Reflection, 
Ross says, is our best chance of acting rightly – but as Lazari-Radek and Singer also point out, Ross 
does not suggest how we might go about this reflection, and ultimately Ross is thrown back on a 
heavy reliance on simple intuition, rather than a robust normative or meta-ethic. 
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claiming to be anything else: It works primarily from self-evidence and intuitionism. 
But it is in that intuitionism that further weakness lies. Intuitionism was – and is – 
roundly criticised for almost always failing to provide any actual, solid answers, and 
for doing little more than telling us what we already know115. The problem in Ross’ 
system has always been that there is little ground on which Ross can propound 
these duties as duties, and actually propound them as right116. 
Like Ross, Sidgwick also aimed to give some kind of systemisation to a common 
sense morality, and his theory is of course also comprised of self-evidence and 
intuitionism. But given Sidgwick’s heavy use of Reason to defend even his intuitionist 
principles, Ross emerges as more of a pure intuitionist than Sidgwick. This is where I 
believe Sidgwick’s approach to the two moral properties can hold up where Ross’ 
may not. Sidgwick’s system specifically demonstrates that both deontological and 
utilitarian properties are rational, and establishes a logical connection between them 
on this basis. This rescues Sidgwick’s epistemology from being entirely dependent 
on intuitionism, and grounds it in something more substantially objective. If we reject 
Ross’ theory that we do just see these duties, then we must reject Ross altogether. 
Ross’ system gives a plausible argument for a plurality of duties, but it is still just that 
– a plurality, of which we are already all too aware117. 
 
0.8.b.iii.b) William Frankena: ‘Mixed Deontological Theory’ 
 
                                                 
115 See G.J. Warnock, Contemporary Moral Philosophy (New York: St. Martin’s Press: 1967), p.13; 
W.D. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy (London: Macmillan:1970), p.105; Alasdair MacIntyre, A 
Short History of Ethics (London: Routledge: 1967) p.255; Richard Kraut, What is Good and Why 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 2007), p.123; David Wiggins, A Sensible Subjectivism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press:1998). 
116 H.W.B. Joseph made this point by drawing particular attention to Ross’s lack of a single unifying 
principle (the sort for which moral philosophers from both schools of thought had previously been 
striving, and the sort that Prichard claimed did not exist), arguing that this leads simply to a collection 
of ‘unrelated obligations’, which is not an acceptable basis for a comprehensive moral theory (Joseph, 
Some Moral Problems (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1931). Joseph argued that Ross’s work in 
general simply was not systemised enough. In 1971, Rawls would make the same point, arguing like 
Joseph that without any ‘reasonable ethical criteria’ with which to weight normative ethical principles 
against each other, we have only half a theory (A Theory of Justice, p. 41) 
117 Part of the appeal of Ross’ theory is that he accounts so well for both good and right, those two 
concepts that had been so fundamentally split with Kant/Bentham, and later with Moore. Sidgwick 
does not use this language as specifically as Ross does, and actually does not pay much direct 
attention to the place of ‘good’ at all. There is, however, potential for Sidgwick’s theory to be phrased 
in terms of the roles of ‘right’ and ‘good’, if these two concepts are equated with deontological and 
utilitarian moral properties respectively. Whether or not Rational Benevolence does combine these 
two concepts will be addressed in the thesis conclusion.   
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American philosopher William Frankena can, like Ross, also be thought of as holding 
a deontological intuitionist position. But Frankena was far more explicit than Ross 
that both deontological and utilitarian theories of morality contribute something vital 
to morality. Where Ross incorporated utilitarian ideas via a metaphysical argument 
for intrinsic goodness, Frankena specifically sought to give credit to the central 
utilitarian principle itself118. This is, according to Frankena, quite simply because “we 
must grant that the utilitarians have hold of an important part of the truth”119. The 
construction of his moral theory that demonstrates his deontological/utilitarian 
combination is as follows.   
In a section from the 1973 reprint of Frankena’s Ethics, that Louis Pojman 
expressly entitles ‘a reconciliation of ethical theories’, Frankena presents the idea 
that for a theory of moral obligation, we first ‘recognise two basic principles of 
obligation, the principle of utility, and some principle of justice’120. The principle of 
utility, he argues, must be first taken as ‘one of our basic premises’, because we can 
only make sense of morality by talking in terms of the maximising of good and the 
minimising of evil121. But for this reason the principle of utility itself is not, for 
Frankena, actually the most primary principle, simply because it only indicates the 
even more basic premise that we ought to maximise good and minimise evil. The 
actual primary premise that is indicated by the practical principle of utility is, then, the 
principle of beneficence. This principle in turn requires another that tells us how to 
distribute goods and evils, when there are conflicting claims being made. This is the 
principle of distributive justice, through which our categorical duty to maximise good 
and minimise evil is established and guided. This general theory, Frankena points 
out, ‘would be a deontological one, but it would be much closer to utilitarianism than 
                                                 
118 Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.:1963) pp.29-46. 
119 Hare’s directly echoed these words of Frankena’s, almost 20 years later, although he does not 
reference him. 
120 See Louis Pojman, Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth:1994) p.239 
121 Frankena is exacting in his view of the role of utility, extending his argument to ultimately claim that 
all of our moral obligations and rules, even those of justice, presuppose the existence of good and 
evil, and the effect on our lives. “It is not easy to deny”, Frankena says, “as pure deontologists do, that 
one of the things we ought to do…is to bring about as much of a balance of good over evil as we 
can...I find it hard to believe that any action or rule can be right or wrong…in the moral sense, if there 
is no good or evil connected with it’ (Ethics, p.36). The ‘minimising of evil’ had developed its own field 
of utilitarianism at this time, under Karl Popper’s term ‘negative utilitarianism’. The focus in this branch 
of the doctrine is attempting to secure the least amount of harm, rather than the most amount of good 
(Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies (Oxford: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd: 1966).  
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most deontological theories’; as Frankena suggests, we might call it a ‘mixed 
deontological theory’. 
Frankena’s system is arguably less innovative than Ross’, and not as rigorously 
rational and systematic as Hare’s. But his straightforward argument for the roles of 
deontologically-understood duty and the utilitarian principle has the effect of 
appearing to dissolve the conflict between them with ease122.  In terms of the 
relationship between Frankena’s mixed deontological theory and Rational 
Benevolence, Frankena’s theory is similar to the early stages of Sidgwick’s 
construction of Rational Benevolence, in which Sidgwick recognises a principle of 
justice that will form the basis of duty for the ultimate principle of Benevolence123. As 
was the case with Ross’ reliance on intuition, Frankena’s argument for the 
connection between the duty of justice and the utilitarian principle of beneficence is 
lacking the sequence of rational steps through which Sidgwick arrives at his moral 
theory, and Sidgwick’s is, I believe, therefore stronger in this respect.  But 
Frankena’s outline does make it possible to argue that Sidgwick’s system could 
perhaps expand upon it. It also seems as though Frankena himself may well have 
agreed with such an endeavour. “It seems to me”, he says, “that everyone who takes 
the moral point of view can agree that the ideal state of affairs is one in which 
everyone has the best life…in such state of affairs, it is clear that…both the principle 
of justice and the principle of beneficence will be fulfilled. If so, we can see that the 
two principles are in some sense ultimately consistent, and this seems to imply that 
increasing insight may enable us to know more and more how to solve the conflicts 
that trouble us…”124. Frankena left to deontology a firm belief that while the concept 
of moral duty and obligation may be present at all times, so too is a certain 
importance of utility: So many deontological systems fail, Frankena says, on their 
simple failure to recognise this point. 
 
0.8.b.iii. c) Robert Audi: Ethical Intuitionism 
                                                 
122 As will be seen in the next chapter, Frankena himself recognised that Sidgwick had pointed to a 
similar dissolution of the traditional boundaries between deontological and utilitarian understandings 
of morality.  
123 But what is particularly interesting in comparing these two systems is that Frankena, who is 
primarily considered to be a deontologist, begins from the principle of utility and arrives at duty, 
whereas Sidgwick, who is primarily considered to be a utilitarian, begins from the deontological 
principle of duty and only then derives the utilitarian principle.   
124 Ethics, p.73 
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Intuitionism has seen something of a revival in recent years, largely due to the work 
of Robert Audi. In his estimable work The Good in the Right (2004), Audi develops 
Rossian intuitionism further than Ross did himself, and to a point at which Audi 
integrates it with Kant’s categorical imperative125. The result is a strengthening of 
both Ross and Kant’s positions, and a system that accounts for a theory of value as 
well as the duty based deontological position (that Audi simply refers to as ethical 
intuitionism) i.e. Audi’s theory includes both the good and the right. If Audi is 
successful – which it is widely agreed that he is – then this is another form of 
reconciliation, and one that is unique in that it does not just look to (or result in) 
deontological and utilitarian/consequentialist views, but rather shifts the focus to a 
credible form of epistemological – and Kantian - intuitionism.  
The first intuitionist to whom Audi refers as he is developing his understanding 
of intuitionism (and especially of the intuitionism that informed Ross), is actually 
Sidgwick himself. There are also similarities between Audi’s appropriation of Kant for 
his intuitionist purposes and Sidgwick’s, and in the fact that both philosophers 
incorporate a notion of the good into a largely Kantian framework.  As part of my 
argument involves presenting Sidgwick’s own intuitionism as being specifically 
comprised of both deontological and utilitarian properties however, the terminology 
of Rational Benevolence is likely to be different to Audi’s ethical intuitionism. It is also 
on this basis that I argue that Rational Benevolence may be more directly relevant to 
the issue of the ‘divide’ between deontology and utilitarianism, if it is understood that 
that divide has been perpetuated by the unhelpful use of these mutually exclusive 
labels. But I aware of the eminence of Audi’s argument, and propose that further 
engagement with it in the future would be constructive for the arguments made here.   
 
0.8.b.iii. d) Derek Parfit: Triple Theory 
 
The last, most recent, and probably most important figure relevant to the field of 
reconciling deontological and utilitarian moral properties is Derek Parfit. Of all moral 
philosophers of the last thirty years, Parfit is among the most influential. His 1984 
                                                 
125 Audi, The Good in the Right, (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 2004) 
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book Reasons and Persons126 was regarded as something of a work of genius when 
it was released, and to this day remains hugely important for its rational arguments 
regarding wide moral problems such as population ethics, and responsibility towards 
future generations. 
Parfit is primarily associated with a utilitarian position, but this is to greatly 
undersell the philosophic detail with which he approaches consequentialism in 
Reasons and Persons127. His argument there is actually that consequentialism in all 
its present forms needs to be revised – and that common sense morality also 
requires this. Crucial to both of these revisions, Parfit argues, is a fundamental 
rationality – although he does profess in Reasons and Persons that he himself has 
failed to identify ‘Theory X’, which could solve the various problems he has identified 
in these ethical frameworks.  
More recently however, in his long-awaited work On What Matters Parfit has 
presented a theory that goes a long way towards meeting the requirements of 
‘Theory X’128. This is an argument for the coalition of deontological, consequentialist 
and contractarian theories. As Samuel Scheffler says in the introduction to this two-
volume colossus of a work, ‘Parfit aims to rechart the territory of moral philosophy’, 
by challenging the common assumption that there is a fundamental disagreement 
between consequentialists and Kantians, and by arguing for a ‘startling convergence’ 
among these positions instead129. 
There is not space in this thesis to engage with Parfit’s sophisticated arguments 
to the extent required to do them justice; to attempt to do so would be both 
philosophically and temporally too ambitious. However, Parfit’s theory is, 
ideologically at least, something close to the sort of reconciliation between 
deontological and utilitarian principles that I have been suggesting is needed, and an 
analysis of his position is crucial to any theory attempting to enter this field of 
reconciliatory deontological-utilitarian theories. Full engagement with Parfit’s theory 
                                                 
126 New York: Oxford University Press: 1984 
127 For example, he introduces The Repugnant Conclusion (which he actually associates with 
Sidgwick), which denies total-utilitarian standards on the basis that if it is better that there are more 
people living to have some degree of happiness rather than less people living (even if the latter group 
have more happiness), then we are led through a series of population increases/happiness 
decreases, until we reach society Z, in which there are hundreds of billions of people alive, but all with 
lives barely worth living (Reasons and Persons, 381-391). He brings a similarly destructive case 
against average happiness utilitarianism.  
128 On What Matters (New York: Oxford University Press: 2011). 
129 Scheffler, in, On What Matters, p. xx 
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would be a possible line of future work; here I give a rudimentary outline of Parfit’s 
theory, using the summary of On What Matters that Parfit himself provides at the 
beginning of the volume, and compare it to the method through which Rational 
Benevolence is established.  
The beginning of Parfit’s theory is provided by Kant’s argument for universal 
laws. Parfit then works through several formulations of a Kantian basic maxim (‘it is 
wrong to act on some maxim unless we could rationally will it to be true that 
everyone accepts this maxim, and acts upon it when they can’), and argues (the very 
non-utilitarian point) that Kant’s formula, when revised in certain ways, can actually 
be made to be ‘remarkably successful’130. Parfit next adds the caveat of ‘what if 
everyone did that?’, and revises Kant’s formula further to ensure an element of 
impartiality. This leads to the inclusion of the next major theory – contractualism - 
which works from a rational agreement formula based on Thomas Scanlon’s theory 
that ‘Everyone ought to follow the principles that no-one could reasonably reject’. 
This version of contractualism, Parfit argues, coincides with the Kantian formula, in 
which we should ask which principles each person would rationally choose, if they 
had the power to choose what everyone would accept. Lastly, Parfit addresses 
consequentialist theories, in which he defines the term ‘best’ as referring to the 
impartial-reason-implying sense that he has been developing. Then, with great 
simplicity, Parfit lays out how the revised contractualism formulation of the Kantian 
maxim admits of a form of rule consequentialism - “everyone ought to follow the 
principles whose universal acceptance would make things go best”. That is, the 
principles that everyone would rationally choose are precisely those that inform this 
formulation of rule consequentialism. Thus, the result is a Kantian Rule 
Consequentialism131. 
Parfit refers to this Kantian/contractualist/consequentialist combination as ‘Triple 
Theory’. This is a ‘single complex higher level property under which all other wrong-
making properties can be subsumed. If this theory succeeds, it would describe what 
these other properties have in common’132. It would also, Parfit says, pose a strong 
challenge to the problem of moral disagreements. Where there have been those 
apparently deep disagreements between Kantians, contractualists and 
                                                 
130 On What Matters, p.16 
131 Ibid, pp.23-25 
132 Ibid. 
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consequentialists, this is wrong. They have been, as Parfit says in a striking image, 
‘climbing the same mountain on different sides’. 
The similarity between what Triple Theory offers and what I am claiming Rational 
Benevolence is offering is obvious; both are reconciliatory theories that aim to close 
the gap between traditional deontological and utilitarian moral approaches, both 
claim that the disparity between them was erroneous in the first place – and both use 
a Kantian maxim and a principle that invokes impartiality133. There are, however, two 
                                                 
133 Brad Hooker disputes the strength of Parfit’s impartiality factor, on the basis that it is not sufficient 
to simply equate impartiality with agent-neutrality, as impartiality does not necessarily entail equal 
concern for everyone (and also that agent-neutral concerns can be ‘silly’ ones, that are not attractive 
morally) (Hooker, ‘Must Kantian Contractualism and Rule-Consequentialism Converge?’, in, Oxford 
Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol.4 (2014) 34-52). This leads to a situation in which the agent-neutral 
selection of rules within the contractualism that Parfit uses has ‘no justificatory force’ (p.48). Also, it is 
clear that attaching impartiality to agent-neutral evaluations will not necessarily produce convergence 
on rule selection, as agent-neutral concerns can still be different (p.49) Because of these differences 
in agent-neutral assessment, this may well lead to a disagreement about which rules everyone has 
the most agent-neural reasons to accept (p.50). Ultimately, this would cause a divergence between 
Kantian contractualism and rule consequentialism, because one set of agent-neutral/impartial reasons 
will be guiding the view of one, and a different set the view of the other. Equally, it is possible for two 
Kantian contractualists to hold different sets of agent-neutral reasons, and therefore even these may 
disagree. (There is a parallel between this point of Hooker’s, and Sidgwick’s point about the flaw of 
the Kantian maxim, which is that it still allows for subjectivity, despite aiming at pure objectivity. See 
chapter 4 of this thesis). Unless the same impartial reasons drive both the contractualism and the rule 
consequentialism, then the two will not be able to converge. Impartiality then, according to Hooker, 
must be more than mere agent-neutrality. However, Hooker points out that provided agents take into 
account the right agent-neutral considerations, then this does result in convergence, and this is a 
remarkable conclusion for Parfit to have drawn (the same will apply even if the two positions only take 
into account the same considerations – they do not necessarily have to be the right ones). But for 
either of these things to happen, there must be agreement on which agent-neutral considerations are 
paramount (p.50). All of this leads Hooker to suggest that this sort of coherence might be best 
represented by a form of reflective equilibrium (pp.50-51). 
As I have outlined above, Sidgwick’s theory of Rational Benevolence also includes an agent-
neutral/impartiality aspect, firstly in the form of the self-evident principle of Prudence, which 
establishes temporal neutrality, and then Benevolence itself, which establishes agent neutrality. It is 
possible, therefore, that this part of Rational Benevolence would be subject to the same queries by 
Hooker as those he brought against Parfit. This seems especially likely given my argument that 
Rational Benevolence does something similar to Triple Theory by creating a convergence between a 
Kantian approach to morality, and a wider utilitarian one. My line of defence against this is to suggest 
that the utilitarianism of Rational Benevolence does, specifically and only, take into account the same 
agent-neutral concerns as Kantianism. I believe that Sidgwick himself expressly recognised the 
problem that Kantianism alone could not produce an adequate system for guidance, precisely 
because it did not seem to eradicate the problem of subjective moral beliefs, and that by rigorously 
testing what could be said of the Kantian maxim, Universal Benevolence is the only morally rational 
result. I theorise therefore that Rational Benevolence may avoid the problem of simply equating 
agent-neutrality with impartiality, because the particular impartiality in Rational Benevolence and its 
combination with Sidgwick’s negative version of the Kantian maxim produces only one ultimately 
reasonable agent-neutral concern. That is, Kantianism and consequentialism are, in Sidgwick’s 
theory, made to have the same agent-neutral concerns – and this is one way in which Hooker thinks 
Parfit has a valid point. Sidgwick’s theory is probably simpler than Parfit’s, but this may actually be to 
its advantage. In terms of whether this amounts to a form of reflective equilibrium, it will be seen (in 
chapter 1) that it is difficult to conclude whether or not Rational Benevolence is reflective equilibrium, 
because it is difficult to conclude whether Sidgwick is predominantly a coherentist, or a 
foundationalist.  
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points on which some distance appears between Triple Theory and Rational 
Benevolence. The first is that Sidgwick’s theory is more traditionally philosophical 
than Parfit’s, by which I mean it is more meta-ethical in an abstract way. As 
important as Parfit’s Triple Theory is to deontological/utilitarian reconciliatory 
theories, I do not believe that it reconciles the moral properties in the same way as 
Sidgwick’s argument for the truly mutually dependent nature of the relationship 
between deontological and utilitarian properties does. Whereas Parfit’s argument is 
highly logical and formulaic, Sidgwick offers the basic, metaphysical means of 
understanding non-consequentialist duty to be inextricably attached to utilitarian 
considerations, which will be particularly effective if it can be shown that Rational 
Benevolence conforms to a synthesis in the way I have described it above. In that 
synthesis, the two rational moral values naturally both qualify and limit each other, 
which is how they are made to be irrefutable components of one coherent whole. 
This, as I have argued above, is a highly effective way of holding deontological and 
utilitarian principles together in such a way that they are in dynamic relationship 
rather than contention, which would be most helpful for the problem of moral 
ambivalence that I am trying to address. Parfit does also use the language of 
synthesis, but Triple Theory is not a synthesis of the kind I propose to draw out of 
Sidgwick’s Rational Benevolence.     
The second area in which Rational Benevolence presents something slightly 
different to Triple Theory is that of normative value. Rational Benevolence offers a 
potential method for being able to identify ‘rationally benevolent’ actions – actions 
that can be seen to include the values (and thus the limits) of both rational 
deontological and utilitarian properties and are thus more robustly morally defensible 
in contexts such as the Parental Predicament. Triple Theory is highly sophisticated, 
but it is unclear how this single, complex, higher level property is to apply at a 
practical level. 
On these two counts, I believe that Rational Benevolence might still be able to 
contribute something of value to understanding how deontological and utilitarian 
properties can be united, even in the face of Parfit’s accomplished theory. 
 
0.8.c Other Considerations on Rational Benevolence as a Moral Theory 
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There are two remaining possible objections that could be brought against my 
argument for Sidgwick’s theory of Rational Benevolence. The first is - what of other 
moral theories? The most obvious of these that is omitted from the above discussion 
is virtue ethics. It is true that virtue ethics arose largely in specific response to 
modern moral philosophy’s preoccupation with moral obligation as it was being 
presented by deontological or utilitarian principles, and it is certainly one of the only 
positions (not including religious ones) that can genuinely claim to be approaching 
morality in a way different to those two major schools134. It may even provide another 
possible means of challenging the traditional divide. However, where deontological 
and utilitarian normative theories are concerned with right action, the central 
questions of virtue ethics are those such as ‘how should I live?’, ‘what is the good 
life?’ and ‘what are the correct personal and societal values?’, and this does not 
often involve asking what it is right or wrong to actually do in a given situation. This 
question will be particularly pertinent in highly sensitive situations which are 
unexpected, and which are constrained by time in some way. The Parental 
Predicament, for example, is likely to involve one or both of those factors. In any 
case, I argue that normative questions are always going to be asked of any ethical 
situation in some capacity, and the answers to them are always going to involve 
recourse to the same options: Do we obey absolute principles? Or do we act in 
whatever way will secure the best outcome in the circumstances? I suggest that 
virtue ethics has very little constructive to say to these questions, and therefore to 
the problem of moral ambivalence, other than that cultivating the right character 
would enable an individual to act rightly in any situation, rather than just the specific 
situation in which they are in at the time – and I cannot see that this approach is 
adequate for providing a real guide for action in what is often the unanticipated here 
and now, or for offering better protection to parents within the framework of 
autonomy.  
The last theoretical consideration of Rational Benevolence however must be this: 
Is Rational Benevolence, and Sidgwick’s moral theory, ultimately just utilitarianism? 
This is, of course, the tide of prevailing opinion, and there are likely to be good 
grounds for such volumes. Sidgwick did at times align himself with a utilitarian 
                                                 
134 See G.E.M. Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, in, Philosophy, Vol.33, No.124 (1958) 1-19; 
Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana: 1985); Philippa Foot, Virtues 
and Vices (Oxford: Blackwell: 1978); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth: 1985) 
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position, although it is widely recognised that this was a highly sophisticated form of 
utilitarianism135. But I agree with Schneewind that it does not necessarily follow that 
ME is itself a defence of utilitarianism. Sidgwick is clear about this from the outset, 
and it is my view that the results of the investigations in ME reveal to Sidgwick that 
utilitarianism is absolutely dependent on other self-evident principles, which he lifts 
directly from the deontological tradition, as I have outlined above and will argue in full 
in the thesis. I argue therefore that Rational Benevolence itself is not simply 
utilitarianism, and this is the case I will be making here.   
On the other hand, it may be that Sidgwick does offer a form of utilitarianism, and 
that this might in itself be a perfectly acceptable version of the synthesis in Rational 
Benevolence. Brad Hooker argues that rule utilitarianism, and a form of reflective 
equilibrium therein, is an effective means of accounting for and unifying our various 
moral convictions. Hooker also argues that Sidgwick himself could be interpreted to 
be a rule utilitarian136. Following Hooker then, it might be said that Sidgwick is indeed 
a type of rule utilitarian, and that this is actually to his great advantage. This may well 
also be another way of arguing that Sidgwick achieved the sort of unification 
between deontological and utilitarian moral inclinations for which I am arguing via 
Rational Benevolence. But to label Sidgwick as a rule utilitarian does not, on my 
view, pay adequately specific attention to the crucial deontological aspect of his work 
that makes his theory so distinctive, and so effectively overcomes ‘the antithesis’ 
between deontology and utilitarianism. I agree with Hooker that our primary moral 
intuitions need to be coalesced, and I believe this was also Sidgwick’s position - I 
have presented the case above that Sidgwick’s own epistemic intuitionism is itself 
                                                 
135 See Sidgwick, ‘Professor Calderwood on Intuitionism in Morals’, p.564. Bart Schultz has also said 
recently that Sidgwick ‘set out with unparalleled clarity and force the utilitarian view that maximising 
happiness...was the ultimate normative standard’ (Schultz, A more Reasonable Ghost, 
https://roundedglobe.com/books/34a3e7ff-778f-48d5-bca0-
ed4e10132715/A%20More%20Reasonable%20Ghost:%20Further%20Reflections%20on%20Henry%
20Sidgwick%20and%20the%20Irrationality%20of%20the%20Universe/ (no date; accessed 
20/6/2016) p.2 
I maintain however that even if Sidgwick is ultimately called a utilitarian, it appears evident that he has 
appropriated Kant to his cause to such a great extent that he has incorporated Kant’s ideas into his 
own view - and this does suggest that Sidgwick’s thought is at least sympathetic to deontological 
ideas.   
136 See Hooker, ‘Rule Consequentialism’ (Stanford), and ‘Sidgwick and Common Sense Morality’ 
pp.355-359. I have italicised ‘could’ in this sentence, however, because this does require some 
qualification. Overall, Hooker tends most often towards the argument that Sidgwick was an act 
utilitarian (see also Ideal Code pp.5-6, 99). But Hooker does believe that Sidgwick’s emphasis on 
assimilating common sense morality can accord with a rule-utilitarian approach (Ideal Code, pp.114, 
116). Hooker also points out that in any case, rule-utilitarianism would have offered Sidgwick a better 
method for doing this than the act form (‘Sidgwick and Common Sense Morality’, p.360). 
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comprised of both deontological and utilitarian principles (as I will argue more 
extensively in chapter 2). But this is precisely why I dispute Sidgwick’s utilitarian 
label. It is only because Sidgwick’s theory of Rational Benevolence is a synthesis 
between equally important and mutually informing deontological and utilitarian 
concepts that it can be so directly applicable to the problems outlined at the start of 
this thesis. Because Rational Benevolence embodies this balanced meeting between 
the two moral properties, it accounts for the dual reasonableness that I have 
theorised to be the cause of moral ambivalence, and legitimises the rationality of 
both positions. And it is my argument that this elevates Sidgwick away from a merely 
utilitarian label.  
Lastly, even if it is admitted that Sidgwick is not a utilitarian, there are a number 
of ways in which it might be argued that Rational Benevolence is not a ‘synthesis’ 
between deontological and utilitarian principles137. It might be stated that the 
relationship is not truly mutually informing – that it is weighted in favour of one moral 
property or the other, or that it is not necessary that the deontological and utilitarian 
aspects both retain those qualities, and depend on each other. But it will be my aim 
in this thesis to build a case that the relationship between utilitarianism and 
deontology in Rational Benevolence is a synthesis of that nature. I also emphasise in 
response to those possible objections that Sidgwick himself used the language of 
synthesis, and that he recognised the importance of attempts to bring together the 
differing but apparently valid moral inclinations that make up the human moral 
experience.  It was Sidgwick’s hope that he could aid towards the construction of 
such a system, and it is my hope that this thesis might go some of the way towards 
constructing that system itself.  
 
 
0.9. Summary of Aims, and Structure of the Thesis  
 
                                                 
137 For example, David Phillips does not believe that Sidgwick achieved the reconciliation that he 
thought he had, on the basis that there is a fundamental problem with Sidgwick’s argument for his 
own self-evident principles, from which he constructs his moral theory (Sidgwickian Ethics, pp.95-
111). Thomas Hurka agrees with Phillips (Hurka, ‘Sidgwick on Consequentialism and Deontology’, in, 
Utilitas, Vol. 26, No.2 (2014) 129-152, p. 147-151), Both of their positions are considered in the literature 
review. 
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It is my principal aim in this thesis to show that Sidgwick’ theory of Rational 
Benevolence provides a synthesis, understood as an interdependent and mutually 
informing relationship between utilitarian and deontological moral properties, that I 
have argued is required for a full understanding of the human moral experience. 
Specifically, this will involve first demonstrating how Sidgwick argues for the 
rationality of both deontological and utilitarian principles of morality, and then how 
this rationality unites them to create his moral theory of Universal Benevolence, 
which is best represented by the term ‘Rational Benevolence’. I theorise that in this 
way, Rational Benevolence could offer a reconciliatory theory that challenges the 
traditional divide between deontological and utilitarian moral principles as it exists at 
the philosophical level, and also a means of addressing moral ambivalence in such a 
way that more than one course of action can be morally justified in ethically difficult 
situations.  
There are three main stages to constructing this argument, which are laid out 
in the following chapter outline. 
 
 
Chapter 1: Literature Review: Other Readings of Henry Sidgwick 
The overall purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, it aims to create a space in 
which to argue that there is a recognisably deontological aspect of Sidgwick’s work 
that has largely been missed, due to the fact that he has always been read as a 
utilitarian. Secondly, it argues that Sidgwick’s reconciliation between deontological 
and utilitarian moral properties has also been overlooked. The chapter begins from 
Sidgwick’s time, and moves through the most notable theorists of the 20th century 
who have categorised Sidgwick as a utilitarian. The next part of the chapter focuses 
on the resurgence of interest in Sidgwick that has taken place in the last two 
decades, and specifically where Sidgwick has appeared in a significant way in the 
work of prominent theorists, but without having been utilised for his reconciliatory 
theory. The last part of the chapter examines recent theorists who have 
acknowledged that Sidgwick’s work offers some kind of reconciliation, and argues 
that the particular synthesis of Rational Benevolence has not been recognised.   
 
 
Chapter 2: Sidgwick’s Account of Deontology  
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Here the case is made for there being a recognisably deontological influence in 
Sidgwick’s work. I argue here that by ‘Intuitionism’ (with a capital ‘I’) Sidgwick is 
referring to a recognisably deontological method of ethics, understood as 
representing Reason-based non-consequentialism, and that this traditionally Kantian 
form of duty is actually found to contribute significantly to his own understanding of 
moral obligation. This relies almost exclusively on textual analysis, referring to ME, 
the personal document, and other articles and papers by Sidgwick. The second half 
of the chapter is concerned with examining the value that Sidgwick ascribes to 
deontological-based dogmatic intuitionism (or common sense morality) as a method 
of ethics that appears in the moral process of ordinary individuals, and assessing the 
place of this system of ethics in Sidgwick’s overall moral theory. I aim here to show 
that despite showing most principles of dogmatic intuitionism to not actually be self-
evident, Sidgwick does not himself entirely discount the method, and that he derives 
the principle of Universal Benevolence as an ultimately rational moral obligation from 
the self-evident, non-consequentialist bases of Justice and Prudence. Through this I 
also argue that Sidgwick’s ‘Intuitionism’ actually informs his own epistemic 
‘intuitionism’. The chapter concludes that Sidgwick affords far greater weight and 
value to non-consequentialist moral properties than is commonly thought - but that 
Sidgwick does not consider deontological principles to be by themselves sufficient 
for constructing a wholly comprehensive or accurate account of morality. 
 
Chapter 3: Sidgwick’s Account of Utilitarianism 
This chapter begins from the acknowledgement that Sidgwick is a utilitarian in some 
sense, and that this utilitarianism is of course essential to the proposed synthesis. I 
do however argue in this chapter that Sidgwick’s discussions of utilitarianism are 
often less ‘typical’ than might be expected of classical or standard utilitarianism. Four 
defining features are identified in order to make this argument, that also guide this 
stage of the investigation. These are; that Sidgwick was not intending to write a 
defence of utilitarianism; that his predominantly Kantian understanding of rightness 
calls into question the status of means to ends; that Sidgwick recognises the ‘defects 
and difficulties’ of the utilitarian position; and that Sidgwick’s own version of the 
utilitarian doctrine is a stringent one. I then argue that the last stage of his discussion 
on utilitarianism, in which Sidgwick aims to give the ‘positive’ proof for utilitarianism, 
can only be fully understood in light of the ‘negative’ relation between utilitarianism 
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and common sense morality given in Book III. That ‘negative’ relation (which I argue 
is not actually a negative relation at all, but another form of the positive relation) is a 
philosophical connection between the two moral positions that accounts for 
Sidgwick’s statement in Book III that ‘the truth lies between these conclusions’, and 
the sister passage in Book IV that states a line of argument is needed that does 
allow the validity to some extent of common maxims. This situation thus provides the 
starting point for the following chapter, which will argue for that philosophical 
connection – and the relationship between deontological and utilitarian principles in 
Sidgwick’s work.  
 
Chapter 4: ‘Rational Benevolence’: Sidgwick’s Synthesis 
In this chapter, all the claims made throughout the preceding stages of the thesis are 
brought together to fully form the arguments that Sidgwick perceived there to be a 
necessary and inherent relationship between deontological and utilitarian principles 
of morality, and that the nature of the relationship he creates conforms to the 
definition of ‘synthesis’ that I have given. The main discussion is taken up by a 
comprehensive analysis of ME’s Book III, in which Sidgwick uncovers the essential 
link between the fundamental, self-evident and non-consequentialist principles of 
Justice and Prudence, and the subsequently derived self-evidence of utilitarian 
Universal Benevolence. This connection, I will argue, is based on the inherent 
rationality of each type of moral property. It is only the rationality of the self-evident, 
non-consequentialist principles of Justice and Prudence that establish Universal 
Benevolence as ultimately rational; it is Universal Benevolence as the ultimately 
rational end of moral action that confirms and contextualises the place of Justice and 
Prudence. All must retain their original respective non-consequentialist or utilitarian 
properties in order to be mutually informing in this way – but all also depend on each 
other for full realisation and validation. In this way, the rightness of absolute-principle 
based and end-based moral properties are inextricably linked within a coherent 
whole that is most suitably referred to as ‘Rational Benevolence’. The last section of 
the chapter then turns to the PD, where Sidgwick outlines clearly the personal 
process through which he came to believe that there is no opposition between 
deontological and utilitarian principles – and in which he plainly states that neither 
the deontological position in Intuitionism, nor utilitarianism, are morally complete 
without reference to the other.  
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Conclusion 
The results of chapter 4’s argument for the synthesis embodied by Rational 
Benevolence are here examined in light of the problem of moral ambivalence that 
was outlined at the start of this introduction. Applying the findings of Rational 
Benevolence to the context of the Parental Predicament, it will be argued here that 
Sidgwick’s synthesis between two different but equally rational moral properties 
directly reflects the dual reasonableness that causes moral ambivalence, and thus 
explains moral ambivalence/moral conflicts more effectively than theories that 
attempt to argue exclusively for either absolute-principle based or outcome-based 
approaches. That is, I argue here that Rational Benevolence provides a means of 
understanding both courses of action in situations of grave moral ambivalence to be, 
in a sense, ‘right’. I then follow up this explanative function, and argue that Rational 
Benevolence has two levels of ‘descriptive value’. These are a) the superficial, in 
which Rational Benevolence is simply explaining more accurately and more 
realistically the moral conflicts that we are seeing, and b) the substantive, in which 
that explanation itself specifically points to the dual reasonableness that could 
provide the basis for Rational Benevolence as a system of normative ethics. I then 
outline how Rational Benevolence might be normatively applied, including an 
examination of exactly what is meant by ‘rationally benevolent actions’, and whether 
or not a universalizability factor could be established. A full investigation into Rational 
Benevolence as a theory of normative ethics is beyond the scope of this thesis, and 
areas for possible future work are identified in light of this. But overall I suggest that 
the synthesis between deontological and utilitarian properties as it appears at the 
theoretical level could transfer directly onto moral actions at the practical level in 
such a way that each position both validates and limits the other to an appropriate 
degree, as it was said above is required by the dual reasonableness of moral 
ambivalence. 
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CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW  
OTHER READINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF SIDGWICK 
 
This chapter will examine the place of Henry Sidgwick’s work within moral 
philosophy. It is in part a history of ideas, in that it tracks where and why Sidgwick’s 
work has been relevant in the century that followed him, and in part a critical 
engagement with the work of more recent theorists for whom Sidgwick’s ethical 
theory has been a significant influence. The aim is to ascertain how Sidgwick’s work 
has been predominantly interpreted, and to construct a place for my particular 
reading of Sidgwick that I develop in this thesis, which consists of these main points: 
That Sidgwick’s moral theory is not exclusively utilitarian, that there is a recognisably 
deontological aspect to his work that contributes vitally to his own theory of moral 
obligation, and that his theory of Rational Benevolence offers a synthesis between 
deontological and utilitarian moral properties that could contribute significantly to 
overcoming the traditional divide between those ethical systems.  
The theorists included in this chapter range from Sidgwick’s contemporaries to 
theorists writing today, and the chapter follows a mainly chronological structure to 
support this. But the chapter is also designed to tell a certain story, about the way in 
which Sidgwick’s work has been passed down through history. The story’s main 
theme is what has been missed about Sidgwick’s work, and as such it is, I believe, 
an original one. The narrative moves through stages that correspond with the main 
ideas in my reading of Sidgwick. As outlined in the thesis introduction, Sidgwick has 
historically and (almost) universally been considered to be a classical utilitarian (of 
the Benthamite/Mill tradition), despite his work having been utilised by some 
distinctly non-utilitarian positions. In the 20th Century sections of the chapter 
therefore, attention will be drawn both to the prevalence of Sidgwick’s utilitarian 
status and to the places where he was also momentarily relevant to deontological 
theories also, with the argument being made that the significance of that flexibility 
was overlooked.  When it comes to the recent resurgence in interest in Sidgwick, 
and in the movement towards making him actively relevant to contemporary 
philosophy, it will be seen that his utilitarian reputation has endured. Whereas there 
has been some recent recognition of the fact that ME should perhaps not be read 
simply as a defence of utilitarianism, and even a degree of acknowledgement that 
Sidgwick might offer some kind of reconciliation between deontological and utilitarian 
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principles, neither of these aspects, still, have been fully realised. This account of 
Sidgwick’s story will end therefore on the points that Rational Benevolence has not 
been recognised as the source of reconciliation in Sidgwick’s work, that it has not 
been read as a synthesis between deontological and utilitarian principles – and the 
idea that there is now space in the field for these arguments to be made. It is to this 
part of Sidgwick’s story that I intend this present thesis to be directly relevant. 
In terms of the most recent literature, the focus is mainly on theorists who have 
addressed in some way the idea of Sidgwick’s applicability to both deontological and 
utilitarian fields - but there are other writers included here, who although they do not 
directly discuss reconciliation have nonetheless presented readings of Sidgwick that 
have shaped his place in moral philosophy, and contributed helpfully to my reading 
of him here.  
 
1.1.  The Methods of Ethics: Reception and the Early Years 
The first part in telling the story of how Sidgwick’s work has been passed on through 
the years must of course take account of how ME was originally received, upon 
publication and in the years in which it was still relatively new. There are some 
important details here, in Sidgwick’s discourse with his peers and critics, and in the 
criticisms themselves, that begin to build the path that ME would be set upon for 
much of its future. In these sections I take account of the reception of ME, and of 
where it appeared in the work of theorists whose ideas were to contribute 
significantly to the development of moral philosophy in the 20th Century. 
1.1.a. Initial Reactions 
By the time ME was published in 1874, Sidgwick had been working on it for over a 
decade138. Sidgwick was careful to distinguish that by the ‘The Methods’ of the title 
he did not mean a or the definitive method, but rather impartial observation and 
investigation into morality as it appeared and operated in ordinary moral thought. ME 
was meant to be a ‘technical work’139, which would introduce clarity into an otherwise 
highly confused and diverse field. Sidgwick intended it to be the most comprehensive 
                                                 
138 As mentioned in the thesis introduction, Sidgwick alludes this work as early as 1862, in the letter to 
H.G. Dakyns. He also told several other people over the next few years that he was developing a 
“great work” (Schultz, Eye of the Universe, p. 141). 
139 See Schneewind, Sidgwickian Ethics, p.191 
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and thorough inquiry into the nature of the human moral experience yet written – and 
it was. Sidgwick’s systematic approach to moral thought, and his diligent attention to 
detail, bore ME upon its publication to the heights of instant recognition.  
 The initial discussion and reviews of ME - though vast – are varied. Much of 
the literature is positive regarding the volume’s scope and depth. H. Calderwood 
presented a fierce challenge to Sidgwick’s version of intuitionism, but elsewhere 
states his ‘admiration of the ability manifest everywhere throughout the book’140. A. 
Bain, in his long scrutiny of ME, praises Sidgwick for ‘not blinking any difficulties’, 
that arise during the investigation of each method (hedonism, in particular), and 
despite criticising some of the later aspects of ME, also accredits it with being one of 
the best volumes of its generation141. This sort of statement was to become a 
running theme in ME’s lasting reputation142. In terms of Sidgwick’s own contribution 
to moral philosophy (as opposed to ME’s value as a sort of encyclopaedia of the 
various ethical approaches) however, ME divided opinion. F.H. Bradley took 
Sidgwick to task on the controversial issue of hedonism143. For some, Sidgwick’s 
critical and non-constructive approach to philosophy rendered him fairly useless in 
terms of true meta-ethics144. In a review of Sidgwick’s later work Philosophy: Its 
Scope and Relations, A.E. Taylor said of ME that the ‘cardinal defect’ of the volume 
was its failure to fundamentally grasp some philosophical problems145. Even C.D. 
Broad was later to venture that some of ME’s claims were ‘extraordinarily trivial’146. It 
                                                 
140 Calderwood, H. ‘Mr Sidgwick on Intuitionalism’, in, Mind, Vol.1, No.2 (1876) 197-206, p. 206 
141 A. Bain, ‘Mr Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics’, in, Mind, Vol.1, No.2 (1876) 179-197, p. 185 
142 Hastings Rashdall stated ME to be an “instant philosophical classic” in 1885 (‘Professor Sidgwick’s 
Utilitarianism’, in, Mind, Vol.10, No.38 (1885) 200-226, p.201), C.D. Broad famously declared it to be 
‘the best treatise on moral theory that has ever been written’ in 1930 (Broad, Five Types, p.143), and 
John Rawls called it ‘the first truly academic work in moral theory, modern in both method and spirit” 
(Rawls, Preface to Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics, 7th Edition (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing: 
1980), p.v). See also Henry Barker, ‘A Recent Criticism of Henry Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics’, in 
Philosophical Review, Vol.11, No.6 (1902) 617-603; William Pepperell Montague, The Ways of 
Knowing, or The Methods of Philosophy (London: Compton Printing Works Ltd: 1925) p.5, and Brand 
Blanshard, Reason and Goodness (London: George, Allen, and Unwin: 1961), p.90 - all of whom are 
united on the basis of great regard for Sidgwick’s treatment of ethics, even if they are divided about 
the results of his arguments. 
143 F.H. Bradley, ‘Mr Sidgwick on Ethical Studies’, in, Mind, Vol.2, No.122 (1877) 
144 Schultz states that much of the controversy surrounding ME when it was first published arose 
because Sidgwick tended to keep philosophy ‘at arm’s length’ (Schultz, Eye of the Universe, p.142). 
This is connected, perhaps, to Sidgwick’s preferring to always keep arguments open, and to the fact 
that he wasn’t aiming to give an ethical theory, but rather an exploration.  
145 A.E. Taylor, ‘Review: Philosophy: Its Scope and Relations: Henry Sidgwick’, in, Ethics, Vol.13, 
No.3 (1903) 377-, p.378. Taylor was still ready, however, to admit to Sidgwick’s ‘genius’, that showed 
in all he had written as a critical philosopher. 
146 Despite his initial glowing review, it is also Broad who draws attention to Sidgwick’s ‘grave defects 
as a writer’ (Five Types, p.144). These are almost universally accepted as over-complexity, an 
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was vaguely recognised that, despite apparently following in the tradition of Bentham 
and Mill in some respects, Sidgwick was aware of the difficulties of the utilitarian 
doctrine, and was clearly prepared to address them in a far more credible way than 
either Bentham or Mill had attempted. But so much of all of this was overshadowed 
by that now infamous Sidgwickian problem, the Dualism of Practical Reason (here 
after ‘DoPR’) - which represented Sidgwick’s inability to reconcile reasonable self-
interest with duty, and which Sidgwick himself loudly lamented147. Sidgwick was 
persuaded to alter the last chapter of ME in order to reduce the emphasis on this 
problem148. But despite these revisions, the DoPR was to remain among the most 
persistently reviewed of all aspects of Sidgwick’s work, and arguably overshadowed 
some of ME’s more refined achievements149.  
 Overall, The Methods obtained a place of immediate importance upon its 
publication, and retained a significant degree of philosophical merit thereafter. 
Interestingly, not much of the literature contemporary to Sidgwick makes much of ME 
                                                 
impenetrable density of content – and and unfortunate tendency to dullness. Broad also believed 
Sidgwick, on some points, to have failed to actually produce any truly substantial answers to some of 
the more pressing questions. But Broad’s more generous assessment of Sidgwick also draws 
attention to another reason why ME earned the status that it did. ‘His capacity for seeing all sides of a 
question and estimating their relative importance was unrivalled….and he never allowed the natural 
desire to make up one’s mind on important questions to hurry him into a decision….Those who, like 
the present writer, never had the privilege of meeting Sidgwick can infer from his writings, and still 
more from the characteristic philosophic merits of such pupils of his as McTaggart and Moore, how 
acute and painstaking a thinker and how inspiring a teacher he must have been’ (Broad, Five Types, 
p.144). Broad’s assumption is proven by other more personal accounts of Sidgwick to be absolutely 
sound. 
147 Others also recognised the extent of the problem (see Lesley Stephens’ review of ME, ‘Sidgwick’s 
Methods of Ethics’ in Fraser’s Magazine (1875) n.s.11, for example), although none were harsher 
critics of this problem than Sidgwick himself.  
148 During the section in the preface to the second edition in which Sidgwick discusses the 
amendments he had made to the last chapters of ME, he reminds his readers of Butler’s influence, 
but also emphasises where he differs from Butler. According to Sidgwick, Butler had never seriously 
asked the question ‘what among the common precepts of our common conscience do we really see to 
be ultimately reasonable?’ whereas Sidgwick himself had asked this question. What is most important 
about this is that it leads to Sidgwick stating – plainly and without qualification – that the answer he 
found ‘supplied the rational basis that I had long perceived to be wanting to the Utilitarianism of 
Bentham….and thus enabled me to transcend the commonly received antithesis between Intuitionists 
and Utilitarianism’. That is, there is very strong evidence here to support the argument that the DoPR 
not only need not stand in the way of drawing out of Sidgwick’s work a synthesis between 
deontological and utilitarian principles, but that Sidgwick’s deeper investigation of into what can be 
called ultimately reasonable actually yielded such a result. This point will be resumed in subsequent 
chapters.  
149 See, as just a few examples of works that are predominantly concerned with the DoPR, W.R. 
Sorley, A History of English Philosophy (New York: G.P Putman’s Sons: 1921); J.L. Mackie, 
‘Sidgwick’s Pessimism’, in, Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.26, No.105 (1976) 317-27; David O Brink, 
‘Sidgwick and the Rationale for Rational Egoism’, in, Bart Schultz, Essays on Henry Sidgwick 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1992) pp.199-240; W. Frankena, ‘Sidgwick and the 
Dualism of Practical Reason’, in The Monist, Vol.58 (1974) 449-467; Alison Hills, ‘The Significance of 
the Dualism in Practical Reason’, in, Utilitas, Vol.15, No.3 (2003) 315-329. 
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as a defence of Utilitarianism. This was to follow however, as the result of the 
aforementioned F.H. Bradley’s issue with Sidgwick’s hedonism, and Sidgwick’s 
apparent incompatibility with another branch of moral philosophy that was 
developing at the time – Idealism.  
 
1.1.b. Sidgwick’s Utilitarianism and British Idealism 
In the preface to ME’s second edition, Sidgwick responds to the criticisms from A. 
Bain and H Calderwood that were outlined above150. But Sidgwick also references a 
third type of critic, who he doesn’t mention by name. These critics have, Sidgwick 
says, despite Sidgwick’s insistence in the preface to the first edition of ME that he 
was not intending to defend any one particular ethical theory more than another, 
‘overlooked or disregarded the account of the plan of my treatise…and [have] 
consequently supposed me to be writing as an assailant of two of the methods which 
I chiefly examine and a defender of the third’ (ME: x). Chief of the critics to whom 
Sidgwick was referring here is undoubtedly F.H. Bradley.  
 Bradley was among the members of the first wave of British Idealism that 
began in the 1870s. Arguing a belief in an all-encompassing ‘Absolute’ reality, and 
concerned to emphasise the faculty of Reason as the means of accessing and 
understanding this Absolute, Idealism was to some extent a revival of the of the 
German idealism of Immanuel Kant and G.W. F. Hegel. More specific to the 
discussion here is that it was in part a reaction to the utilitarianism of David Hume, 
J.S. Mill – and Henry Sidgwick. In his 1877 pamphlet Mr Sidgwick’s Hedonism; An 
Examination of the Main Argument of The Method of Ethics, Bradley took Sidgwick’s 
apparent hedonism to be paradigmatic of that which the Idealists were rejecting, and 
mounted a sustained attack151. 
                                                 
150 Sidgwick actually gave a very lengthy response to what he considered to be Calderwood’s serious 
‘misapprehension’ of his ‘meaning and drift’, in ‘Professor Calderwood on Intuitionism in Morals’, in, 
Mind, Vol.1, No.4 (1786) 563-566. 
151 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1877). Schneewind points out that this was really the 
only protracted criticism encountered by ME in Sidgwick’s lifetime. It was, however, fierce. Bradley 
had actually already criticised Sidgwick’s account of reason in Ethical Studies (1876) In the evocative 
words of D.G. James, “Bradley trained on Sidgwick’s book in a footnote to an essay in Ethical Studies 
a brilliant burst of machine gun fire; and then, in a brochure he put out in 1877, he brought up his full 
armoury and blew Sidgwick’s position to pieces” (James, Henry Sidgwick: Science and Faith in 
Victorian England, (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1970) p.33. 
Bradley’s main charge against Sidgwick was that his account of Reason was vague. (For others of 
this opinion, see E. Albee, A History of English Utilitarianism (Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge: 1901) 
and James Seth (‘The Ethical System of Henry Sidgwick’) who also considered Sidgwick’s rendering 
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Bradley’s criticisms of hedonism were, and still are, considered to be seminal152. But 
if Bradley had introduced Idealism, it was T.H. Green – a colleague of Bradley’s at 
Oxford - who made the most important developments to it. Despite having been 
great friends since both attending Rugby School, it was actually Green who provided 
a systemised Idealistic account of morality that could be thought to really compete 
with Sidgwick’s. Heavily anti-utilitarian, on the basis that that doctrine lacked any 
metaphysical grounds, and concerned to show that human existence is not entirely 
governed by the laws of nature Green engaged extensively with ME in his 
Prolegomena to Ethics153. Unlike Bradley however, Green held ME in great esteem. 
This was due to the crucial – and telling - fact that he did not consider Sidgwick’s 
utilitarianism to be the standard classical doctrine. Green was, like Bradley, also 
concerned with Sidgwick’s use of Reason - but where the original utilitarians such as 
Hume had believed Reason to be a faculty of means, rather than of ends, Green 
recognised Sidgwick’s interpretation of utilitarianism to be highly Kantian, in that the 
function of Sidgwick’s Reason was to yield ultimate ends154. As Green describes it, 
                                                 
of Reason to be ambiguous. See Barker (‘A Recent Criticism’) for the completely opposite opinion). 
Bradley could not fathom whether Sidgwick thought particular moral judgements, or universal 
judgements, were the functions of Reason – and was also unclear on how Reason and desire were 
related in motivating an individual to act. Bradley’s attempted definition of Sidgwick’s Reason is “I 
think that Reason stands for the faculty which apprehends ‘universal truth,’ general rules’, ‘abstract 
moral notions’, ‘moral axioms’; and further that it includes as well the reasoning to particular cases 
from ‘general moral axioms’ whether these latter are ‘universal moral intuitions’ or not. The word may 
cover more, but I doubt it” (‘Sidgwick’s Hedonism’, p.9). In Bradley’s defence, that interpretation of 
Sidgwick’s use of Reason is not entirely inaccurate; Sidgwick does often use an amalgamation of 
reasoning and intuitionism in his epistemology, and at other times separates them entirely. But 
Sidgwick was entirely capable of defending himself. The dialogue between the two philosophers, 
consisting mainly of reviews of each other’s work, reveal Sidgwick at his quietly disparaging best. In 
his review of Bradley’s Ethical Studies, Sidgwick described the book (and by extension Bradley 
himself) ‘vehemently propagandist’ (Mind, Vol.1 (1876) p.545). Of Bradley himself, Sidgwick said 
“penetrating criticism, especially in ethics, requires a patient effort of sympathy, which Mr Bradley has 
never learned to make, and a tranquillity of temper which he seems incapable of maintaining (‘Review 
of Ethical Studies’, p.545)  
152 See Stewart Candlish, ‘The Truth About F.H. Bradley’, in, Mind, Vol.98, No.391 (1989) 331-348, 
and Marcus Singer, ‘Henry Sidgwick’, 1992, p.73, in, Singer (ed.) Sidgwick, Essays on Ethics and 
Method (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 2000), p.xxxviii 
153 Green (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1883). See Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics 
(Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd: 1967) p.245. 
154 Green gave one of the most robust defences of Sidgwick’s rejection of egoistic hedonism in favour 
of universal hedonism, drawing attention to the fact that it was Sidgwick’s interpretation of Reason 
that had led him to that conclusion (Green, Prologomena, pp. 409-10). Green believed most theories 
of the ‘good’ to be unavoidably circular, but allowed Sidgwick’s theory to escape this accusation on 
the grounds that Sidgwick concluded that it is reasonable to seek as ultimate good a form of life that is 
reasonably desired. Whereas this may still appear circular, for Green this was Sidgwick agreeing with 
his own belief – highly Kantian and almost transcendental - that Reason gives its own end, and needs 
no further qualification.  
Nor did Sidgwick’s apparent alignment with the Idealist values of Green – and of Bradley –end there. 
It has since been proposed, by Dr C. J. Dewey perhaps most notably, that the Oxford Idealists 
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Sidgwick ‘accepted principles, as it would seem, so antagonistic to those of the 
philosophic utilitarians’, by having sought a ‘proof’ for the utilitarian principle which he 
only found to exist in Reason - but (inexplicably, to Green) ended ‘by accepting their 
conclusions’155. 
Green’s reading of Sidgwick was thus vital for suggesting that Sidgwick was only a 
very particular kind of utilitarian. There were sundry agreements with this idea: 
Sidgwick’s friend James Bryce, for example, wrote of him – “the system of Utility 
takes in his hands a form so much more refined and delicate than was given to it by 
Bentham and James Mill, and is expounded with so many qualifications unknown to 
them, that it has become a very different thing. 156. As noted in the introduction, F.H. 
                                                 
(Bradley and Green) actually shared with the ‘Cambridge Revisionists’ (of whom Henry Sidgwick 
was the main one) a common moral and social philosophy, on the basis that both groups rejected 
aspects of traditional utilitarianism (Dewey, ‘Cambridge Idealism’; Utilitarian Revisionists in Late 
Nineteenth-Century Cambridge’, in, The Historical Journal, Vol.17, No.1 (1974) 63-78. See also S. 
Collini, ‘Idealism and “Cambridge Idealism”’, in, The Historical Journal, Vol.18, No.1 (2009) 171-177, 
pp.171-172). Collini rightly points to several facts that seriously undermined Dewey’s claim, such as 
the vehemence of the debate between Sidgwick and Bradley in the pages of Mind, and the fact that 
they weren’t as unified on the rejection of hedonism as Dewey seems to assume that they are. But 
theories such as Dewey’s are important for the fact that if nothing else, they point to how easy it was 
to distinguish Sidgwick from the earlier utilitarians – to the extent to which writers such as staunch 
Idealist Green could actually draw parallels with Sidgwick’s views.  
155 Green, Prologomena, p.411. Despite Green’s apparent support for Sidgwick on this point, Green’s 
ethics were a life-long battleground for Sidgwick, and the two had actually long been in dispute about 
the nature of ‘ultimate good’, which started after the publication of Sidgwick’s 1877 article ‘Hedonism 
and Ultimate Good’ (Mind, Vol.2, 27-38). Sidgwick and Green were also opposed on notions of 
pleasure, feeling, time as an abstract concept, and moral ideas, among other things. Before it became 
obvious in Green’s Prologomena that Green was trying to recruit Sidgwick to a more transcendentalist 
position, the discourse had been long and convoluted. See Sidgwick, ‘Green’s Ethics’, in Mind, Vol.9, 
No.34 (1884) 169-187; Sidgwick, Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant and Other Philosophical 
Lectures and Essays, (London: Macmillan: 1905) 220-221; Sidgwick, Review of Green and Groses’ 
Edition of Hume’s Treaties (Academy, 30th May, 1874); Sidgwick (E.E. Constance Jones, (ed.), 
Lectures on the Ethics of T.H.Green, Mr Herbert Spencer and J. Martineau (London: Macmillan: 
1902), pp.11-14, 15-22, 179.  
In his review of Sidgwick’s Lectures on the Ethics of T.H.Green, James Seth states that although 
Green gave enormous weight to Sidgwick’s use of Reason, Green’s Idealism would forever be the 
only system of ethics on which Sidgwick never got a proper grasp (Seth, ‘Reviewed Work: Lectures 
on the Ethics of T.H. Green, Mr Herbert Spencer and J. Martineau’, in, The Philosophical Review, 
Vol.12, No.5 (1903) 548-553, p.550). Others however, such as D. Weinstein, look more favourably on 
the relationship between Green and Sidgwick, claiming that they both recognised that they shared 
“good-promoting” theories of morality, and that most of their arguments were actually due either to 
misunderstanding each other, or to each feeling that the argument of the other was vague to the point 
of incoherence (Weinstein, Utilitarianism and the New Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press: 2011) pp. 53-55). Weinstein also draws attention to the point made in the main text above, that 
in terms of accepting the normative value of utilitarianism, Green moved closer to Sidgwick’s position 
than Sidgwick did to Green (Utilitarianism, p. 55).  
156 James Bryce, ‘Henry Sidgwick’, in, Studies in Contemporary Biography (London: Macmillan: 
1903). It is also important to note the influence on Sidgwick of F.D. Maurice, an eminent figure among 
the Cambridge ‘Apostles’ (of whom Sidgwick was also a member) whose Christian faith led him to 
believe that much of life was undefinable. As Schultz remarks, Maurice was standing “behind both Mill 
and Sidgwick, as a powerful voice pleading the limits of utilitarianism” (Schultz, Eye of the Universe, 
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Hayward urged that ‘Sidgwick should not be classified as this or that….it is extremely 
difficult to classify him at all’ 157. But the fact remains that in terms of Sidgwick’s 
moral position in his own day, whether in Bradley’s work or Green’s, the point of 
departure between Sidgwick and the Idealism of his time was that of hedonism. Even 
Alasdair Macintyre, in his A Short History of Ethics, places Sidgwick ahead of Green 
and Bradley on the timeline, the implication being that Sidgwick was merely the last 
defender of utilitarianism in the face of rising Idealism, and that once Idealism took 
over, engagement with Sidgwick’s work was simply dropped158. Of course this is 
chronologically correct in terms of published works, but the regular overlooking of 
Green’s rather more sympathetic reading of Sidgwick excludes the importance of 
that nuanced interpretation in favour of Bradley’s fundamental and more insistent 
claim that Sidgwick was a hedonist, and as such a utilitarian. Bradley’s attitude is 
indicative of the sort of engagement with ME that was to follow in the long term. D.G. 
James, writing on the status of Sidgwick’s work as it stood at the end of the classical 
era, speaks of Sidgwick’s ‘rehabilitation of utilitarianism’. ‘A utilitarian ‘science’ of 
behaviour’, James states, ‘with its show of cause, effect, quantities and 
measurements has been reaffirmed with the aid of a priori concepts, and has 
become, in Sidgwick’s hands, more catholic, respectable and traditional than it had 
ever had been before’159. And where Sidgwick might not have disputed his utilitarian 
label per se, he would most likely have argued against the fact that this could be 
                                                 
p. 46). Sidgwick took note of Maurice’s careful approach to theological epistemology, and can be 
thought to have applied similar care in his own systematic treatment of each ethical position.  
157 See Hayward, ‘Mr Hayward’s Evaluation of Professor Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics: A Reply’ in, 
International Journal of Ethics, Vol.11, No.3 (1902) 360-365. This is itself a reply to E.E. Constance 
Jones’ reply to Hayward’s original article ‘The True Significance of Sidgwick’s Ethics’ (in, International 
Journal of Ethics, Vol.11, No.2 (1901) 175-187). Hayward accuses Constance Jones - Sidgwick’s 
most devoted student - of assuming that Sidgwick’s departures from utilitarianism were simply 
‘common sense’, when actually they were the result of a very specifically Kantian type influence. “I 
should rather regard this Rationalistic terminology as somewhat foreign to Hedonism. I do not think 
that Miss Jones will find, in Sidgwick’s Hedonistic predecessors, any such emphasis on Reason’ (‘A 
Reply’, p.361). Hayward thought that Sidgwick’s work was ‘unconsciously Kantian’, and that this was 
the result of Sidgwick’s emphasis on Reason. Schneewind has also claimed that Sidgwick’s view was 
importantly different to other utilitarians (Sidgwickian Ethics, pp. 201-21), and that there were some 
‘markedly non-utilitarian features’ (see also Schneewind, ‘Sidgwick and the Cambridge Moralists’, in, 
The Monist, Vol. 58, No.3 (1974) 371-404, p.372). Schneewind also agrees with my position that 
Sidgwick’s philosophical intuitions (Justice, Prudence, and Universal Benevolence) are largely 
Kantian in function - ‘by requiring us to generalise whenever we assign a reason for an act or a 
desire’. A large part of Schneewind’s interpretation however is due to his contextualising of Sidgwick 
within the wider framework of Cambridge moralists of his day, and not exactly a direct comment on 
Sidgwick’s moral theory. 
158 MacIntyre, Short History, p.163 
159 James, Henry Sidgwick, pp.35-36 
 87 
surmised from ME. Sidgwick himself summarises it perfectly; ‘Oh how I sympathise 
with Kant’, he once said, ‘with his passionate yearning for synthesis, and condemned 
by his reason to criticism’160. 
1.1.c. Sidgwick at the turn of the Twentieth Century: G.E. Moore and Bertrand 
Russell 
Some of the influences that would be most formative for ME’s continuing reputation 
came from two of Sidgwick’s pupils – G.E. Moore, and Bertrand Russell. With these 
two figures, the idea would be continued that Sidgwick was a very particular kind of 
utilitarian. 
By the time Moore and Russell were writing at the beginning of the 1900s, moral 
philosophy was moving rapidly away from the Idealism that had characterised it 
during Sidgwick’s era, and towards a more analytical and systematic form161. In 
Sidgwick’s academic sphere of Cambridge, Moore was at the head of this change162. 
Although Moore’s relationship with Sidgwick was complicated, his hugely influential 
Principia Ethica heavily cites ME on a point for which Moore was to be best known – 
his account of the good163. For Moore, good is the fundamental ethical value, and as 
                                                 
160 Letter of 1868. 
161 Alasdair MacIntyre’s evocative description of moral philosophy’s arrival into the twentieth century is 
that it ‘opened on a quietly apocalyptic note’ (Short History, p.159). The sense was that moral 
philosophers had failed to answer the fundamental questions that had been asked so far – those of, 
‘what kind of actions ought we to perform?’, and ‘what kind of things ought to exist for their own sake’ 
As Schultz describes it, Sidgwick was “cast as a kind of bookish, academicized remnant of this 
legacy, holding out against the wave of  philosophical idealism that swept such figures as Green and 
F.H. Bradley into the forefront of British philosophy, until with the new century G.E. Moore and 
Bertrand Russell shifted the current, and contemporary analytical philosophy was launched’ (Schultz, 
Eye of the Universe, p. 3). 
162 Moore was – and remains – highly influential. So important was he in fact to the framing of moral 
philosophy in the twentieth century, that he has been credited with everything from singlehandedly 
changing ethical theory and ‘setting the trend’ for modern moral philosophy in general, (Schultz, Eye 
of the Universe, p. 5), to ‘creating the puzzles’ that everyone else would later try to solve (Joseph 
Margolis, ‘G.E. Moore and Intuitionism’, in, Ethics, Vol.87, No.1 (1976) 35-48). Moore had perceived 
that problem pointed out by MacIntyre, that important philosophical questions had not yet been 
answered, and theorised that this was because they had not yet been properly framed: His seminal 
work, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: University Press) published in 1903, was intended to do this. His 
writing style, which was fierce and direct, was naturally convincing; Principia Ethica was, according to 
Schultz, held up almost as an ‘object of worship’. (Schultz, Eye of the Universe, p. 5) 
163 Of all the people in the world not to like Sidgwick – and by all accounts not liking Sidgwick was a 
difficult thing to do – Moore, as his most famous pupil, is the most remarkable. But Moore was 
outspoken on the fact (Ann Dawes, Henry Sidgwick (Cambridge: Biograph: 2007)  Moore wrote of his 
dislike of Sidgwick in his autobiography, and is described by Everett Hall as being possibly “the only 
person in the world who found his personality unattractive” (Hall, ‘The Philosophy of G.E. Moore’, in, 
Philosophical Review, Vol. 53, No.1 (1944) 62-68 p.62). Moore considered Sidgwick’s famous 
consideration for all viewpoints not to be a sign of great tolerance and patience, but of weakness, and 
lack of conviction. As for Sidgwick’s response to Moore, Sidgwick stated in a letter to Daykns that he 
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such cannot be defined via any describable, empirical properties: Moore’s famous 
‘naturalistic fallacy’ is his belief that it is an error to attempt to do so. Good is only 
identifiable via reference to ‘moral intuitions’, understood as self-evident propositions 
which cannot directly be either proven or disproven – a point on which he clearly, 
and self-confessedly, followed Sidgwick164. Moore’s positing of these intrinsic goods 
(or ‘ideals’, such as justice, freedom and knowledge) alongside a straightforward 
consequentialist account of the relationship between those goods and the ‘right’ 
actions that secure them, resulted in the first form of one of utilitarianism’s most 
popular contemporary interpretations, ‘ideal utilitarianism’165. Most significantly for 
this current discussion, Moore’s use of Sidgwick depended on his recognition of the 
Kantian influence in Sidgwick’s work. Moore drew a direct parallel between Kant’s 
argument that moral rules that pass the categorical imperative are ultimate 
definitions, and his own unanalysable account of the good, both of which also appear 
in similar guises in ME. Thus Sidgwick’s precise and semi-Kantian rendering of both 
Intuitionism and utilitarianism was essential to Moore’s own, and this was only 
possible on the basis that Sidgwick’s non-naturalistic version was so different to that 
of the utilitarians that had gone before him. What is most striking about Moore’s 
having identified this distinctive quality in Sidgwick’s utilitarianism is his claim that 
even Sidgwick himself had not been aware of it. As Moore said in 1903, ‘Sidgwick 
himself seems never to have been clearly aware of the immense importance of the 
difference which distinguishes his Intuitionism from the common doctrine’166. Yet 
                                                 
hadn’t even known Moore was publishing on ethics (Dakyns, 3rd Feb 1900), and died before Moore 
published Principia Ethica in 1903. 
164 Theories that argue that certain things are ‘good’ may well be correct, but they have not defined 
good per se – they have simply shifted the question of the property of goodness onto whatever it was 
they were using to define ‘good’. According to Moore, Sidgwick had not committed the naturalistic 
fallacy, given that Sidgwick thought notions of ‘right’ and ‘ought’ were irreducible to definable terms. 
Schultz points out that many theorists think Sidgwick to have actually only produced an irreducible 
account of ‘right’, whereas Moore produced an irreducible account of ‘good’, which is an interesting 
interpretation given that both Moore and Sidgwick are held to be utilitarians. 
165 Although it is most commonly associated with Moore, the actual term ‘ideal utilitarianism’ did not 
appear until Hastings Rashdall used the phrase in his The Theory of Good and Evil (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press), which was published in 1907. Moore also argued that because it is always so 
difficult for us to determine by ourselves what will secure the best outcome, we would do best if we 
followed certain established rules. He is not far from Mill in this claim, but Moore would be 
retrospectively identified as an early ‘rule consequentialist’ more frequently than Mill, given his 
influence on modern utilitarianism in general.  
166 Principia Ethica, p.5. Moore goes on to explain that Sidgwick does not hold that actions that are 
held to be right, or ‘duties’, are incapable of proof or disproof, and thus does not follow the 
‘Intuitionists proper’ as Moore called them. Instead, Moore considered himself to be united with 
Sidgwick in holding that only ethical intuitions as to what is ultimately good are real moral intuitions. 
Moore did not consider himself to be an intuitionist of the type that had preceded him – and he did not 
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even these words from the influential Moore did nothing to stop the tide of opinion 
that Sidgwick was a classical – and increasingly outdated – utilitarian. 
The impact that Moore did have on the perception of Sidgwick’s work is an important 
and somewhat diverse one. As Hurka describes, Sidgwick was actually often seen to 
be defending an ‘unanalysable right’, whereas Moore was defending an 
‘unanalysable good’ but this had either not mattered, or been apparent, to Moore167. 
Moore himself went some way to recognising this when he drew on Sidgwick’s 
Kantian notion of irreducible notions, but ultimately his emphasis on the good 
contributed substantially to furthering the ‘right’ vs ‘good’ aspect of the 
deontological/utilitarian divide - and Sidgwick was heavily indicted in this. Sidgwick 
may have been a very particular type of utilitarian, and Moore may have recognised 
this to an extent, but such nuances did not survive Moore’s pivotal reformulation of 
utilitarianism that would shape the progress of the doctrine in the early twentieth 
century.  
 Bertrand Russell was also guilty of failing to acknowledge the extent to which 
he was indebted to Sidgwick. Russell was not considered to be a moral philosopher 
                                                 
consider Sidgwick either to have been part of that camp. Other theorists have also presented 
Sidgwick and Moore as having a kind of common front in the form of their style of intuitionism, and – 
more importantly – when it comes to the concept so central to Moore of the good being ‘undefinable’. 
Bernard Bosanquet, who reviewed Principia Ethica for Mind (Vol.13, 254-261) in 1904, stated at the 
time that it was clear throughout the book how strongly Moore was influenced by Sidgwick. Skorupski 
also describes Sidgwick and Moore together as being “leading figures in a reaction against that mood 
that developed at the turn of the century. The nature of this reaction is not quite easy to catch. Its 
essence, whether in ethics or in logic or epistemology, is to place great stress on the self-standing 
autonomy of these subjects as intellectual disciplines…whose basic principles can only be known by 
‘a priori Intuition” (Skorupski, ‘Spencer and the Moral Philosophers’, in, Mark Francis and Michael W. 
Taylor (eds.) Herbert Spencer; Legacies (Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge: 2011) p. 144. See also 
Thomas Hurka, ‘Moore in the Middle’, in, Ethics, Vol.113 (2003) 599-628. p. 600). Margolis is 
particularly specific that what Moore had said on this subject was already present in Sidgwick (‘G.E. 
Moore and Intuitionism’, p.37). Decades later, Bernard Williams would still draw the same 
comparisons, on the basis of Sidgwick and Moore’s shared intuitionism (Bernard Williams, ‘The Point 
of View of the Universe’, in, Bernard Williams, Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical 
Papers 1982-1993 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1995) p.155). Even E.E. Constance 
Jones, with her staunch devotion to Sidgwick, emphasised the similarities between the two 
philosophers, despite Moore’s hostility towards Sidgwick.  See Jones, ‘Mr Moore on Hedonism’, in 
International Journal of Ethics, Vol.16, No.4 (1906) 429-464. Thomas Hurka agrees that Principia 
Ethica was certainly highly influential on the development of modern moral philosophy, but disagrees 
that many of its claims were new, or original (‘Moore in the Middle’, pp. 599-601). The most important 
point on which Hurka disputes Moore’s originality is his claim that Sidgwick was the first philosopher 
to state that the good was indefinable. Despite Moore’s agreement with Sidgwick on the nature of 
good, Moore did finally depart from his former teacher’s arguments on that eternally problematic issue 
of hedonism. On Moore’s view, ‘good’ must be a universal property, and thus cannot be defined as 
‘pleasure’, which is a naturalistic description. Moore mainly considered Sidgwick’s account of the 
good to avoid such terms, but according to Moore’s strict criteria for how not to define the good, 
Sidgwick was still guilty of equating ‘good’ with some kind of consciousness. 
167 Hurka, ‘Moore in the Middle’ pp.602-603 
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in the traditional sense, as Moore was168. He was, however, a very popular writer 
and his highly logical arguments were well known in non-philosophical and public 
spheres. At least some of these qualities, both personal and intellectual, Russell 
owed to having been a pupil of Sidgwick’s. Still an adherent of the Idealist tradition 
himself, Russell renewed the by then declining interest in ME by attempting to solve 
the DoPR, and reaching the non-cognitivist conclusion that it is difficult to establish a 
true reason for acting morally169. Although this went no way towards aiding the 
DoPR, it was Russell’s preoccupation with this subject that led him to finally reject 
Absolute Idealism in favour of what was to become his famous idea that knowledge 
was only to be had at face value. Russell’s epistemological emphasis on logic as the 
only medium through which “direct truths” could truly be known quickly became 
popular as the “new philosophy of logic”, which included an emphasis on the use of 
scientific approaches to ethics170. 
Russell admitted some years later that both he and Moore were far more indebted to 
Sidgwick than either of them had admitted, and that they had not given him the 
respect – either personally or academically - he deserved171. Sidgwick’s 
                                                 
168 Russell’s thought did align closely with Moore’s on the issue of the non-naturalistic properties of 
good, which of course was an idea Moore shared with Sidgwick. But it is also arguable that to some 
extent, it was Moore who was influenced by Russell’s own account of the errors of naturalism. Russell 
published his ideas on the matter in “The Relation of What Ought to be to What Is, Has Been, or Will 
Be” (which was actually a paper he wrote for Sidgwick) in 1893, a full ten years before Moore’s 
Principia Ethica appeared. This is not surprising however, since both were pupils of Sidgwick, and 
Sidgwick had already outlined this argument.   
169 Russell originally theorised that the DoPR might be solved via McTaggart’s argument that self-
interest and morality could be united by looking towards a day when the Idealist ‘Absolute’ would 
become an explicit reality (Russell, ‘On the Foundations of Ethics’, in, Charles Pigden (ed.), Russell 
on Ethics (London: Routledge: 1999), pp. 206-11). Eventually however, Russell became persuaded of 
Bradley’s non-reality version of the Absolute, and finally stated that he did not believe Practical 
Reason and self-interest could ever be truly reconciled. 
170 See Russell’s ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description’, in Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, Vol.11 (1911) 108-128; Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press: 1912); Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (London: George Allen and 
Unwin: 1948), among others. (For the secondary literature, see Paul Hager, Continuity and Change in 
the Development of Russell’s Philosophy (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers: 1994); A.D. Irvine, 
‘Russell on Method’, in, Godehard Link (ed.) One Hundred Years of Russell’s Paradox (Berlin and 
New York: Walter de Gruyter: 2004), and, Irvine, ‘Epistemic Logicism and Russell’s Regressive 
Method’, in, Philosophical Studies, Vol.55 (1989) 303-327). Russell, more than Moore, was the 
leading figure in this new foray away from classical philosophy and into more obviously analytical 
philosophy. His extensive list of publications reflects the early decades of the 1900s’ fashionable 
preoccupation with science, and realism. There are, however, grounds on which it is more than 
reasonable to argue that Sidgwick himself was trying to reintroduce an element of the scientific 
method into his own approach to sorting out the many ethical theories of his time. He uses the 
specific language in several places throughout ME (see ME:vi, I:I:1,-2; III:I:215; III:XI:338, 355, 360; 
III:XIII:374).  
171 “We called him ‘old Sidg’”, Russell recalls in My Philosophical Development (London: George Allen 
and Unwin: 1959), “and regarded him as merely out of date”. As Roma Hutchinson suggests, the 
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investigations and means of inquiry were also comprehensively logical, and there is 
little doubt that Sidgwick’s work set Russell’s early agenda172. But it is also clear that 
ME had become something of a relic in this time – a dry and dated work that only 
served to summarise, however thoroughly, those modes of moral philosophy that 
were rapidly going out of fashion. Unfortunate though it was, Moore and Russell’s 
attitudes were directly representative of the lasting impression that was attached to 
Sidgwick as his era faded away. 
Russell also maintained the impression that Sidgwick was ‘the last surviving 
representative of the Utilitarians’. When H.A. Pritchard published his well known 
paper ‘Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Fundamental Mistake’173, which questioned 
those attempts to give answers to the ‘why?’ of moral obligation and untangled the 
Moorean association between ‘ought’ and ‘good’, he brought back to the forefront of 
moral philosophy the idea of the ‘right’. Utilitarianism thus faced a serious challenge, 
and Sidgwick was still being held up as its last great defender. In this cacophonic 
environment of analytical philosophy and the subsequent dwindling faith in 
utilitarianism, Sidgwick’s voice was almost entirely lost.  
 
1.2.  Sidgwick in the Mid-Twentieth Century  
 
During the First World War, and the decade that followed it, moral philosophy was 
relatively quiet. A sort of societal utilitarian attitude had been encouraged in the 
nation during the war, as the means through which the war effort – and the tragedy -  
could be supported, and accepted. In the decades that followed however, there were 
several major resurgences in both the deontological and utilitarian schools. Although 
                                                 
general attitude of these more progressive of Sidgwick’s pupils could be seen as one of ‘mean-
mindedness and contempt” (Hutchinson, Index to The Collected Stories of Bertrand Russell. Russell: 
The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, [S.l.], v. 22, jun. 2002. ISSN 1913-8032. Available at: 
<https://escarpmentpress.org/russelljournal/article/view/2017>. Date accessed: 27 Jun. 2016. See 
also Ronald Beanblossom ‘Russell’s Indebtedness to Reid’, in, The Monist, Vol.61, No.2 (1978) 192-
204, and P.A. Schlipp (ed.) The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell (The Library of Living Philosophers 
Vol.5) (Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University: 1944). At a more professional level, Russell 
and Sidgwick did actually maintain a decent working relationship, as is clear from their 
correspondence and from Sidgwick’s comments on the numerous papers Russell wrote for him. See 
Kenneth Blackwell, Andrew Brink, Nicholas Griffin (eds.) The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell 
Vol.1 (London: Routledge: 1983) pp.209-10. They also knew each other personally through the 
Cambridge Apostles, and the Ethical Club.  
172 Russell also departed from Moore’s analytic version of consequentialism on the basis of a rather 
more Sidgwickian caution regarding how to derive the moral ‘ought’.  
173 In, Mind Vol.21 (1912) 21-37 
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in many ways this rising contention furthered the divide between deontological and 
utilitarian ethical systems, there remained a point of reference that was common to 
both sides of the debate. This was the work of Henry Sidgwick. In these sections, 
some of the writers whose theories were held up as rivals to Rational Benevolence in 
the thesis introduction appear again, but this time in their capacity as figures who 
contribute something important to the unfolding story of interpretations of Sidgwick’s 
work.  
 
1.2.a. Sidgwick and W.D. Ross 
 
The 1930s saw the beginning of a significant revival in deontological ethics – in the 
capable hands of W.D. Ross. As was seen in the introduction, Ross offers a 
moderate form of deontology that incorporates both right and good in such a way 
that both deontological and utilitarian concerns are to some extent accounted for. For 
the intuitionism that informs this theory, Ross directly followed Sidgwick.  
It is interesting that Ross, as a deontologist, would draw on Sidgwick’s intuitionism, 
when for Sidgwick it had led to (apparently) utilitarian conclusions. But Ross’s 
intuitionism took the form of the non-empirical, a priori knowledge type of 
intuitionism, a tradition that had come down through Thomas Reid and William 
Whelwell, and had been so convincingly formulated and redressed by Sidgwick174. 
Ross seems to have simply ignored the fact that Sidgwick’s epistemological 
application of intuitionism yielded utilitarian results175. In fact, where Sidgwick 
                                                 
174 This was as opposed to empiricist intuitionism which argues that moral truth can be known through 
some kind of moral ‘sense’.  Many writers unite Sidgwick and Ross on the basis of their shared 
intuitionism (see for example Hurka, ‘Sidgwick on Consequentialism and Deontology’, p.133, and 
Elizabeth Tropman, Renewing Moral Intuitionism’, in, Journal of Moral Philosophy, Vol.6, No.4 (2009) 
440-463). John Rawls unites Ross and Sidgwick on the basis of their shared beliefs about the nature 
and function of conscience (Rawls (Barbara Herman (ed.) Lectures on the History of Moral 
Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 2000) p.77). Interestingly however, John 
Deigh (‘Sidgwick on Ethical Judgement’, in Schultz, Essays on Henry Sidgwick, pp.241-258) points 
out that Sidgwick maintained Kant’s view that ethical judgement (i.e. in their case the recognition of 
something rational as right) is a motivator to action, where deontologists such as Ross and Prichard 
did not.  
175 A possible explanation for the deontological/utilitarian intuitionism cross-over between these two 
writers is that it was only on the type of intuitionism that each upheld that they were divided. 
Originally, the term ‘intuitionism’ was synonymous with moral pluralism: It was only during the 1700s 
and 1800s that the word became associated with the form of epistemological intuitionism that 
dominated the early 1900s. Sidgwick was considered a monist in that he defended the principle of 
utilitarianism only, where Ross defended a pluralist account of several deontological a priori moral 
principles that are ranked in terms of priority. There is then an apparent division between Ross and 
Sidgwick over the issue of moral pluralism, but Ross does not seem to have recognised it. 
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appears in Ross’ defence of deontology in The Right and the Good, there is 
considerable weight attached to the points. Most significantly, during Ross’ refuting 
of Moore’s understanding of ‘rightness’ (as productive of the greatest possible good), 
he draws on Sidgwick’s argument that Bentham had never really given a definition of 
‘the right’ that wasn’t in the end basically a tautology176. Ross then utilises Sidgwick’s 
point that “the meaning of ‘right’ or ‘ought’ is in fact ‘too elementary to admit of any 
formal definition’, and explicitly quotes Sidgwick’s express repudiation of ‘the view 
that ‘right’ means ‘productive’ of any particular sort of result’177. This is what informs 
Ross’s intuitionist view that ‘‘right’ is an irreducible notion’178. And this is what informs 
the foundational concept of Ross’s deontological ethics. 
Sidgwick’s direct relevance to Ross’ deontology here is striking – as is Ross’ 
overlooking of the fact that it was a utilitarian whose notion of rightness he agreed 
with. That particular relevance, of Sidgwick’s epistemology to deontological 
concepts, was once again lost in the shifting tides of new philosophy.  
 
 
 
 
1.2.b. Sidgwick in Act and Rule Utilitarianism 
Deontology advanced significantly under Ross. The Right and the Good was 
generally considered to be one of the most outstanding treaties on moral theory of 
the twentieth century, and utilitarianism suffered a sudden and brutal decline in 
credibility in the wake of the events of the Second World War.  Not long after this 
however, utilitarianism was to receive one of its most important reformulations; the 
‘rule’/’act’ distinction, defended mainly by Richard Brandt in his 1963 paper, 
‘Towards a Credible Form of Utilitarianism’179.  
                                                 
176 The Right and the Good, p.7 
177 The Right and the Good p.8. Ross, here, reads Sidgwick as I do in that passage from ME. What is 
right, for Sidgwick, is not dependent on the production of results. i.e. his notion of rightness is non-
consequentialist. This reinforces my argument for the presence of a non-consequentialist type of duty 
element in Sidgwick’s work, and it is supported even further within this context of Ross’ work, by the 
fact that Ross’ system depends almost entirely on the notion of non-consequentialist duty.  
178 The Right and the Good p.12 
179 In, Michael D. Bayles (ed.) Contemporary Utilitarianism (New York: Doubleday: 1968), pp.143-186. 
The title of Brandt’s paper is also revealing of the paper’s purpose. As opposed to the traditional 
utilitarian position, which generally holds that the principle of utility is to be applied on case by case 
basis in order to produce the most utility (or ‘happiness’, to use Bentham’s understanding), rule 
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There are noticeable differences between Brandt and Sidgwick’s versions of 
utilitarianism, and Brandt did not often reference Sidgwick directly. He did, however, 
label Sidgwick as a rule utilitarian180. This led to a highly interesting debate over the 
nature of Sidgwick’s work, headed up by fierce rule-utilitarian critic, J.J.C. Smart. 
Smart firmly declared Sidgwick to in fact be an act-utilitarian, in his famous 
denunciation of the existence of any such thing as ‘rule utilitarianism’181. Both views 
                                                 
utilitarianism argues that the most beneficial results are brought about by following certain impartial 
rules that are thought to maximise utility, rather than by individual actions. The rightness or 
wrongness of an action is therefore judged not according to the results that it brings about 
immediately, but by its conformity to a rule that has been judged to bring about the best results (see 
also Richard T. Garner, and Bernard Rosen, Moral Philosophy: A Systematic Introduction to 
Normative Ethics and Meta-ethics (New York: Macmillan:1967), p.70). Those rules are what 
determine moral rightness. In this way, rule utilitarianism aimed to avoid the common accusation 
advanced against utilitarianism in its classical form, that its lack of a proper objective concept of ‘right’ 
was ethically unsound, and socially and morally dangerous. 
See also Brandt’s Ethical Theory: The Problems of Normative and Critical Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J: Prentice-Hall: 1959), A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1979), and 
Morality, Utilitarianism and Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1992). In the 1963 paper, 
Brandt looks to J.O. Urmson and his interpretation of Mill as a rule utilitarian. But some writers, such 
as Michael McDonald, have drawn parallels between Sidgwick’s work and Brandt’s, especially where 
A Theory of the Good and the Right is concerned (see McDonald, ‘Critical Notice’, in, Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol.12, No.2 (1982) 375-389).  McDonald points out that Brandt seems to 
share Sidgwick’s conviction that morality is inherently connected to rationality, and that both 
philosophers advocate a form of ‘desire theory’, wherein we act according to what we feel will make 
our lives go best) (pp. 381-382). It is indeed the case that Brandt and Sidgwick both anchor their 
ethical theories in human rationality, but McDonald also points out that Brandt does ultimately depart 
from Sidgwick by rejecting Sidgwick’s Philosophical Intuitionism. Brandt is careful to avoid the 
‘normative generalisation’ of the argument – defended by Sidgwick – that there is a basic premise 
(derived by intuitionism or some other abstract means) that it is best to act so as to maximise desires 
and that therefore actions that conform to this are the best actions. This, Brandt says, is precisely 
what the reasoning of A Theory of the Good and the Right is not meant to suggest (Brandt, Theory of 
the Good and the Right, p.154). Brandt’s alternative approach is an empiricist one, that argues – in 
reverse to the previous argument – that if we act rationally we are likely to satisfy desires, and 
therefore acting rationally can be recommended to agents, because it conforms with what we already 
know and do. In this way, Brandt is closer to Mill than he is to Sidgwick, but Sidgwick and Brandt still 
share the welfare-maximising basis that provided the basis for Brandt’s rule utilitarianism. 
180 It was at this point in history that G.E.M. Anscombe introduced the phrase ‘consequentialism’ in 
her important paper ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (in, Philosophy, Vol.33, No.124 (1958) 1-19. Actually 
via a specific reference to the work of Sidgwick, Anscombe intended the word ‘consequentialist’ to 
refer to the denial that there is any significant moral difference between results of an action that are 
intended, and those that are foreseen, but not intended (p. 10). These days, ‘consequentialism’ is 
often used as a synonym for utilitarianism, but this is inaccurate: Anscombe intended the word to 
distinguish between the attitude of classical utilitarianism that appears to hold individuals to account 
for unforeseen bad consequences of actions, and that of utilitarianism as it was reformulated by 
Sidgwick – and thus continued after him - in which one cannot be held responsible for the bad 
consequences of one’s actions, even if they were foreseen, provided that they were not the agent’s 
intention.    
181 See Smart, ‘Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism’, in, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.6, No.25 
(1956) 344-354; Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics (Carlton: Melbourne University 
Press:1973); Smart and Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press: 1973); David Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1965). Both 
Smart and Lyons denounced ‘rule’ utilitarianism on the basis that it is simply not a viable form of the 
doctrine. In his well known paper of 1956 (in which he refers to ‘extreme’ and ‘restricted’ utilitarianism, 
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are understandable. On the one hand, Sidgwick could be understood to be arguing 
that specific ‘rules’ are to be derived from more generalised principles – which 
seems to be the route he takes later in ME182. On the other hand, Sidgwick defends 
Benevolence as the true end of moral duty, by which he means the obligation to 
regard the good of any other individual as much as his own, and this appears 
distinctly act utilitarian if that form is understood as focusing on the effects of 
individual actions, as opposed to the type of actions done, and how far they conform 
to a rule. It is this to which Smart confidently directs the reader when he argues that 
Sidgwick is an act-utilitarian and therefore one who avoids the certain collapse into 
rule-worship, and deontology183. Today, the general consensus is that he was an act 
utilitarian – but that his act utilitarianism was a less direct version than Smart’s, for 
example184. A great many others, however, have not been so sure that Sidgwick 
classifies quite this easily185. The act/rule Sidgwickian debate is in this way reflective 
                                                 
ahead of Brandt’s use of the definitions ‘act’ and ‘rule’), Smart points out that to adhere firmly to such 
rules is actually just a form of ‘superstitious rule worship’, more akin to a deontological position – and 
yet if breaking of the rules is permitted, those rules are no longer relevant anyway. Restricted 
utilitarianism thus ‘collapses’ into extreme (or ‘act’) utilitarianism. 
182 “[philosophical intuitionism] …while accepting the morality of common sense as in the main sound, 
still attempts to find for it a philosophic basis which it does not itself offer: to get one or more principles 
more absolutely and undeniably true and evident, from which the current rules might be deduced….” 
(I:VIII:103). During his discussion of the method of utilitarianism, Sidgwick clearly writes from the point 
of view that there are rules from which utilitarian-type actions are derived (IV:V:488-91).  
183 See also William H. Shaw, who also asserts conclusively that Sidgwick was an act-utilitarian 
(Shaw, Contemporary Ethics: Taking Account of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Blackwell: 1999) p.10 
184 See John Gray, ‘Indirect Utility and Fundamental Rights’, in, Gray, Liberalisms: Essays in Political 
Philosophy (London: Routledge: 1989); Bernard Williams, Making Sense of Humanity and other 
Philosophical Essays 1982-1993 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1995); Hooker, Ideal 
Code, p.143; Singer and Lazari-Radek, Point of View of the Universe, p.176; Roger Crisp, The 
Cosmos of Duty: Henry Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2015) 
pp.206-214; Robert E. Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy (Cambridge University 
Press:1995) p.16. Geoffrey Scarre has recently utilised Sidgwick to argue against act-utilitarianism, 
pointing out that the selfless optimisation that seems to be required by act utilitarianism (and the sort 
Scarre attributes to Peter Singer) leads to ‘paradoxically narrow-minded’ remote and unfeeling 
individuals, and that Sidgwick did not believe that one would be motivated to promote another’s utility, 
if he was required to relinquish his own (Scarre, ‘Is Act Utilitarianism the ‘Ethics of Fantasy’, in, 
Society for Applied Philosophy Vol.15, No.3 (1998) 259-270, p.262. 
185 See R.G. Frey, ‘Act Utilitarianism: Sidgwick, Bentham, or Smart?’, in, Mind, Vol.86, No.341 (1977) 
95-100;  Hooker, ‘Sidgwick and Common Sense Morality’, 355-360; Rawls, ‘Two Concepts of Rules’, 
in, The Philosophical Review Vol.64 (1955) 3-32, p.14; John C. Harsayni, ‘Rule Utilitarianism and 
Decision Theory’, in, Erkenntnis, Vol.11, No.1 (1977) 25-53, and ‘Morality and the Theory of Rational 
Behaviour’, in, Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press) 56-61.  
Frey’s article is particularly illuminating of this debate. From the first page it is clear that Frey is 
convinced that Sidgwick is an act-utilitarian: His phrase “…it can often be used to provide support for 
parts of what he calls the morality of common sense…” (p.95) is a perfect example of the function of 
act-utilitarianism, as opposed to the reverse situation in which rules might be used to restrain simple 
utilitarian actions. However, in the following sentence, Frey specifically refers to the presence of this 
 96 
of Hayward’s early words – that Sidgwick as a moral philosopher is often very hard 
to classify at all186. 
 
 
1.2.c. Sidgwick and William Frankena  
In 1963, William Frankena produced his seminal deontological work, Ethics187. Like 
Ross, Frankena’s semi-reconciling (of deontological and utilitarian principles) theory 
was discussed in the thesis introduction for its relevance to the theory of Rational 
Benevolence. But again like Ross, Frankena is highly important in this narrative for 
where his deontology also made significant reference to Sidgwick.  
Though little secondary literature draws attention to the fact, Frankena shares many 
characteristics with Sidgwick, both academic and personal. Frankena’s aim in Ethics 
was much the same as Sidgwick’s in ME in that Frankena sets out to examine each 
ethical position, such as egoism, hedonism, and relativism, in turn (although 
Frankena does state a more specific intention to go beyond the meta-ethics to 
                                                 
reverse situation in Sidgwick’s writing as well: “…act-utilitarianism is [not] going to be allowed to 
sweep aside just any of the views and convictions of the ‘plain man’…’ Frey concludes here that 
Sidgwick is arguing that “act utilitarianism will sometimes give results that warrant amending common 
sense morality, and at other times will give results that warrant amending act-utilitarianism….the point 
here is not which amendments Sidgwick was in favour of, but that he thought that amending the 
theory was an appropriate response in the light of at least some deeply counterintuitive results”. That 
is, Frey obviously considers Sidgwick to at least be a more moderate or conservative act utilitarian 
than Smart. Even more revealing is the argument that the second situation that Frey describes could 
be interpreted as representing Sidgwick to essentially hold a fully rule utilitarian position. Frey does 
not retract his definition of Sidgwick as an act-utilitarian, but Frey’s particular portrayal of Sidgwick’s 
act-utilitarianism lends further support to the idea that Sidgwick could be either an act or a rule 
utilitarian, certainly in comparison to either Smart or Bentham. 
Incidentally, I agree that this debate over whether Sidgwick was an act or a rule utilitarian should 
exist, given that it is not truly clear in the text of ME. However, as it is one of my specific aims in this 
thesis – and certainly in this chapter – to dilute the image of Sidgwick as a utilitarian, I have not 
specifically engaged with this aspect of Sidgwick studies. 
186 At about this time, A.R. Lacey, in ‘Sidgwick’s Ethical Maxims ‘(Philosophy, Vol.34, No. 130 (1959), 
217-228) argued that Sidgwick did not distinguish between ‘strictly non-teleological duties, such as 
the Kantian duty of absolute veracity, and semi-teleological ones’ (p. 218). Furthermore, Lacey 
believed there to be a strong sense of ‘duty’ in Sidgwick, as shown by the fact that Lacey was able to 
identify 4 ‘duty premises’ in Sidgwick’s work (p. 220). (Only the first of these – the duty to produce 
good – is positive. The other three are negative statements about what is not our duty). Ultimately, 
Lacey believes Sidgwick’s notion of duty is a teleological one. This is a defensible position, as there is 
no doubt that there is a teleological element in Sidgwick’s work. I dispute it however, on the basis that 
I believe Sidgwick’s interpretation of rightness (as being that which is ultimately reasonable) to call 
into question whether Sidgwick’s theory of moral obligation is entirely teleological (See chapter 3). 
Lacey is important here for sustaining an undercurrent of recognition that duty of some kind was a 
major focus of ME. 
187 Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall: 1963) 
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“providing the general outlines of a normative theory”, and his approach to the 
various ethical positions was always one of thought and consideration, never of 
dismissal188. Interestingly, it could also be argued that Frankena too suffers a similar 
fate to Sidgwick’s in having been typecast as a certain kind of moralist when actually 
his theory far surpasses the boundaries of that label. For, where Sidgwick is almost 
universally considered to be a utilitarian despite his clear sympathy for deontological 
arguments, Frankena is almost universally considered to be a deontologist, despite 
his clear respect for utilitarian aspects of morality.  
Most importantly for the relationship between the two, Frankena frequently 
references Sidgwick – and often within the specific context of deontology. There are 
numerous examples of this. The first source to which Frankena recourses when 
giving an example of the abstract rules that might be held by a ‘pure rule-
deontologist’, is Sidgwick, and Sidgwick’s Principle of Justice – and he actually does 
this twice189. Frankena goes on to directly compare Kant’s isolating of a single basic 
deontological principle with Sidgwick’s own account of the abstract principle of 
Justice (as Sidgwick intended) and later again groups Sidgwick together with Kant in 
his discussion of what is good as an end190. Here, Frankena specifically states that 
Sidgwick combines a hedonistic theory of value with a deontologist (and not a 
teleological) theory of the duty of obligation. Similarly to Ross, it is Sidgwick’s notion 
of right that makes this possible: ‘One may adopt a hedonistic theory of value without 
adopting any such theory of obligation’, Frankena says, ‘A hedonist about the good 
may be a deontologist about the right; roughly speaking, Butler, Kant, and Sidgwick 
combine hedonism about the former with deontologisim about the latter’191. 
The importance of these words from Frankena cannot be overstated. For the first 
time in the history of Sidgwick’s appearances in the work of other philosophers, 
Frankena explicitly recognises not just the presence of the deontological aspect of 
Sidgwick’s theory, but also the fact that this deontological aspect contributes as 
significantly to his moral theory as the utilitarian aspect. If anything, the fact that 
                                                 
188 Ibid, p.5 
189 Ibid, pp.15, 25 
190 Frankena states later that Sidgwick’s principle of justice is not actually sufficient as a normative 
ethical principle, given that it only states that we should act according to rules if we want to be just, 
but tells us nothing about what the rules are to be (Ethics, p.39). But Frankena is still discussing 
Sidgwick within the context of that single principle which Frankena earlier identified to belong to the 
realm of the pure rule deontologist.  
191 Ethics, p.68 
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Frankena states Sidgwick to be a deontologist about the right might seem to give 
more authority to deontology in Sidgwick’s system than utilitarianism192. As if to add 
further weight to his point, Frankena includes Kant in the same category. There 
could hardly be a more direct example of the fluidity of Sidgwick’s work for either 
occupying a space between deontological and utilitarian theories, or for being able to 
move between them, than how he appears in this surprisingly brief passage in 
Frankena.  
Although they are separated by some thirty years, it seems appropriate to group 
Ross and Frankena together here. Both Ross and Frankena are deontologists. Both 
had noticed that Sidgwick’s concept of the right was not a utilitarian one. Both follow 
Sidgwick in this concept of rightness. The view of neither Ross nor Frankena has 
prevailed. It is commonly recognised that both philosophers reference Sidgwick, but 
the full significance of how and why they reference him remains, it seems to me, 
unfulfilled193.  
1.2.d. Sidgwick and John Rawls: Sidgwick’s Appearance in Political 
Deontology 
There has already been, throughout this history of Sidgwick’s place in moral 
philosophy, an enormously wide variety of interpretations of his work and thought. 
                                                 
192 Frankena is in clear agreement with my argument in this thesis that Sidgwick’s interpretation of the 
right is a deontological one, understood as representing non-consequentialist duty. But Frankena is 
also the only other scholar to specifically reference the fact that Sidgwick’s theory of obligation may 
not actually be teleological. I agree entirely with Frankena that Sidgwick’s argument for the right 
poses a challenge to the teleological aspect of his work (see chapter 3). 
193 Alasdair Macintyre’s comments on Sidgwick are typical of how Sidgwick was viewed for so long 
during the mid twentieth century. In Short History, MacIntyre identifies Sidgwick as a melancholy sort 
of figure, whose ‘defects are usually the defects of his age’ (p. 235). By this MacIntyre means that 
Sidgwick was preoccupied with his own crises of philosophy and faith, and stood at the brink of the 
clash between intuitionism and the utilitarian consciousness that had dominated his age. Whereas 
both of these claims are true, MacIntyre falls into the same trap as many twentieth century theorists 
by simply placing Sidgwick at the end of the classical era, and then closing the door upon him. 
(Marcus Singer is explicit that this is a misunderstanding of Sidgwick on the part of MacIntyre. See 
Singer (ed.) Essays on Ethics and Method p.xxxiv-xxxv). MacIntyre also fails to draw on Sidgwick in 
his own, influential argument for virtue ethics that rationality is fundamentally flawed, despite the clear 
similarities between this claim and Sidgwick’s. In his ‘Whose rationality?’ theory, MacIntyre argues 
that human rationality is not constant: It is empirical that what is considered ‘rational’ varies from 
culture to culture, from individual to individual. Rationality cannot then be held up as the paradigm of 
ethics (MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Damn Press: 1981), pp.6-22; 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth: 1987) pp.1-11. Whereas the parallel 
between MacIntyre’s claim and Sidgwick’s own primary concern that reason was full of conflicts may 
seem to be apparent, MacIntyre’s only reference to Sidgwick is that he finally proved the teleological 
framework of ethics to have failed (After Virtue, pp.64 – 65). Sidgwick is then swiftly dispensed with. 
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But perhaps the most surprising use of Sidgwick is that found in the work of 
American philosopher John Rawls during the political upheaval of the 1970s.  
 The 1970s was an interesting era for moral philosophy194. Ethical debate was 
changing in accordance with the rapidly changing socio-political context, which was 
characterised by a rise in socially progressive values such a general political 
awareness and the subsequent rise in interest in the concept of civil and political 
rights195. Together, these themes were instrumental in the increasing support for 
egalitarian and individualistic social values. Where utilitarianism was unlikely to be 
able to meet such demands, the natural association between the concept of civil 
rights and the absolute ‘right’ inherent in deontological approaches to ethics was 
obvious. New trends in moral debate were about to rise to meet the new ethical 
demands - and this was the sphere in which Rawls was working.  
 Rawls’ revitalising of Kant’s doctrine as against utilitarianism in his seminal 
Theory of Justice (1977) was nothing short of revolutionary. His deontological theory 
of ‘justice as fairness’ presents a firm case for the prioritising of the right over the 
                                                 
194 It is arguable that as the decades had pressed on, both deontology and utilitarianism in their 
classical forms had come to a close. The ‘divide’ between the two positions, however, raged on. In 
1967, Philippa Foot gave a now famously popular argument against consequentialist theories of 
morality in the form of her ‘Trolley Problem’, a thought experiment that involves the reader deciding 
whether to allow five workmen on a track to die under the wheels of a runaway trolley by simply 
allowing the trolley to run on, or whether to intentionally turn to the wheel onto another track, which 
will kill only one man (Foot, ‘The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect’, in, Virtues 
and Vices and other Essays in Moral Philosophy Vol.19 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers: 1978). The 
utilitarian view, Foot argues, not only makes the second choice morally permissible, but actually 
morally obligatory – that is, utilitarianism makes it morally obligatory to intentionally kill a person, in 
certain circumstances. The Trolley Problem was also extensively analysed – and supported - by 
Judith Jarvis Thompson (‘The Trolley Problem’, in, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 94, No.6 (1984) 1395-
1415). Warren Quinn also followed Foot in his argument that the difference between killing or letting 
die came down to a difference between positive and negative rights (Quinn, ‘Action, Intentions, and 
Consequences; The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing’, in, Philosophical Review Vol.98, No.3 (1989) 
355-382). Despite this, R.M Hare’s preference utilitarianism was leading the pro-utilitarian side, and 
the pure deontology of Kant and Ross seemed to have been diluted by Frankena’s pointing to the 
importance of utilitarian principles.  G.E. Anscombe’s influence was also being felt by this time; a 
combination of her attack on both deontology and utilitarianism, and Frankena’s own leaning towards 
the field of virtue ethics in his discussions of moral character, finally allowed virtue ethics onto the field 
as a real viable alternative to the two schools of thought that had so dominated ethical debate until 
this point. In terms of deontology/utilitarianism relations however, this stage in the history is an 
example of old habits dying hard. However many modifications had been made to either doctrine, 
wherever those two labels could be identified they were still considered to represent two 
fundamentally conflicting ideas.  
195 This was particularly prevalent in America. Anti-nuclear weapons protests, the rise of feminism and 
the change in the role of women, and widespread withdrawing of public support for the Vietnam war 
are all examples of the atmosphere that was developing (sometimes with ironic violence) during this 
time – the atmosphere of freedom of expression, and of personhood. Novelist Tom Wolfe described 
the combination of these factors as having made the 1970s into ‘the ‘Me’ decade’, in his influential 
essay of 1976, ‘The ‘Me’ Decade and the Third Great Awakening’, in New York Magazine, (New York: 
Condé Nast) 23rd August.  
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good, and advances a sophisticated case against utilitarianism196. In the notes I have 
given a highly redacted version of what is an extremely complex and multi-layered 
theory, but for present purposes, it is not inaccurate to say that in Rawls we have – 
on Rawls’ own definition – a classically deontological system that gives absolute 
precedence to the right197. But even in this most important of neo-Kantian/anti-
utilitarian theories, its author saw fit to recourse frequently - and often positively - to 
Sidgwick198. 
Sidgwick appears in Rawls’ work in multiple ways. Firstly, Rawls recognised the 
importance of the utilitarian doctrine only as it had been expounded by Sidgwick - 
and accepted it as the only really serious alternative to his own theory of justice as 
fairness199; Rawls’ engagement with utilitarianism throughout his seminal A Theory 
                                                 
196 Rawls identifies the utilitarian position as being the principle that an individual will advance as far 
as possible his own welfare/good, and that when applied to the group of society, the aim is to 
advance as far as possible the welfare/good of the group (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp.19-21, 294-
294-295, 394-396 ; Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Colombia University Press: 1993 p. 21). 
From the perspective of Rawls’ political philosophy, the problem with this is most clearly 
demonstrated when individual case utilitarianism and social utilitarianism are viewed congruently. 
Because the aim in both cases is simply the satisfaction of desires, how this satisfaction is brought 
about does not matter; that is, without an independent account of the right “there is no reason in 
principle why the greater gains of some should not compensate for the lesser losses of others; or, 
more importantly, why the violation of the liberty of a few might not be made right by the greater good 
shared by many” (Political Theory p.23).  Rawls’ main claim against utilitarianism therefore is 
summarised as ‘it does not take seriously the distinction between persons’ (Theory of Justice: 73-93; 
Political Liberalism, p.24). The good simply cannot be given the priority over the right (See Will 
Kymlicka, ‘Liberalism and Communitarianism’, in, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol.18, No.2 
(1988)181-203, p. 184). Instead, Rawls gives an account of the right that is independent of the good. 
In order to argue for this, Rawls constructs a type of thought experiment that is based on the concept 
of a social contract, whereby all parties within the contract agree on an arrangement to which 
everyone can mutually agree. This is the ‘original position’, a hypothetical situation in which everyone 
will be a member of a society that is to be created, but does not know anything about what their role in 
that society might be (Theory of Justice, pp.15-19, 104, 145, 587). They will be entirely ignorant as 
whether they are wealthy or poor, male or female, a minority or a majority etc. This being the case, 
and humans being rational, Rawls argues that the first logical desires of these people will be fairness, 
freedom and equality – or, as Rawls terms it, the principle of justice. Following Kant’s lead, Rawls 
argues that it would simply be irrational to propose anything else. In Rawls’ words, “my aim is to 
present a conception of justice which generalises and carries to a higher level of abstraction the 
familiar theory of the social contract…the guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic 
structure of society are the object of the original agreement. They are principles that free and rational 
persons concerned to further their own interests would accept…as defining the fundamental terms of 
their association (Theory of Justice 1971, p.10)  
197 Political Liberalism, p. 26. 
198 Rawls had enormous respect for The Methods, which he considered to be a better representation 
of the utilitarian doctrine than Mill’s (A Theory of Justice, p. 20). For Rawls, Sidgwick represented both 
a model example of how to go about investigation moral theory in general, and the epitome of the 
classical utilitarian doctrine, in its “clearest and most accessible formulation” (Theory of Justice, p.20). 
199 Theory of Justice, p.417 
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of Justice is, essentially, engagement with Sidgwick200. Furthermore, Sidgwick was 
the only utilitarian whose ethics were relevant for Rawls’ strictly deontological 
system. He referenced Sidgwick’s account of the good, and perceived that Sidgwick 
also advocated a form of deliberative rationality, in which a person’s good is 
determined by what he would choose if all paths and consequences were available 
to him at the time201. Most specifically, Rawls drew specifically on Sidgwick’s 
egalitarian views on formal justice and social class202.  
In the secondary literature, one of the most common points on which Rawls and 
Sidgwick are united is that of reflective equilibrium - the process through which we 
arrive at the principles generated by Rawls’ original position thought experiment203. 
                                                 
200 See Gerald F. Gaus and Chandran Kukathas (eds.) Handbook of Political Theory (London: SAGE 
Publishing:2004) pp.413-417. Gaus and Kukathas also argue, with great directness, that ‘political 
theorists must take Sidgwick seriously if they take Rawls seriously’, and that this is based on Rawls’ 
own theory (p.413). This is to Sidgwick’s great credit and potential as a political theorist, as well as a 
philosopher.  
201 Theory of Justice, p.366. Rawls defines Sidgwick’s account of the ‘good’ as ‘the satisfaction of 
rational desire’ (Richard Kraut, What is Good and Why: The Ethics of Wellbeing (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press: 2009) p.124). 
202 See Theory of Justice, pp.51, 63. Rawls points to Sidgwick’s superior avoidance of the ‘priority 
problem’ brought about by reliance on intuitionism as the sole method of moral epistemology 
(whereby considered judgements can possibly be identified, but not weighted appropriately), that 
Sidgwick achieves through his systematic and highly defensible argument that the principle of utility is 
that to which we will all ultimately appeal, no matter what our theoretical moral standpoint (Theory of 
Justice, p. 36. This apparently empirical argument is another reason why Rawls afforded such credit 
to Sidgwick’s utilitarianism). Rawls also finds Sidgwick to be in agreement with his argument that “the 
expectations of those with the same abilities and aspirations should not be affected by their social 
class” (Theory of Justice, p. 63) – a crucial point for the heavy emphasis on the priority of individuals 
that dominates so much of Rawls’ political and moral theory. Rawls agrees with Sidgwick that Kant is 
unclear why the lives of the saint and the scoundrel are not equally the result of free and rational 
choices (when Kant has argued that we only become our true selves when we act in accordance with 
the moral law), and aligns himself with Sidgwick’s objection by suggesting the original position as the 
medium through which we can see which principles free and rational people would choose (Theory of 
Justice, pp. 224-225). 
203 See Theory of Justice, pp.18, 15. Several theorists have argued for the similarity between 
Sidgwick’s work and Rawls’ reflective equilibrium (see for example Phillip Pettit and Chandran 
Kukathas, Rawls: ‘A Theory of Justice’ and its Critics (Cambridge: Polity Press: 1980), pp.7-8; B. 
Barry ‘John Rawls and the Search for Stability’, in, Ethics, Vol.105 (1995) 874-915; Brad Hooker Ideal 
Code, Real World p.9; Frank Snare ‘John Rawls and the Methods of Ethics’, in, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research Vol.36, No.1 (1975) 100-112, p.109); Schultz, Eye of the Universe, 196-
197). Rawls himself draws the parallel in A Theory of Justice when he states that the process of 
reflective equilibrium is the basis of moral theory and has been for centuries (A Theory of Justice, 
pp.44-45), including in Sidgwick’s writing. Peter Singer is very clear that reflective equilibrium has 
existed throughout most of the history of moral philosophy, and that Rawls directly attributes his 
inspiration for it to Sidgwick (Singer, ‘Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium’, in, The Monist, Vol.58, 
No.3 (1974) 490-517, p.490), but he does not agree that this is the method that Sidgwick uses. Singer 
argues that Rawls relies on Schneewind’s article ‘First Principles and Common Sense Morality in 
Sidgwick’s Ethics’ (in, Archiv Für Geschichte der Philosophie Vol.45, No.2 (1963) 137-156) but that 
this too was mistaken: Singer’s argument is based on the fact that both these philosophers 
understood Sidgwick to be ‘attempting to bring people over to utilitarianism’ above all other moral 
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Rawls himself draws the parallel in A Theory of Justice when he states that the 
process of reflective equilibrium is the basis of moral theory and has been for 
centuries, including in Sidgwick’s writing204. Rawls and Sidgwick are also similar in 
their approaches to moral theory, though their results on the latter may not have 
been the same205.  
It is possible to overstate the connection, or the nature of the connection, between 
Rawls and Sidgwick: They are, after all, philosophers of two very different schools of 
though, and it is unlikely that they would have finally agreed on what, ultimately, is 
moral. And yet, theirs is perhaps the most important relationship in the history of 
Sidgwick’s work. Unlike where Sidgwick had appeared in rather more moderate 
forms of deontology, such as the systems of Ross and Frankena, Rawls cannot be 
described as presenting a moderate theory. This is the single most comprehensive 
                                                 
theories, when this is not what he is doing. Singer points to Sidgwick’s own revising in the preface to 
the second edition of ME of the point that he is not aiming to present a system of normative ethics 
(ME p.xx, in, ‘Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium’, p.502). For further points on Singer’s engagement 
with Rawls over the question of Sidgwick’s reflective equilibrium, see the section on Singer below.  
204 Theory of Justice, pp.44-45 
205 Schneewind makes this point when he unites Rawls and Sidgwick on the basis of their shared 
conception of the relationship between general and specific moral principles. According to 
Schneewind, Rawls and Sidgwick agree that general moral principles are only fully justified if they 
serve to systemize our more specific moral convictions (Schneewind, ‘Korsgaard and the 
Unconditional in Morality’, in, Ethics (1998), Vol.109, No.1, 36-48, p. 44) which would account for a 
large part of the reason that Rawls held Sidgwick’s approach to ethics in ME in such high regard.  
Frank Snare also focuses on the similarities between Rawls and Sidgwick’s ‘methods’. In John Rawls 
and the Methods of Ethics, Snare evaluates the way in which Rawls determines the basic principles of 
morality. Overall, Snare is arguing that Rawls followed Bentham, Mill and Sidgwick in his own inquiry 
into normative ethics, citing Sidgwick’s phrase “the point of view of the universe”, as evidence that the 
objective viewpoint ‘method of ethics’ is clearly a concept shared by Rawls’ original position theory 
(Rawls and the Methods of Ethics, p.106) . Snare appears to have an unusual idea of how Sidgwick 
was using the word ‘method’. Apparently ignoring Sidgwick’s appeal to the reader in the preface and 
the introduction to bear in mind that he is not aiming to produce a singular ‘method’ through which 
ethics should be done (i.e. his express point is that he is not aiming at a system of normative ethics), 
Snare doesn’t agree that utilitarianism and ethical egoism are ‘methods’ at all, but rather principles 
that would emerge from some other actual method (also see Schultz, Eye of the Universe, p.150 for 
agreement that “caution” is required when interpreting what Sidgwick meant by ‘method’). Snare is 
right to suggest that Sidgwick’s own ‘method’ is philosophical intuitionism (or at least, that his method 
of Rational Benevolence resulted from philosophical intuitionism), but is wrong to accuse Sidgwick of 
having used the word ‘method’ misleadingly: I believe that it is Snare who has misunderstood 
Sidgwick’s intentions in ME. Whereas it might be inaccurate to interpret the entirety of ME as a 
treatise on normative ethics, as Snare seems to have done, it is not wrong to argue that Rawls 
followed Sidgwick’s approach to how to do normative ethics. For example, Snare argues that in 
admitting that some principles may have to be modified in the original position, Rawls is mirroring 
Sidgwick’s argument about the necessary modification of ‘considered convictions’ (Rawls and the 
Methods of Ethics, p.109). What is even more striking about Snare’s article is how readily he draws 
parallels between Rawls, and Bentham, Mill and Sidgwick, rather than between Rawls and Kant – 
which he does barely at all. Snare even attributes the ‘original position’ to Bentham and Mill’s ideas 
about ‘proofs’ and ‘first principles’, rather than to the hypothetical situation that is so integral to Kant’s 
categorical imperative.  
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and decisive defence of modern deontology to have been written to date, and 
Sidgwick appears in it extensively. Although Rawls stands at the farthest end of 
moral theory to Sidgwick, he utilises him for many of the points so crucial for that 
position. 
Sidgwick and Rawls’ somewhat complex relationship is perhaps best summarised by 
Claudia Card in her 2002 paper ‘Responsibility Ethics, Shared Understandings and 
Moral Communities’, when she states both Sidgwick and Rawls to be proponents of 
the ‘theoretical-juridicial’ model of ethical theorising (which is characterised by 
intellectualism, rationality and individualism, among other things)206. Card sees this 
represented by Rawls’ original position, and points not just to the fact that Rawls was 
influenced by Sidgwick in this respect, but the way in which he influenced him: 
“Rawls was strongly influenced by Sidgwick. He did not become a follower or 
adherent of Sidgwick’s position, but rather, took seriously the challenges Sidgwick 
put forward in The Methods and tried to meet some of them”207. Card’s words 
encapsulate Sidgwick’s legacy to Rawls, while acknowledging the distance between 
them208. Overall there is no doubt that Rawls’ work has been crucial in maintaining 
Sidgwick’s philosophical (and often political) relevance – and the significance for this 
of the fact that Rawls was such a staunch deontologist cannot be missed 
1.2.e. Sidgwick Revitalised: Sidgwick and Derek Parfit 
Rawls frequently used Sidgwick as a model for how ethical inquiry should be done, 
but he did not draw on Sidgwick’s actual moral theory itself. Use of Sidgwick’s work 
was to change distinctly in the next decade however, with a theorist who would 
become one of the most influential philosophers – and one of the most significant 
Sidgwick scholars – of the 20th Century, Derek Parfit.  
Parfit has an indispensable role in Sidgwick’s story, both for revitalising Sidgwick’s 
reputation as a philosopher in his own right, and for making him truly relevant to 
                                                 
206 In, Hypatia, Vol.17, No.1 (2002) 41-155 
 
207 Ibid, p.142. 
208 Michele M. Moody-Adams is another example of the many scholars who believe Rawls to be one 
of the writers most integral to the recent revival in interest in Sidgwick’s work. (See Moody-Adams, 
‘Review of Schultz (ed.) Essays on Henry Sidgwick, in, Victorian Studies, Vol.37, No.1 (1993) 149-
150, p.149) 
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contemporary ethics209. Much of this is the result of the extremely high regard in 
which Parfit holds Sidgwick’s skill as a writer. Where the century before Parfit has 
often considered Sidgwick to be dry and inaccessible, Parfit takes a very different 
view, and throughout the preface of his great 2011 work On What Matters, he is 
eager to encourage wider reading of ME. He points out that Sidgwick never repeats 
himself, that he makes important points concisely, and that he writes with clarity, 
however complicated his arguments210. In terms of Sidgwick’s philosophy, Parfit 
states quite simply that ME is ‘the best book on ethics ever written’. Where Sidgwick 
had remarked that he had “two masters: Kant, and Mill”, Parfit states his two masters 
to be Sidgwick and Kant, and ME, for Parfit, contains the ‘largest number of true and 
important claims’211. He once said in a letter to Marcus Singer – “if there is any book 
which it would be for the best that everyone doing moral philosophy could assume 
that everyone thoroughly knew, it would be ME’212. What we have in Parfit’s account 
of Sidgwick is - at both a personal and an academic level – the most important 
modernisation of Henry Sidgwick to date213. 
In terms of Parfit’s own moral theory, it has already been stated in the introduction 
that there is neither room nor scope in this thesis to engage with it as fully as it 
deserves. It is, however, quite possible to identify where Sidgwick is directly relevant 
to Parfit’s own influential arguments, and from this we can take several important 
points regarding one of the ways in which Sidgwick is presented today. On some of 
these points, my reading of Sidgwick aligns closely with Parfit’s. 
                                                 
209 Both Parfit’s 1984 book Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1984), and On What 
Matters (Vols.1 and 2) (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2011) are held up by Bart Schultz as being 
‘almost wholly responsible for defining the ‘field of analytical rehabilitations of Sidgwick’s arguments’ 
(Schultz, ‘Review of Singer and Lazari-Radek, Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and 
Contemporary Ethics’, University of Notre Dame, 7/7/2014). 
210 Parfit does admit that Sidgwick’s work is not exactly easily digestible, and that Sidgwick is 
sometimes boring. Parfit also draws attention to Sidgwick’s own description of his own “one damning 
defect of long-windedness and difficult dullness” – but on this point Parfit disagrees with Sidgwick, 
arguing that what Sidgwick thought would appear ‘dull and repellent’ is instead rather ‘finely 
expressed’ (Parfit, On What Matters, Vol.1, p.xxxvii). I could not agree more.  
211 Ibid, p.xxiii 
212 See M. Singer (ed.) Essays on Ethics and Method, p.xii. Parfit also points out that one of 
Sidgwick’s greatest merits was the accommodating way in which he would respond to his critics 
(which infuriated them), and that whereas he might not have been as original a philosopher as, say, 
Kant, Sidgwick is more like Darwin in that he took ideas that were clear, and grounded in common 
sense, and – to use Parfit’s own perfect paraphrasing – “intensified them almost to the point of 
genius” (On What Matters, Vol.1, p. xl). 
213 Parfit also argues that it is important we read the preface to the sixth edition (On What Matters, 
Vol.1, p.452).  
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In his first volume, the critically acclaimed Reasons and Persons (1984), Parfit’s 
central question is quite simply, what do we have reason to do? What, ultimately, are 
our reasons for acting? The entire first half of Reasons and Persons is concerned 
with this search, and of course Parfit shares this aim to unite ethics and rationality 
with Sidgwick214. Echoing Sidgwick’s introduction to ME, Parfit outlines three bases 
for what we have reason to do – self-interest (the most supremely rational aim for 
each human is that life goes best, or that an action is only rational if it maximises 
one’s own interest), consequentialism (the one ultimate moral aim is that outcomes 
be as good as possible), and common sense morality (the belief that there are 
certain moral aims that each of us ought to achieve215. In On What Matters, Parfit 
devotes an entire chapter to Sidgwick’s own observation of the apparent stalemate 
between these methods that seems to exist in human rationality216. Parfit’s own 
                                                 
214 The second half of Reasons and Persons is concerned with the distinctiveness of persons, and 
what makes us particular people. In this area too, Parfit draws on Sidgwick. Parfit frequently 
references Sidgwick’s emphasis on the separateness of persons, defining it as a deep truth about 
personal identity, and as being one of the “fundamental facts underlying all reasons for acting” 
(Reasons and Persons, pp.133, 329. See also On What Matters, Vol.1, p.133). The fact that we are 
all different people, with different lives to lead, is, according to Parfit, of great moral and rational 
significance. From this, it appears to be fairly clear that Parfit believes Sidgwick to be a forerunner of 
Rawls’ separateness of persons theory. This puts him at serious odds with Peter Singer, who does 
not believe that Sidgwick suggested the separateness of persons as Rawls’ interpreted it. 
215 Reasons and Persons, p.99. Parfit draws a direct correlation between his self-interest theory, and 
Sidgwick’s theory of rational egoism. All of these theories are what Parfit calls, ‘self-defeating’ as 
rational methods. Self interest theory is a self-defeating argument because it often indicates that it 
would actually be more rational for us to believe some other theory, or act in some self-denying way, 
because that is actually what will make things go better for us. Consequentialism self-defeats 
because if we were all to become pure do-gooders, we would not be acting on our motives of desire 
(such as love for our families and the desire to work well etc.) and thus happiness would not actually 
be increased, but instead greatly reduced. Common sense morality too fails, on the basis that our 
prioritising of our own duties, ahead of the enabling of others to carry out their duties, may easily 
result in nobody being able to carry out many of their duties.  
216 This is of course what is represented by Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason. It is this conflict 
between rational impartialism and rational egoism that so concerned Sidgwick that concerns Parfit 
here. After much discussion however, Parfit eventually refutes Sidgwick’s DoPR view in as little as 
three sentences. It is simply impossible, Parfit argues, to have most reason to act in two different 
ways. If duty and self-interest appear to conflict, we simply have to revise or refute one of the views. 
Parfit’s choice is to revise self-interest, which in turn refutes the problem by showing how self-interest 
theory itself makes it rational to act morally even if we know this would be worse for us. The details of 
this are given in Reasons and Persons (pp.19-21). During the discussion of whether self-interest can 
be overridden by morality when the two conflict, Parfit draws out the argument that self-interest theory 
can in fact support the belief that it is rational to keep promises (promises being the example of moral 
behaviour), even when we know that this will be worse for us. This is due to the fact that if self-interest 
can make us have this belief (which we sometimes do), then this automatically shows that that belief 
is justified. And if this is the case then there are many cases in which self-interest theory itself tells us 
that it is rational to act morally even when we know it would be worse for us; that is, moral reasons 
supersede self-interest, without actually denying it. Is is possible to say then, that Parfit solves 
Sidgwick’s infamous Dualism of Practical Reason? To some extent, the answer would seem to be 
yes. Parfit refutes self-interest theory with far more conviction than Sidgwick, but while also 
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approach to this apparent plurality of reasons for acting (which is also at the heart of 
my claim for moral ambivalence made in the thesis introduction), is also similar to 
Sidgwick’s, in that he believes these theories to not work by themselves, and to be in 
need of revision. Again following Sidgwick’s view, Parfit admits that we all accept 
some form of common sense morality, but that it is in need of revision. The revision 
that Parfit suggests is given all the theories seem to be rational to some extent, and 
are therefore difficult to refute entirely, it would seem sensible to consider the “very 
attractive notion”, as Parfit calls it, of perhaps somehow binding them together. Even 
more specifically, Parfit proposes that the failings of consequentialism require 
revisions that are provided by parts of common sense morality, and that the failings 
of common sense morality require revisions that are in part consequentialist217. To 
use Parfit’s own term, he suggests that his arguments about these bases of reasons 
for acting may dovetail. “We might be able to develop a theory that includes a 
combines revised versions of both C and M”, he says. “Call this, the unified 
theory”218. This would of course eventually become the Triple Theory that he 
developed in On What Matters, and that was outlined for its relevance to my 
argument for Rational Benevolence in the thesis introduction. What is important here 
is that Parfit directly recognises Sidgwick’s claim that he had unified utilitarianism 
and common sense morality. Parfit is probably the first philosopher to recognise this 
idea of a combination of principles in Sidgwick, in language that accords directly with 
that I have used in my own similar argument. But Parfit does not utilise Sidgwick’s 
own ‘unified theory’, and there is a crucial reason for this. It is that Parfit is arguing 
for unification between common sense morality and consequentialism, not 
utilitarianism, whereas Sidgwick was arguing ‘for a Hedonistic version of 
Utilitarianism’219. Parfit takes the consequentialist line because this theory may apply 
to several principles about what makes outcomes bad (such as more inequality and 
deception, for example), and therefore it is already closer in nature to common-
sense morality220. This is an interesting claim, both in terms of Parfit’s own unified 
                                                 
accounting for its presence. Parfit does not deny that the conflict between rational egoism and rational 
benevolence is very real: He does, however, present a far more convincing case for acting morally 
when this seems to conflict with self-interest. 
217 Reasons and Persons, p.112 
218 Ibid. 
219 Ibid. 
220 See On What Matters, Vol.1, pp.168-169. To distinguish between the two positions, Parfit believes 
consequentialism to be defined as ‘whether our acts are right or wrong depends only on facts about 
how it would be best for things to go’, and utilitarianism as ‘things go best when they go in the way 
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theory, and as against Sidgwick’s. It may well be that on this basis, Parfit’s 
reconciliation between deontological and ‘utilitarian’, or consequentialist, principles is 
indeed superior to Sidgwick’s, especially if it were to be shown that Sidgwick’s 
version of utilitarianism is somehow more restrictive than Parfit’s. But it is points like 
this at which we reach the limits of how far this thesis can effectively engage with 
Parfit here. I can only point to the fact that Sidgwick’s own reconciliation as it 
appears in Rational Benevolence is not picked up by Parfit, and then to the 
possibility of further work in the area of comparing the two ‘unified’ theories221.  
Having said this about Parfit’s rejection of Sidgwick’s particular utilitarianism 
however, On What Matters sees Parfit apply Sidgwick to numerous places during the 
building of Triple Theory. He recourses to Sidgwick’s view that it is impossible to 
compare impartial and self-interested viewpoints– and disputes it, but only to an 
extent)222; he suggests that Sidgwick’s version of Impartial-Reason-Act-
Consequentialism is actually seriously morally demanding223, and he also occupies a 
curious space between the view that Sidgwick is an act utilitarian and the view that 
he is a rule utilitarian, that he then deploys to support his own view that a version of 
rule utilitarianism is the correct one224.  
There are then two major conclusions to be drawn regarding Parfit’s extensive and 
progressive use of Sidgwick’s work. The first is that Sidgwick steadfastly remains a 
                                                 
that would, on the whole, benefit people most, by giving them the greatest total sum of benefits minus 
burdens’ (On What Matters, Vol.1, p.373).  
221 Parfit does, however, directly refer to Rational Benevolence as Sidgwick’s moral theory, and he is 
the only other writer to do so (Reasons and Persons, pp.139-140). However, his treatment of Rational 
Benevolence is very different to mine. Parfit defines Rational Benevolence as ‘reason requires each 
person to aim for the greatest possible sum of happiness, impartially considered’ (Reasons and 
Persons, p. 139). Rational Benevolence is, in Parfit’s terms, a ‘pure’ theory, in that it is both agent and 
temporally neutral, and for this reason it poses a very real threat to self-interested reasons for acting. 
But Parfit actually does not believe Sidgwick himself to have extended the argument for Rational 
Benevolence far enough, given that Sidgwick thought Rational Benevolence could still be challenged, 
by an aspect of Prudence. The reason for this, Parfit argues, is that Sidgwick failed to adequately 
account for the importance of what Parfit calls ‘Present aim theory’ (Reasons and Persons, pp.140-
142). See also Schultz, Eye of the Universe, p.216). However, Parfit does not seem to acknowledge 
that Sidgwick did actually finally conclude that Rational Benevolence supersedes Rational Egoism 
anyway. It is true that Sidgwick does not offer the length and depth of argument to support this claim 
that Parfit does, but he does at least allude to the idea in ME that morality has more claim to rational 
acceptance than self-interest. What is also important about Parfit’s treatment of Rational Benevolence 
is of course that he does not recognise it to be the sort of reconciliatory theory that I argue it is.  
222 On What Matters Vol.1, pp.134-137 
223 Ibid, pp.168-169 
224 See On What Matters Vol.1 pp.251-252, 404. This point is especially interesting in light of the 
Sidgwick as an act/rule utilitarian debate outlined above. Singer and de Lazari-Radek directly 
challenge Parfit’s non-act-utilitarian reading of Sidgwick here, in Point of View of the Universe. See 
below.  
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utilitarian on Parfit’s view. Parfit does not discuss the non-consequentialist-duty-
based/deontological aspects of Sidgwick’s work, and where Kant appears in Triple 
Theory, his maxims are being reformulated in rule-consequentialist and 
contractualist terms. The second conclusion is that Parfit does not, in his own 
reconciliatory theory, directly use the reconciliation offered by Sidgwick. It would also 
appear, certainly from Reasons and Persons, that Parfit believes Sidgwick to have 
attempted a unified theory on a purely hedonistic basis, which I dispute here. 
However, Sidgwick is a constant presence in Parfit’s building of Triple Theory, and 
can be seen to be instrumental to Parfit’s arguments for what will eventually become 
a Kantian form of consequentialism – and that is telling enough in itself for how it is 
possible to read Sidgwick.  
 
1.3. Perceptions and Oversights of Sidgwick’s Reconciliation Between 
Deontological and Utilitarian Principles  
In the previous two sections, I have been concerned to demonstrate two things. The 
first is that Sidgwick has unanimously been read as a utilitarian, since his own day 
and in the century that has followed. The second is that there have been some 
important movements towards recognising that Sidgwick’s work offers something 
slightly different to standard utilitarianism - and even that he includes rather 
deontological concepts - but that in none of these cases the full significance of this 
has been pursued. For the next two stages in this particular chronicle of Sidgwick’s 
work, I aim to examine the work of recent and current theorists who have either 
specifically recognised Sidgwick to present some kind of reconciliation between 
deontological and utilitarian principles of morality, or who are of the utmost 
importance to current Sidgwick studies but who have not fully recognised this aspect 
of his work225. In all these cases, I argue that Rational Benevolence has not been 
held up as the embodiment of that reconciliation, and that any recognition of 
Sidgwick’s reconciliation has not been presented as a synthesis, as I argue it to be.  
                                                 
225 By including Parfit in the previous section, and not here in the section on current and recent 
theorists, I do not mean to exclude him from this category - On What Matters was only published in 
2011. He was included in the above purely on the basis that Reasons and Persons appeared in 1984, 
and that that volume suggested as early as the 1980s that Parfit saw Sidgwick’s theory as an 
example of the sort of unified theory that Parfit would later go on to develop into Triple Theory, in On 
What Matters.  
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 The section, which still follows a rough chronology in order to remain in 
keeping with the ‘narrative’ style in which I have aimed to present this chapter so far, 
begins with Marcus Singer’s case against Sidgwick’s interpretation of common-
sense morality. It then moves through, among others, Brad Hooker and Antony 
Skelton’s argument for and against a coherentist element in Sidgwick, and considers 
Mariko Okano-Nakuno’s argument against the apparent ‘discrepancies’ between 
Sidgwick and Kant. The chapter then examines Peter Singer’s influential use of 
Sidgwick, which in turn engages David Phillips, Thomas Hurka, and Roger Crisp. 
Although these last theorists are not always directly concerned with the idea of 
reconciliation per se in Sidgwick, it is my view that their work on Sidgwick is 
indispensable to any reading of him, and especially to readings of Sidgwick’s notion 
of duty. It is also still the case that these important readings of Sidgwick have not 
interpreted his theory of Rational Benevolence as I do here. Where it is with regret 
that there is not room to reference all theorists who have contributed to current 
readings of Sidgwick, as many as possible are included in the notes.  
 
1.3.a. Marcus Singer: An Early Rejection of Sidgwick’s Reconciliation  
Following the faint historical recognitions of Sidgwick’s nuanced version of 
utilitarianism, it might seem odd that the section on modern readings of Sidgwick 
should begin with an outright rejection of Sidgwick’s attempt to unite divergent moral 
principles. But Marcus Singer had initially utilised Sidgwick’s reference to Kant in his 
own argument for the ‘generalisation principle’ in his 1955 volume Generalisation in 
Ethics, and this generated for Singer both a lifelong fascination with Sidgwick, and 
an eventual disagreement with the idea that Sidgwick had achieved unity between 
common sense morality and utilitarianism226. Firstly, Singer believed Sidgwick to 
                                                 
226 Singer, Generalisation in Ethics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf: 1955). When Singer’s argument 
began life in 1948, it was called ‘Generalisation in Sidgwick’s Ethics’, but Singer admitted that this 
was not a good paper, and the revised 1955 version replaced it completely. The later version does 
still include Singer’s original appeals to Sidgwick’s arguments. Singer’s generalisation argument 
presupposes what Singer calls ‘the generalisation principle’, which is ‘what is right (or wrong) or one 
person must be right (or wrong) for any similar person in any similar circumstances. The parallel with 
Kant’s universalizability principle is clear, but notably it is actually Sidgwick to whom Singer 
immediately refers for support, quoting Sidgwick’s principle of justice (or impartiality), which states 
that ‘we cannot judge an action to be right for A and wrong for B, unless we can find in the natures or 
circumstances of the two some difference which we can regard as a reasonable ground for 
differences in their duties’ (III:XIII:380). The argument was not universally well received, with many 
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have broken his own rule in ME, by first claiming that he was not intending to 
introduce or endorse the method of ethics, and then proceeding to claim that the 
morality of common sense was in need of systemisation, which he then provides via 
the principle of utilitarianism227. More seriously, Sidgwick had, on Singer’s view, 
misinterpreted the nature of common sense morality. In his 1986 article ‘Common 
Sense and Paradox in Sidgwick’s Ethics’, Sidgwick’s connection between common 
sense morality and utilitarianism shows up as a major concern for Singer228. Singer 
points out that, for Sidgwick, common sense morality is a body of moral truth, and 
that it is identified with intuitionism, so much so that he slides back and forth between 
them229. But for Singer, this is a mistake, stating the reason as ‘Intuitionism is a 
philosophical theory, common sense is not230. Singer believes Sidgwick to be wrong 
in declaring common sense morality unable to answer some questions in some 
situations, and wrong in his claim that common sense morality is often divided 
against itself: It is, therefore, wrong for Sidgwick to have ‘foisted’ utilitarianism on 
                                                 
writers and theorists disputing its validity, and the line of reasoning (see David Keyt, ‘Singer’s 
Generalisation Argument’, in, Philosophical Review Vol.72 (1963) 466-476; A. Phillips Griffiths, 
‘Review of Generalisation in Ethics’, in, Philosophical Books, Vol.3, No.1 (1962) 18-21; Howard Sobel, 
‘Generalisation Arguments’, in, Theoria Vol.31, No.1 (1965) 32-60; Lansing Pollock, ‘A Dilemma for 
Singer’, in, Philosophical Studies, Vol.33, No.4 (1978), 425). But it has gained a lasting place in the 
ranks of arguments that attempt to provide a rational foundation for morality, and Sidgwick’s input is 
undeniable. Singer’s 1974 paper ‘The Many Methods of Sidgwick’s Ethics’ (in, The Monist, Vol.58, 
No.3 (1974) 420-448) gave a careful and detailed biographical account of the birth and revisions of 
ME, and assessed Broad’s claim that ME was the best treatise on ethics ever written (and, by proxy, 
Brand Blanshard’s agreement with Broad that appeared in Blanshard’s Reason and Goodness). But 
he also quotes Arthur Murphy’s critique of ME, given in Murphy’s The Theory of Practical Reason 
(LaSalle, Ill: Open Court: 1964), which stands in the sharpest contrast to Broad’s opinion (see Singer, 
‘The Many Methods’, pp.430-431), and cites the Dualism of Practical Reason as a reason why 
Sidgwick’s work should not, perhaps, be considered to be the best treaty on morality ever written. 
Singer’s argument here is convincing: ‘Sidgwick regarded the first principle of rational egoism as self-
evident. He also regarded as self-evident the first principle of utilitarianism, the axiom of ‘rational 
benevolence’ (‘The Many Methods’, pp. 445). It was the contradiction, or apparent contradiction 
between these that constituted for him, ‘the profoundest problem of ethics’, the Dualism of Practical 
Reason. Yet, strange as it may seem, he did not notice that his own conditions for self-evidence are 
violated by just this contradiction’ (‘The Many Methods, p. 446) Singer also points out that James Seth 
made this same observation in 1901. 
227 ‘The Many Methods, p.441. This point of Singer’s provides an interesting parallel with my claim 
that Sidgwick did more than simply expound the various methods that we do use, and actually 
developed something close to a suggestion as to what we ought to do. Singer’s reasoning as to why 
the correlation between intuitionism and utilitarianism amounts to a ‘genuine method of ethics’ (p. 
442) is extremely sound, and correlates closely with the arguments for Rational Benevolence I will 
develop later. As Singer puts it: “despite his disclaimers in the introduction, Sidgwick wanted his 
Methods of Ethics to have practical bearings, and thought that it did” (p. 445). 
228 In, History of Philosophy Quarterly Vol.3, No.1 (1986) 65-78. 
229 Ibid p.66. See also Singer ‘Sidgwick and Nineteenth-Century British Ethical Thought’, in Schultz 
(ed.) Essays on Henry Sidgwick, pp.65-92.  
230 ‘Common Sense’, p.69. 
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common sense, as a means of answering those questions231. Singer quite clearly 
recognises that Sidgwick believed there to be little distance between Utilitarianism 
and Intuitionism – as is seen in his introduction to the 2000 collection of Sidgwick’s 
writings, Essays on Ethics and Method where he states that ‘the Utilitarianism he 
ends up with is Utilitarianism on an Intuitionistic basis, and Utilitarianism, by parity of 
reasoning, can be said to be unconsciously intuitionistic’232. But for Singer, as his 
1986 paper makes clear, this reconciliation is frustrated by the fact that Sidgwick has 
fundamentally mishandled the common sense morality that is represented by that 
Dogmatic Intuitionism, by equating the two233. This is, I believe, quite a unique 
charge in the world of objections to Sidgwick. But it also depends on our taking 
seriously Singer’s distinction between “intuitionism” as an epistemological method of 
ethics (that which I distinguish with a small ‘i’) and ‘Intuitionism’ as representative of 
Sidgwick’s view of common sense morality, and thus the deontological position (the 
type I distinguish with a capital ‘I’). As I outlined in the thesis introduction, and will 
argue in full in the next chapter, it is my view that Sidgwick’s intuitionism and his 
Intuitionism are united - and therefore it is not problematic when that common sense 
morality is united with the intuitions that lead to the utilitarian principle234. 
                                                 
231 Ibid. p.73 
232 Singer (ed.) Ethics and Method, p.xxi 
233 Singer remarks in Common Sense and Paradox that Sidgwick took Rational Benevolence to be a 
self-evident principle, and that he considered it to be the basis for the utilitarian principle (p.75). 
Singer thus confirms that whereas he might not agree with the link between utilitarianism and 
common sense morality, this is at least how Sidgwick saw it. Singer also states here that he himself is 
not prepared to accept rational benevolence as a principle of the morality of common sense (p. 75). 
Nor, however, incidentally, is he prepared to accept Sidgwick’s account of rational egoism as self-
evident.  
234 Marcus Singer has one more important contribution to make to the Sidgwick cause – in this case, 
a historical, rather than a philosophical one. This is Singer’s account of his personal engagement with 
Sidgwick that we are given in the preface to Ethics and Methods, and its illumination of the events that 
occurred in the 1980s, which concerns the general raising of awareness of Sidgwick’s work. Singer 
describes how during the 1960s, when he first thought about compiling the material that was 
eventually to become his volume on Sidgwick’s essays and methods, there simply was not enough 
interest in Sidgwick to warrant the project. Papers such as Singer’s own of 1974 were at that time 
relatively rare. In 1983 however, Singer established The Sidgwick Society, the purpose of which was, 
according to its mission statement, simply ‘admiration for the character of Henry Sidgwick and the 
way he practiced philosophical inquiry: careful, cautious contemplation, considering all points and 
every possibility, along with his resolute aim at truth and clarity and clarified understanding……and 
his resolute good sense, good judgements, and good will’ (see Ethics and Method, p.x). Singer also 
quotes from a later statement, which is deserving of recognition here: ‘The society does not do 
anything – it holds no meetings, publishes no journals…it just is. It exists as a tribute to Henry 
Sidgwick, and the example he set in his intellectual work and life’. Surprisingly, for both Singer and 
the reader, Singer recalls his amazement at the volume of interest that was expressed in the society - 
at how many people wanted to become members. Interest in Sidgwick, he realised, was far greater 
than he or even his partial collaborator Bart Schultz had ever thought. Academics from Richard 
Brandt to William Frankena have at one point been on the Board of Directors of The Sidgwick Society, 
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1.3.b. Janice Daurio: The Methods as One Single Moral Theory 
Among the works that most specifically read Sidgwick in terms of how far his work 
provides a kind of unity between moral principles, Janice Daurio’s 1997 paper 
‘Sidgwick on Moral Theories and Common Sense Morality’ is notable, mainly for the 
extremity of its claim235. The paper is in part a direct challenge to Schneewind’s 
claim that one of the reasons for the historical neglect of ME is its lack of unified 
argument236, and in part her own response to her observation that ‘philosophers 
since Broad have continued to miss the essential unity’237. On this point about unity 
having been missed in ME, I am obviously in direct agreement with Dario. Where I 
do not agree, however, is with Daurio’s argument is that the entirety of ME is actually 
‘a thorough and systematic examination of a single moral theory’, one which unifies 
utilitarianism, intuitionism, and egoism238. Clearly, this goes even beyond my 
argument for Sidgwick’s reconciliation. But Daurio’s theory is, like M. Singer’s, 
helpful for illuminating what I am not saying about the reconciliation for which I am 
arguing.  
Daurio makes the argument for the single moral theory from the apparent 
inconsistency in ME between Book III, in which Sidgwick agrees with common sense 
moralists who do not believe that a notion of goodness is needed in order to 
establish what is right conduct, and the end of Book IV, where Sidgwick argues that 
rightness wholly depends on the universal happiness. This, Daurio admits, gives a 
contradictory impression, but can be overcome if all three of the moral theories 
Sidgwick set out to investigate – egoism, intuitionism and utilitarianism – are part of 
“that single moral theory…the one implicit in common sense morality”239. Her 
                                                 
and as Singer was writing in 2000, it had just opened its website, which is still active and running 
today.   
235 In, History of Philosophy Quarterly Vol.14, No.4 (1997) 425-445. Daurio claims in the introduction 
to this paper that Sidgwick work is ‘still in its infancy’, even at this relatively late year. Neatly following 
the section above that outlined Marcus Singer’s establishing of The Sidgwick Society, it was actually 
Singer himself who picked Daurio up on this statement, politely pointing out in a private letter to 
Daurio that Sidgwick studies would be better considered to be ‘at the kindergarten stage’ (‘Sidgwick 
on Moral Theories’, p.442). 
236 See Schneewind, Sidgwickian Ethics, p.72 
237 ‘Sidgwick on Moral Theories’, p.426 
238 Ibid. p.426. 
239 Ibid., p.427. Obviously, this claim flies directly against Sidgwick’s statement that he was not aiming 
to defend one theory above all others – and nowhere does Daurio show that she is aware of this 
statement often repeated by the author. Sidgwick did not even claim to be defending one of the three 
methods, let alone a situation in which all three can be viewed together. 
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argument is based on an understanding of a ‘moral theory’ as a complex 
combination of methods and principles. The relationship of the rightness of the rules 
to the good of the outcome is Daurio’s interpretation of what Sidgwick meant by a 
method: Then the ‘good’ itself is a principle in this system. Central to Daurio’s 
argument is that Sidgwick believed various aims or methods can be paired with 
various ends or principles. That is, within one single theory, a method might be 
attached to some principle, or more than one method might be attached to a 
principle. This leads her to declare that ‘the moral theory implicit in common sense 
morality – and therefore the moral theory of The Methods – is this complex moral 
theory, linking the three methods of egoism, intuitionism, and utilitarian, to some end. 
If it can be shown that there is just one ultimate end, and if it can be shown that this 
one ultimate end is the one achieved by agents acting on rules generated by all 
three methods, then ‘common sense morality is justified’240. Daurio uses a quote 
from Sidgwick that appears to support her argument that ‘the good’ unifies all of the 
moral theories into one. Sidgwick asks that if universal good is not what systemises 
human activities, then what can it be? If this systemisation of activity can be 
achieved, Daurio says, then the three methods naturally become linked by their 
mutual reference to Happiness as the ultimate end – all three methods in common 
sense morality are linked to just one principle, the utilitarian one. 
In some ways, it is easy to see why Daurio theorises ME to be a coherent whole, 
with common sense morality emerging as the overall moral theory, providing a sort 
of playing field in which all the various ‘methods’ (egoism, intuitionism and 
utilitarianism) can sub in and out in a pursuit of the goal of the good. But Daurio’s 
paper continually runs a high risk of making the unity at which she is aiming feel 
rather forced. There is, for example, a fairly significant and inexplicable leap between 
the claim that ‘the discovery of three methods in common sense morality means that 
the moral theory implicit in common sense morality is complex’ and the sentence 
immediately succeeding that one in which it is stated that ‘if the three methods of 
egoism, intuitionism and utilitarianism are successfully joined to just one principle, 
whatever that principle is, then common sense morality is justified: It presupposes a 
valid, complex moral theory’. This is a very sweeping statement to make, when there 
                                                 
240 Ibid. p. 434 
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is little material evidence of such a principle – or even little reason for there to be a 
particular principle at all (‘whatever that principle is’)241. 
But ultimately it is the inclusion of all three methods into one systemised morality that 
aims at Happiness that is the most problematic aspect of Daurio’s theory. At the mid-
way stage of the paper, Daurio points out that Intuitionism, for Sidgwick, has led 
directly to utilitarianism242. Daurio comes tantalisingly close here to recognising that 
intuitionism and utilitarianism are intrinsically linked, but she does not focus on the 
nature of the link between them, instead moving straight on to argue that common 
sense morality also implies egoism, which has the abrupt effect of bringing Daurio’s 
theory to a sudden, frustrated close: “The sad conclusion: We are stuck with the 
egoist method, which cannot be logically or plausibly connected to the utilitarian 
principle in the indirect moral theory of common sense morality”243. Daurio’s efforts 
have, essentially, been thwarted by that most ancient of The Methods’ problems – 
the Dualism of Practical Reason. This, she argues, is why ME cannot be read as a 
unified argument – but she does not take this to mean that unity is not present in ME 
at all. 
On this last count, I do not disagree with Daurio. Unity does exist in ME, and it does 
provide a moral theory. I am also in complete agreement with her observation that 
unity in ME has been missed because so many theorists have simply regarded ME 
as a defence of one moral theory – utilitarianism. However, as Daurio’s ultimately 
                                                 
241 Ibid. p.433. Daurio has, earlier in the paper, shaped what is meant by this principle to some extent, 
for example stating that the connection between a theory’s aim and the end achieved is meant to be 
logical, and that if this can be proven then the moral theory is valid (p. 430). However, such 
arguments are effectively denounced by Peter Singer’s refuting of Rawls’ argument that Sidgwick 
used reflective equilibrium, on the basis that Sidgwick did not believe that just because a moral theory 
could be seen to be valid, does not necessarily make it right. Daurio’s argument for the connections 
between the various theories also consists in arguing that some moral theories are direct, by which it 
is meant that the conscious aim of the method and the ultimate end of the principle are the same i.e. 
egoism generates rules that are to do with the individual’s happiness as the ultimate end, and acting 
on those rules leads to said happiness, and indirect theories in which the conscious aim is matched 
with a principle of another sort i.e. where egoism generates rules that are to do with the agent’s 
happiness, but acting on those rules might actually defeat that very aim (pp. 432-434). These claims 
are not wrong, and Daurio is absolutely correct to point out that Sidgwick anticipated some of the later 
refinements which utilitarianism was to undergo, in the hands of Derek Parfit for example, and Dean 
Cocking and Justin Oakley in their defence of indirect consequentialism (Cocking and Oakley, 
‘Indirect Consequentialism, Friendship, and the Problem of Alienation, in, Ethics, Vol.106, No.1 (1995) 
86-111). But in the case of ME, it seems too far a leap to use this mechanism as a means of arguing 
for a broad-spectrum unity across all of the methods. Sidgwick may have perceived that methods and 
ends are often indirectly, rather than directly, related, but it does not follow that his investigation of 
mankind’s various ways of making moral decisions itself actually uses this in practice.  
242 ‘Sidgwick on Moral Theories’, p.440 
243 Ibid. 
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foiled argument shows, reconciling all three methods is not where that unity exists. It 
is simply not the case that ME overall is one single moral theory. Sidgwick’s moral 
theory depends on the reconciliation of two of the methods only. Daurio was not 
wrong to look for moral unity. But she was looking in the wrong place. 
1.3.c. Brad Hooker: Synthesis as Coherentism in Sidgwick’s Work 
In the past decade or so, the highly interesting question has arisen of whether - in 
the propositions, claims, and conclusions that Sidgwick puts forward – Sidgwick is 
advocating a coherentism theory of knowledge, or a foundationalist one. There are 
very good grounds in ME for holding either position, and this particular debate also 
gives rise to some important points about the nature of Sidgwick’s reconciliation 
between deontological and utilitarian principles as it appears in Rational 
Benevolence. Whereas there are several theorists who contribute importantly to this 
topic, I have taken Brad Hooker and Antony Skelton to present the most direct 
discussions; they are also the most relevant for the fact that they connect their 
coherentist/foundationalist investigations in some way to an idea of the relationship 
that Sidgwick developed between deontological and utilitarian principles – as I will 
also do. 
Hooker’s 2000 paper ‘Sidgwick and Common Sense Morality’ begins with a 
paragraph overflowing with praise for ME, which includes Hooker’s belief that 
Sidgwick’s criticisms of Kant were ‘exactly right’, and that his account of moral 
judgement is better than any other244. For Hooker, Sidgwick’s main contributions to 
moral philosophy are his moral epistemology (which he identifies as having been 
considered foundationalist), his use of common sense in utilitarianism, and his 
development of utilitarianism itself. From this then it is clear that Hooker joins the 
ranks of those who believe Sidgwick to be a utilitarian. But Hooker does recognise 
that Sidgwick was ‘clearly looking for a moral system that would actually resolve 
uncertainty and disagreement’245. More specifically, Hooker emphasises that 
Sidgwick believed common sense morality to be in need of – and he uses Sidgwick’s 
phrase here - rational synthesis246. That is, Hooker disputes the view that Sidgwick’s 
epistemology was wholly foundationalist. Hooker outlines Sidgwick’s criteria for self-
                                                 
244 Hooker, ‘Sidgwick and Common Sense Morality’, in, Utilitas, Vol.12, No.3 (2000) 347-360. 
245 Ibid. p.354-355. 
246 Ibid. p.351 
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evidence, and argues two things; firstly, that the principles of common sense morality 
that Sidgwick passed through these criteria failed, thus challenging the 
foundationalist reading, and secondly that as Sidgwick then reintroduces some 
common sense morality principles in his argument for utilitarianism, this produces a 
coherentist system247. In this system, on Hooker’s view, it is utilitarianism that 
provides the necessary systemisation, reforms, and revisions248.  
The theory of coherentism posits that beliefs within a system must cohere with one 
another in order to be valid, or justified249. Hooker’s point that the rational synthesis 
of our moral beliefs is, in Sidgwick, a form of coherentism is a good one, and it does 
seem as though this might explain the relationship between common sense morality 
and utilitarianism. I do not disagree with Hooker: In fact, Hooker’s account of the 
need for this relationship accords closely with the one I will give in the next chapter, 
in the discussion of how far Sidgwick believes common sense morality to be valuable 
by itself250. And given that definition, coherentism would appear to be a valid 
alternative means of representing the idea of the reconciliation between 
deontological and utilitarian principles in Sidgwick’s work: It supports fully my claim 
outlined in the introduction (and expanded later in chapter 4) that both the 
deontological and utilitarian properties of Sidgwick’s moral theory can only be 
                                                 
247 Hooker also points to Sidgwick’s observation that our moral intuitions (those that comprise 
common sense morality) are often vague, and loose, and that this does not accord with a ‘good 
intuition’; “In order for an intuition to be a good one, careful reflection should not drain our confidence 
in it. But that is exactly what Sidgwick thinks happens with many of the intuitions that make up 
common sense’ (p. 350).  
248 As Hooker says, ‘Utilitarianism makes sense of common sense morality, by endorsing most of it, 
and explaining its unity’ (p. 351). In this paper, Hooker also furthers the ‘Sidgwick as an act/rule 
utilitarian’ debate. Hooker admits that there are various ways in which Sidgwick could be interpreted 
in these areas, but he is himself mainly of the opinion that ‘indirect collective utilitarianism’, or a form 
of rule utilitarianism, would best represent Sidgwick’s position (p. 360), and that act utilitarianism is 
probably not the version that coheres common sense morality in order to create the rational synthesis.  
249 The type of coherentism in question here is the coherence theory of epistemic justification, as 
opposed to the coherence theory of truth. Other notable theorists to debate Sidgwick’s coherentist 
epistemic justification are Bart Schultz, David Brink, J.B. Schneewind, Robert Shaver, and Roger 
Crisp (see below). For Hooker’s further discussions of coherence, rule consequentialism, and 
reflective equilibrium, see Hooker’s Ideal Code, Real World, p.9; ‘Rule-Consequentialism’, in, Mind, 
Vol.99, No.393 (1990) 67-77; ‘Rule-consequentialism, Incoherence, and Fairness’ Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society Vol. 95 (1995) 19-35; ‘Ross-Style Pluralism versus Rule-Consequentialism’ Mind, 
Vol.105, No.420 (1996) 531-552; Hooker, Elinor Mason and Dale E, Miller (eds.) Reflective 
Equilibrium and Rule Consequentialism, in Morality, Rules and Consequences (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press Ltd: 2000). See also Dale Miller, ‘Hooker’s Use and Abuse of Reflective Equilibrium’, 
in Hooker et al (eds.) pp.156-178. 
250 Incidentally, Hooker also takes common sense morality to refer specifically to duties (and virtues), 
as I do. ‘Sidgwick and Common Sense Morality’, p.360. 
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validated, or justified, when they are brought into harmonious relationship with each 
other.  
However, I do not believe this is the end of the coherentist/foundationalist part of 
Sidgwick’s story. Firstly, there is the issue of Sidgwick’s epistemic intuitionism. 
Sidgwick quite clearly defends a highly non-inferential form of intuitionism (we see 
this particularly in his statement in the PD that he “must somehow see that it was 
right….I was forced to recognise the need of a fundamental ethical intuition’ (xvi), 
italics Sidgwick’s), and this search for a non-inferential knowledge continues in 
Sidgwick’s search for ultimately rational self-evident first principles251. All of this 
strongly indicates foundationalism. Then the coherentist aspect appears again when 
Sidgwick derives the point of view of the universe, and thus Rational Benevolence, 
from the self-evident Kantian maxim, presented by Sidgwick as Justice. Rational 
Benevolence thus appears non-foundationalist, as it is inferentially known. 
Sidgwick’s argument that Rational Benevolence is the proof of utilitarianism is also 
clearly non-foundationalist. At a wider level, this then translates to a relationship 
between utilitarianism and common sense morality in which the two revise and 
support each other – and this would seem to agree with the coherentism that Hooker 
assigns to Sidgwick. It also accords with the way I have expressed Rational 
Benevolence, which is that the rationality and the justification of each principle 
depends directly on the rationality and validity of the other; knowledge is clearly 
inferential here, and also a form of coherentism252.  
                                                 
251 It is on the basis of this foundationalist intuitionism that Sidgwick and W.D. Ross are often united.  
252 Roger Crisp (‘Sidgwick and the Boundaries of Intuitionism’, in, Phillip Stratton-Lake (ed.) Ethical 
Intuitionism (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 2002) 56-75) and David Brink (‘Common Sense and First 
Principles in Sidgwick’s Methods’ in, Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol.11, No.1 (1994) 179-201) both 
contribute importantly to this debate, both using as their starting point Sidgwick’s epistemological 
intuitionism, and arriving at different conclusions as to just how effective this type of knowledge is. 
These conclusions, it can be seen, seem to depend on whether one is willing to read Sidgwick as a 
foundationalist, or a coherentist who was actually using – whether he intended it or not – a form of 
reflective equilibrium. Crisp, who has taken the foundationalist approach, has greater faith in 
Sidgwick’s intuitionism. He describes intuitionism as being for Sidgwick ‘a doxastic faculty’, with a 
‘capacity to form non-inferential, self-evident beliefs that certain actions, rules, or whatever are right 
and reasonable, and moral intuitions are such beliefs’ (‘Sidgwick and the Boundaries of Intuitionism’ 
p.57. See also Crisp, The Cosmos of Duty, p. 97). Crisp believes that this Sidgwickian version of 
intuitionism is by far the strongest version of that method of knowledge. Brink, on the other hand, 
picks up on the inferential process of moral justification used by Sidgwick in the search for self-evident 
principles, and the fact that Sidgwick clearly believes this process to be central to the establishment of 
those principles. This process, Brink argues, in which principles are ‘discursively justified’ is a form of 
dialectical equilibrium (‘Common Sense and First Principles’, p.192) – and this is inconsistent with the 
sort of epistemic intuitionism Sidgwick also advocated. Russell Hardin is also of the firm position that 
a form of reflective equilibrium is present in Sidgwick’s work (‘Common Sense at the Foundations’, in, 
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 The question becomes then, is the ‘synthesis’ between moral principles – the 
one that Hooker refers to here and the one that I argue is present in Rational 
Benevolence – a coherentist one, as Hooker would have it? And might this be a 
credible alternative way of understanding the relationship between deontological and 
utilitarian principles? It is my view that Sidgwick cannot be defined as either a 
coherentist or a foundationalist. I believe that there is a peculiar mixture of 
coherentist and foundationalist elements in Sidgwick’s work, and that this is the 
direct result of his peculiar mixture of Reason and intuitionism, and that – also like 
his Reason and intuitionism – they seem to be inherently connected. His reasoning 
establishes a non-inferential, foundationalist basis, and this results in a form of 
coherentism. Rational Benevolence is therefore, I argue, a 
foundationalist/coherentist hybrid253. I do not, unlike Brink, think that this causes any 
damage to Sidgwick’s epistemology, or his moral theory. For one thing, it is not 
absolutely necessary to define Sidgwick either way; it is not important per se to how 
we understand Rational Benevolence that it is coherentist or foundationalist254. But it 
does serve to show some of the character of Rational Benevolence, and of 
Sidgwick’s individuality as a philosopher.   
                                                 
Schultz (ed.) Essays on Henry Sidgwick, pp.143-161). The fact that Sidgwick appears to be using 
both an intuitionist and a dialectical process of justification does indeed seem to point straight to 
reflective equilibrium, which is a form of coherentism, and would seem to accord with Hooker’s view of 
Sidgwick. Hooker himself argues that Sidgwick did advocate a form of reflective equilibrium (Ideal 
Code, Real World, p.9). The reflective equilibrium/coherentism/foundationalism debate continues, as 
will be seen below in the work of David Phillips, and Peter Singer.   
253 David Phillips agrees specifically that Sidgwick’s epistemology is a hybrid (Sidgwickian Ethics, p. 
61). 
254 It could, however, alternatively be argued that it is actually important that we know whether 
Rational Benevolence is coherentist or foundationalist, as whether the principles within it are 
inferentially or non-inferentially known may affect my argument for the mutually informing relationship 
between deontological and utilitarian principles that is so vital to the synthesis. To this end, I venture 
that a purely foundationalist view of Rational Benevolence is possible, if both the absolute-principle 
based and the utilitarian based principles are argued to be independently self-evident, and I admit that 
this might be the only version that my account of Rational Benevolence allows. On the other hand, we 
may, in the end, be forced to call Rational Benevolence coherentism, because foundationalism 
precludes any inferential knowledge, where coherentism does not necessarily (i.e. it is possible to 
hold a non-inferentially known belief, and for this to then generate other beliefs that cohere with it). I 
still maintain however that a coherentist/foundationalist hybrid may be a valid representation of 
Rational Benevolence that does not threaten the need for each moral property to be independently 
valid. Rational Benevolence is foundationalist in that we only know each moral property because we 
know the other, and coherentist in that they are only validated because they cohere. This may, in fact, 
even add to the strength of Rational Benevolence. 
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1.3.d. Antony Skelton: The Rejection of Sidgwickian Coherentism, and the 
Question of Reconciliation 
Antony Skelton has been writing prolifically on Sidgwick for over a decade255. His 
work shows great admiration for Sidgwick, while also challenging some of Sidgwick’s 
most famous claims, such as the self-evidence of certain principles that Sidgwick 
thought to have met those conditions. Skelton is relevant to the wider issue of how 
(or indeed if, on Skelton’s view) Sidgwick brought dogmatic intuitionism together with 
utilitarianism via philosophical intuitionism – but coherentism is also a theme in that 
discussion, and it seems suitable to discuss this aspect first, following Hooker’s 
version. 
In his 2010 paper Henry Sidgwick’s Moral Epistemology256, Skelton begins with the 
statement that Rawls clearly considered Sidgwick to be a coherentist, given that 
Rawls thought Sidgwick to be using a system of reflective equilibrium, and that Peter 
Singer disagreed on the basis that he believed Sidgwick to be committed to a 
foundationalist intuitionism which relies on self-evident principles as justification257. 
Skelton perceives Singer to have moved away from this position somewhat, by 
sometimes arguing that Sidgwick supports his arguments with reference to common 
sense morality258. But for Skelton, Singer’s first view was the correct one. Skelton 
believes Sidgwick’s moral epistemology to be an inherently foundationalist one, that 
allows no ‘evidentiary role’ to common sense morality259. Utilising Sidgwick’s 
justification of utilitarianism as the model of Sidgwick’s epistemology, Skelton 
emphasises Sidgwick’s non-derivatively justified philosophical intuitions - that is, his 
criteria for self-evidence260. His careful selection of texts from ME lead him to the 
point at which he states that the ‘rational synthesis’ (i.e. the same rational synthesis 
from the same passage quoted by Hooker) is provided by those philosophical 
                                                 
255 See, as a selection, ‘Utilitarian Practical Ethics: Sidgwick and Singer’ (in, Placido Bucolo, Roger 
Crisp, Bart Schultz (eds.) Henry Sidgwick: Ethics, Psychics, and Politics (Catania: University of 
Catania Press: 2011); ‘Henry Sidgwick’s Practical Ethics: A Defence’, in, Utilitas Vol.8, No.3 (2006) 
199-217; ‘Schultz’s Sidgwick’, in, Utilitas, Vol.19, No.1, 91-103 (2007), as well as the articles I have 
directly referenced in the main text, and his engagement with David Phillips, which appears below.  
256 In, Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol.48, No.4 (2010) 491-519. 
257 Something that I agree exists in Sidgwick. 
258 Something else that I agree exists in Sidgwick. 
259 ‘Moral Epistemology’, p.492. 
260 Skelton says “An explanation of the structure of the case for utilitarianism and the justificatory 
architecture to which it appeals is the chief task of any account of Sidgwick’s epistemology’ (Ibid. 
p.493). 
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intuitions261. This is a thoroughly foundationalist position, in which the philosophical 
intuitions “exhibit the truth” of the first principle of utilitarianism262. 
 This foundationalist view appears throughout Skelton’s work263. We might now 
ask what consequences this reading, as opposed to the coherentist one, has for 
Skelton’s wider understanding of the relationship between philosophical intuitionism 
and utilitarianism.  
Skelton’s foundationalist reading of Sidgwick certainly makes it harder to argue for a 
synthesis, as I have described it. On Skelton’s view, philosophical intuitionism is the 
justification for utilitarianism, and this is the end of the matter – and this does not 
amount to the sort of mutually informing relationship between deontological and 
utilitarian principles that I wish to develop in this thesis264. Furthermore, Skelton’s 
                                                 
261 What is particularly interesting here is that Skelton uses many of the same passages from ME in 
his argument for foundationalism that are quoted by Hooker in his argument for coherentism. For 
example, ‘although common sense cannot offer us any “independent and self-evident rules of 
morality” (III:XI:360), it “may still be perfectly adequate to give practical guidance to common people in 
common circumstances” (III:XI:361)’, (see Skelton, ibid. p. 494). As will be seen, these passages will 
appear again, in my own arguments for the synthesis between deontological and utilitarian principles. 
Skelton also makes the point here that just because we might be able to get our moral views to 
cohere, this does not necessarily mean that they justified. This is a further argument against 
coherentism, and strongly reinforces Skelton’s argument for a foundationalist reading of Sidgwick. 
262 Ibid. p.496. See also Skelton’s later statement that ‘moral justification is therefore foundationalist in 
nature; moral theories are justified by appeal to philosophical intuitions’ (p.497). 
263 See Skelton’s starting point in his 2008 paper ‘Sidgwick’s Philosophical Intuitions’ (in, Ethics and 
Politics, Vol.10, No.2 (2008) 185-209), which is Sidgwick’s view that the utilitarian method could not 
be made coherent and harmonious without a fundamental intuition, and that the only moral intuitions 
that can be found to be ultimately sound are only those generated by the principle of utilitarianism (p. 
185). In a later paper, ‘Henry Sidgwick: 1838-1900’ (in, William Sweet (ed.), Biographical 
Encyclopaedia of British Idealism (London: Continuum: 2010) Skelton is again clear that whereas the 
self-evident axioms of philosophical intuitionism indicate utilitarianism, it is utilitarianism that 
‘systemises and corrects common sense morality’. He follows this up by quoting Sidgwick’s statement 
that ‘utilitarianism is the final form into which Intuitionism seems to pass, when the demand for really 
self-evident first principles is rigorously pressed’’(III:XIII:388). 
264 Skelton has, at one point, actually picked up the coherentist interpretation, arguing that it ‘gathers 
steam’ from Sidgwick’s argument that utilitarianism can explain, systemise and make consistent the 
varied and often disparate rules of common sense morality, which in turn then lends utilitarianism a 
certain degree of credibility (‘Henry Sidgwick’, in, J. Mander and A. P. F. Sell (eds.) The Dictionary of 
Nineteenth Century British Philosophers (London: Bloomsbury: 2002). But Skelton rejects this view. 
For one thing, he says, Sidgwick’s argument that utilitarianism seems to lend a certain validity to 
common sense morality is in serious question. If what he means is that the claims of common sense 
are given probative value, then this might support a coherentist reading. But if this is the case, then 
Sidgwick has to explain why certain claims from common sense morality are discarded while others 
are not, without appealing either to common sense axioms themselves, or to utilitarianism (which 
would essentially equate to a tautology).  Also, Sidgwick’s search for self-evident proofs itself needs 
to be explained, given that if one is a coherentist regarding the types of moral principle, then 
presumably non-inferentially justified belief of intuitions is unnecessary. I argue here however that 
Skelton’s argument does not seem to follow. If a coherentist position is understood to hold that a 
belief is justified if it coheres with other beliefs in a system, there is nothing here to necessarily 
eliminate self-evidence as being a part of that system. The property of self-evidence may well be a 
necessary part of that particular system of epistemology. David Phillips, who is of the opinion that 
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view leads him to quote Sidgwick’s passage, “the Intuitional method rigorously 
applied yields as its final result the doctrine of pure Universalistic Hedonism, which is 
convenient to denote by the single word, ‘Utilitarianism’” (III:XIV:406-407), and use 
this to argue that on this foundationalist basis, Sidgwick ‘takes himself to be 
reconciling Utilitarianism with an intuitionist (rationalist) epistemology’265. Skelton 
does not specifically pursue the idea of this reconciliation, focusing instead on 
furthering his argument that Sidgwick justified utilitarianism as a first principle on the 
basis of philosophical intuitions, and arguing that this same process is occurring in 
Book IV, when Sidgwick aims to ‘prove’ (as a first principle) the principle of 
utilitarianism. Where Skelton does recognise that others have interpreted the 
common sense morality/utilitarianism link to be one of coherentism, he later states 
that this is implausible, on the basis that he believes Sidgwick to be clear that the 
first principle (utilitarianism) cannot be derived from other propositions266. This is 
admittedly a strong position (if Skelton is to be agreed with – see note. 128), and 
brings into view the chief problem that Skelton’s argument for foundationalism 
causes to my argument for the mutually informing relationship between deontological 
and utilitarian principles. This is that common sense morality, or the dogmatic 
intuitionism which is its philosophical version, could be thought of as having little 
validity of its own. Even where Sidgwick accepts some of those maxims as valid, 
                                                 
Sidgwick is a moderate foundationalist, suggests that such a ‘hybrid’ view results if ‘on the one hand, 
we think of foundationalism as the view that epistemic justification is entirely a matter of deriving 
propositions which stand in need of justification from self-evident premises…and if, on the other hand, 
we think of coherentism as the view that justification is wholly a matter of relations between 
propositions, and not at all a matter of their self-evidence’ (Sidgwickian Ethics, p.61). Phillips goes on 
to outline what is essentially also this thesis’ position on Sidgwick’s foundationalism/coherentism: 
‘Sidgwick’s actual view then shares with foundationalism the idea that self-evidence has an essential 
epistemic role. But it also features two characteristically coherentist ideas; the idea that apparently 
self-evident propositions are not immune to doubt or questioning, and the idea that my justification for 
believing apparently self-evident claims comes in part from their coherence with other apparently self-
evident claims I believe…’ 
265 ‘Moral Epistemology’, p. 497. 
266 Ibid. p.503. Skelton also challenges Schultz’s coherentist account of ME, in his 2007 paper, 
Schultz’s Sidgwick, and by default also that of Robert Shaver (Rational Egoism: A Selective and 
Critical History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1999). If Sidgwick really was developing a 
coherentist justification of utilitarianism here, Skelton argues, ‘then he would be keen to show that the 
theory really was derived from the rules and judgements of common sense morality. But this he does 
not do’. In my argument for Rational Benevolence however, the utilitarian principle does emerge as 
derived very clearly from rules and judgments that are at least related to common sense morality (see 
chapter 4). This would seem to mean then that I cannot argue for coherentism in Sidgwick, on 
Skelton’s understanding. But this comes down to the fact that Skelton and I read Sidgwick’s ‘proof’ of 
utilitarianism in very different ways. It is not my aim in this thesis to ultimately decide whether or not 
Sidgwick was a coherentist, but the diversity in interpretations over this point suggest that there is 
scope for further engagement here. 
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Skelton argues, this ‘does not mean that they have warrant apart from the first 
principle’. And this would seem to frustrate, or fundamentally challenge, my view that 
the utilitarian principle itself relies on a notion of duty, represented by Intuitionism, for 
its own establishment and validity267. But there is actually a point of Skelton’s with 
which I directly agree, and which I deploy here as a means of arguing that 
utilitarianism can be brought into a mutually informing relationship with deontological 
principles. This is his statement that Sidgwick did not, as coherentists want him to 
do, argue that utilitarianism is directly derived from the rules and judgements of 
common sense morality268. I also do not think this is how Sidgwick derives the 
utilitarian principle; it is not the rules and judgements of common sense morality that 
themselves point to utilitarianism, but rather the deontological properties that inform 
that position (which Sidgwick only finds to be truly self-evident and defensible in the 
form of Justice, and Prudence, and then Universal Benevolence). I admit that in 
Book IV Sidgwick is clearly showing how utilitarianism systemises and corrects 
common sense morality – but I maintain (and I will argue in full in chapters 3 and 4) 
that this is not where the relationship lies, as Skelton perceives the coherentists to 
argue269. I will shift the argument for a type of coherentism (as I said above, a 
foundationalist/coherentist hybrid) instead to Sidgwick’s argument for the necessary 
connection between a specifically deontological notion of moral obligation, and the 
utilitarian principle.  
 There is one final remark to be made about Skelton and his role in modern 
day readings of Sidgwick, which is that Skelton never disputes that Sidgwick is a 
utilitarian270. Skelton states in both the 2002 and the 2008 papers his view that 
                                                 
267 On the other hand, I am not arguing that utilitarianism depends directly on principles of common 
sense morality per se – this is also not what Sidgwick argued. I am arguing that utilitarianism is 
derived from self-evident, non-consequentialist-based principles (Sidgwick’s philosophical intuitions), 
and that whereas Sidgwick draws these out of common sense morality, they become something much 
different under his treatment to the other principles of that position, which Sidgwick finds to not be 
self-evident. It is these two truly self-evident principles (Justice and Prudence) which provide the 
grounds for the reconciliation between deontological and utilitarian moral properties.  
268 ‘Moral Epistemology’, p.503 
269 Nor is utilitarianism, however, adequate by itself for a system of ethics – and this fact is 
immediately represented by the meta-ethical connection between deontological and utilitarian 
properties embodied by Rational Benevolence.  
270 Skelton actually gives an extremely succinct account of Sidgwick’s argument for utilitarianism, in 
14 steps, in ‘Sidgwick’s Philosophical Intuitions’ (pp. 203-204). I do not dispute Skelton’s presentation 
of the process through which Sidgwick arrived at a utilitarian position – I do, however, dispute that that 
utilitarianism is purely utilitarian. Having said this, it would be unfair not to recognise where Skelton 
perceives Sidgwick not to have had an exclusively utilitarian agenda. In ‘Henry Sidgwick’s Practical 
Ethics: A Defence’, in which Skelton defends Sidgwick’s Practical Ethics from criticisms advanced by 
Sissela Bok and Karen Hanson among others, Skelton points out that Sidgwick does not want to 
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Sidgwick was attempting to bring the common sense moralists over to utilitarianism 
(and that the Dualism of Practical Reason occurred because Sidgwick failed to get 
the rational egoists to move over to utilitarianism), and I disagree that this is the 
complete picture of Sidgwick’s aim; the utilitarianism he is offering is of a very 
particular nature (one that has a fundamental deontological property), and for this 
reason Sidgwick is not simply offering ‘utilitarianism’. Whereas Skelton’s work is 
excellent in its probing of the specifics behind Sidgwick’s arguments for such 
important matters such as the relationship between the self-evident principles of 
common sense morality, and utilitarianism’s own self-evident status, Skelton has a 
narrow view of the type of relationship that this can be, and it is an exclusively 
utilitarian one.  
 
1.3.e. Robert Audi, and the Idea of a Sidgwickian/Kantian/Rossian Synthesis  
 
The coherentist/foundationalist debate is, in many ways, an alternative (and 
extremely interesting) approach to exploring whether Sidgwick’s work offers some 
kind of reconciliatory relationship between deontological and utilitarian principles. 
Another angle from which this might be approached is the narrower question of 
whether Sidgwick’s intuitionism by itself is comprised of deontological and utilitarian 
moral properties, or whether it somehow demonstrates reference to both. That his 
intuitionism is of this dual nature is part of the argument I advance in this thesis. 
Almost all scholars (such as Antony Skelton just discussed, and David Phillips and 
Peter Singer discussed below) hold Sidgwick’s intuitionism to be utilitarian without 
question271 - and Robert Audi is also of this opinion. But the area of Sidgwick’s 
theory that Audi considers to be unsatisfactory, and the fact that Audi proposes W.D. 
Ross as a solution, draws attention precisely to what I believe is the potential for 
Sidgwick’s intuitionism to be taken to include deontological and utilitarian properties. 
Audi was outlined in the introduction for his own important intuitionistic method of 
                                                 
convince people of utilitarianism in Practical Ethics, and that he doesn’t assume the acceptance or 
validity of it (p. 213) 
271 For further examples see D.D. Raphael, ‘Sidgwick on Intuitionism’, in, The Monist, Vol.58, p.3 
(1974) 405-419 (Raphael also directly agrees with my interpretation of Intuitionism as representing a 
deontological position p.407); Ross Harrison ‘Cambridge Philosophers VI: Henry Sidgwick’, in, 
Philosophy Vol.71, No.277 (1996) 423-428, p.434); Alan Donagan, ‘Sidgwick and Whelwellian 
Intuitionism: Some Enigmas’, in, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol.7, No. 3 (1977) 447-465, 
p.451). 
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combining Kantian and Rossian intuitionism with a theory of value ‘that provides 
unifying grounds for all of the moral principles in question’. Here, account is taken of 
where and how Sidgwick features in that theory.  
The first thing that should be noted is that, as a follower of Ross, and of Kant in 
some form, Audi is not aiming to include elements of utilitarianism in his moral 
theory, at least as it is classically recognised. There is all the more reason then to 
think it significant that Henry Sidgwick – that renowned classical utilitarian - should 
be the first intuitionist to whom Audi refers at the beginning of his own account of 
intuitionism. Audi examines each of Sidgwick’s three kinds of intuitionism, beginning 
from Perceptional Intuitionism, and moving through Dogmatic Intuitionism to the final 
Philosophical form. This last stage, Audi points out, embodies both generalised 
moral principles (i.e. those found in Perceptional Intutionism) and the more specific 
ones determined by the dogmatic stage, and provides a ‘method of correction of both 
formulations at that middle level and of moral judgements concerning particular 
actions’272. This, Audi explains, is Sidgwick’s attempt at ‘synthesising’ the principles 
of common-sense morality. Audi does point out that Sidgwick recognised even his 
preferred type of intuitionism to be fallible, but that ultimately Sidgwick is not vastly 
interested in these implications. Instead, Audi states, Sidgwick was more concerned 
with how we can ascertain and rectify errors in moral judgements – for it is when 
those inconsistencies appear in our moral intuitions that ‘the need for synthesis’ 
becomes the most urgent273. 
Clearly then, Audi’s perception of Sidgwick’s intuitionism is that within it, Sidgwick 
was concerned to bring to ethics a mechanism through which our ordinary and daily 
moral judgements can be properly assessed, and either followed or discarded 
accordingly. This involved Sidgwick passing those judgements through the criteria 
for self-evidence – yet Audi argues that Sidgwick’s ultimate use of philosophical 
intuitionism lies in the movement that Sidgwick makes from philosophical intuitionism 
to utilitarianism. So Audi concludes here that Sidgwick’s intuitionism was essentially 
utilitarian, as so many other writers have done. 
But what is most crucial about Audi’s treatment of Sidgwick is that he recognises a 
place in Sidgwick’s intuitionism in which a deontological aspect might have been 
                                                 
272 Audi, The Good in the Right, p.8 
273 Ibid. p.9 
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helpful. Audi refers to Sidgwick’s insistence that we ‘remain as far as possible in the 
‘region of middle axioms’’, before going on to lay out his own vision of combining a 
modified version of Ross’s intuitionism with a Kantian style of moral theory, in order 
that we might have a better understanding of moral obligation and moral justification, 
and an ‘enhanced ability to determine what to do, particularly where we face 
conflicting duties’274. For Audi then, Sidgwick’s intuitionism could have been met by 
the Rossian/Kantian formulation that he himself proposes, and this would have 
perhaps met Sidgwick’s ‘call for middle axioms’ more effectively275.  
Audi’s own Kantian/Rossian intuitionism is a valuable theory, but I draw attention to 
Audi’s overlooking of Sidgwick’s own use of Kant. Where Audi has utilised Sidgwick 
in order to show that a Kantian/Rossian intuitionism is vital to the synthesising of 
moral principles, he as not recognised that Sidgwick himself did this in such a way 
that his resulting moral system was not merely one of utilitarianism, and that it too 
included a crucial reference to a ‘Kantian intuitionism’276. Had Audi identified (or 
focused on) this, he could possibly have traced a direct line from Sidgwick’s position, 
through Ross, to his own Rossian/Kantian form of intuitionism. This would have been 
a Sidgwickian/Rossian/Kantian version of that theory. Audi’s work is therefore 
significant in two ways: It points to the apparent need for a deontological element in 
Sidgwick’s intuitionism, but then does not take into account the fact that Sidgwick 
himself supplied this. I agree with Audi on the first count, and posit that I can make a 
case against the second277.  
 
                                                 
274 Ibid. pp.80-82. By ‘middle axioms’, Sidgwick means the ‘broad agreement in the details of morality 
which we actually find both among thoughtful persons, and among plain men who do not seriously 
trouble themselves about first principles’ (Sidgwick, Practical Ethics: A Collection of Essays and 
Addresses (London: S. Sonnenschein: 1896), p.6. 
275 As Audi himself states, combining the Kantian categorical imperative with ‘relative closeness to 
moral practice of Rossian principles of duty’ (emphasis added), yields the major benefits of both 
positions (p. 81). 
276 Audi says that “This chapter will show how the modified Rossian intuitionism…can largely answer 
Sidgwick’s call for middle axioms and how it can be integrated with a Kantian moral theory…” (p. 81). 
It is my view that Sidgwick himself integrated a Kantian moral theory.  
277 Audi also recognises that Ross owed a lot to Sidgwick’s work, despite the fundamental differences 
in their ethical positions (or at least, between Ross’s position and the position Sidgwick is traditionally 
thought to have held. See The Good in the Right, pp.26, 29). In doing so, Audi is – perhaps 
inadvertently - demonstrating Sidgwick’s inherent flexibility, and the fact that his applicability extends 
far beyond the realms of the utilitarianism with which he is so frequently and so freely associated. 
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1.3.f. Mariko Nakano-Okuno: ‘Sidgwick and “The So-Called ‘Discrepancies” 
Between Utilitarian and Kantian ethics’ 
The next theorist relevant to this section on possible recognitions of a Sidgwickian 
deontological/utilitarian reconciliation is Mariko Nakano-Okuno. Although the theories 
examined so far in this section are all crucial for what they do or do not say about 
Sidgwick’s uniting intuitionism with utilitarianism, the specific concepts of Sidgwick’s 
ideas on duty and on deontology itself have been largely missing. With Nakano-
Okuno, and her direct comparison of Sidgwick and Kant, we move on to that most 
central question of where else a deontological element has been recognised in 
Sidgwick’s work, and whether a connection has been made between that 
deontology, and Sidgwick’s utilitarianism.   
As suggested by the title of this 2004 paper, given at the Proceedings of the World 
Congress on Henry Sidgwick, Nakano-Okuno’s understanding of the relationship 
between deontological and utilitarian moral principles is that there is far less distance 
between them than is commonly imagined. She begins her argument from an 
observation similar to mine at the start of this thesis, that moral philosophy cannot 
help but refer to utilitarian or Kantian ethics, whenever it discusses the eternal 
questions of the meaning of right, or good, or freedom, and duty, and that the 
discrepancy between deontological and utilitarian principles is, to use her phrase, 
‘taken for granted and hardly questioned’278. With these differences being, in 
Nakano-Okuno’s opinion, ‘overstated’, her intention here is to argue that the two 
schools of thought actually share several important ideas, which are ‘essential 
elements for both’279. Her paper then could be thought of being, like this thesis, an 
attempt to close the distance, or ‘heal the divide’, that has traditionally permeated 
deontological/utilitarian relations. Nakano-Okuno’s language is that of reconciliation, 
‘close relationship’, and, as she she states at the end, ‘constructive dialogue’ 
between these two giants of moral philosophy.  
In terms of Sidgwick’s role here, Nakano-Okuno uses ME as the major text for 
utilitarianism, believing – as has become so much the norm – Sidgwick’s account of 
the doctrine to be the most sophisticated280. What is revealed most obviously by 
                                                 
278 ‘So-called Discrepancies’, p.260 
279 Ibid. 
280 The Kantian texts against which Sidgwick’s utilitarianism are compared are the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, the Critique of Practical Reason and the Metaphysics of Morals. Nakano-
Okuno outlines the general reasons for the conflict between Kantian and utilitarian principles, listing 
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Nakano-Okuno’s argument is just how easy it is to correlate deontological and 
utilitarian principles – when the latter are conceived of in Sidgwick’s terms. Nakano-
Okuno summarises Sidgwick’s moral position with what she considers to be his three 
main objective truths – the principle of Justice (which is the Kantian maxim), the 
principle of Prudence, and the principle of Rational Benevolence. These give the 
normative ought, the temporal neutrality, and the equal treatment of all people 
respectively – and these, she argues, correspond to the formulae of the categorical 
imperative. She also points out that the traditional utilitarian concept of Happiness, or 
hedonism, has not yet appeared, and that when it does this happiness is defined as 
the Ultimate Good (which is ultimately going to coincide with Kant’s view)281. 
Nakano-Okuno then begins the process of examining the ‘overlaps’ between the 
fundamental principles in this position, and those in the Kantian one. She first 
expressly recognises that Sidgwick professed his principle of Justice to correspond 
directly to Kant’s fundamental formula of the categorical imperative282. He has some 
caveats about it, but ultimately, ‘what the principle of Justice and the formula of 
universal law require is essentially the same’283. Nakano-Okuno goes as far as to 
state that ‘the utilitarian principle itself is not a fundamental principle; rather, the 
validity of every utilitarian moral judgement must be tested in the light of this 
Fundamental Principle of Justice i.e. the Formula of Universal Law’284. Nakano-
Okuno goes on to argue for other important parallels between Sidgwick and Kant, 
including a claim that Kant’s Formula of an End in Itself corresponds to Sidgwick’s 
Rational Benevolence, the fact that Sidgwick’s principles do not depend on will as 
the determining ground but rather on prior-accepted laws, that Sidgwick’s self-
evident and non-tautological principles are consistent with Kant’s a priori principles, 
and that Kant also included ultimate ends that are duties which are happiness and 
                                                 
the standard Kantian formulas (the categorical imperative, and the other a priori laws) and identifying 
the common grounds for the alleged conflict to lie in either a total difference in their fundamental 
moral principles, the grounds for the determination of moral will, the priority of right or good, attitudes 
to hedonism, the significance of freedom, or the fundamental principles of morals (‘So-called 
Discrepancies’, pp.264-278). It is this last point from which Nakano-Okuno’s use of Sidgwick, and her 
reconciliation, truly begins. 
281 Ibid., pp.282, 296. 
282 Nakano-Okuno actually refers to the preface to the sixth edition (the PD) for support of this point, 
on more than one occasion. She does not, however, read the relevant passages from the PD as 
representative of Sidgwick’s own reconciliatory idea.  
283 Ibid. p.290 
284 Ibid. 
 128 
perfection, as Sidgwick also believed them to be285. Overall, she theorises the 
apparent divergence between Kant’s theory and utilitarianism to be the result of the 
fact that Kant never combined the idea of supreme principles with that of ultimate 
ends, instead presenting each as independently important. Sidgwick, on the other 
hand, did combine them, and obtained the Greatest Happiness Principle. That is, the 
difference lies in the respective construction of their principles, not in the 
fundamental moral principles themselves. 
I agree wholeheartedly with Nakano-Okuno’s assessment of the correlation between 
Sidgwick and Kant’s theories, and her work is clearly important to the cause of 
drawing general attention to the fact that Sidgwick was not, in many ways, simply a 
standard utilitarian, and that his work demonstrates significant Kantian tendencies286. 
But I do part ways with her on two counts. The first of these is her ultimate 
conclusion that Sidgwick’s combining of the principles led to utilitarianism. The 
reason that I disagree with her on this leads to the second point of divergence, which 
is that Nakano-Okuno has not actually taken into account the idea of reconciliation 
between deontological and utilitarian principles as it appears in Sidgwick’s own work. 
She has recognised that Sidgwick looked to a fundamental notion of absolute duty, 
and that this had it roots in the traditional Kantian notion of duty, no less. But this is 
as far as her discussion on the role of duty in Sidgwick’s moral theory goes - and it is 
for this reason that I believe her to have missed the other ‘close relationship’ which is 
that between non-consequentialist duty and utilitarianism in Rational Benevolence. It 
is surprising that she has missed it, given the points that she has made. Bizarrely 
                                                 
285 Ibid., p.306. The first claim – that Rational Benevolence accords with Kant’s Formula of an End in 
Itself - is particularly striking, mainly for its apparent simple truth. Nakano-Okuno points out that both 
expressly state that we should treat a person as a subject with his own ends, and that all people 
should be treated equally. Although I do not argue this point directly in this thesis, I agree entirely with 
this similarity Nakano-Okuno has drawn, and appropriate it momentarily here as further evidence of 
there being an essential deontological basis to Rational Benevolence.  
Further to the last point, which is a particularly important one for showing the similarity between 
Sidgwick and Kant’s positions, Nakano-Okuno argues that this sole ultimate end can only be 
established after the fundamental ethical principles in both Kant and Sidgwick. Not only does she then 
attribute Kantian concepts of duty to Sidgwick, but she also attributes a type of consequentialism to 
Kant. This is not the angle that I necessarily take in this thesis, but as Sidgwick says, ‘no morality ever 
existed which did not consider ulterior consequences to some extent’ (I:VIII:96), and where this 
should not be read as a statement that all morality is ultimately utilitarian, it can be read as further 
grounds on which to argue that the distance between deontological and utilitarian ethics is actually 
less than it might first appear.  
286 It might be said, alternatively, that Nakano-Okuno is not so much concerned with proving Sidgwick 
to be a deontologist of some kind, but rather with proving Kant to be a consequentialist of some kind 
(see especially her discussion of ethical hedonism as an a priori principle in both Sidgwick and Kant, 
pp.306-308).  
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then, Nakano-Okuno’s argument assumes the peculiar position of being at once one 
of the closest to my own, and yet the furthest away287. 
 
1.4.  Current Wider Readings and Interpretations of Sidgwick 
In this last part of this narrative of how Sidgwick’s work has been passed down and 
read through the years, the presentations of Sidgwick are somewhat broader than 
those discussed above. The main focus remains on where theorists have broached 
the possibility of reconciliation between deontological and utilitarian principles in 
Sidgwick’s work – and on points to do with where Sidgwick is associated specifically 
with a deontological idea of duty, or how his utilitarianism is read and applied. But 
some aspects of the wider interpretations of Sidgwick are taken into account for the 
fact that these have had major impact on shaping the entire field of Sidgwickian 
studies – to which this thesis is directly relevant - as it stands today. Without 
consideration of these theorists’ contributions, a history of Sidgwick’s work would 
simply be incomplete.  
 
1.4.a. Sidgwick and Peter Singer: The Point of View of the Universe 
Peter Singer is possibly the most significant Sidgwick scholar of modern times. 
Where Derek Parfit recourses to Sidgwick’s views just as often – and is equally 
crucial to the revival of interest in Sidgwick – Singer’s many ethical writings have 
often been aimed at the public sphere, and as such have had wider exposure. It is 
also important to note that Singer addresses a wide range of popular and often 
inflammatory moral issues, and that he does this from a firmly utilitarian position - 
while utilising Sidgwick. For these reasons, Singer has been particularly instrumental 
in making Sidgwick relevant to contemporary ethics. The following overview of 
                                                 
287 See also Nakano-Okuno’s book Sidgwick and Contemporary Utilitarianism (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan: 2011), in which she states Sidgwick’s belief that he had reconciled dogmatic intuitionism 
with utilitarianism (pp. 25-26), although her interpretation of that reconciliation is that dogmatic 
intuitionism is dependent on and controlled by utilitarianism. (Nakano-Okuno also includes a brief 
discussion of the ‘status of utilitarianism’ in ME here, but again the main focus is on its role as the 
systemiser of common sense morality). I do not disagree that this is part of the reconciliation; it will be 
seen in chapter 4 that I argue that utilitarianism ‘contextualises’ the sort of non-consequentialist, 
absolute-principle foundation from which the rules of dogmatic intuitionism are built. The difference is I 
argue that that relationship works both ways – that utilitarianism itself depends on those non-
consequentialist, absolute-principle foundations.  
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Singer’s arguments is woefully condensed, but the point is to emphasise where 
Sidgwick has featured in the vast work of this controversial philosopher, and 
specifically to examine Singer’s particular interpretation of how duty features in 
Sidgwick’s work.  
 Singer, a pupil of R.M. Hare’s, was originally associated with a form of 
preference utilitarianism288. This first became apparent in 1975 when Singer 
published Animal Liberation - his first major work in which he took the unusual step 
of resurrecting the Benthamite view on pleasure and pain in order to argue that the 
interests of sentient beings such as animals ought morally to be considered, on 
account that they can feel pain. His 1979 volume Practical Ethics saw Singer 
develop this argument to a position from which he argued that as preferences are 
tied to a being’s capacity to experience pain and pleasure, they can be ranked 
                                                 
288 As outlined in the introduction, Preference utilitarianism is established by a crucial universalizability 
aspect, on account of the fact that one’s own interests – or preferences – cannot logically be found to 
count for more than another’s, given that one may be in the position of any of the other parties 
involved in a situation. Equality must naturally lead to universalizability. But Singer’s interpretation of 
the role of universalizability is thus highly demanding – even more so, in fact, than Kant’s, or Rawls’. 
Where Kant’s categorical imperative and Rawls’ original position only applied to rational beings 
(rationality and Reason being the core indicators of what we ought to do), Singer’s does not. And it is 
this that has caused such controversy to surround Singer’s work. Removing the necessity for 
interested parties to be rational had two major effects. The first was that it immediately brought in to 
the realm of moral decision making a wide range of other parties with interests, or preferences, who 
had not previously been thought relevant to this context, such as animals. The second effect was that 
it discounted certain other parties who conventionally would always be thought to have a stake in 
moral decision making: The most obvious of these parties is that of human beings who cannot 
reasonably be held to be rational, such as foetuses, infants, and the mentally disabled. To expand this 
aspect of Singer’s moral theory, it helps to return to the core argument of Animal Liberation (London: 
Pimlico, Random House: 1975) in which Singer first defends the idea that the interests of sentient 
beings other than humans need to be included in the moral equation. At the root of this claim is his 
argument that the capacity to feel pain is often more morally significant than an animal’s intelligence. 
Singer does not (despite the claims of many of his accusers) necessarily dictate that equal treatment 
should be shown to all those with interests, given that some naturally have different interests and that 
this warrants different treatment (for example, the interests of those with disabilities will naturally be 
different to those who do not have a disability (see Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press: 1993) pp. 52-54).  However, Singer does argue that his equality principle refutes moral 
personality, rationality, and intelligence as reasons for claims on equality (see Practical Ethics, pp. 17-
54, for a full explanation of the equality theory), and that this being the case, equality clearly cannot 
be limited to humans. In terms of intelligence, whereas animals are generally of a lower intelligence 
than average humans, there are many humans who also have diminished intelligence, as the result of 
a birth defect or otherwise acquired disability. Conversely, animals such as chimpanzees have 
learned sign language, and thus display levels of intelligence that far surpass those of disabled 
humans. This equality, which naturally extends to all sentient beings in Singer’s theory, brings with it 
the basic interest, applicable to all parties, of the desire to avoid pain. All sentient beings have the 
capacity to suffer, and whereas some may have the capacity to suffer more than others (chimpanzees 
removed from their young, for example, display far more intense distress and misery than when 
rabbits are removed from their young), all capacities to suffer must be taken into account. “If a being 
suffers’, Singer states, early on in this section of his argument for equality, “there can be no moral 
justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration” (Practical Ethics, p. 57). 
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according to how great that capacity is. This has led to some of Singer’s most 
controversial claims about infanticide, abortion, animal rights, and euthanasia289. But 
the point about Singer is that whereas his views may appear extreme in some ways, 
on further reading, they are actually highly defendable. Singer uses an often almost 
impenetrable line of reasoning in all his ethical arguments, and as a result his views 
have largely held fast, despite the constant criticism. Throughout all of this, Singer 
has made reference to Henry Sidgwick. 
Singer is not himself, like Sidgwick, an intuitionist290. However, he believes 
Sidgwick to be a very particular type of intuitionist, whose ‘intuitive propositions of 
real clearness and certainty’ are rational intuitions that may account for the fact that 
intuitions are apparently an irrefutable part of our moral experience291. In Singer’s 
conclusion to his critique of intuitionism in Ethics and Intuitions (in which he 
examines the most common intuitionist responses to Philippa Foot’s famous ‘trolley 
problem’) he draws particular attention to the last of those clear and certain axioms 
of Sidgwick’s, quoting directly: “The good of any one individual is of no more 
importance, from the point of view…of the Universe, than the good of any other”. It is 
this phrase – ‘the point of view of the Universe’ - that Singer has adopted as the 
fundamental summary of his ethical beliefs292. Singer’s use of ‘the point of view of 
the universe’ is perhaps best demonstrated in his 1993 book, How Are We To Live?, 
in which Singer – writing for a public readership – propounds the importance of 
                                                 
289 It is clear why Singer’s theory has attracted such debate. His views make it possible to argue that 
a chimpanzee could potentially have greater moral status than a human infant, and indeed Singer 
does argue that this could be the case. His emphasis on the capacity for suffering, and its weight in 
moral questions, has also led him to argue for infanticide in cases where the infant’s present and 
future suffering far outweighs its interest in being alive, and of course for abortion when the mother is 
suffering in some way. His argument for abortion is doubly supported, given that the foetus does not 
actually possess morally relevant characteristics (Practical Ethics, pp. 150-152), and does not 
conform to definitions of ‘personhood’, such as rationality, self-consciousness, awareness and the 
capacity to feel. His critics have generally decried his ‘challenge to the superiority of human life’ 
(Singer’s own term, from the preface to the second edition of Practical Ethics), and of course his 
propounding of views that so flagrantly violate certain moral standards that have for so long been 
accepted (such as abortion, infanticide, and even bestiality) For a full overview of the range of 
arguments against Singer, see the two excellent volumes Dale Jamieson (ed.) Singer and his Critics 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers: 1999), and J.A. Schaler (ed.) Peter Singer Under Fire (Chicago and La 
Salle, Ill: Open Court: 2009). The second volume also includes Singer’s responses to each of the 
arguments put forward against him. 
290 See Singer, ‘Ethics and Intuitions’, in, Journal of Ethics, Vol.9, No.3-4 (2005) 331-352 
291 Ibid., pp.350-351 
292 Singer no longer adheres to preference utilitarianism, having moved instead to a more classical 
and hedonistic utilitarian position. The ‘point of view of the universe’ is not only just as relevant to this 
position, but has at least to some extent been the inspiration for it. 
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adopting a broader and more inclusive attitude to our societies293. Singer introduces 
the phrase during the final chapter, entitled ‘The Good Life’, in a grand reveal of an 
argument that has unfolded steadily, and convincingly. Once it has been introduced, 
Singer uses the expression eleven times in seven pages. ‘From this perspective’, 
Singer says, ‘we can see that our own sufferings and pleasures are very like the 
suffering and pleasures of others; and that there is no reason to give less 
consideration to the sufferings of others, just because they are ‘other’’294. 
The point of view of the universe is also, according to Singer, a direct result of our 
capacity to Reason295. As I will be arguing here, Sidgwick establishes the point of 
view of the universe via Reason, and Singer does not disagree. But what is 
particularly interesting is that Singer does not associate this Reason with the 
production of an unconditional, non-consequentialist form of duty. In fact, Singer 
rejects Kant from the equation altogether, with characteristic confidence: “Let us 
throw out, once and for all”, he declares, “Kant’s idea that moral worth is to be found 
only when we do our duty for the sake of doing our duty’296. This means that Singer 
has explicitly divorced Kant’s version of Reason and duty, from Sidgwick’s version of 
Reason and duty. Because Singer does believe that Benevolence, the informant of 
                                                 
293 Singer, How Are We To Live? (Oxford: Oxford University Press:1993). 
294 In Practical Ethics, the phrase is used only once – during Singer’s closing emphasis on the 
importance of objectivity for acting ethically (Practical Ethics, p. 334). However, the words can be 
seen to have a steady presence in Singer’s views, and in those who have engaged in discourse with 
Singer. During his response to Frank Jackson’s article on non-cognitivism (Jackson, ‘Non-cognitivism, 
Normativity, Belief’, in, Ratio, Vol.12, No.4, (1999), 20-435) and Singer’s apparent non-cognitivist 
position, Singer’s first concern is to dispute that label by referring Jackson to the fact that, for him, the 
plausibility of Sidgwick’s ‘point of view of the universe’ axiom is undeniable, and that this implies that 
there is at least one ethical judgement that can be known (Singer, ‘A Response’, in, Dale Jamieson 
(ed.) Singer and His Critics, pp. 269-335, p.270), and that he attempted to write both How Are We To 
Live and The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press: 2011) on its basis. Singer furthers his point against Jackson a few pages later, by 
arguing that the point of view of the universe is “something that as a rational being I can come to 
understand” (‘A Response’, p. 285). In a response to Michael Huemer (‘Singer’s Unstable Meta-
ethics’, in, Singer Under Fire, pp. 359-379) (who questions whether Singer is actually a non-
cognitivist, given that he often follows Hare’s arguments from moral language) on whether he is an 
intuitionist on the basis of his heavy appeals to Sidgwick, Singer inclines to agree that his position 
seems to change, but points to ultimately favouring Sidgwick’s advantage in believing the element of 
moral universalizability to be a self-evident truth: Here, again, Singer references the point of view of 
the universe (Singer ‘Reply to Michael Huemer’, in, Singer Under Fire, 380-394, pp.391-392). Jan 
Narveson (‘Singer on Moral Theory’, in, Singer under Fire, pp. 463-487) discusses Singer’s use of 
Sidgwick’s phrase at length, pointing out that Singer has been influenced by it to the point of affording 
it ‘the same sort of axiomatic status that Sidgwick credited it with’ (p. 467). Narveson himself does not 
believe ‘the point of view of the universe’ to be an effective, or even a true, metaphor – but he links 
Singer with it to the extent to which he refers to it as ‘the Sidgwick-Singer formula’ (p. 469). 
295 Practical Ethics, p.272 
296 Ibid. p.215-217 
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the point of view of the universe, is in fact a duty – this is extremely clear in The 
Expanding Circle297. 
So Singer takes an extremely different view of Sidgwick’s use of Reason to mine, 
leaving out the idea of Reason establishing the sort of non-consequentialist duty for 
which I am arguing. But Singer does still utilise Sidgwick’s version of Reason to 
argue for an objective ethical right. This is precisely what the point of view of the 
universe is meant to represent. The phrase is definitive of a certain aspect of 
Singer’s moral theory, which is that his utilitarianism – and Sidgwick’s - indicates an 
objective viewpoint that is the result of Sidgwick’s emphasis on Reason and 
rationality. This objectivity is fully utilised in Singer’s most recent work, The Point of 
View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics (2014) co-authored with 
Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek298. This comprehensive volume is a defence of 
Sidgwick’s hedonistic utilitarianism, during which the authors identify challenges to 
this view, and compare Sidgwick’s position to alternative and competitive theories299. 
Despite their firm assertion that Sidgwick is a classical utilitarianism – and their own 
                                                 
297 The Expanding Circle, pp.30-31, 50, See also Singer and Lazari-Radek, Point of View of the 
Universe, pp.72-74. Singer does make many other references to Sidgwick that do not specifically 
involve the point of view of the universe. For example, Singer argues against Narveson that all three 
of the classical utilitarians, including Sidgwick, naturally thought of their theories concerning pleasure 
and pain as extending to animals (Singer Under Fire, p. 460). Singer also utilises a different quote 
from Sidgwick at the beginning of his chapter on the biological basis of ethics in The Expanding Circle 
(p.23) but this too clearly supports Singer’s strict and all-encompassing universalistic view of morality. 
Singer frequently draws on Sidgwick’s distinction between what it may be right to privately 
recommend, and what would not be right to advocate openly (part of Sidgwick’s esoteric argument), 
during the complicated discussions regarding whether utilitarianism dictates that it may be to the 
greater benefit if some actions are not publicly followed (see Singer Under Fire, p. 241, The 
Expanding Circle, p. 166, and Singer and his Critics, pp. 292, 301). Overall, the impression gained 
from even a perfunctory reading of Singer’s views, and the responses to his work, is one that is 
imbibed with Sidgwick’s presence. Of all theorists who either reference Sidgwick or have at least 
recognised the importance of his work, perhaps no other has attached Sidgwick to their ethical views 
as frequently and so concretely as Peter Singer. In a rather touching turn of phrase that Singer 
himself uses during a response in Singer and his Critics, Singer describes his source of inspiration as 
‘my philosophical hero, the far-seeing and by no means conservative, Henry Sidgwick’ (p. 314) 
298 Singer and Lazari-Radek also give a strong defence of Sidgwick’s use of Reason to produce 
ethical objectivity and impartiality (embodied by Universal Benevolence) in ‘The Objectivity of Ethics 
and the Unity of Practical Reason’, in, Ethics Vol. 123, No.1 (2012) pp.9-31 
299 Singer and Lazari-Radek accept absolutely that Sidgwick intended to give a normative theory in 
ME. As I have outlined in the introduction, I do not entirely share this view, on the basis that Sidgwick 
specifically states in the first and second prefaces to ME, and in the introduction, that his aim is not to 
discuss what people ought to do, but rather what they do do. I do agree with Singer and Lazari-Radek 
however, that Sidgwick’s treatment of the notion of ‘ought’, and its inherent relationship to Reason, 
does eventually yield a normative element, but that this – and his moral theory overall - arose 
inevitably from Sidgwick’s investigation, at odds with those originally stated intentions. I return to this 
point in chapter 4.  
Singer and Lazari-Radek argue their case for this hedonistic understanding of utilitarianism on the 
basis of Sidgwick’s argument that the sole ultimate good is ‘desirable consciousness’, and that this is 
pleasure/happiness (Point of View of the Universe, pp. 207-212). 
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self-confessed intention to defend utilitarianism themselves - the authors want to 
emphasise that ethical judgements are objective truths we can know by Reason300. 
Utilising Sidgwick’s account of moral motivation, they argue that this begins with the 
rational judgement that an act is right, and that this has concomitant impulses for 
doing that action301. ‘This account of moral motivation’, they say, ‘preserves the 
objectivity of moral judgements and their ability to motivate’302.   
The authors thus intend to bring a Sidgwickian account of the role of Reason to 
ethical theory and practice, and in doing so they have retained the Reason that I 
believe leads Sidgwick to a deontological version of duty very similar to Kant’s. But 
they specifically eliminate Kant as an influence. Although this perhaps presents a 
significant alternative reading of the type of duty in Sidgwick’s work, I do not see how 
Singer and Lazari-Radek can rely so far on Sidgwick’s definition of rightness for their 
theory of moral obligation when this is so bound up with a version of Reason and 
rationality so similar to Kant’s, and then entirely reject the Kantian notion of duty from 
the theory of moral obligation that Sidgwick eventually builds from that model of 
                                                 
300 Singer is slightly reticent about defending moral objectivity in How Are we to Live?, stating “I am 
not defending the objectivity of ethics in the traditional sense. Ethical truths are not written into the 
fabric of the universe (p. 275). In Point of View of the Universe, Singer and Lazari-Radek have made 
a full move to defending objectivity. Sidgwick’s point of view of the universe, as is evident from the 
title, remains the foundation of that objectivity. 
301 Ibid, p.64. Other inclinations such as sympathy and moral dissonance are also important 
motivating factors, but Reason is the master for Singer and Lazari-Radek’s Sidgwick (Point of View of 
the Universe, pp. 62-66).   
They also discuss whether Sidgwick’s foundationalism can act as an alternative to the method of 
reflective equilibrium favoured by coherentist theories (p.94). Their conclusion here is that Sidgwick’s 
‘point of view of the universe’, which is rooted in his emphasis on rationality, gives to morality an 
objectivity that reflective equilibrium, or other coherentist theories, cannot (from this basis, they are 
prepared to argue definitely, where Sidgwick was only tentative, that ‘the point of view of the universe’ 
is the perspective of a rational being, where egoism is not (p. 378)). I return to Singer’s objections to 
Sidgwick’s ‘reflective equilibrium’ shortly. In terms of the foundationalist/coherentist debate explored 
above, Singer and Lazari-Radek refer to Robert Audi’s distinction between strong and modest forms 
of foundationalism (p. 108). As modest foundationalism allows a role to coherence, this may be the 
most appropriate way of understanding Sidgwick to be at once a foundationalist and a coherentist. 
This does not quite accord with Audi’s distinction however, which holds strong foundationalism, or 
‘classical ethical foundationalism’ to refer to those theorists who were seeking to establish self-evident 
principles that were ‘directly justified and un-revisable’, whereas the modest ethical foundationalist in 
Audi’s distinction only holds some ethical beliefs to have prima facie value/justification. It is 
immediately apparent from this more detailed explanation of the two positions that Sidgwick would 
belong in the first camp, and Ross, for example, in the second. The extent to which Sidgwick and 
Ross can both be called foundationalists under Audi’s distinction, and how far the respective work of 
those two philosophers can be made ‘coherent’, in the non-ethics sense of the word, would be the 
subject of further work.   
302 They also argue that Sidgwick’s search for rational justification, and the resulting hedonistic 
utilitarianism, supersedes Ross’s prima facie duties as a means of deciding between moral duties. 
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Reason303. It might be argued that the point of view of the universe is simply a wholly 
utilitarian concept, with utilitarian aims and values, and I admit that this is a legitimate 
interpretation. But this still does not necessarily preclude the idea of that view being 
established as a categorical and non-consequentialist type of duty. On such a 
reading it would still be a utilitarian theory, and it would still incorporate the 
hedonistic utilitarianism of Singer and Lazari-Radek, but it would have the crucial 
quality of strong moral bindingness. This seems to be how Singer and Lazari-Radek 
want to present the point of view of the universe (given that they use the phrase to 
represent a normative ethical theory)– and it is certainly how Sidgwick himself 
presented it. But when they do present Sidgwick’s form of Rational Benevolence, it is 
from an intuitional basis, not a deontological one. I do not dispute that intuitionism is 
of course a key epistemological method in the establishment of this principle, but I 
approach this point from a different angle by arguing that Sidgwick’s intuitionism and 
Sidgwick’s Intuitionism are very similar when it comes to Sidgwick’s use of Kant, and 
that therefore – even where epistemological intuitionism is key -  there is still a 
deontological basis to that Rational Benevolence304.  
                                                 
303 In terms of their interpretation of the relationship between Kant and Sidgwick, they recognise that 
Kant’s maxim was important to Sidgwick’s principle of Justice – but argue that this maxim is the not 
the sole criterion of moral rightness. On this, I agree with them – rightness, embodied by Rational 
Benevolence, also requires Prudence in order to generate Universal Benevolence (and thus the point 
of view of the universe).  But I do not believe this gives grounds on which to overlook it, and I do not 
believe Sidgwick does overlook it. (They also concede that one could draw a parallel between 
Sidgwick and Kant’s statement that ‘duty is the necessity of an action from respect for the law’ 
(Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 16; Critique of Practical Reason, I:6:6) 
304 Singer and Lazari-Radek do go some way towards acknowledging that the non-consequentialist 
aspect of Intuitionism may appear again in Sidgwick’s epistemic intuitionism (Point of View of the 
Universe, pp. 69-70). They first draw attention to the initial confusion that seems to arise over the use 
of ‘intuitionism’ to refer to the content of our moral judgements, and the use of the term to describe the 
process through which we reach moral judgements. But there is, they state, a philosophical 
connection between intuitionism in the first, wider, epistemic sense (i.e. that which I distinguish with a 
small ‘i’) and intuitionism in the narrower, ‘common sense morality’ sense (that which I distinguish with 
a capital ‘I’) ‘with its demand for obedience to rules irrespective of consequences’ – which is that if a 
theorist is going to maintain that certain truths are obtained just by looking at them, then this must 
exclude reference to consequences, or this ceases to be real intuitionism. The authors quote ME 
III:I:200 in support of this, which I also use in the next chapter as evidence for my argument that 
Sidgwick’s Intuitionism (in the narrower sense) represents the traditional non-consequentialist form of 
deontology, and for support of a point that Singer and Lazari-Radek have themselves just made, but 
not (in my view) expanded. This is my argument that Sidgwick himself, as an intuitionist (in the wider, 
epistemic sense, with a small ‘i’) also adheres to some extent to a position in which consequences are 
not relevant to the knowledge of certain moral truths (i.e. to Intuitionism in the narrower sense) and 
that therefore his moral theory is built from this position. Singer and Lazari-Radek have recognised 
the same connection between the two forms of intuitionism that I do, but they have not – explicitly at 
least - taken this final step of recognising that if Sidgwick is an intuitionist in the wider, epistemic 
sense, then on his own definition he must also be an Intuitionist in the narrower sense. 
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The main point from which I diverge with Singer and Lazari Radek then is this 
issue of the role and nature of the duty in Sidgwick’s moral theory305. ‘Duty’ for them 
clearly refers to the wider sense of the word, in which it applies just as much to 
utilitarianism (or any other moral position) as it does to deontological positions; I 
maintain that ‘duty’ as it appears in Sidgwick is the specifically non-consequentialist 
form of duty, found in the deontological tradition. 
On the issue of a possible reconciliation between deontological and utilitarian 
principles in Sidgwick’s work however, Singer and Lazari-Radek’s position is 
possibly the closest to mine of all theorists in this chapter. In a chapter entitled ‘The 
Profoundest Problem of Ethics’, they specifically recognise that Sidgwick thought the 
antithesis between utilitarianism and common sense morality can be overcome, and 
that this happens because whereas non-self-evident common sense morality must 
appeal to the principle of utility, utilitarianism itself ‘must ultimately rest on an appeal 
to principles or axioms that we intuitively grasp as self-evident…Intuitionism is not 
really incompatible with utilitarianism; rather, intuitionism leads to the self-evident 
moral principles that form a rational basis for utilitarianism306. It is the allusion to 
there being a reciprocal relationship between Intuitionism and Utilitarianism in 
Sidgwick’s thought that creates a strong parallel here between their view and mine. 
They draw attention to the fact that utilitarianism itself looks to something else for its 
support, and in doing so do not simply discard common sense morality, or the 
intuitionism therein, in favour of a utilitarianism that can simply leave all other modes 
of moral reasoning behind307. However, this is an instance in which I believe a 
                                                 
305 Singer and Lazari-Radek do however agree that Sidgwick’s version of Intuitionism is a form of 
deontology understood in the traditional form which I take it to mean (Point of View of the Universe, p. 
24).  
306 Ibid, p.149. The ‘profoundest problem of ethics’ to which they refer is of course the conflict 
between rational benevolence and rational egoism, Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason. Singer 
and Lazari-Radek make the unusual step of claiming that they can solve this via an evolutionary 
argument. (David Phillips also argues that Sidgwick was more successful in overcoming this problem 
than Sidgwick himself realised. See Sidgwickian Ethics, pp.134-151). They appeal to the fact that 
there are better grounds for supporting an intuition for which there is no evolutionary explanation than 
there are for supporting an intuition that can be assumed to have an evolutionary origin, and posit that 
this throws egoism into serious doubt (p. 195). This being the case, Singer and Lazari-Radek then 
tentatively conclude that all reasons for action are impartial, which thus supports the ‘point of view of 
the universe’ and rather neatly resolves the dualism in favour of benevolence rather than egoism.  
307 In the reflective equilibrium paper, after having shown that Sidgwick does not use that method, 
Singer asks what then is the significance of the ‘coincidence of utilitarianism and common sense 
morality’ (‘Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium’, p. 507) It means, for Singer, that utilitarianism is 
doubly supported - by its initial plausibility and the absence of any inconsistency or indeterminacy. It 
also receives the additional support of the method of intuitionism. “The result of unfolding the method 
 137 
demarcation between Intuitionism and intuitionism is essential, both for clarity, and 
for substance. Singer and Lazari-Radek have stated that intuitionism leads to the 
self-evident principles that form the rational basis for utilitarianism, but this is not the 
same thing as saying that Intuitionism - understood as representing the deontological 
position- leads to those principles. If we were to recognise that it is Intuitionism in the 
methodical rather than just the epistemic sense that Sidgwick means here, then the 
reconciliation between the deontological aspect of common sense morality and 
utilitarianism is made much more robust. Again, this depends on understanding 
Sidgwick’s method of Intuitionism as being in part the same as his epistemic-device-
intuitionism.  
On a final note regarding the idea of reconciliation in Singer’s work, there is the 
issue of reflective equilibrium – a cause with which Singer became notably involved 
in the 1970s when Rawls argued that Sidgwick was using this method, and Singer 
directly challenged him. As I noted above, reflective equilibrium is closely connected 
to coherentism, and as such this method of obtaining moral judgements could also 
possibly be put forwards as a means of reconciling deontological and utilitarian 
principles and impulses. But Singer disputes that Sidgwick was using reflective 
equilibrium as a method of testing the validity of moral judgements, and I agree with 
Singer’s on this, for two reasons308. The first is weaker; I agree with Singer that 
                                                 
happened to be that the method of intuitionism and the method of utilitarianism are shown to be 
reconcilable, because the judgements of common sense morality turn out to require the utilitarian 
principle to fall back on as an underlying self-evident first principle” (p. 505) Singer also refers to the 
preface to the sixth edition (the PD) to support some of his points made in this paper, but he does not 
read the passages in the way that I do. 
308 As previously mentioned, Rawls drew on Sidgwick’s own careful balance between common sense 
morality and the fact that that common sense morality is not absolute, fixed, or capable of real proof, 
to support his own argument that when there is no inherently plausible theory that matches our 
immediate intuitional moral judgements, then we need to modify the theory or the judgements until 
there is an equilibrium between them (see also Singer, ‘Ethics and Intuitions’, p. 344). Using 
Schneewind’s account of reflective equilibrium in Sidgwick (‘First Principles and Common Sense 
Morality in Sidgwick’s Ethics’) Singer refers to the passage in ME in which Sidgwick states that 
“perhaps we may say that what is needed is a line of argument which on the one hand allows the 
validity, to a certain extent, of the maxims already accepted, and on the other hand shows them not to 
be absolutely valid, but needing to be controlled and completed by some more comprehensive 
principle” (IV:II:420). The first principles are those of common sense morality, and the comprehensive 
principle is that of utility. And it is, as even Singer admits, reasonable to assume that this is a form of 
reflective equilibrium. But Singer does not himself share the view that this was Sidgwick’s method for 
testing moral theories. Singer, who believes Sidgwick to be ‘among the clearest and most careful 
thinkers in his area’ examines Sidgwick’s methods of argument, in order to show that whereas 
Sidgwick appears to be arguing for the utilitarian principle, he is actually using utilitarianism as an 
example of the sort of ad hominen argument that might be adopted if one were trying to prove the 
superiority of one principle over another. Ultimately, Singer rejects the idea that Sidgwick was using 
reflective equilibrium, because Singer rejects the idea that intuitions can be used for moral justification 
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Sidgwick’s focus was on the establishment of truly valid self-evident first principles, 
but this means I would have to agree that Sidgwick was a foundationalist, and as 
discussed above I do not believe entirely that Sidgwick was a foundationalist (as 
Singer does). On the second count, my agreement with Singer is firmer. This is that 
reflective equilibrium, on Singer’s view, is actually subjectivist. Singer does not 
believe Rawls has left room for validity that is independent of achieving reflective 
equilibrium, and therefore the validity of a moral theory will ‘vary according to whose 
                                                 
(see his emphasis on rationality as outlined above). He is thus drawing attention to the fact that 
Sidgwick’s approach was far more scientific than that, and that he therefore produced a far more 
objective system of justification. (See Eivind Kirkeby’s ‘Against Moral Intuitions’, 
(https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/24997/Against_Moral_Intuitions.pdf?sequence=1 
(2009) accessed 8th July 2016) in which he argues that there is an apparent inconsistency between 
Singer’s rejection of intuitionism, and his claim that Sidgwick does not use reflective equilibrium, 
precisely because he is an intuitionist (p.18). Kirkeby points out that Singer attaches this intuitionism 
to Sidgwick’s search for self-evidence, and the sort of ‘first principles’ which Sidgwick did not believe 
to be capable of being proven (given that this would deflect self-evidence onto that which proves the 
principle) p.19. But Kirkeby also states that once Sidgwick has argued for the self-evident axioms 
(Justice, Prudence, and Universal Benevolence), he then argues that these need to be tested against 
our commonly held principles of common-sense morality (p.23). Singer still denies that this a form of 
reflective equilibrium, because Singer’s issue with Rawls’ version of this method is that Rawls 
assumes its results to be absolutely valid, whereas Singer does not believe Sidgwick’s method to hold 
that the results are valid in this way. Kirkeby’s description of the Sidgwick/Singer/Rawls/reflective 
equilibrium debate seems to me to perfectly summarise the reasons why it is so difficult to conclude 
on whether or not Sidgwick was using a form of that method. His self-evident principles are at the very 
core of his moral theory – but so is a vital coherence between those self-evident principles (or the 
Universal Benevolence they combine to produce) and the moral rules that we already hold (that make 
up common sense morality). Self-evidence seems to deny reflective equilibrium – negotiating a 
relationship between self-evidence and commonly held moral rules seems to absolutely confirm it. In 
terms of my own interpretation of Sidgwick on this point, I have said in the main text that on the basis 
of Sidgwick’s self-evidence and his specific aim to avoid subjectivism I agree with Singer that 
reflective equilibrium is not Sidgwick’s primary method. However, some aspects of my argument for 
Rational Benevolence do also leave Sidgwick on the uncertain ground between the two views. My 
argument for the positive proof between utilitarianism and the deontological basis of the self-evidence 
principles (see chapter 3) refers to that passage at IV:II:420 that Singer admits (and that I agree) 
appears to point towards reflective equilibrium. There is also the sister passage at III:XIII:379, to 
which I have already referred in the thesis introduction, in which Sidgwick talks about the truth lying 
between the two conclusions that there are certain absolute principles, but they require systemisation 
by another, more comprehensive, principle. I refer to these passages collectively as ‘the connection 
passages’, and they form an integral part of my argument for the reconciliation. This would seem to 
require that I state Sidgwick to be using reflective equilibrium. On the other hand, Rational 
Benevolence itself is not – on my argument – reflective equilibrium because its construction is far 
more solid than that; it takes as a foundation the non-consequentialist and self-evident principles of 
Justice and Prudence, and through them establishes Universal Benevolence, which then fully 
contextualises those principles within one holistic moral theory. It also seems as though ‘rationally 
benevolent’ actions (see thesis conclusion) could not be established on a basis that is still subjectivist. 
Furthermore, if we limit the concept of a reconciliation in Sidgwick’s work to that between common 
sense morality and utilitarianism in this practical ‘reflective equilibrium’ sense, then there would be no 
need for the synthesis in Rational Benevolence anyway. On this basis then, I am generally persuaded 
to argue that Sidgwick’s synthesis at least does not rely on reflective equilibrium). See also Steven 
Sverdlik, ‘Sidgwick’s Methodology’, Journal of the History of Philosophy Vol. 23, No.4 (1985), 537-
553, and Marcus Singer’s ‘The Methods of Justice: Reflections on Rawls’, Journal of Value Enquiry, 
Vol. 10, No.4 (1976), 286-316).   
 139 
considered moral judgements the theory is tested against’309. This was the problem 
that Sidgwick perceived in Kant (Rawls is a neo-Kantian), and it is fair to assume that 
Sidgwick would have wanted to avoid the same problem – hence his quest to 
establish truly self-evident principles. I am, therefore, following Singer’s lead, and (for 
the most part) rejecting reflective equilibrium as representative of Sidgwick’s theory – 
specifically as being representative of the method through which he reaches the 
reconciliation between deontological and utilitarian principles in Rational 
Benevolence310. 
In the wake of this extensive and comprehensive reading of Sidgwick presented 
by Singer and Singer and Lazari-Radek, there is one last point to be made. This is 
that as vital as all this work has been for rehabilitating Sidgwick into the modern day, 
and to drawing out Sidgwick’s insightful and often progressive views for the purposes 
of modern ethics when for so long ME has been regarded as almost impenetrable, 
Sidgwick’s utilitarian status is still - even at this late stage in his history - being 
reinforced, perhaps more than ever. This is particularly significant for my argument 
here, given that the point of view of the universe has been the foundation for so 
much of Singer’s work and that I do not agree this position needs to be a completely 
utilitarian concept311. It is my view that even Singer’s extensive and sophisticated 
reading of Sidgwick has, in its far-reaching scope, overlooked a smaller but critical 
piece of evidence that Sidgwick’s work is not just classical utilitarianism.  
 
                                                 
309 ‘Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium’, p.494. 
310 Brad Hooker’s more recent defence of reflective equilibrium as a process for obtaining moral 
judgements offers a more substantial and developed version than Rawls’, and thus might avoid 
Singer’s objection to the method (see Hooker’s ‘Rule-Consequentialism, Incoherence, and Fairness’, 
Ross-Style Pluralism vs Rule-Consequentialism’, and ‘Reflective Equilibrium and Rule 
Consequentialism’ in, Hooker, Mason and Miller (eds.) Morality, Rules, and Consequences, pp.222-
238). This is a type of rule-consequentialism that does not presume a consequentialist framework, 
and Rational Benevolence – and the way in which utilitarian principles and the basis of common-
sense morality inform each other therein - also does not presume a consequentialist framework. 
Further exploration of the relationship between Sidgwick and Hooker’s version of reflective equilibrium 
in the future would therefore likely be beneficial to widening an understanding of the relationship 
Sidgwick saw between common sense morality and utilitarianism, but this relationship is not my 
specific focus in this thesis. Here I am involved with establishing Rational Benevolence as a moral 
theory which unifies in a meta-ethical way deontological and utilitarian principles, and for this context I 
generally follow Singer’s subjectivist objection (despite the fact that some of my argument also 
appears to point towards reflective equilibrium).  
311 Singer also believes that ME has been misinterpreted, because it has always been read as a 
defence of utilitarianism (‘Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium’, pp. 502-503, 505) 
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1.4.b Sidgwick and David Phillips: Intuitionistic Utilitarianism, and The 
Unfairness Objection 
Phillips’ relatively short but extremely important book Sidgwickian Ethics is testament 
to the now steadily growing resurgence of interest in Sidgwick’s work312. 
Acknowledging ME’s ‘mixed reputation’, Phillips claims to offer an approach to 
Sidgwick that ‘accentuates the positive and minimises, if it does not eliminate, the 
negative’313. In just four concise chapters, Phillips covers all the major areas of 
discussion; Sidgwick’s meta-ethics, his epistemology, and, most importantly for the 
purposes of this chapter, the two main conflicts of ME; as Phillips calls them, 
‘Utilitarianism Versus Dogmatic Intuitionism’, and ‘Utilitarianism Versus Egoism’314. 
There is unfortunately not room here to do full justice to all of Phillips’ detailed and 
innovative explorations of Sidgwick’s meta-ethics and epistemology, and for its 
relevance to my argument for Sidgwick’s reconciliation between deontological and 
utilitarian principles, Phillips’ discussion of the conflict between utilitarianism and 
Intuitionism is obviously of particular interest. However, a few points from Phillips’ 
earlier arguments about Sidgwick’s method of epistemology are crucial to an 
understanding of that discussion, and also serve to give some further ground to my 
own arguments – especially for my claim that there is a distinct Kantian/deontological 
influence in Sidgwick’s work. These points are discussed first. This is followed by a 
discussion of Phillips’ ‘unfairness objection’ brought against Sidgwick, which also 
features an important contribution on this subject from Thomas Hurka.  
 
                                                 
312 Sidgwickian Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2011). Phillips himself states that his 
approach to interpreting and evaluating the central arguments of ME is probably closest in spirit to 
C.D. Broad, but points out that Broad’s 80-year-old treatment of ME ‘cannot be informed by the 
lifetime of work in ethical theory and Sidgwick interpretation since its publication’ (Sidgwickian Ethics, 
p. 8). 
313 Ibid. p.4 
314 Phillips believes Sidgwick to deserve far more attention than it has thus far received, and to be 
‘rich in implications for contemporary controversies’ (Ibid. p. 7). He claims that his work is not 
idiosyncratic, and he is right: Although Singer and Lazari-Radek have since followed with Point of 
View of the Universe, which also seeks to apply Sidgwick to contemporary ethics and arguably does 
this more obviously than Phillips, Phillips’ observations and arguments about Sidgwick’s work are, in 
most places, highly distinctive. He is also one of the only theorists to recognise the importance of 
Sidgwick’s supplementary comments made regarding the two conflicts in the personal document. He 
references the document early in his introduction, and specifically the sections on which this thesis 
relies for some of its most solid proof. These passages are used differently by Phillips however. 
Phillips states that Sidgwick actually believed he had overcome the conflict between utilitarianism and 
intuitionism, but argues that Sidgwick was less successful than Sidgwick thought. Contrarily, 
especially to Sidgwick’s own opinion, Phillips believes that Sidgwick did successfully overcome the 
conflict between utilitarianism and egoism, the infamous Dualism of Practical Reason. 
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1.4.b.i ‘Intuitionistic Utilitarianism’ 
 
Firstly, Phillips places great emphasis on Sidgwick’s nonnaturalism, which he 
believes to indicate Sidgwick’s status both as a foundationalist and his commitment 
to intuitionism315. This intuitionism is, for Phillips, at the centre of Sidgwick’s meta-
ethics and his epistemology – and will result in what Phillips refers to as Sidgwick’s 
‘intuitionistic utilitarianism’. But what is most crucial about Phillips’ view of Sidgwick’s 
intuitionism is that he specifically recognises the connection between Kant, and 
Sidgwick’s intuitionist theory of moral obligation. This creates an important parallel 
between Phillips’ interpretation of that relationship, and the one for which I am 
arguing. Phillips acknowledges that Sidgwick allows a significant role to the Kantian 
view of moral motivation, and argues that for Sidgwick, the Kantian view is an 
important and active corollary of the ‘fundamental distinction’ (that ‘ought’ or ‘right’ 
means something fundamentally different to all other concepts), rather merely being 
a by-product of an adherence to Kant on Sidgwick’s part316. This corresponds very 
                                                 
315 Ibid. pp.12-22. See also pp. 6, 11, 52-55, 57. Phillips considers this nonnaturalism to be supported 
by ‘the fundamental distinction thesis’ (pp.12, 27, 33), which refers to Sidgwick’s statement that ‘the 
fundamental notion represented by the word ‘ought’, or ‘right’, is…essentially different from all notions 
representing facts of physical or psychical experience’ (see ME: I:III:25). From this, Phillips argues, 
Sidgwick infers a definite ‘autonomy of ethics’ (p. 55 – Phillips refers to Nicholas Sturgeon for this 
phrase, see Sturgeon, ‘Ethical Intuitionism and Ethical Naturalism’, in, Phillip Stratton-Lake (ed.) 
Ethical Intuitionism (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 2002) pp.184-211) which gives intuitionism this place of 
absolute importance in Sidgwick’s epistemology as conceived by Phillips (see also pp. 52-55, 57, 60). 
So crucial is the intuitionism which arises from Sidgwick’s nonnaturalism on Phillips’ view in fact, that 
it is this that becomes ‘central to Sidgwick’s rejection of the received distinction between intuitionism 
and utilitarianism’ (p. 22). This also, naturally, leads to Phillips’ foundationalist reading of Sidgwick 
(pp. 52-53), although Phillips concludes, borrowing a phrase from Audi, that this is a moderate 
foundationalism.  
I agree with Phillips that Sidgwick’s work has a nonnaturalist basis, particularly as it is this that lends 
Sidgwick’s work the heavy emphasis on self-evidence and rationality, both of which are crucial to the 
moral theory for which I am arguing. I also agree that intuitionism is indeed crucial to Sidgwick’s 
reconciling of that divide, although I emphasise the deontological nature of this intuitionism (in chapter 
2), and of course argue, contra Phillips, that that reconciliation is successful.  
316 Ibid. pp.24-27, 32-33. ‘The right answer, I think’ Phillips says, ‘is that Sidgwick’s central 
commitment is to the fundamental distinction thesis about rationality’ (p. 33) Also, Phillips says, 
‘Sidgwick is independently committed to the fundamental distinction thesis: ‘it is more to him than just 
a premise in an optional argument for the Kantian view of moral motivation’ (p. 24). See main text 
below. Robert Shaver disagrees with Phillips, and with me, that Sidgwick is committed to this 
fundamental concept of ‘right’, or ‘ought’. His interpretation of Sidgwick’s discussion of rightness and 
Reason is that this is only an optional view of Reason as a motivator. Phillips points out that Shaver’s 
view here is then problematic for the link between nonnaturalism and intuitionism, which Shaver does 
deny. See Shaver, ‘Sidgwick’s Minimal Meta-ethics’, in, Utilitas, Vol.12, No.3 (2000) 261-277, and 
‘Sidgwick on Moral Motivation’, in, Philosophers Imprint Vol.6, No.1 (2006).  
 …..but he does not expand upon it specifically, or take the view – as this thesis does – that Sidgwick 
can in fact be called a deontologist to some extent, and that this deontology fundamentally informs 
Sidgwick’s own moral theory. It is the task of chapter 3 of this thesis to develop this argument.  
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closely with my point that Sidgwick’s own emphasis on rationality led him to grant a 
role to Reason very similar to that of Kant’s, through which rightness cannot be 
defined by reference to consequences - and furthers the grounds for my claim that 
there is a traditionally deontological element in Sidgwick’s work.  
Phillips offers further defence for Sidgwick’s sympathy with the deontological 
position, and for the importance of his fundamental notion of ‘right’; he concludes 
that Sidgwick is meta-ethically committed to Kant’s view of Reason as a motivator, 
and that, as compared to Moore, Sidgwick’s fundamental notion is that of ‘right’, not 
‘good’317. Perhaps most strikingly, Phillips is explicit that some of Sidgwick’s meta-
ethics are in fact Kantian, and that this appears in Sidgwick’s argument that moral 
judgements ‘involve commitment to the categorical imperative’, as well as in his 
belief that rational beings are motivated by rational concepts. Phillips thus presents a 
strong and confident case for the Kantian influence in Sidgwick’s work which I hope 
to continue, and expand upon here.  
It is also the case that Phillips directly links this Kantian influence to Sidgwick’s 
nonnaturalist intuitionism, as I do. On this issue of Sidgwick’s intuitionism, I am 
mainly in complete agreement with Philips. I agree with Phillips that Sidgwick’s 
intuitionism is foundationalist, and I certainly agree, as I have stated, that this is a 
direct result of Sidgwick’s commitment to Phillips’ ‘fundamental distinction’ thesis. I 
also agree that it is these premises that lead Sidgwick to his reliance on self-
evidence318. Furthermore, Phillips also directly argues that it is Sidgwick’s 
                                                 
317 Sidgwickian Ethics, pp.32-38. Phillips summarises here, ‘for Sidgwick, the fundamental notion is 
the notion of obligation’ (p.36) and ‘Nonnaturalist meta-ethics is better to start with Sidgwick than with 
Moore’ (p. 38). 
Phillips is also in agreement with my view that for Sidgwick, the self-evident notion of Justice is, to 
borrow Phillips’ terminology, ‘the fundamental ethical notion, a conceptual truth’ (p. 42).  
318 Ibid. p.60. Phillips also presents a very similar but admittedly more specifically worded version of 
what I earlier suggested is a foundationalist/coherentist hybrid in Sidgwick’s work. Where I used the 
term foundationalist/coherentist hybrid to refer to the wider context of Sidgwick’s fusion of 
utilitarianism with dogmatic intuitionism, Phillips’ hybrid refers to the narrower idea of whether 
Sidgwick’s epistemological method itself is a hybrid of two methods: Phillips isolates the meeting 
between Sidgwick’s intuitionistic self-evidence and his introduction of a criteria to test for that self-
evidence as causing a hybrid state of affairs in Sidgwick’s epistemology (p. 60). His view of this is that 
“Sidgwick’s actual view then shares with foundationalism the idea that self-evidence has an essential 
epistemic role. But it also features two characteristically coherentist ideas: the idea that apparently 
self-evident propositions are not immune to doubt or questioning, and the idea that my justification for 
believing apparently self-evident claims comes in part from their coherence with other apparently self-
evident claims I believe, and in part from the consistency of my beliefs about these claims with other 
people’s beliefs about them’ (pp. 61-62). (Phillips also goes on to argue that on one hand Sidgwick 
uses language of self-evident first principles, and on the other that he uses only bipartite and criterial 
arguments for the proof of the utilitarian principle, which seem to require a commitment to 
foundationalism and a coherentist element respectively). In terms of a possible reconciliation between 
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intuitionism that leads him to his ‘distinctive philosophical position’, which is an 
overcoming of the ‘received dichotomy between intuitive non-utilitarianism, and 
inductive utilitarianism’319. For support of this Phillips quotes passages from the 
personal document on which I rely in later chapters as proof that Sidgwick reconciled 
the divide between utilitarianism and intuitionism320. As has been seen, Phillips is not 
the first theorist to have recognised Sidgwick’s tackling of that dichotomy - but he is 
the first to frame it in these specific terms.  
 This point, then, corresponds almost directly with my central claim in this 
thesis. But there are two lines of argument that I deploy in response to the challenge 
that this might pose. The first is that Phillips, like other theorists before him, has not 
taken the idea of Sidgwick’s overcoming that dichotomy far enough. This, to me, is 
evident in Phillips’ omission of the crucial last part of that passage from the PD. For 
where Sidgwick has said, as Phillips cites, that ‘the Utilitarianism of Mill and Bentham 
seemed to me to want a basis; that basis could only be supplied by a fundamental 
intuition’, he continues immediately with, ‘on the other hand, the best examination I 
could make of the Morality of Common Sense showed me no clear and self-evident 
principles except such as were perfectly consistent with Utilitarianism’ (xxi). What 
Sidgwick is saying here is not just that utilitarianism was in want of a prior basis of 
                                                 
utilitarian and deontological principles, both of those coherentist ideas are important, but the first (that 
self-evident propositions are not immune to doubt or questioning) is where a meta-ethical 
reconciliation would lie (as opposed to the more practical sort of ‘reconciliation’ between beliefs 
offered by a method such as reflective equilibrium. I therefore believe that if there are two such 
coherentist elements in Sidgwick’s moral theory, as Phillips suggests, that that first one – the meta-
ethical need for coherence – is the more important, at least for the theory I aim to develop here. I am 
not, however, necessarily denying that Sidgwick does use that sort of wide reflective equilibrium 
represented by Phillips’ second coherentist element – the idea that justification for self-evident 
principles comes in part from coherence with other peoples’ beliefs about them. Sidgwick is often 
concerned with the idea of there being consensus on principles (I:I:6, I:III:27, I:VIII:100, III:I:210, 
III:215, and of course there is Sidgwick’s fourth criterion for testing self-evidence – universal or 
general consent, III:XI:341, which Phillips identifies as one of the coherentist elements). However, 
Sidgwick also believes that the ‘function’ of the philosopher is to ‘do more than just define and 
formulate the common moral opinions of mankind. His function is to tell men what they ought to think, 
rather than what they do think; he is expected to transcend Common Sense in his premises, and it 
allowed a certain divergence from Common Sense in his conclusions’ (III:XIII:373). The ‘conclusions’ 
that Sidgwick is referring to here, are his self-evident principles, which this passage suggests he holds 
to be unassailable. Phillips’ work, then, here leads to further debate over whether or not Sidgwick 
relies on a form of reflective equilibrium, and again the answer is unclear.  
319 Sidgwickian Ethics, p.57. 
320 For the passages in question see the personal document, xxii-xxiii, where Sidgwick states that ‘I 
was then a utilitarian again, but on an Intuitional basis...I could find no real opposition between 
Intuitionism and Utilitarianism. The Utilitarianism of Mill and Bentham seemed to me to want a basis: 
that basis could only be supplied by a fundamental intuition’. These passages have a role in chapter 2 
regarding Sidgwick’s ‘intuitionism/Intuitionism’, and a crucial one in chapter 4 as evidence of his 
reconciliation.  
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justification, but that the utilitarian principle, once revealed, then confirmed the self-
evident principles (Justice, Prudence, and Universal Benevolence) that Sidgwick had 
retained from common sense morality thus establishing the two sources of morality 
as existing in what I will argue to be a mutually reciprocal relationship. That 
argument I develop in chapter 4; here my point is that Phillips has not seen the full 
reconciliatory value of that passage.  
Phillips does, however, have another argument for Sidgwick’s reconciliation, and 
again it is similar to mine. Phillips’s view is that Sidgwick believed himself to have 
reconciled utilitarianism with intuitionism on the basis that there is no epistemic 
difference between them – as Phillips says, paraphrasing Sidgwick, ‘all sensible 
moralists will be intuitionists’321. This is, again, very similar to my argument that 
Intuitionism (understood as the traditional deontological position) is actually a crucial 
part of Sidgwick’s moral epistemology. But there is a crucial difference, and it is 
represented in my capitalising of the word, where Phillips makes no such distinction 
– despite himself having recognised that there needs to be a delineation between the 
‘moral-theoretic’ and the epistemic versions of intuitionism322. That difference is that 
where Phillips believes Sidgwick to have (thought himself to have) reconciled 
utilitarianism and non utilitarianism on the basis of their shared appeal to intuition 
(with which I do not disagree), I believe Sidgwick to have reconciled them on the 
basis that Intuitionism (with a capital ‘I’, as representative of the narrower, ‘moral-
theoretic’ sense) is also a feature of Sidgwick’s intuitionism (with a lower case ‘i’, 
representative of the epistemological device sense). As Phillips says, when it comes 
to the moral-theoretic conflict between utilitarianism and intuitionism (which on my 
interpretation should be capitalised in this context), he believes Sidgwick to have 
resolved it with a victory for utilitarianism. That is, Sidgwick’s moral theory, and his 
intuitionism, emerge as wholly utilitarian on Phillips’ view – whereas on mine, 
Sidgwick’s moral theory emerges as partly utilitarian, and partly deontological. In this 
way, this kind of reconciliation would actually resolve or at least address both the 
epistemic and the moral-theoretic conflict between utilitarian and non-utilitarian 
positions.  
                                                 
321 Sidgwickian Ethics, p.53 
322 Ibid. p.36 
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 I do not, therefore, agree with Phillips’ ultimate classification of Sidgwick’s 
moral position as ‘utilitarian intuitionism’. The intuitionism referred to here is the 
epistemic device version only: It is my view that when it comes to Sidgwick’s moral 
theory as it appears in Rational Benevolence, Phillips does not recognise the 
significance of the very ‘moral-theoretic vs epistemic’ distinction that he creates. 
 
1.4.b.ii ‘The Unfairness Objection’, and the Question of Self-Evident Principles 
 
Despite Phillips’ recognition of Sidgwick’s intuitionistic reconciliation between 
common sense morality and utilitarianism, Phillips himself does actually dispute the 
validity of that reconciliation – and he does so on the fairly novel argument that it is 
Sidgwick’s argument for utilitarianism that is not successful. In order to argue this, he 
advances a strong argument which he terms ‘the unfairness objection’323. The 
                                                 
323 Ibid. p.100. In an astute discussion of Sidgwick’s moral epistemology, Phillips observes an 
anomaly in Sidgwick’s approach to justification, which he refers to as ‘the puzzle in Sidgwick’s moral 
epistemology’ (p. 65). This epistemological puzzle is relevant to my argument for Sidgwick’s 
reconciliation because it leads Phillips to a conclusion on the type of argument that Sidgwick was 
using in order to reconcile the conflict between utilitarianism and Intuitionism, with which I disagree – 
and this point is relevant in the main text below, and later in the thesis. However, to articulate this fully 
would require more space than is available here, and so I only discuss this point tentatively, as far as 
my point below requires. Phillips remarks that Sidgwick sees two methods of argument; one Phillips 
calls ‘criterial’, which involves beginning with ‘whatever we affirm to be self-evident’ and then going on 
to seek to establish universality and originality (p. 64), and another he calls ‘bipartite’, consisting of 
course of two aspects, in which it must firstly be proven to the holder of a belief that that belief is 
wrong, and secondly agreed that that belief does have some value, in some sense. Phillips believes 
that Sidgwick thinks criterial arguments are stronger, and that there is a clear criterial argument in 
Book III, for utilitarianism, against common sense morality (p. 67). Phillips’ puzzle is that having built 
the case that Sidgwick values – and uses – criterial arguments, he observes that they then disappear 
from Book IV: II, and are replaced by bipartite arguments for utilitarianism only. What, Phillips asks, is 
the reason for this? (p. 69). He considers various responses. He cites Schneewind as having 
considered Book III itself to only consist of bipartite arguments, and therefore as denying that there is 
an inconsistency between the two books. Phillips does not believe that this is plausible, and I agree 
with him in as far as Sidgwick at least began to develop a criterial sort of argument. It could also be 
argued, Phillips goes on, that there is actually a criterial argument in Book IV, but this is not the case 
either, because the criterial passages in Book IV do not appear as independent arguments, but rather 
only as part of bipartite arguments (p. 70), and this is not what Sidgwick considered to be a truly 
criterial argument (see also Sidgwick, ‘The Establishment of Ethical First Principles’, in, Mind Vol.4 
(1879), pp.106-11). Phillips’ own possible answer to the puzzle is that Sidgwick recognises in IV:II that 
the independent criterial argument against utilitarianism has failed, therefore he does not use it in 
Book IV, and turns instead to the other option, of the bipartite argument (Sidgwickian Ethics, p.72). I 
argue however that there is actually another answer to the apparent inconsistency, that Phillips hasn’t 
considered. This option falls into Phillips’ solution category of recognising that there is a discrepancy 
between the types of argument, but claiming that it is not a puzzle. It is that the argument in Book IV is 
actually a different argument - a new bipartite argument. There are two aspects to understanding this 
line of argument. The first is that Phillips has in mind at all times that Sidgwick is aiming to establish 
utilitarianism against common sense morality (pp. 67, 68, 71, 72). I argue that this is not the case. 
Instead, I argue that the criterial argument disappears from Book IV because a) Sidgwick had seen a 
connection between utilitarianism and common sense morality, and, b) this connection emerged on 
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unfairness objection can be summarized quite simply. In his chapter ‘Utilitarianism 
Versus Dogmatic Intuitionism’, Phillips outlines the criterial argument through which 
Sidgwick rejects as self-evident the maxims of common sense morality, in favour in 
of his philosophical intuitions (Justice, Prudence, and Rational Benevolence) that he 
does argue to be genuinely self-evident324. This involves Sidgwick arguing that the 
former do not satisfy his four criteria for self-evidence, and that the latter do. But 
here, Phillips says, a contradiction appears directly out of the text: Whereas Sidgwick 
previously argued that Intuitionism’s principles be made precise enough to give 
‘determinate verdicts’ in each case, he does not subject his own self-evident 
principles – which make up his utilitarian position- to the same criteria. In fact, 
Phillips points out, Sidgwick expressly states that his ‘favoured principles’ are still ‘of 
too abstract a nature, and too universal in their scope...particular duties have still to 
                                                 
the basis that the utilitarian principle of benevolence could only be derived from certain self-evident 
premises belonging mainly to Intuitionism. Although Sidgwick finds most of dogmatic intuitionism, or 
common sense morality, to not be self-evident, he does not abandon that mode of ethics, and instead 
pursues it until he identifies Justice, Prudence, and Universal Benevolence – which allows him to then 
state the utilitarian principle. Therefore, only a bipartite type of argument – understood in Phillips’ 
terms as first stating that a belief is wrong and then returning to the value of a belief - is relevant for 
this new situation in which utilitarianism and common sense morality are seen to be inextricably 
linked. This requires reading the passage from IV:II that Phillips cites not as a negative proof of the 
sudden, unexplained introduction of a bipartite argument, but rather as a positive affirmation of the 
fact that Sidgwick had seen the necessity of this connection/argument. This is why I say above that 
Sidgwick began to form a criterial argument for utilitarianism in Book III – but it is my view that he 
does not actually develop that criterial argument. “Perhaps we may say”, says Sidgwick, being quoted 
by Phillips, ‘that what is needed is a line of argument that allows the validity, to a certain extent, of the 
maxims already accepted, and on the other hand shows them to be not absolutely valid, but needing 
to be controlled and completed by some more comprehensive principle’. This is clearly a ‘bipartite’ 
argument as Phillips defines it, but it does not have to succeed where the criterial argument failed – 
because that ‘failure’ was actually not a failure, but the discovery of a new theory. It is, if we may say, 
an independent bipartite argument. Or, on a more stringent understanding of bipartite, it is not 
bipartite at all, but rather, perhaps, even a new criterial argument (for Sidgwick’s particular type of 
utilitarianism, as represented by Rational Benevolence). This discussion of bipartite and criterial 
arguments is directly reflected in my interpretation of Sidgwick’s ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ versions of 
proof for utilitarianism, which I lay out in chapter 3. The ‘negative’ proof is the criterial argument, and 
the ‘positive’ the bipartite; and I argue in chapter 3 that Sidgwick does not actually give fully negative 
proof for utilitarianism in Book III, and that he actually gives another version of ‘positive’ proof.  
Antony Skelton is also of the opinion that the disappearance of the criterial argument from Book IV is 
not actually the ‘puzzle’ that Phillips holds it to be (see Skelton, ‘Sidgwick’s Argument for Utilitarianism 
and his Moral Epistemology: A Reply to David Phillips’, a paper given at a 2013 Symposium on David 
Phillips’ Sidgwickian Ethics’ - Anthony Skelton, « Sidgwick’s Argument for Utilitarianism and his Moral 
Epistemology: A Reply to David Phillips », Revue d’études Benthamiennes [En Ligne], 12 | 2013, mis 
en ligne le 10 Décembre 2013 URL : http://etudes-benthamiennes.revues.org/675 date accessed 29th 
June 2016. Skelton’s argument for this is that Sidgwick recognized that the criterial argument would 
not on its own be enough to establish utilitarianism as a method of moral reasoning.  
324 Sidgwickian Ethics, pp.96-101 
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be determined by some other method’. This is the unfairness objection –and on 
Phillips’ view Sidgwick’s criterial argument for utilitarianism fails because of it325. 
 Phillips is not alone in his view of Sidgwick’s treatment of his own self-evident 
principles. Since Phillips, Thomas Hurka has contributed significantly to the 
unfairness objection with the argument that it is only if the self-evident principles are 
stated as ‘other things equal’ that they seem to meet the criteria, in which case they 
simply cease to be utilitarian326. Both writers observe that attempting to rescue 
Sidgwick’s axioms requires modifications that either cause them to fail one of the 
other criteria, or to take on an entirely different nature from that which Sidgwick 
actually intended – and both point to the fact that utilitarianism most certainly fails the 
universal acceptance test, on anyone’s reckoning327.  
Together, Phillips and Hurka present a strong case against Sidgwick’s argument for 
utilitarianism, and it has had the rare effect of challenging this usually highly 
                                                 
325 As Phillips says, “Sidgwick insists that common sense principles meet a standard of determinacy 
from which he exempts his own favoured utilitarian principles’. And that is unfair’ (Ibid. p.101). The 
unfairness objection is quite a new point to have been brought against ME, given Sidgwick’s long-
running reputation for being nothing but methodical and systematic. It is not entirely original to 
Phillips; Roger Crisp, for example, also noticed the problem (‘Sidgwick and the Boundaries of 
Intuitionism’). 
326 Hurka, ‘Sidgwick on Consequentialism and Deontology’, p. 149. Hurka’s ‘other things equal’ 
argument is discussed below. Hurka also agrees that Sidgwick’s own preferred moral theory falls prey 
to the same problems as he thought deontology to do, but he does not seem to see this, which is why 
it is unfair (see pp. 12, 13, 19 for the clearest outline of this). Hurka’s charge against Sidgwick that his 
defence of utilitarianism against common sense morality is unfair turns on the same basic premise as 
Phillips’, that Sidgwick’s treatment of his own ‘self-evident’ principles is, in comparison, ‘extremely lax’ 
(p. 148). Hurka sees Sidgwick as having simply assumed that they satisfy the conditions, while 
leaving the actual substantiation of these claims extremely thin. Hurka also takes issue with the 
formulation of the criteria itself, arguing that if the second condition, ‘the self-evidence of the 
proposition must be ascertained by careful reflection’ (III:XI:339) can be satisfied, then surely the 
others are somewhat redundant (p. 131), although Hurka does vindicate Sidgwick to some extent 
here by positing that Sidgwick was simply careless in making this proposition, and that what he was 
actually referring to was the apparent self-evidence of a principle, as distinct from the ‘mere 
impressions or impulses…or opinions’ which with we frequently confuse genuine intuitions. Hurka 
also, rightly, points out that this entire process of getting an apparent intuition to meet the criteria for 
self-evidence in any case negates Sidgwick’s description of intuitions as the result of ‘immediate and 
irresistible’ (III:II:229) cognition (p. 133). 
327 Sidgwickian Ethics, p.105; ‘Sidgwick on Consequentialism and Deontology’, p.149. Phillips also 
presents an argument that Sidgwick’s practical reason is indeterminate in ‘Sidgwick, Dualism, and 
Indeterminacy in Practical Reason’, in, History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol.15, No.1 (1998), 57-78). 
Hurka’s overall point is that it is only if Sidgwick’s axioms are moderated to become ‘other things 
equal’ principles that they appear self-evident and generally accepted (and even then there are 
objections) (pp. 162-4), but then doing this means that they cannot fully establish utilitarianism to the 
degree that Sidgwick intended (they would however, presumably become Rossian-style prima facie 
principles. See below). This can only happen if they are read as ‘all things considered’, at which point 
the axioms promptly fail the condition of being widely accepted. ‘As he said of deontological 
principles’, says Hurka, ‘Sidgwick’s axioms may satisfy some conditions for self-evidence in one form 
and others in a different form, but in no form do they satisfy them all’ (p. 149) 
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acclaimed doctrine, from this most eminent of the ‘classical’ utilitarians328. Moreover, 
it is clear that if Sidgwick’s self-evident axioms can be thus disputed, then this will be 
problematic for any theory that relies on those axioms as constructs of Sidgwick’s 
normative moral theory – such as my one in this thesis. Of even greater 
consequence for my argument is Phillips’ point that if Sidgwick has not truly 
established these principles – and the resultant utilitarian principle - as self-evident 
(and ultimately rational), then the reconciliation which depends on the ultimate 
rationality of these principles must also fail. We must therefore find a means of 
handling Phillips’ point329. This requires two defences; finding a line of argument that 
explains why Sidgwick apparently unfairly allows indeterminacy in his own self-
evident principles, and addressing the more philosophically problematic issue of 
whether or not those principles are actually self-evident (and indeed whether this 
matters).  
My response to the unfairness objection stands between the positions of 
Phillips/Hurka,  who believe that it is unfair, and Singer and Lazari Radek, who 
believe that it is not330. Firstly, I acknowledge that this particular inconsistency in ME 
                                                 
328 As Phillips himself says, only C.D. Broad had made this kind of critique of Sidgwick previously. 
329 Phillips does attempt to rescue Sidgwick from this charge, first by arguing that Sidgwick’s axioms 
actually do meet the determinacy requirement (which even Sidgwick seems to admit they do not), 
then by considering whether Sidgwick’s axioms meet the clarity and precision requirement when they 
are taken together. But again, Phillips points out, Sidgwick’s own investigations into utilitarianism do 
not support the idea that its maxims are clear and precise (p. 103). Phillips has also already pointed to 
the fact that Sidgwick ‘presents utilitarianism as itself a deduction from self-evident principles’ (p. 64). 
In any case, Utilitarianism does not, clearly, pass the universal acceptance test. Also, in this case, 
where common sense morality was not allowed to use any other principles, on Phillips’ view Sidgwick 
has a) combined principles or b) roped in other principles in order to satisfy the conditions. Hence, 
Phillips says, Sidgwick’s argument for utilitarianism against common sense morality is truly unfair. 
330 Point of View of the Universe, p.144. Singer and Lazari Radek, focusing on Phillips’ emphasis on 
determinacy in Sidgwick’s criteria, argue that the problem is neither inconsistency nor leniency - and 
predictably do not agree with Phillips and Hurka that Sidgwick is guilty of unfairness when it comes to 
the testing of his own principles. Instead, they draw the reader’s attention to the difference in type and 
role between common sense principles and utilitarian ones, arguing that as common sense morality is 
specifically the collection of people’s general, intuited moral rules that rely on common consent, it is 
important that they are tested for self-evidence, in order that everyone can consent to them. Sidgwick 
points out that even if all our common sense morality fitted together with no conflict between them, the 
result would still be an ‘accidental aggregate of random precepts that are in need of rational 
justification’. But the morality of common sense, being as it is, does not offer that justification. This is 
why it relies on absolute common consent; without it common sense morality simply breaks down, 
and that whole system of ethics disintegrates. The dictates of a utilitarian system on the other hand, 
Singer and Lazari-Radek argue, do not themselves rely on common consent. As a system of ethics 
utilitarianism should still be established on a self-evident basis, but this does not mean that those 
principles themselves have to yield determinate results. For this reason, common sense morality must 
be subjected to testing for self-evidence, where utilitarianism need not be. See also Katarzyna Lazari-
Radek, ‘Sidgwickian Ethics’ (Review), Mind, Vol.123, No. 491 (2014), 951-956. This is a nice line of 
defence from Singer and Lazari-Radek, and I agree with this interpretation of the different roles of 
 149 
does seem to exist. Even if Sidgwick did assume that his own self evident principles 
safely passed the criteria, it would have been expedient of him to demonstrate – 
even briefly – how this is the case331. But, similarly to Singer and Lazari-Radek, I do 
believe that there is a justified reason for the apparent anomaly. This is that Sidgwick 
is aware that these principles do not ‘meet a standard of determinacy’ - and that this 
is itself actually integral to his philosophic conclusions332. Phillips is right that the 
criterial argument for utilitarianism fails. He is even right that the criterial argument 
fails because those principles cannot be established as self-evident (I will return to 
this point shortly). But, if we see the argument for utilitarianism as a bipartite one, 
and not as a criterial one (as I suggested in the notes above) it doesn’t matter that 
the criterial argument fails because we can argue that each of these self-evident 
principles does in fact rely to some extent on the others333. This is what makes it a 
‘bipartite’ argument, and it is a different bipartite to the one Phillips reads Sidgwick as 
using exclusively for utilitarianism as against the type of Intuitionism that informs 
common sense morality. It seems to me that this is what Sidgwick is saying when he 
makes the point that these principles are ‘too abstract in nature, too universal in their 
scope’ etc. (III:XIII:379). Phillips reads this passage as Sidgwick having, ‘dropped the 
ball’ in terms of awareness that his own principles are not determinate. I read it as a 
fundamental part of his wider argument, in that he is actually admitting that they are 
not entirely self-evident334. That is, not only does Sidgwick recognise the lack of self-
                                                 
common sense morality and utilitarianism. The point also leads them to their wider argument, in which 
they pick up Sidgwick’s statement that even under his own axioms ‘particular duties still have to be 
determined by some other method’ and argue that this other method is utilitarianism. This passage is 
also vital to my own defence of Sidgwick against Phillips, but on slightly different grounds. See the 
main text.  
331 It is this sort of apparent carelessness that leads Hurka to accuse Sidgwick of ‘equivocating on his 
principles’ (‘Sidgwick on Consequentialism and Deontology’, p.150). 
332 (See Sidgwickian Ethics, p.101). I differ with Singer and Lazari-Radek here on the point that 
whereas they believe Sidgwick’s system still ultimately (and safely) produces a viable form of 
utilitarianism, even if it is not self-evident, I believe that the failure of the criterial argument precisely 
does not produce utilitarianism, and that this is not a problem.  
333 To reiterate, Phillips’ definition of bipartite arguments is that ‘they involve both a negative and a 
positive verdict on the interlocutor’s initial belief. On the one hand, negatively, the principle the 
interlocutor initially holds to be self-evident is not itself self-evident; on the other hand, positively, there 
is something right about the interlocutor’s initial principle. That initial principle is either a truth, though 
not itself self-evident; or, at least, though false, it points towards a self-evident truth that will emerge 
when its arbitrary and unjustifiable limitations are removed’ (Ibid, p.63). 
334 This response also meets Hurka’s objections in the same way, given that Hurka also believed 
Sidgwick to be concerned only to establish utilitarianism as the supreme moral principle. To expand 
further, it seems likely that Sidgwick was anticipating the need for there to be more than one principle 
involved in establishing a fully comprehensive ethical system, and there is nothing to say that this 
comprehensive system has to itself be self-evident, especially if we borrow Singer and Lazari-Radek’s 
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evidence, but he understands it to be epistemologically important - and this also 
allows me to maintain my argument that Sidgwick was not simply defending 
utilitarianism. 
Now for the second problem, concerning the question of whether Sidgwick’s self-
evident principles of Justice and Prudence can actually be established as having any 
degree of self-evidence. As much as Sidgwick’s recognition that they are not fully 
determinate is important, self-evidence does matter, because self-evidence for 
Sidgwick is also what is ultimately rational - and what is ultimately rational for 
Sidgwick is also what is morally right, which makes it an unconditional duty. If these 
principles cannot be established as ultimately rational, and therefore as right without 
reference to ulterior results, then this threatens my entire argument that Sidgwick 
only derived the utilitarian principle from a non-consequentialist, deontological 
version of duty, which makes up one part of the reconciliation between deontological 
and utilitarian principles. It could be posited that Phillips is simply wrong that the 
principles are not self-evident (or that Sidgwick was just ‘extremely lax’, as Hurka 
would say, about testing his philosophical intuitions) but both Hurka and Phillips 
argue that if we ourselves test them on Sidgwick’s behalf, they do seem to fail – and 
this, I admit, is a stronger point. However, this is only testing those principles against 
Sidgwick’s own criteria, and it may well be that they fail this particular test. But this 
might not necessarily mean that their self evidence has to be rejected entirely. And 
ultimately, it is still more than possible to argue that Sidgwick believed these 
                                                 
line and argue that common sense morality on its own might depend on self-evidence, but a system 
that included utilitarianism also would not itself depend on self-evidence to the same extent. Phillips’s 
unfairness objection also incorporates this very point – that Sidgwick allows the addition of further 
principles in order to make his own axioms pass the test where he did not allow common sense 
morality the same liberty. I maintain that this addition of further principles was not Sidgwick merely 
searching for further support for his ‘own favoured principles’, nor a blind sort of bias, but rather the 
result of these principles appearing to Sidgwick as a necessary and unavoidable stage in the 
exploration and explanation of the reality of human morality. Further support for the argument that the 
failure of Sidgwick’s self-evident axioms to meet that criteria is actually indicative of his wider 
argument for the relationship between deontological and utilitarian principles can be taken from the 
personal document (included in the preface to the sixth edition). Sidgwick says here, “…I had myself 
become, as I had to admit to myself, an Intuitionist to a certain extent. For the supreme rule of aiming 
at the general happiness, as I had come to see, must rest on a fundamental moral intuition, if I was to 
recognise it as binding at all….and there was also the Kantian principle, which I recognised as 
irresistibly valid, though not adequate to give complete guidance’ (xix). Over the next two pages, 
Sidgwick continues to explain how he oscillated between adherence to utilitarian principles and 
adherence to deontological ones, until eventually he concluded that there was a harmony between 
them (xx). Such passages, and others like them (such as the connection passages to which I refer in 
chapters 3 and 4) significantly support the idea that, for Sidgwick, neither method of ethics was fully 
adequate on its own. 
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principles to be self-evident, and therefore that for him, the derived principle of 
Rational Benevolence is ultimately rational – and thus is unconditionally right, without 
reference to consequences. Overall, I anticipate that a combination of these 
responses to Phillips (and Hurka’s) quite legitimate claims against Sidgwick on this 
issue is sufficient enough to still allow for my particular construction of Rational 
Benevolence, and for that theory to hold up philosophically335.   
 
 
 
1.4.c. Thomas Hurka: Sidgwick’s ‘Extreme’ Deontology 
With Phillips, Sidgwick’s utilitarian status has received the curious treatment of 
having been been both maintained – and questioned for its integrity. Thomas Hurka 
makes a similarly unusual move, by being one of the very few theorists to specifically 
discuss Sidgwick’s deontology. Even more surprisingly, Hurka interprets this to be an 
‘extreme’ understanding of deontology, which contrasts unfavourably with the later 
‘moderate’ deontology of W.D. Ross336.  
                                                 
335 I do, however, point to a possible need for future work on the self-evidence of Sidgwick’s 
principles. Here, Brad Hooker offers something extremely valuable, and something that could possibly 
be a far more effective way of expressing ‘self-evidence’ as it appears in the context of this thesis. 
Hooker is wary of the very term ‘self-evident’, believing it to have so often ‘been misused by popular 
moralists to express an unreasonable degree of certainty’ (Hooker, ‘Intuitions and Moral Theorizing’, 
in, Stratton Lake, Ethical Intuitionism, 161-183, p.165). Instead, Hooker prefers the term 
‘independently credible’, which refers to a belief that is ‘attractive without reference to evidence 
beyond itself and yet might turn out to be mistaken’. Both of these statements from Hooker accord 
closely with what would seem to be the most appropriate conclusion to draw on Sidgwick’s self-
evident principles. It certainly appears from the strength of the Unfairness Objection that Sidgwick 
himself was at least guilty of using the term ‘self-evident’ to express that ‘unreasonable degree of 
certainty’ to which Hooker refers, and yet Sidgwick’s axioms do attain a [degree] of self-evidence that 
would seem to justify them in at least being called ‘independently credible’. This is the line I take 
overall, against Phillips’ argument for unfairness.  
Phillips does also take note of this point from Hooker, and briefly considers to what extent Sidgwick 
himself made a distinction between strong and weak versions of self-evidence (Sidgwickian Ethics p. 
86). He concludes that Sidgwick was aware of apparent self-evidence, but only seemed to believe 
that this meant additional external support was required, rather than considering the idea that some 
evidence for self-evidence could be supplied by contemplation of the principle itself. Overall, Phillips 
agrees that Sidgwick’s case can be supported more effectively if a weaker form of self-evidence is 
allowed for, and argues that this is actually present in Sidgwick’s work (p. 59) 
336  Hurka is also the editor of Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick and Ewing 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2011), and British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to Ewing (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press: 2014), which also include examinations of the common ground shared by 
consequentialists and deontologists such as Sidgwick and Ross. Given that his 2014 paper, ‘Sidgwick 
on Consequentialism and Deontology: A Critique’ is the most relevant to my argument here, this will 
be the main text used in this discussion of Hurka’s reading of Sidgwick. Where relevant (and possible) 
however, British Ethical Theorists, and British Moral Philosophers, will be used for their additional 
points. 
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 In ‘Sidgwick on Consequentialism and Deontology; A Critique’, Hurka begins 
by arguing that Sidgwick argued for consequentialism, and against deontology. 
Sidgwick’s critique of deontology, Hurka outlines, involved arguing that where some 
of the principles might seem to have a degree of universal acceptance, any 
qualifications that are added to them immediately destroys that consensus, and thus 
blocks their self-evident status337. Hurka then goes on to say that the pluralist 
deontology view (with which Sidgwick was working) requires that we weigh 
conflicting duties, but gives us no means for doing so. Overall, Hurka points to 
Sidgwick’s problems with the indeterminacy of common sense morality principles, 
and the lack of clarity, certainty, and precision inherent in this method. And this, 
Hurka argues, is the direct result of Sidgwick having failed to grasp ‘the concept of a 
prima facie duty and therefore not seriously considering the moderate, as against 
absolute, deontology that it makes possible’338. That is, Hurka believes that Sidgwick 
should have taken account of an ‘other things equal’ version of a deontological 
system, in which principles are not always inviolable. Instead, Sidgwick seems to 
take the ‘right all things considered’ line, which only allows for absolute, or extreme, 
deontologies339. Hurka summarises, ‘he in effect assumed that the only alternative to 
consequentialism is an absolute deontology which forbids some acts whatever their 
consequences’340 
Hurka’s offensive on Sidgwick’s failure to see the value of prima facie duties is 
convincing, turning on the idea that what Sidgwick thought to be derived from the 
principle of utility was actually a form of moderate deontology, readily available to 
him, which he simply missed and which caused the grounds for his objections341. In 
                                                 
337 ‘Sidgwick on Consequentialism and Deontology’, pp.133-134 
338 Ibid. pp.135, 148 
339 Ibid. p. 136. To be exact, Hurka disputes what Sidgwick meant when he defined the Intuitionist 
position as holding that we have the capacity to see that certain acts are ‘right and reasonable in 
themselves’. If, Hurka argues, by this Sidgwick meant that they are seen as right ‘all other things 
equal’, then Sidgwick had in fact grasped the idea of a moderate deontology. If, however, he meant 
right ‘all things considered’, then this is an extreme form only.  
340 Ibid, p.136 
341 Ibid, p.9-12. He also further challenges Sidgwick’s position by pointing to the fact that Sidgwick’s 
objections to the deontological position apply just as much to his own consequentialist principles. To 
cite a few examples, Hurka does admit that Sidgwick had a point that if a moral truth is self-evident, 
we should be able to intuit it with precise content (‘Sidgwick on Consequentialism and Deontology’, 
p.143) - but does this apply to just deontological theories, or to all claims to self-evident moral 
knowledge? If so, Hurka points out, it cannot support consequentialism over deontology. Hurka refers 
to Sidgwick’s principle of Justice as his ‘universalizability’ axiom (p.144), but makes the point that this 
is not distinctly consequentialist and that most deontologists accept it (which, I argue, is actually 
evidence for Sidgwick’s recognition of certain deontological values). He also takes a strikingly 
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light of Hurka’s argument that Sidgwick’s system would have benefitted from his 
seeing the possibility of prima facie, rather than absolute, duties, the question arises 
as to whether this would be a more effective way of tackling the boundaries between 
deontological and utilitarian moral properties, as opposed to the sort of reconciliation 
between deontological and utilitarian principles for which I am arguing here342. 
                                                 
different view of the point of view of the universe to Singer and Lazari-Radek, by stating that the point 
of view of the universe – which only appears twice in ME and then tentatively - is only true if one does 
accept that view. Sidgwick never said ‘you ought to adopt the point of view of the universe’, which 
means that as an axiom it still does not give any actual practical guidance – which of course is one of 
the objections Sidgwick brings against deontological principles (p.146). Overall, Hurka raises many 
issues with the credibility of Sidgwick’s utilitarianism, and of the principle of Benevolence – but those 
are not my concern here. My focus in this thesis is to give metaphysical grounds for there being a 
mutually informing connection between deontological and utilitarian properties of morality, and to use 
Sidgwick to do so – the issue of whether Rational Benevolence is actually as sound as Sidgwick 
believed it to be is an important one, but for now it can be detached from the example Sidgwick offers 
of how the two types of moral principle combine to work together. Having said this, I do want to state 
my belief that there are grounds on which to argue that Sidgwick did actually see the point of view of 
the universe as a specific moral duty. He uses the phrase ‘as a rational being I am bound to aim at 
good’ (III:XIII:382), and again a few lines later, ‘morally bound’. We know from Sidgwick’s earlier 
discussion of ‘right’ and Reason that rational beings ought to pursue those things that they recognise 
as an ultimately rational end. The combination of rational beings and rational ends is what therefore 
what incurs the ought that Hurka thinks is missing. 
342 Hurka makes a good case for Ross’s being able to answer most of Sidgwick’s objections. Hurka 
uses Ross to demonstrate how recognition of prima facie duties, and ‘other things equal’, avoids the 
need for criteria for self-evidence like the one Sidgwick develops. Applying Ross retrospectively to 
Sidgwick, Hurka argues that if Sidgwick had recognised this, he would have avoided many of the 
problems of trying to establish self-evidence, which in the end were self-defeating. Hurka points out 
that Ross is able to describe how two duties may be right at once, while seeming to conflict. They do 
not contradict each other, it is simply that on the basis of other things equal it is possible to devise 
which duty should be followed, without the other duty being wrong, or ceasing to be a duty. Presented 
in this way, Ross’ system does seem to be able to deal with conflict between principles more 
effectively and simply than Sidgwick, who – on Hurka’s interpretation - stated that in a situation of 
conflict, one or the other principle, or both, must be wrong. This then requires Sidgwick to introduce 
exception-clauses, which of course causes the principles to fail self-evidence criteria 2 and 4 
(‘Sidgwick on Consequentialism and Deontology’, p. 137). (Phillips also draws a comparison between 
Sidgwick and Ross. There is, Phillips suggests, an ‘unofficial’ way of arguing for utilitarianism, which 
does not involve common sense morality having to generate determinacy. This involves recognising 
only apparent self-evidence. Here, Phillips argues, Sidgwick’s main opponent is Ross, whose 
‘deontological intuitionism explicitly and by design does not meet the clarity and precision condition 
interpreted as requiring complete determinacy’ (Sidgwickian Ethics, p. 105) Where Sidgwick argues 
that principles such as ‘I ought to keep my promises’ are not self evident, Ross believes that they are 
(although this is prima facie self-evidence, and may in fact only be metaphysical, and not epistemic). 
So, Phillips says, if even a deontologist’s principles cannot be rejected on the grounds of 
indeterminacy, how can Sidgwick be justified in rejecting them?) 
I do, however, think that Hurka himself is guilty of some unfairness towards Sidgwick when it comes 
to his comparison between Sidgwick and Ross. Hurka drags Sidgwick’s search for self-evident 
principles, and his subsequent failure, over the coals, but the theory to which he is unfavourably 
comparing Sidgwick’s i.e. Ross’s does not itself rely on the same sort of self-evidence that Sidgwick 
was aiming to establish. This is because Ross has no need for self-evident principles, as Phillips also 
points out in his similar comparison. Ross’s system is a weighing of duties, the result of which are 
never self-evident (Sidgwickian Ethics, p. 105) Ross does not ‘solve’ the problem of self-evidence 
therefore, he avoids it. Hurka himself uses the language of avoidance, rather than solution (arguing 
that if Sidgwick had recognised the value of prima facie duties he could have avoided the self-
defeating problems of trying to establish self-evidence) but the problem remains; comparing a theory 
that fails to do something to another theory that does not even attempt that same thing hardly seems 
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Hurka’s exposition of how Ross’ system may have an advantage over Sidgwick’s is, I 
believe, among the best – and presented in this way the prima facie duty approach 
becomes a viable candidate for reconciliation between deontological and 
consequentialist considerations. However, I take a different and more positive view 
of Sidgwick’s use of ‘extreme deontology’. As I outlined in the thesis introduction 
(and as will be continued properly in the following chapter) it is indeed Hurka’s ‘all 
things considered’ version of deontology that Sidgwick uses, and furthermore it is 
this deontological view i.e. an absolute, non-consequentialist one, that I argue 
informs his own concept of rational moral obligation. This in turn provides the crucial 
traditionally non-consequentialist deontological basis of Rational Benevolence, which 
I then argue unites with his utilitarian principle to create a mutually informing 
synthesis between equally rational deontological and utilitarian moral properties. This 
of course requires arguing, contra Hurka, that it is an advantage to Sidgwick’s 
system that he takes the extreme view of deontology, which I essentially do in the 
next chapter343. But, following on from the construction of Rational Benevolence, this 
is not where I believe Sidgwick’s version of deontology to end. There is scope to 
argue that Rational Benevolence itself represents a form of ‘moderate deontology’, in 
that the addition of the utilitarian principle to a foundation of non-consequentialist 
duty adds a prima facie, ‘other things equal’ dimension to the moral theory as a 
whole. This tempers Sidgwick’s original ‘right all things considered’ interpretation, 
and may actually contribute helpfully to the idea of a synthesis between 
consequentialist and non-consequentialist moral principles344. Taken altogether then, 
                                                 
fair. Hurka seems to play Sidgwick at his own game, in critiquing his search for self-evident principles, 
but then attempts to win according to the rules of a different game. Furthermore, where Ross does 
talk about self-evident principles, his claim is that self-evident moral truths may well exist 
metaphysically but are epistemically unavailable to human beings, limited as we are in time, space, 
and knowledge. Sidgwick’s epistemology attempts to go further than Ross’s here (with his testing of 
intuitions for ultimate self-evidence) which creates further distance between the two intuitionists. 
343 In chapter 2 I do not make the specific point, in Hurka’s terms, that Sidgwick is using the ‘all things 
considered’ version of deontology, as opposed to the ‘other things equal’ – but I can clarify here that it 
is the ‘all things considered’ version that I am assuming of Sidgwick’s deontology, as it appears before 
it becomes part of Rational Benevolence, where it becomes more moderate (see main text above).    
344 This is not to say that Ross’s system would simply be superior, as Hurka is suggesting here. I 
theorise Sidgwick’s Rational Benevolence to be similar to Ross’s argument for prima facie duties, in 
that they both hold neither principle in situations of moral conflict to be actually wrong, even if the 
dominance of one is temporarily recognised for the purposes of a given situation. As I outlined in the 
introduction (with reference to Hare, who did expressly believe that in a situation of conflict of duty, 
‘one of them is not your duty’), the way in which Sidgwick constructs Rational Benevolence unites the 
fundamental, non-consequentialist duty-based moral property that underpins the morality of common 
sense with an equally fundamental utilitarian-based moral property, and this can be used to overcome 
conflicts between duties. There is, in any case, perhaps scope to engage further with Hurka on this 
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Sidgwick may have begun from an extreme deontological position – and this may be 
crucial to the synthesis – but it is not the system that he himself eventually offers in 
his own moral theory. This system, I theorise, is much closer to a version of 
moderate deontology.  
Hurka’s wider work raises another issue about how duty features in Sidgwick’s work, 
which it is extremely important I take account of here, ahead of continuing my own 
argument for Sidgwick’s particular notion of duty. One of the points central to Hurka’s 
two most recent books is that underivative duty, i.e. the notion that basic moral 
duties are neither reducible to nor derivable from non-normative judgements, 
appears as much in Sidgwick’s consequentialism as it does in Prichard and Ross’s 
deontology345.  Hurka summarises, ‘if asked whether we ought to promote other 
people’s happiness, they would have said that there is no answer other than we 
ought to…no less than the deontological duties of Prichard, Ross, and Broad, the 
supreme consequentialist duty holds just because it does’346. In Hurka’s concept of 
underivative duty then, we see clearly the attributing of a strong sense of duty to 
Sidgwick that is actually not connected with the traditional ‘deontological’ school, and 
that pertains wholly to his consequentialism. Hurka furthers the distinction between 
‘duty’ as it appears in each school of thought by pointing out that for Sidgwick, the 
fundamental duty is to promote the good, as opposed to deontologists such as Ross, 
for whom deontological duties cannot be derived from this more fundamental duty to 
promote the good347. I entirely support Hurka’s categorisation of this as a ‘thin’ 
concept in Sidgwick; as Hurka cites, Sidgwick believed that ‘ought’ was ‘too 
elementary to admit of any formal definition’. Sidgwick also most certainly argues for 
a type of duty that is in part consequentialist – and Hurka’s view that Sidgwick 
considered the most fundamental duty to be the promotion of good is admittedly a 
difficult point to challenge. But on my view this is not the only notion of duty that 
                                                 
point about Sidgwick and prima facie duties, and to ask whether Sidgwick might have actually 
recognised the concept of prima facie duties to some extent even if he did not expressly develop it 
actually in the pages of ME. 
345 Hurka, Underivative Duty, pp.24-25; British Ethical Theorists, p.1. This underivative duty, Hurka 
argues, is a fundamental common denominator between these positions –even more so, perhaps, 
than intuitionism. 
346 Underivative Duty, p.25. 
347 Hurka also characterises Sidgwick’s irreducible moral concept (or his ‘radically minimalist view’) as 
being ‘what a person ought, has a duty, or as some today would say, has a reason to do’ (British 
Ethical Theorists, p.22). 
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Sidgwick uses. As I outlined in the thesis introduction, and will argue in full in chapter 
2, I believe that Sidgwick does in fact also maintain a traditionally deontological 
notion of duty, that is Kantian, and non-consequentialist, and that this notion of duty 
does inform the principles from which he derives utilitarianism. On the basis of the 
fact that I believe Sidgwick’s moral theory to be an amalgamation of non-
consequentialism and consequentialism however, the ultimate moral duty in 
Sidgwick – that of Rational Benevolence – emerges as both deontological and 
utilitarian in nature.  
 
1.4.d. Roger Crisp: Sidgwick’s Deontology, and the Lack of Rational Synthesis 
 
Roger Crisp – and his excellent book The Cosmos of Duty: Henry Sidgwick’s 
Methods of Ethics - provides a neat chronological and conceptual ending to the list of 
theorists included in this narrative348. His comprehensive exegetical and critical 
engagement with ME provides a model of Sidgwick’s place in moral philosophy 
today –and although there is not space here to engage with the whole volume, he 
collates many of the themes that have occupied this chapter and discusses some 
highly important topics in terms that are immediately relevant to much of what has 
been said above. The main example of this is his discussion of Sidgwick’s treatment 
of deontology, which accords with the interest in this aspect of Sidgwick’s work 
revitalised by Hurka. He also makes several more points that align closely with my 
own theories about Sidgwick – and one which disagrees significantly - thereby 
providing a convenient point from which to go on and develop those claims in the 
rest of the thesis.  
I will begin with the more general points. Firstly, Crisp actually begins Cosmos of 
Duty with the fact that Sidgwick’s plan for ME was that it would ‘reconcile ‘moral 
sense’, or ‘intuitionism’, with utilitarianism’. He immediately follows this with the claim 
that whereas Sidgwick is usually described as the third of the great ‘classical 
utilitarians’, his own personal account of his intellectual journey – as seen in the 
preface to the sixth edition – shows that he soon departed from his initial adherence 
to utilitarianism as strictly understood, ‘never to return’349. Crisp also points to the 
                                                 
348 Crisp, The Cosmos of Duty: Henry Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 
2015) 
349 Ibid. p.5 
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impartial position that Sidgwick intended to adopt for ME, and the fact that he was 
nonetheless led to a moral theory. All of these points are identical to those from 
which my own use of Sidgwick begins (except of course, the last, where Crisp 
considers this moral theory to be exclusively utilitarian, where I do not). 
Crisp also draws attention to Sidgwick’s denial of rightness as means to ends (and 
irrespective of good), and describes Sidgwick’s criticism of the ‘instrumentalist view 
of rightness’ as ‘powerful’350. Crisp interprets Sidgwick, as I do, as working with a 
normative conception of rightness, in which recognition of rightness involves a 
‘definite precept to perform it’, which results from Reason, or ultimately rationality, as 
the motivating factor351. Crisp contrasts this with Sidgwick’s view of goodness, which 
leads to a definite distinction in Crisp’s reading of Sidgwick between rightness as 
having the only normative property, and goodness as a mere evaluative judgment352. 
Crisp waives this to some extent later in the text, by arguing that the ‘bestness’ within 
goodness implies a rational dictate to perform the action if one can’, but his overall 
position on Sidgwick’s distinction between rightness and goodness maintains the 
idea that rightness is associated with rational dictates353. This supports my reading of 
Sidgwick’s view of rightness, which is in turn a crucial component for my 
understanding of Sidgwick’s argument for Rational Benevolence, and for my 
argument that both deontological and utilitarian properties are presented as 
ultimately rational by Sidgwick, and therefore as ultimately right.  
Crisp offers the helpful term ‘non-consequentialist intuitionism’ with which to 
distinguish the form of intuitionism in which actions are known to be right in 
themselves, independent of their consequences, and also argues that Sidgwick’s 
intuitionism represents a ‘standard argument for foundationalism in epistemology’354. 
                                                 
350 Ibid. p.12 
351 Ibid. p.62 
352 As Crisp describes it, the moral ideal in goodness is to be construed as attractive, not imperative 
(Ibid.p.57). We could, Crisp says, make a case that goodness is actually ‘non-latently normative’ – but 
this is not the view Crisp believes Sidgwick to take, given Sidgwick’s connection between rightness 
and normative Reason (p. 59). 
Crisp does, however, question whether Sidgwick’s definition of ultimately reasonable must equate 
with a moral judgement. i.e. whether what is ultimately reasonable must also be that which is morally 
right, as represented by an ‘ought’ (pp. 17-18). His own views, Crisp argues – of egoism and 
utilitarianism – ‘are best stated in terms of ultimate reasonableness, with no reference to ought or 
morality at all’ (p. 18). This is a similar position to Hurka’s rejecting the point of view of the universe as 
being an ‘ought’, and it would seem as though Crisp would agree with him on this. Later however, 
Crisp leaves behind that distinction when he argues that Sidgwick’s rightness is indeed a normative 
conception (p. 57. See also p. 71) 
353 Ibid. p.63 
354 Ibid. pp.99-102 
 158 
Crisp does, however, see the coherentist position in what he considers to be 
Sidgwick’s reluctance to abandon an Aristotelian approach to testing philosophical 
conclusions against common thought355. And here, within the realm of that ongoing 
‘Sidgwick as a foundationalist/coherentist?’ debate, we reach one of the most 
interesting readings of the implications of Sidgwick’s apparent coherentist 
tendencies. For it is due to Sidgwick’s allowing of a semi-coherentist approach to 
common sense morality that Crisp believes his argument against deontology is 
unsuccessful. In order to fully contextualise what Crisp says here, it is helpful to look 
at his relevant preliminary comment made in the preface to Cosmos of Duty. Here, 
Crisp states that there are two failures in ME. The first was the one Sidgwick 
perceived – that between egoism and utilitarianism, and Crisp thinks (like Phillips) 
that this can actually be resolved. The second failure, he argues, is ‘his attempt to 
dismiss a reflective form of pluralistic deontology of the kind defended by Aristotle, 
and developed by Ross’356. On Crisp’s view, Sidgwick is correct to promote 
hedonistic utilitarianism – but Crisp states that he himself cannot adhere to this 
position on the basis of Sidgwick’s argument for it (and against common sense 
morality) in ME357. That is, Crisp makes startling use of his personal view to point to 
the fact that he does not believe Sidgwick to have done enough to truly refute 
common sense morality, or the deontological position. Returning now to the main 
text, and to how this is the result of Sidgwick’s coherentist inclinations, Crisp has 
pointed out that the rules of common sense morality cannot, for Sidgwick, be made 
precise or consistent358. He then shows that Sidgwick did allow a degree of authority 
to common moral thought –but that in doing so, Sidgwick did not explain why a 
dogmatic intuitionist should not find that their common sense morality principles 
could be thought of as ‘primary intuitions of reason’359. Why, then, Crisp asks, does 
Sidgwick not distance himself entirely from that source of morality? Instead, he takes 
the coherentist route of attempting to test common sense morality via philosophical 
                                                 
355Ibid. p.107.  Crisp also associates this non-consequentialist intuitionism directly with common 
sense morality, which gives a particularly clear view of Sidgwick’s frequently-noted confusing 
grouping together of apparently very different methods of ethics under the one term ‘intuitionism’.  
356 P. vii 
357 Crisp says, ‘his own account of the epistemic implications of disagreement requires me, and 
indeed other moral theorists, to suspend judgement on the question of which ethical view is correct’ 
(vii).  
358 Ibid. p.104 
359 Ibid. p.105 
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theory, and in doing so leaves it unclear how or why we are to decide between the 
deontological position, and his utilitarian one.  
Crisp, then, has presented a view of Sidgwick’s coherentism which not only does not 
offer a form of reconciliation between deontological and utilitarian principles, but 
which actually finds in favour of the deontological position.  It is interesting that Crisp 
maintains deontology in ME in this way, but it is not the same way in which I aim to 
maintain it. This brings us to the point to which I alluded in the introduction to this 
section, that there is a point on which Crisp diverges from my otherwise often 
comparable reading of Sidgwick. Crisp points out that of the two problems with 
common sense morality that Sidgwick identifies – lack of clarity/consistency, and the 
lack of a single unifying principle which could provide a ‘rational synthesis’ – 
Sidgwick pays very little attention to the second problem. The result was, as was 
seen, that dogmatic intuitionism can still contest utilitarianism. ‘Disappointingly’, 
Crisp says, ‘all we have in the Methods at this point is assertion. If Sidgwick could 
have supplied a powerful argument for rational synthesis he might have omitted from 
The Methods much of the detailed discussion of common sense morality…’360. Crisp 
is not arguing, as Hurka did, that Sidgwick could have systemised common sense 
morality more effectively if he himself had adopted the pluralistic Aristotelian/Rossian 
deontology that Crisp thinks Sidgwick is left with361. Crisp is arguing precisely that 
Sidgwick failed to offer a synthesis at all – and that this is part of what leaves his 
                                                 
360 Ibid. p. 104 
361 Crisp refers again to the ‘Aristotelian dialect’ which he says Sidgwick runs ‘unstably’ alongside 
philosophical intuitionism at p.212. ‘Aristotelian dialect’ is a wonderful description of how Sidgwick 
presents many of his arguments, and it is original to Crisp in as far as applying it to Sidgwick goes. It 
might also be asked whether this Aristotelian dialect might in itself be another form of reconciliation, 
mediating as it does between common sense morality and philosophical intuitionism. To this I argue 
that whereas the eventual relationship between the two positions might look rather like this sort of 
system, this would be a by-product of the synthesis for which I am arguing, not the intended mode of 
synthesisation itself.  
This leads to a wider point, that Crisp’s focus is very much on the relationship between common 
sense morality and utilitarianism as two methods of ethics (Ibid. pp. 198-234). His analysis of this is 
exceptional in depth and clarity, and I am aware of the challenge of such exegesis to my claim that 
the deontological and utilitarian principles that inform common sense morality and utilitarianism 
respectively are actually mutually informing. Furthermore, Crisp also draws on passages to show 
Sidgwick’s ‘proving’ of utilitarianism, that I also use to show a relationship between common sense 
morality and utilitarianism (see pp. 209-214). But ultimately my focus is much narrower, and it is on 
Sidgwick’s construction of Rational Benevolence as a moral theory. Whereas it is important that 
Sidgwick’s apparent argument for just utilitarianism (in Book III and in Book IV of ME) is accounted 
for, I do believe there is a case to be made for the mutually informing nature of deontological and 
utilitarian principles in Rational Benevolence being visible in Sidgwick’s exposition of the relationship 
between the two methods, even as it appears in that ‘proof’, both positive and negative. This case is 
developed in full from the end of chapter 3 of this thesis, and into chapter 4.  
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position open to a challenge from deontology. Ironically then, Crisp’s argument is not 
that Sidgwick does not offer a synthesis between deontology and utilitarianism 
because Sidgwick’s system was exclusively utilitarian. His view is that Sidgwick 
didn’t offer such a synthesis because his position is actually not as convincingly 
utilitarian as is commonly assumed. I argue of course, contra Crisp, that Sidgwick’s 
moral theory does present a synthesis between deontological and utilitarian moral 
principles. It is not specifically a synthesis that aims to systemise common sense 
morality and utilitarianism, although as I will argue in later chapters I do believe that 
the meta-ethical synthesis in Rational Benevolence maps onto how Sidgwick sees 
the relationship between those two moral positions. Lastly, where it is Crisp’s view 
that Sidgwick’s leaving his argument exposed to the deontology in common sense 
morality was accidental and disadvantageous, I will be arguing that where 
deontology does feature in Sidgwick’s moral theory of Rational Benevolence, this is 
entirely intentional, and expedient to the theory. 
 
1.5. Conclusions  
Having reached the most recent work to be done on Sidgwick, this chronicle of how 
his work has been interpreted throughout the years can come to a close. There are 
of course a thousand other discussions on Sidgwick, on various aspects of his work, 
all of which will be valuable in some way to any reading of him; it is with great regret 
that so many theorists have had to be excluded from this discussion362. But the aim 
                                                 
362 I will attempt here to give a brief overview of other eminent scholars who have contributed to the 
now extensive range of work done on Henry Sidgwick, but whose work has not fitted directly into the 
direction of the narrative I have tried to construct in this chapter. Focus still predominantly remains on 
subjects that are particularly relevant to my arguments in this thesis.  
Firstly, John Deigh, mentioned above in relation to where Sidgwick is possibly more Kantian than 
deontologist Ross, agrees that Sidgwick borrowed vocabulary and distinctions from Kant (‘Sidgwick 
on Ethical Judgement’, p. 244). He specifically addresses where Sidgwick’s use of Reason and ought 
places him in terms of judgements of duty, and believes Sidgwick to be an internalist, where ought 
implies a reason for action, as opposed to an externalist, which does not argue that Reason has this 
role. David Brink has argued (in ‘Sidgwick and the Rationale for Rational Egoism’, in, Schultz (ed.) 
Essays on Henry Sidgwick, p. 199-240) that Sidgwick is both an internalist and an externalist, but 
Brink favours the externalist view, due to the Dualism of Practical Reason, which means that 
judgements of duty do not necessarily bring reason to action. Deigh maintains however that Sidgwick 
thought moral rather than prudential judgements to be ‘the clearest examples of what he meant by an 
ethical judgement, and, correspondingly, that he took the notion of duty to be the primary or clearest 
representative of what he meant by the fundamental notion of ethics’ (‘Sidgwick on Ethical 
Judgement’, p. 247) – and my view aligns with Deigh’s (see chapter 2, p. 8). Deigh then goes on to 
point out that Sidgwick used the categorical imperative differently in relation to moral judgements of 
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here has been to tell a very particular story about Sidgwick, about his utilitarianism, 
his deontology, and about his applicability to both. Despite the length of the story, its 
chapters can now be easily summarised.  
From the earliest days of ME’s publication, Sidgwick was read as a utilitarian. 
Despite some cursory recognitions that this was perhaps not quite the standard 
utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill, time and tide did not wait for this impression. 
Sidgwick then continued quietly to be as relevant to important deontologists such as 
Ross, Frankena, and Rawls, as he was to twentieth century revivals of utilitarianism. 
More recently, deeper critical engagement with Sidgwick has furthered his utilitarian 
status, and, tellingly, drawn attention to where deontology features in his work. 
Sidgwick has even been relevant to one of the greatest deontological/utilitarian 
                                                 
‘ought’ as opposed to prudential judgments of ought. He does, however, point out that Sidgwick 
departs from Kant on his inclusion of hypothetical imperatives (which incidentally furthers Deigh’s 
internalist account. See p. 252), and for Deigh, it is actually a problem that Sidgwick did not 
distinguish between right and ought in the hypothetical and categorical imperatives. On Deigh’s view, 
Sidgwick’s use of Reason emerges as almost more Kantian than Kant’s. Ross Harrison also agrees 
with Deigh’s view that Sidgwick was an internalist (‘The Sanctions of Utilitarianism’, in Proceedings of 
the British Academy, Vol. 109 (2001), 93-116). See also Robert Shaver’s argument that Sidgwick only 
holds a thin, non-reason-giving account of the good, in ‘Sidgwick’s False Friends’ (in, Ethics Vol.107, 
No.2 (1997) 314-320). 
Antony Quinton (Utilitarian Ethics (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd.: 1973) treats Sidgwick as a critic 
of utilitarianism (‘rather than as a continuator of it’ p. 87), and although he does ultimately define 
Sidgwick as a utilitarian, he outlines four counts on which Sidgwick differs from classical utilitarianism. 
The two that are the most important to my discussion are: that pleasure is not, for Sidgwick, the sole 
object of desire (p.88. See chapter 3 of this thesis for the discussion of Sidgwick’s idea of pleasure), 
and Quinton’s observation that Sidgwick’s intuitionism is partly substantive, and partly a priori (p.89). 
This latter point especially accords with my own reading of Sidgwick’s intuitionism, in that I believe it 
to be partly ‘purely’ intuitional, but also further verified by Sidgwick’s search for self-evidence. Quinton 
also attaches Sidgwick’s argument that a rational being ought to aim at good specifically to Rational 
Benevolence, and states this to be ‘an improved, rationalised, version of the fundamental principle of 
utilitarianism’(p. 90). He also argues, as I do indirectly, that common sense principles are 
‘implications’ of Rational Benevolence. The main difference, of course, is that I argue this Rational 
Benevolence is not exclusively utilitarian.  
Stefan Collini (‘My Roles and their Duties: Sidgwick as a Philosopher, Professor, and Public Moralist’, 
in Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. 109 (2001), 9-49), states that ‘even by the standards of 
moral philosophers, Henry Sidgwick showed a striking readiness to use the word ‘duty’. John 
Skorupski, who describes Sidgwick’s ethical position as ‘philosophical intuitionism’ (English Language 
Philosophy 1750-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press:1993, p.67), gives an innovative account of 
why there is either unity in Sidgwick’s practical reason, or actually three postulates, as opposed to the 
infamous dualism (this is based on Sidgwick’s argument that intuitive knowledge must also be made 
precise, and therefore counts as much as a part of practical reason as utilitarianism and egoism). See 
also Skorupski’s Sidgwick and the Many-Sidedness of Ethics, in Bucolo, Crisp and Schultz (eds.) 
Henry Sidgwick: Happiness and Religion (2004), 410-422). J.L. Mackie gives a particularly good 
defence of Sidgwick’s dualism of practical reason, agreeing with Sidgwick that it was irreconcilable, 
and that if Sidgwick’s approach could not reconcile it, then certainly no-one who has come after him 
could either (‘Sidgwick’s Pessimism’, Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 26, No.105 (1976) 317-27. See also 
David Holley, ‘Sidgwick’s Problem’, in, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 5, No.1 (2002), 5-65).  
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reconciliation theories that has perhaps ever been put forward – Parfit’s Triple 
Theory. Yet through all of this, his own reconciliation, as it appears in ME, has been 
missed.  Theories such as coherentism and reflective equilibrium have offered 
worthy alternative ways of reading ME as offering some kind of reconciliation 
between deontological and utilitarian principles, but I maintain that none of these are 
reconciliations of the kind that I am proposing to be available in ME. These 
reconciliations have usually pertained to Sidgwick’s merging of common sense 
morality with utilitarianism, and whereas this is part of my theory, it is not the meta-
ethical reconciliation between deontology and utilitarianism that I believe Sidgwick 
saw. The two positions are presented with utilitarianism in control - systemising, 
supplementing, correcting, directing common sense morality - and Sidgwick’s 
utilitarianism is accepted as it is. Certainly no other reconciliatory theory has applied 
Sidgwick’s language of ‘synthesis’ to the way in which he constructs Rational 
Benevolence. I suggest that the reading of Sidgwick that I offer here will itself 
synthesise with these other readings, in such a way that the various movements 
towards recognising Sidgwick as having applicability to both deontological and 
utilitarian positions might be thrown into a different, and possibly revealing, light.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 BUILDING A SYNTHESIS: SIDGWICK’S ACCOUNT OF DEONTOLOGY 
 
 
The thesis introduction and chapter 1 were intended to together set up the thesis’ 
premises, and the grounds for those premises. For the purposes of clarity, those 
ideas can be summarised as; a) frequent moral ambivalence experienced by many 
individuals indicates the moral value of both deontological and utilitarian principles of 
morality, b) the validity of the two types of principle indicates that both are (to an 
extent) reasonable, c) an understanding of human morality is needed which 
accounts for this dual reasonableness, and d) Henry Sidgwick’s moral theory of 
Rational Benevolence, which connects the two types of principle on their shared 
appeal to Reason, provides this understanding. This chapter now marks the 
beginning of this thesis’ own investigation into the research question proper, 
represented by that last point, of whether Sidgwick’s theory of Rational Benevolence 
can be found to afford significant moral value to both deontological and utilitarian 
principles, holding them in such a way that they are no longer divided, but rather 
mutually inform each other in a type of relationship that could be called a ‘synthesis’.  
 The first step in this process is to establish an irrefutable presence of 
deontological principles in Sidgwick’s moral theory363. Whereas the utilitarian aspect 
of Sidgwick’s work has been much expounded, it is only if it can be found that 
Sidgwick also attributes value to traditionally non-consequentialist deontological 
ideas that it becomes possible to argue for a Sidgwickian moral theory that depends 
on deontological principles as much as it does utilitarian ones364. To this end, this 
chapter focuses specifically on Sidgwick’s interpretation of deontological moral 
concepts, and the extent to which he relies upon them in his own moral theory, as an 
integral part of human morality.  
This analysis of Sidgwick’s deontology follows the chronological structure of 
ME itself, and is organised into two stages. The first is concerned with Sidgwick’s 
own understanding of deontological principles of morality, and tracks those principles 
                                                 
363 As outlined in the thesis introduction, ‘deontological’ and ‘deontology’ are herein defined as 
representing the moral view that actions are right in as far as they conform to certain moral rules, or 
duties, that are considered to be absolutely binding, and unconditionally right, without reference to 
consequences.   
364 It is also through this argument for Sidgwick’s deontology that the thesis is able to challenge the 
long-standing idea that Sidgwick is simply a utilitarian. 
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from their earliest manifestations in ME’s introduction, through to Sidgwick’s 
argument for the connection between Reason and moral rightness. The purpose 
here is to clarify that by ‘Intuitionism’ (with a capital ‘I’) Sidgwick is referring to a 
recognisably deontological position, understood as representing non-
consequentialist and unconditional duty, and then to argue that despite his utilitarian 
reputation Sidgwick actually holds a similar and largely non-consequentialist view of 
rightness – and that this contributes significantly to his own understanding of moral 
obligation. 
The next part of the chapter then examines the value that he ascribes to 
deontology as it is represented by Dogmatic Intuitionism (or common sense 
morality), first as a method of ethics important to the ordinary individual’s lived 
experience, and then in his own moral theory. This leads to the central discussion of 
Sidgwick’s self-evident principles - Justice, Prudence, and Universal Benevolence – 
which crucially argues for the ultimately rational and non-consequentialist foundation 
of those principles. The aim here is to show that Sidgwick derives Universal 
Benevolence as a non-consequentialist moral obligation from a recognisably 
deontological and even Kantian basis, thus showing that part of Sidgwick’s 
‘Intuitionism’ actually informs his own epistemic ‘intuitionism’. Kant’s influence here is 
further supported via reference to the personal document (PD). 
 The chapter concludes that Sidgwick affords far greater value to a version of 
traditional deontological duty than is commonly thought, not just as a method of 
moral reasoning to which an ordinary person does recourse in their moral thinking, 
but also as an indispensable aspect of his normative morality represented by the 
term ‘Rational Benevolence’. The chapter also concludes that despite this Sidgwick 
does not consider deontological principles to be by themselves sufficient for 
constructing a wholly comprehensive or accurate account of morality, and that the 
deontological properties of his own theory, though necessary, naturally point towards 
a dependence on ‘some other method’, which Sidgwick theorises to be utilitarianism. 
These conclusions set up the next chapter, which examines Sidgwick’s account of 
that utilitarianism, and argues similarly to this chapter that whereas Sidgwick also 
attributes great value to the utilitarian principle, this too is incomplete without support 
from deontological concepts. Together, chapters 2 and 3 lay the groundwork for the 
thesis’ central argument, developed in chapter 4, that deontological and utilitarian 
principles are necessarily combined in Sidgwick’s theory of Rational Benevolence. 
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2.1. Sidgwick’s Deontology in I:I : Initial Connections with the Intuitional View 
 
Given ME’s infamous reputation as being somewhat difficult to read, its introduction 
is actually remarkably concise – and bold - in its approach to what are some 
inarguably substantial statements. It is in the introduction that Sidgwick draws 
attention to the fundamental problem in ethics – so similar to that outlined at the start 
of this thesis – that people generally aim to do things that they deem to be 
reasonable, and yet an enormous diversity of actions results from these these 
practical ‘reasonings’ (I:I:5-6, 14). It is here that he states that, for that reason, most 
single answers to the question ‘why should I do something’ only leave space for the 
same question to be asked from another angle (I:I:6). It is in the introduction that 
Sidgwick asserts, even at this early stage, that the term ‘ought’ needs to be handled 
carefully, given that it is most often used to describe actions that are relative to an 
optional end, when this is not the ‘exhaustive’ account of that concept (I:I:7). Further 
to this last point, it is in the introduction that Sidgwick argues that the pursuit of 
Happiness can be interpreted to be an ultimate end, in such a way that it is still 
prescribed by an ‘ought’ derived from Reason, and thus still accords with the Kantian 
categorical imperative (I:I:7); that is, it is in the introduction that Sidgwick states his 
own view of utilitarianism to be a version in which Happiness can be found to be an 
end categorically prescribed (I:I:8), at which people ought to aim. 
These are no small claims. But from them, some minutiae can be derived that 
are vital for a full understanding of Sidgwick’s interpretation of deontology, and of 
what he calls the Intuitional method. These are examined here in turn.  
 
2.1.a. ‘Good’ and ‘Duty’ in Right Conduct 
 
In the second section of I:I, Sidgwick draws a clear contrast between the general 
conceptions that Ethics is sometimes considered as an investigation into the true 
‘moral laws or rational precepts of Conduct; [and] sometimes an inquiry into the 
nature of the Ultimate End of reasonable human action – the Good…of man’ (I:I:2-3). 
This is Sidgwick’s distinguishing between the Aristotelian scholastic approach to 
ethics, which focused on the identity of the true ‘good’ for man and included 
eudaimonistic theories on how one was to live in order to attain that good, and the 
more modern approach to ethics, which specifically enquires into the nature of right 
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and wrong actions. Within the latter, it can be assumed that Sidgwick is including 
both deontological and utilitarian theories (i.e. the theories of Kant, Bentham, and 
Mill) – there is nothing in the text to state that by ‘right conduct’ Sidgwick means 
either one or the other. But an interesting insight arises here, even at this early 
stage, into Sidgwick’s view on ‘right’ action, and the role of good365. Good, Sidgwick 
says, can be assumed to be part of most discussions of ethics; ‘determination of 
precepts or directive rules of conduct’ are still necessary, if we require to know is 
right to actually do. Although Sidgwick is pointing out the historical decline of focus 
on the good here, there is a sense that Sidgwick is also demoting the concept in his 
own treatment of Ethics. He continues on to point out that the Intuitional view – which 
he defines for the first time as that in which ‘conduct is held to be right when 
conformed to certain precepts or principles of Duty, intuitively known to be 
unconditionally binding’ (I:I:3) – gives very little weight to Ultimate Good at all.  
Further, we commonly think that human good includes the performance of 
duty as well as the attainment of Happiness, and on this view again the performance 
of duty is not dependent on Ultimate Good. Not only then has the ‘good’, which 
Sidgwick loosely associates with Happiness here, been relegated in terms of its role 
in determining right conduct, but Sidgwick has also acknowledged that there is a 
place for a type of moral duty that is independent of both the good and Happiness. 
So whereas Sidgwick is not entirely specific at this point that this ‘duty’ belongs to 
the deontological position, his denial that the performance of duty can be conditional 
on knowledge of things achieved provides early evidence that Sidgwick understands 
‘duty’ to be absolute, and unconditional366. 
                                                 
365 Generally, I will not capitalise ‘good’ in the thesis, apart from when it appears as part of Sidgwick’s 
phrase ‘Ultimate Good’. This is because Sidgwick is not always consistent about capitalising the word, 
and for me to capitalise it seemed to give it a certain significant weight that I do not necessarily intend. 
This is especially compounded by the fact that Sidgwick does not often capitalise ‘right’. Ultimate 
Good however, is representative of Sidgwick’s ultimate end of Happiness, and as Sidgwick does 
capitalise Happiness, this will appear more consistent. To the same end, I will also capitalise 
Happiness. The self-evident principles of Justice, Prudence, and Universal Benevolence (or just 
‘Benevolence’, where appropriate) will be also capitalised, as per Sidgwick’s example, and in order to 
represent their particular status as Sidgwick’s self-evident philosophical intuitions – and the various 
forms of ‘Intuitionism’ are capitalised where it is clear that they are representing a certain type of 
epistemology, as opposed to Sidgwick’s own epistemic device (for example, within the context of 
Dogmatic Intuitionism). ‘Reason’, as representative of the particular cognitive moral faculty, is also 
capitalised, again in accordance with Sidgwick. Other than this, there are no other capitalisations. 
366 This is as opposed to what could be a utilitarian understanding of duty, as I outlined in the 
introduction. 
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Sidgwick’s emphasis on ‘right conduct’ (which here does not need defining as 
either the deontological or the utilitarian position), characterises the whole of ME367. 
And his preoccupation with what it is right to do is precisely what will lead him to the 
fundamental notion of moral obligation as being based in Reason, that I will argue 
causes him to align with a traditionally deontological, non-consequentialist 
understanding of ‘duty’.  
 
2.1.b. Further Outlines of ‘Intuitionism’ in I:I  
 
Shortly after his discussion of the scholastic good, Sidgwick refers to the Intuitional 
view that he has just described as being the prevalent view. Sidgwick’s reasons for 
                                                 
367 My reading of this passage as Sidgwick shifting the focus of ethics away from the good and 
towards the right is supported by ME when it is read as a whole. When this wider view of ME is taken, 
it is noticeable that Sidgwick is not greatly concerned with ‘good’; there are only two chapters on the 
concept - I:IX, and III:XIV – whereas he is frequently occupied with the language of what is right. 
Having said this, it is important to have an overview of what Sidgwick considers good to be, as the 
concept is relevant to the Universal Good that is established at the core of Rational Benevolence.  
In I:IX, Sidgwick admits that ‘virtuous’ action may be determined by a moral ideal that is ‘attractive 
rather than imperative’, when something is judged to be ‘good’ in itself (I:IX:105). This is not, Sidgwick 
argues, a mere verbal substitution for ‘rightness’ – it is a fundamentally different form of intuitive 
judgement. This distinction serves to further delineate between Sidgwick’s ideas of right and good: 
Right conduct involves an ‘authoritative prescription’ to do something, but it is not clear from the 
judgement that something is good that we ought to prefer that good to all other goods. Interestingly 
however, this leads Sidgwick to attribute to Ultimate Goodness a quality similar to that which he will 
attribute to rightness -  what is ultimately good is not that which is simply good as the means to the 
attainment of some ulterior end. Through this, Sidgwick concludes that ‘ultimate good’ on the 
whole…must be taken to mean what as a rational being I should desire and seek to realise, assuming 
myself to have an equal concern for all existence’ (I:IX:111-112). This ‘good’, which is good in itself, is 
independent of consequences (I:IX:113) – and this again accords with Sidgwick’s later definition of 
rightness as not simply being what is fit to an end. This adds further support to my argument made 
below that Sidgwick has a predominantly non-consequentialist view of both certain moral actions, and 
certain ends, which is essential to my overall argument for the dual reasonableness of deontological 
and utilitarian values in Sidgwick’s moral theory. It is also this temporally neutral and non-
consequentialist notion of ‘good’ that is the basis of Sidgwick’s self-evident principle of Prudence, and 
it is Prudence that establishes Universal Good as the rational end of moral action, within Rational 
Benevolence. Sidgwick’s notion of Ultimate Good (or ‘Happiness’, as he more precisely defines it 
(I:IX:115, see also III:XIII:388, ) may not receive quite the same level of attention as that of what is 
ultimately right, but it is a crucial component in his moral theory, that allows that theory to be seen as 
one of both the right and the good. In III:XIV (entitled ‘Ultimate Good’) Sidgwick considers whether, 
following his conclusions on Justice, Prudence, and Benevolence drawn in III:XIII (which I discuss at 
length below), the ‘practical determination of Right Conduct’ has actually come to rest on the 
determination of Ultimate Good after all (III:XIV:391). In this chapter Sidgwick concludes more 
robustly that Universal Happiness can be the only ‘coherent account’ of Ultimate Good, and that this 
does seem to indicate utilitarianism (III:XIV:406-407).This would seem to promote the role of the good 
above that of the right, as might be expected of a ‘classical utilitarian’ such as Sidgwick. But I argue 
here that these last comments from Sidgwick on the identity and role of good need to be read in light 
of those investigations in Book III, where it is seen that the Universal Happiness Sidgwick is referring 
to can only be established on a very precise basis, that depends absolutely on a notion of a rational 
and therefore categorical and unconditional right. I make this argument below, and in chapter 3 and 4.   
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believing this will become clear as he expands on this method of ethics, but for now 
we can look to Sidgwick’s further definitions of the Intuitional position. He describes 
consequences as not relevant to the ‘rightness’ of certain acts (‘common moral 
opinion recognises…fundamental rules, e.g. those of Justice, Good Faith, and 
Veracity….as to binding without qualification and without regard to ulterior 
consequences’ (I:I:8)). He also points to the role of Reason in the method. In this 
‘ordinary form of the Intuitional view of Ethics’, Sidgwick states, rules such as Justice 
etc. are prescribed as ‘categorical’, as the ‘result of philosophical reflection’. It can be 
inferred from Sidgwick’s linking of the term ‘categorically’ (where he attributes the 
term to Kant) to his phrase ‘prescribed by reason’ on the previous page he believes 
these rules to themselves be prescribed by Reason368. Sidgwick also argues here 
that to be prescribed by Reason ‘categorically’ means ‘without tacit assumption of a 
still ulterior end’ (a point that will shortly be of tremendous importance for 
understanding Sidgwick’s own notion of moral obligation). This Reason-centric 
understanding of ‘categorically prescribed’ and the latent idea that right action is 
independent of consequences, are representative of Sidgwick’s overall position on 
the deontological view369. 
 
2.2. Reason, ‘Ought’, and the Deontological Version of Duty in Sidgwick 
 
In ME’s introduction then, we have all the building blocks of what Sidgwick will 
develop throughout ME into his full understanding of the Intuitional position. From 
this and other later definitions of that view, it is clear that Intuitionism is, for Sidgwick, 
the position that holds what is moral to take the form of duties/certain kinds of 
                                                 
368 Sidgwick himself makes an important clarification about this distinction at I:VI:83, where he 
acknowledges that ‘almost any method may be connected with almost any ultimate reason…In my 
treatment of the subject, difference of Method is taken as the paramount consideration’. This adds 
weight to the argument that when Sidgwick capitalises ‘Intuitionism’, he is doing so in order that the 
word might specifically represent a certain method, which is the non-consequentialist duty-based one.  
369 See also Sidgwick’s table of contents at xxiii for another reference to Rules as prescribed without 
reference to ulterior consequences. Sidgwick does not actually use the language of ‘Rules’ very often 
in ME, but its appearance in the table of contents is helpful for further clarification that by this term 
Sidgwick is specifically referring to the non-utilitarian (i.e. non consequentialist) position. These 
definitions can be thought of as supporting Thomas Hurka’s argument that Sidgwick has an ‘extreme’ 
view of deontology, by which he meant that Sidgwick had failed to recognise the possibility of prima 
facie duties, rather than only absolute ones (see this thesis chapter 1, pp.68-70). But it is my view that 
Sidgwick’s interpretation of what appears to be a mainly Kantian form of deontology is not needlessly 
extreme, but rather simply the most accurate description of the form of deontology that was prevalent 
in his time. 
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actions which are prescribed unconditionally, and without reference to ulterior results 
or consequences370. I believe then that it is no great step to equate this non-
consequentialist emphasis with the deontological view of ethics, as it was outlined in 
the thesis introduction. However, what is significant about my claim is not necessarily 
that Sidgwick’s ‘Intuitionism’ represents the traditional deontological approach to 
morality, but that this type of duty that characterises this Intuitionism (with a capital 
‘I’) is also the same duty that informs Sidgwick’s own theory of moral obligation, that 
will later appear in his epistemic intuitionism (with a small ‘i’). As we have reached 
Sidgwick’s discussion of rightness in I:III, the first part of the argument for this claim 
can now be given. I aim here to show that Sidgwick’s particular use of Reason, and 
his subsequent understandings of ‘ought’ and ‘right’, create a recognisably 
deontological theory of moral obligation whereby moral action is categorically and 
unconditionally prescribed (mainly) without reference to consequences - and that this 
notion of duty remains categorical and unconditional and thus deontological, even 
when it appears in Sidgwick’s more utilitarian outline of rightness371.  
                                                 
370 Sidgwick gives further definitions to this effect at I:III:20, 26, I:VIII:96, 98, I:IX:105, and III:I:200 – 
the significance of these are discussed below. Sidgwick’s own use of intuitionism as his method of 
epistemology may occasionally be blurred (for reasons I am about to suggest), but his definition of 
Intuitionism with the capital ‘I’ is clearer than perhaps David Phillips allows (Sidgwick is also clear 
about his own opinion on intuitionism (with a small ‘i’), as opposed to its representing just one ethical 
system, elsewhere in ME. I:VIII is specifically dedicated to discussing the various forms of 
intuitionism, and III:I:201 shows Sidgwick to be aware of the possible intuitive basis of all three 
methods.) Furthermore, in his response to Calderwood, Sidgwick does reiterate his ‘fundamental 
assumption of Intuitionism’ – as he intends it to be interpreted in ME – which is ‘that we have the 
power of seeing clearly what actions are right and reasonable in themselves, apart from their 
consequences’ (‘Professor Calderwood on Intuitionism in Morals’, in, Mind Vol.1, No.4 (1876), p. 565). 
This fully supports my argument that by ‘Intuitionism’, Sidgwick is referring to the non-
consequentialist, deontological method. Whereas Sidgwick states in the Calderwood paper that in his 
own opinion intuitionism does inform at least both utilitarian and ‘Intuitional’ (deontological) methods, 
even the passage from which Sidgwick has restated that definition to Calderwood (III:I:200)  also 
makes reference to the concept of unconditional duty.  
371 I do need to draw attention here to an alternative view on Sidgwick’s Intuitionism (with a capital ‘I’). 
Alan Donagan (‘Sidgwick and Whelwellian Intuitionism; Some Enigmas’ (Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 7, No.3 (1977), 447-465) states that at I:VIII:101, Sidgwick gives what appears to be 
a Whelwellian version of Intuitionism (the version that I represent with a capital ‘I’). This is also the 
Intuitionism that Sidgwick associates with Dogmatic Intuitionism, or common sense morality (“It is 
such a system as this which seems to be generally intended when Intuitive or a priori morality is 
mentioned, and which will chiefly occupy us in Book iii” I:VIII:101). Within this Intuitionism, ‘actions are 
unconditionally prescribed without regard to ulterior consequences’ (I:VIII:98). If it is the case that it is 
Whelwell’s Intuitionism that Sidgwick has in mind at all times when he describes this moral-theoretic 
(if I may borrow that term from Phillips - see Sidgwickian Ethics, p.6) and deontological position, then 
this would seem to conflict with my claims that there is a Kantian element in that Intuitionism, and that 
Sidgwick retains this Kantian aspect of the Intuitional (deontological) method in his own philosophical 
intuitions that constitute his moral theory. My response to this is in three parts. The first is to suggest, 
contra Donagan, that Sidgwick did have Kant’s position in mind as a partial informant of the Intuitional 
view. This seems a reasonable argument to make, as we see quite clearly earlier in ME Sidgwick 
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2.2.a. Reason, Right, and ‘Ought’: Sidgwick’s Appeal to Kant 
 
In ME Book I, Chapter III (‘Ethical Judgements’) Sidgwick returns to his points made 
in the introduction regarding ‘actions that we judge to be right’, the idea that what 
‘ought’ to be done is ‘reasonable’, or ‘rational’, and of ultimate ends as being 
prescribed by Reason (I:III:23. See also I:IX:105). How far, Sidgwick asks at the start 
of this chapter, is Reason responsible for our judgements of what is ‘right’, and of 
what we ‘ought’ to do? Reason is often recognised to be a part of the moral process, 
but serious contention arises (at Sidgwick’s time) from Hume’s claim that 
‘Reason….can never of itself be any motive to the Will’372. Sidgwick, however, 
follows Kant’s version of the importance of Reason in morality. It is from this defence 
of Reason and rationality as integral to moral judgements that Sidgwick’s own 
interpretation of moral obligation begins to emerge. 
There are substantial grounds in I:III on which to argue that there is a Kantian 
influence on Sidgwick’s view of Reason. Contrary to Hume, Sidgwick uses Reason 
                                                 
outline a specifically non-consequentialist duty-based form of Intuitionism, in which duties are 
prescribed by Reason. Secondly, I agree with Donagan that Sidgwick is rejecting the rawer 
Whelwellian version of epistemic intuitionism throughout Book III (it is intentional that I have used the 
lower case ‘intuitionism’ here – the passage on 101 is a clear example of the confusion that can 
sometimes arise when Sidgwick’s various uses of moral-theoretic and epistemic intuitionism 
converge). The PD clearly shows Sidgwick rejecting Whelwell’s version of Intuitionism (there is again 
convergence between the two types of intuitionism here), on the basis that its principles were 
‘hopelessly loose’ (xv). So what Sidgwick is rejecting throughout (most of) Book III is the non-self-
evident, ‘hopelessly loose’ principles of Dogmatic Intuitionism, or common sense morality. However, 
the final part of my response to the Whelwellian/Kantian ‘Intuitionism’ issue is to refer back to my first 
point, that Kant was a partial informant of that non-consequentialist position, and argue that this 
particular element of moral-theoretic Intuitionism does appear in Sidgwick’s own epistemic 
intuitionism. That is, whereas it may be Whelwell’s semi-moral-theoretic/semi-epistemological 
intuitionism that Sidgwick is rejecting in Book III, Sidgwick adds the Kantian element (which retains 
non-consequentialism) back in when he argues for his own philosophical intuitions, and this helps 
make sense of Whelwell’s position/Dogmatic Intuitionism. This suggestion is directly supported by 
Sidgwick’s account in the PD. There, we see him immediately reject Whelwell’s Intuitionism (see also 
Sidgwick’s rejection of Whelwell in Sidgwick’s Outlines of the History of Ethics (London: Macmillan: 
1886) pp. 233-4). We then see Sidgwick ‘add’ a Kantian intuition to his moral theory, despite his ‘early 
aversion to Intuitional Ethics derived from the study of Whelwell’ (xvi). Sidgwick had, in his words, 
‘become an Intuitionist to a certain extent’ (xix). This -  the addition of a Kantian intuition (which also 
has the non-consequentialist quality) - is what allows the reconciliation between Whelwellian 
Intuitionism (or Dogmatic Intuitionism) and utilitarianism. Thus Sidgwick improves on Whelwellian 
intuitionism, with Kant, and with his own philosophical intuitions. (Incidentally, Donagan agrees that 
Sidgwick would have wanted to reject working out this ‘improved dogmatic intuitionist system on 
Whewell’s lines’ (‘Sidgwick and Whelwellian Intuitionism’ p.460). 
372 What is at stake in opposition to Reason in Hume’s view are the ‘irrational’ desires that arise from 
bodily functions, such as hunger, or emotions, such as anger. Sidgwick disagrees with Hume on the 
basis that the notions represented by the words ‘ought’ and ‘right’ are entirely different from notions 
derived from physical experience of the world (I:III:25). Sidgwick then moves on in I:III from this 
starting point to develop this idea more fully. 
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to ‘denote the faculty of moral cognition’ (I:III:34), which he represents with the 
maxim ‘what I judge ought to be must, unless I am in error, be similarly judged by all 
rational beings who judge truly of the matter’ (I:III:33). This is (as will be confirmed 
later by the PD), obviously resonant of Kant’s fundamental maxim ‘act from a 
principle or maxim that you can will to be a universal law’. In Sidgwick’s view on 
other concepts too – his statement that the meaning of ‘right’ and ‘what ought to be’ 
cannot be ‘fitness to some ulterior end’ (I:III:26), his argument that the concepts of 
‘ought’ and ‘duty’ that make up moral obligation have a peculiar nature in the context 
of ethical judgements, and his belief that ‘right’ and ‘ought’ are ‘too elementary to 
admit of any formal definition’ (I:III:32) – we see developing a position that does not 
seem to accord entirely with the utilitarian view that morality lies in consequences. 
This particular understanding of ‘right’ as not meaning fit to an ulterior end is a direct 
result of Sidgwick’s understanding of the role of Reason in the establishment of what 
is ultimately right being that which is ultimately rational, and needs no reference to 
anything further than itself373. 
Even more importantly for how this understanding of rightness and rationality 
translates into moral obligation, Sidgwick shares Kant’s views on the relationship 
between Reason and volition. Sidgwick states that a cognition that something ought 
                                                 
373 The place that Sidgwick affords to Reason is, at this stage of ME, slightly weaker than Kant’s. 
Where Kant propounds Reason as the only possible source of and for morality, Sidgwick says at 
I:III:33 that he does not ‘mean to prejudge the question whether valid moral judgements are normally 
attained by a process of reasoning from universal principles or axioms…it is not uncommonly held 
that the moral faculty deals primarily with individual cases as they arise, applying directly to each case 
the general notion of duty, and deciding intuitively what ought to be done’. But Sidgwick continues on 
to explain that as this points to something more like ‘Sense’, rather than cognition, there could be no 
way of telling whether A or B is right in any given situation, and Sidgwick is ultimately searching for 
what can finally be called morally valid. From this we can assume that Sidgwick is searching for some 
kind of objective view of what is moral – and for this Reason is the most appropriate route to follow. 
(He reiterates this point in a footnote at I:VI:77, stating again that not all people will determine what is 
right conduct on the basis of what they consider to be reasonable – but that he is restricting his 
investigation in ME into what is prescribed by Reason, and that he intends to ‘exhibit the self-evident 
practical axioms’ that he considers to be included in that category). Sidgwick has also just outlined a 
loose version of Kant’s maxim, which reads ‘what I judge ought to be must, in unless I am in error, be 
similarly judged by all rational beings who judge truly of the matter’ (I:III:33), stating that this is what 
the moral faculty is ultimately pointing to, when we consider the notion of ‘ought’. Despite Sidgwick’s 
less obviously rigorous adherence to Reason then, it is clear that Sidgwick believes Reason to take 
the same form as in Kant’s doctrine – and to yield the same results in terms of what is meant by 
‘ought’. Whereas Sidgwick’s investigations into the reasoned convictions of ordinary people reveals 
the fact that they are actually not ultimately self-evident, and therefore not ultimately reasonable in 
themselves, Sidgwick eventually pursues what can be called ultimately reasonable in order to arrive 
at his version of the Kantian maxim, and at the principle of aiming at the general happiness. See 
I:VIII:100-101, III:XI:337-345, III:XIII:379-389 – and my chapters 3 and 4 for the full development of 
this point. 
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to be done naturally brings with it the impulse to action (I:III:34, 37)374. He also 
agrees with Kant that it is only rational for a rational being to obey dictates that they 
perceive to be the result of Reason (I:III:34)375. From these two precepts it can be 
directly inferred that Sidgwick’s view of Reason leads him, as Kant’s view did for him, 
to the idea that actions prescribed by moral ‘oughts’ are unconditional376. This 
Reason-based idea of unconditional moral obligation then pervades I:III. Once 
Sidgwick has drawn his conclusions on the nature of ‘ought’, the language of 
‘dictates of Reason’ appears frequently – (at I:III:34 twice ; at I:III:36, also twice). 
From then on, this language resolves itself into the more precise vocabulary of 
unconditionality, unconditional imperatives, ‘unconditionally prescribed by Reason’, 
and – in a final strong indication of the correlation between Kant and Sidgwick on this 
point – the categorical imperative (I:III:35, 37). The ‘ought’ - which always represents 
duty in some form - on Sidgwick’s view thus takes on a distinctly non-
consequentialist and deontological appearance. 
 
2.2.b. The Deontological Basis of Sidgwick’s Theory of Moral Obligation 
 
We can now return to the definition of ‘deontological’ given in the thesis introduction 
and re-iterated above (as the view of morality that holds moral value to lie in the 
performance of certain duties that are right unconditionally and irrespective of 
consequences), in order to ascertain how far Sidgwick’s concept of ‘ought’ and ‘duty’ 
accords with it. As just noted, both Sidgwick’s language and his concepts are, in 
these pages, remarkably deontological according to the first part of the definition, 
which stipulates unconditionality, and categorical imperatives. But a question arises 
                                                 
374 Sidgwick also argues that ‘ought’ must mean that one is able to perform a certain action – it is not 
possible to conceive that one ought to do something from which one is prevented from actually doing 
(I:III:33). This view fully supports John Deigh’s internalist reading of Sidgwick, and argues against 
David Brink’s externalist account (see this thesis chapter 1, p.161). 
375 Actions that are ‘reasonable’ in this way, Sidgwick equates with actions that are ‘right’ ‘in an 
absolute sense’ (I:III:35).  
376 Sidgwick does not specifically state in this chapter that he believes unconditional actions to apply 
universally. On this point, Sidgwick’s position differs to Kant’s, for whom universalizability is a crucial 
component of judgements made within the categorical imperative. Also, Sidgwick indicates at other 
times (IV:IV:466-468, 473-474) that he is a cultural relativist, which also challenges the notion of 
universalizability. However, it is not difficult to infer from Sidgwick’s emphasis on the unconditionality 
of oughts that he has at least a notion that these imperatives are universal. Furthermore, Sidgwick 
does return to universalizability in his own moral theory – and he does so specifically, as seen in the 
phrase ‘Universal Benevolence’. This is the direct result of his following Kant’s argument that ultimate 
rationality establishes categorical oughts. That is, Sidgwick will eventually derive a universalising 
stipulation from his non-consequentialist version of moral obligation.  
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regarding the traditional deontological position’s rejection of consequences. 
Sidgwick’s language of ‘unconditional’ and ‘categorical’ implies a move away from 
the consequentialism inherent in utilitarianism, but this hardly counts as solid 
evidence. There are actually two points that the issue of consequentialism raises 
against my claim just made about Sidgwick’s notion of ‘ought’, which render that 
claim as yet incomplete. The first is that deontological ‘duty’ (as opposed to utilitarian 
understandings of duty) is specifically defined as non-consequentialist. The second 
is that Sidgwick has stated at I:III:26 that this notion of ‘ought’ which I am arguing 
represents a (primarily) deontological understanding of duty also applies to ‘the 
adoption of certain ends’. The idea of ends obviously involves the idea of means to 
those ends, which in turn appears to bring moral value to rest on whether or not 
those ends are achieved - and this is a distinctly consequentialist, i.e. non-
deontological, position. At the very least, Sidgwick seems to be arguing that his 
understanding of duty can be utilised as much by the utilitarian, consequentialist 
view. After all, the view that Reason will always generate moral obligation – or a 
moral duty – does not need to be exclusively deontological. How, then, is this 
appearance of the pursuit of rational ends to be made congruent with an argument 
that Sidgwick’s is a traditionally deontological version of duty, that excludes 
consequences? 
I believe that it is more than possible to argue that Sidgwick’s version of moral 
obligation is a deontological one, or at least so close to it that it would be more 
appropriate to understand it as deontology than utilitarianism. The argument 
depends firstly on understanding ultimate, rational ends to themselves be non-
consequentialist in nature, and secondly on Sidgwick’s particular use of Reason (i.e. 
the Kantian version) and the unconditionality/categorical imperative on action that 
this produces. Both of these points are most conveniently explained by briefly 
revisiting the steps through which Sidgwick defined ‘right’ and ‘ought’.  
At I:III:26, Sidgwick immediately dismisses ‘right as fit to an ulterior end’. He 
points out that we recognise some actions to be right unconditionally, that we 
‘similarly regard as ‘right’ the adoption of some ends’ (italics mine), and that on this 
basis the idea that ‘rightness is an attribute of means, not of ends’ is ‘clearly 
inadmissible’. On the basis of Sidgwick’s rejection of rightness as meaning fit to an 
end, his rational ultimate ends themselves thus take on a non-consequentialist 
character. That is, as they are ultimately rational, they are also ultimately right, in and 
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of themselves, with no reference to anything further, such as ulterior consequences. 
It is only in this way that an end can be truly called right, given Sidgwick’s definition 
of rightness - and as can be seen from his two stipulations of rightness on page 26 
both certain actions and certain ends clearly share the non-consequentialist factor of 
being right ‘unconditionally, without regard to ulterior results’.  
From here, Sidgwick goes on to make his well-known argument that as 
certain actions and certain ends are right in this particular, ultimately rational way, 
the notion of ‘ought’ must apply to both, in the form of a categorical imperative 
(I:III:35-36). Sidgwick admits that one might argue there is no obligation without 
reference to consequences, but, he argues, these consequences pertain to 
ultimately reasonable (and universal) ends, and the recognition of an ultimately 
rational end incurs the same categorical ‘ought’ as that which applies to certain kinds 
of actions, and which has its basis in Reason377. Means (to those ultimate ends) are 
included to some extent, but those means are only established on the original non-
consequentialist basis of the rational end378. Permeating both the end and its action 
then, there is a categorical and ultimately non-consequentialist understanding of 
rightness. It is this that I argue informs Sidgwick’s whole view of moral obligation, 
and moral duty.  
 
 
 
                                                 
377 ‘…they recognise some universal end’, Sidgwick says, ‘…at which it is ultimately reasonable to 
aim. But in this view, as I have before said, the unconditional imperative plainly comes in as regards 
the end, which is – explicitly or implicitly – recognised as an end at which all men ‘ought’ to aim; and it 
can hardly be denied that the recognition of an end as ultimately reasonable involves the recognition 
of an obligation to do such acts as most conduce to the end’ (I:III:35). He concludes this point on the 
following page: ‘…the notion of ‘ought’ as used in either dictate is that which I have been trying to 
make clear’ (I:III:36).  
Sidgwick does point out here that the obligation is not unconditional in quite the same way, but that it 
still does ‘not depend on the existence of any non-rational desires or aversions’. 
378 Kant himself also provides some remarkable agreement with Sidgwick on this very point about 
certain ends. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant discusses the role and identity, in his view, of the 
good. The ‘highest good’, he argues, is indeed happiness - but only Happiness as conceived by 
rational agents (Critique (1781) 6:5-7). We have a moral duty to pursue this highest good, but for Kant 
this is not an additional duty, but the sum of all other duties (6:5). The parallel between this and my 
argument that as rightness can only lie in what is ultimately rational and not merely fit to an ulterior 
end duty can only truly be assigned to the ultimate rational end of Happiness and not its means is 
clear. It is also clear that Sidgwick does not attribute real moral value to means to ends. Means in 
themselves are not ultimately rational, therefore they cannot be unconditionally and categorically right 
in the way that their ends are. i.e. they cannot be duties. We might also add that Sidgwick never once 
refers to ‘consequences’ here. 
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2.2.c. Consequentialism in Sidgwick’s Theory of Moral Obligation 
 
In the previous section, I have been arguing that Sidgwick’s view of rightness is non-
consequentialist in that he does not define as right that which is simply fit to an end. 
Further, as rightness is attached to what is ultimately rational, ‘ought’ becomes a 
categorical and unconditional imperative. This might, however, be thought to not fully 
shift the onus of moral value away from consequences. I do admit that Sidgwick’s 
inclusion of ends allows a degree of utilitarianism into this definition of duty, and it 
must be recognised that Sidgwick does at one point attach the ‘ought’ to the idea of 
a ‘fittest means’ to an end (I:III:36). But to this objection I have two responses. The 
first is that even when Sidgwick admits that his notion of ought/moral obligation 
applies to the utilitarian position as well, which he does when he says that nothing he 
has said is intended in favour of the Intuitional view as opposed to the deontological 
one (I:III:35), it still has with it the very particular interpretations of ‘ought’, and 
‘rightness’, which can only come about on the basis of recognising an ultimately 
rational end, which as such pertains to nothing further and so is non-consequentialist 
in this way379. That is, even the way in which utilitarian dictates share in Sidgwick’s 
notion of moral obligation depends on the prior establishment of that obligation as 
unconditional, categorical, and not ‘right’ merely on the basis of consequences380.  
And that, I argue, accords with the unconditional form of duty that is central to the 
traditional deontological understanding of morality. Here then, we have a crucial 
prediction of how Sidgwick’s understanding of duty and rightness retains a 
                                                 
379 The timing of this passage is actually still supportive of the argument that there is a distinctly 
deontological emphasis in this chapter of ME. It appears after Sidgwick makes his point that 
unconditional imperatives are still relevant to the pursuit of ends – the impression is that Sidgwick 
himself has recognised that he appears to have taken a predominantly deontological line in this 
chapter. 
I should also point out here that I do not mean to argue that an end such as Happiness, or Universal 
Good, is non-consequentialist in its dictates. I am arguing that the end itself, being rational, is an 
ultimate one and as such is ‘held to be right unconditionally, without regard to ulterior results’ (I:III:26).  
380  This argument is further (and compellingly) supported by Sidgwick’s briefer account of how 
Reason applies to ends given in ME’s introduction, when he specifically attaches ‘ought’ to the idea of 
the categorical imperative. In light of Sidgwick’s argument for Reason/unconditional moral obligation 
in I:III, we can now see more clearly the importance of Sidgwick’s statement at I:I: 8 about Happiness 
as an end ‘categorically prescribed’. On these pages, we saw Sidgwick mark a clear distinction 
between the position that uses ‘categorically’, and the utilitarian position. But then he says that if 
aiming at the general Happiness is a duty, then the end of Happiness becomes an ultimate end 
categorically prescribed, of exactly the same kind as he had just discussed in relation to the Intuitional 
view. In this way, ‘ends’ and ‘certain kinds of action’ share exactly the same quality of categorical 
obligation.  
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deontological character when Sidgwick uses it in his own moral theory, even when 
that theory yields a utilitarian principle381. 
 The latter point leads to my second response to the objection about 
consequences, which is that the minor role that consequences might be argued to 
play in Sidgwick’s theory of moral obligation is actually not detrimental to my 
argument for Sidgwick’s reconciliation between deontological and utilitarian 
principles in Rational Benevolence. Perhaps we cannot say absolutely that 
Sidgwick’s notion of duty excludes consequences completely382. But as Sidgwick 
says, no method can – not even the Intuitional one (I:VIII:96-97)383. It is integral to 
the specific position I argue Sidgwick to occupy between deontology and 
utilitarianism that ‘ought’, as established by Reason, is in fact equally relevant to 
systems of morality that posit ends as motives for moral action as to systems that 
propound non-consequentialist duties. In both cases, the ‘ought’ is unconditional – 
because in both cases, the ought is established by what is ultimately reasonable. 
Again then, there is a clear prophecy here of the ability of Sidgwick’s notion of moral 
obligation to transcend the traditional deontological/utilitarian boundary, on the basis 
of the shared appeal to Reason of both positions, and this is what I argued in the 
thesis introduction is needed, to account for the dual reasonableness that causes 
moral ambivalence. But it is my firm view that it is the non-consequentialist, 
deontological notion of rightness and duty (understood as either actions or ends that 
are unconditionally and categorically prescribed without reference to anything 
further) that is predominantly informing Sidgwick’s theory of obligation in this most 
important of chapters. The rightness of those ends is based on the rational 
properties intrinsic to that end – not on anything that they bring about. The rational 
‘ought’ is always, on Sidgwick’s view, a form of unconditional and categorical duty – 
and this understanding of duty applies just as much to ends which are right without 
                                                 
381 It is of course that argument that is crucial to the establishment of Rational Benevolence as a 
synthesis, in which deontological and utilitarian properties retain their own independence, while also 
relying on each other for full validation.  
382 See chapter 3 of this thesis for an expanded account of Sidgwick’s reintroduction of ‘means’ to 
ends.  
383 The denial of consequences cannot be extended to the whole range of duty, Sidgwick argues on 
p.96, because ‘no morality ever existed which did not consider ulterior consequences to some extent’. 
In order to differentiate between specifically non-consequentialist and specifically consequentialist 
positions, Sidgwick states that ‘we must understand that the disregard of consequences, which the 
Intuitional view is taken here to imply, only relates to certain determinate classes of action (such as 
Truth-speaking)’. But it is clear that Sidgwick does not believe consequences to be completely 
irrelevant to the Intuitional view, and this further reduces the gap between the two positions.    
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reference to ulterior consequences, as it does to the commonly held duties such as 
Veracity, and Justice.  
 
2.3.  Sidgwick’s Expansion on Deontology as it is Commonly Held  
 
It has now been seen that Sidgwick believes moral rightness, and the moral ‘ought’, 
to lie in what is unconditional and categorically prescribed by Reason. I have also 
argued that as rightness does not lie in fitness to an ulterior end, this is a mainly non-
consequentialist and deontological interpretation of moral obligation. Thus we 
already have a strong impression that a certain deontological understanding of moral 
duty is, in some way, important to Sidgwick. As for where this deontological 
understanding of moral obligation features in Sidgwick’s own wider moral theory, that 
discussion is temporarily delayed in accordance with the order of Sidgwick’s points in 
ME. For ahead of Sidgwick’s argument for his own theory of Rational Benevolence is 
his investigation into the role that deontological principles have in the moral 
processes of ordinary people, and his conclusions on this are essential foundations 
to that theory. In these sections then, I examine Sidgwick’s account of common 
sense morality – or ‘Dogmatic Intuitionism’ – with the purpose of drawing out both 
the value that he ascribes to this method of ethics, and the ways in which he 
believes it to be insufficient. This is done in preparation for the third and final stage of 
the chapter, which examines Sidgwick’s incorporation of deontological principles 
within his own work. 
 
2.3.a. The Place of Common Sense Morality  
 
Here, some further observations on Sidgwick’s definitions of Intuitionism are 
required, as these will be important to the final stage of my argument in this chapter, 
that elements of the Intuitional view appear in Sidgwick’s epistemic intuitionism. They 
also serve to create a wider picture of the place of common sense morality in 
Sidgwick’s thought.  
In I:VI, Sidgwick provides a convenient summary of his points on ethical systems 
made so far, reiterating that ultimately valid reasons for acting tend to be supplied 
either by a belief in certain notions (such as Happiness) as ultimate rational ends, or 
by an adherence to ‘Duty, as prescribed by unconditional rules’ (I:VI:78). It is this 
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latter position that Sidgwick defines as Intuitionism (understood as the system of 
ethics, rather than Sidgwick’s epistemic version) and then associates with ‘common 
sense morality’, in Intuitionism’s ‘Dogmatic’ form, at I:VIII:101384. In doing so, 
Sidgwick also removes any ambiguity from how ‘duty’ is now to be interpreted385. 
Sidgwick furthers the association between common sense morality and 
deontologically-based Intuitionism throughout I:VIII, explicitly stating that he has 
“used the term ‘Intuitional’ to denote the view of ethics which regards as the 
practically ultimate end of moral actions their conformity to certain rules of dictates of 
Duty unconditionally prescribed” (I:VIII:96), and elsewhere adding ‘without regard to 
ulterior consequences’ to a very similar definition (I:VIII:98)386.  
                                                 
384Sidgwick perceives three distinct forms of the Intuitional method, through which its epistemology 
imparts its edicts. These are ‘Ultra-Intuitionism’ (or ‘Perceptional Intuitionism’), ‘Dogmatic Intuitionism’, 
and ‘philosophical intuitionism’ (I:VIII:99-102). Importantly, Sidgwick considers all three manifestations 
to be active in our moral processes, but Sidgwick associates common sense morality with the second 
form, Dogmatic Intuitionism, which holds that we can ‘discern certain general rules with really clear 
and finally valid intuition’ (I:VIII:101). 
The concept of ‘common sense morality’ has appeared earlier in ME – in the first and second 
prefaces (v, vii), in I:I when Sidgwick talks about the ‘practical reasoning of men generally’ and ‘the 
thought of ordinary men’, and in its exact phrasing when Sidgwick outlines the question central to ME, 
‘what are the different practical principles which the common sense of mankind is prima facie 
prepared to accept as ultimate?’ (I:I:6). In the passage on p.6, Sidgwick uses the term ‘common 
sense morality’ more broadly to refer to both absolute-duty based and end based methods of moral 
reasoning. In I:VI, Sidgwick specifically restricts the term so that it refers only to the former (I:VI:85, 
87).  
385 This firm distinction is something of a contrast to the earlier chapters, where – as was seen - 
Sidgwick’s view of Reason infused both absolute-principle based and end based moral systems with 
a sense of ‘duty’, brought about by ‘ought’. Sidgwick is at his clearest by this point in ME that he 
considers the moral position that supports duties to be that which is associated with non-
consequentialist unconditionality (I:VI:77, 78, 81, 84, see also I:VIII:96, 98), but this appears to be a 
more formal, academic presentation of the position – made for the sake of clarity – rather than 
Sidgwick’s own opinion. It would seem as though now Sidgwick is moving into the stage at which he 
intends to examine the methods as they appear in ordinary moral processes (as opposed to his 
examining them as parts of his own moral philosophy), he is drawing more distinct lines between the 
two positions. Sidgwick returns to considering absolute-principle based and end based types of 
morality to share this form of duty in his chapter ‘Philosophical Intuitionism’ (III:XIII), where he 
develops his own moral theory. This is of course the main focus of this thesis’ chapter 4. 
386See also I:VIII:101-102, and III:I:215, where Sidgwick states the ‘public opinion of the community’, 
‘positive morality of the community’, and ‘the consensus of mankind’ to be ‘more significantly termed 
‘the morality of Common Sense’.  
Sidgwick also gives a particularly distinct definition of Intuitionism at III:I:200, which effectively 
summarises his entire position in one passage: ‘..in such maxims as that duty should be performed 
‘advienne que pourra’, that truth should be spoken without regard to consequences, that justice 
should be done ‘though the sky should fall’, it is implied that we have the power of seeing clearly that 
certain actions are right and reasonable in themselves, apart from their consequences…such a power 
is claimed for the human mind by most of the writers who have maintained the existence of moral 
intuitions;  I have therefore thought myself justified in treating this claim as characteristic of the 
method which I distinguish as Intuitionism’ (III:I:200). This passage has particular significance for 
showing that Sidgwick, as an intuitionist himself, must to some extent have to exclude consequences 
from his epistemology. Singer and Lazari-Radek make a similar point in relation to this same 
passage, that supports my argument (made in full below) that Sidgwick excludes consequences from 
his initial intuitions, at least to an extent. They emphasise that Sidgwick is specific in this passage that 
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It is interesting that Sidgwick should create this direct connection between 
‘common sense morality’ and the Intuitional (or deontological) view. The implication, 
which is emphasised by Sidgwick’s use of the language of ‘intuitionism’ and 
‘intuitions’ to represent the position that upholds unconditional, absolute rules of 
duty, is that mankind’s morality is actually by nature (to some extent) 
deontological387. That is, in its rawest form, before it is passed through the rigorous 
testing and examination that Sidgwick intends in ME, our general, everyday practical 
moral reasoning – our immediate moral intuitions – originate from non-
consequentialist, unconditionally binding principles388. The very term ‘common sense 
                                                 
intuitionists cannot refer to consequences (Point of View of the Universe, pp.69-70). If Sidgwick is 
going to call himself an intuitionist, then he too is prevented from using consequences in his epistemic 
method of acquiring of moral truths. Singer and Lazari-Radek’s point seems to be that if Sidgwick is 
an intuitionist in the wider (epistemic) sense, then he must, by default, to some extent also be an 
Intuitionist in the narrower sense. But they do point out that Sidgwick is not completely consistent 
about the exclusion of consequences (p.70), and that calculation of consequences must necessarily 
appear in both Prudence and Benevolence. It will be seen below (and in chapter 4) that I take a very 
different view of the consequentialism of those two principles; I do not dispute that they are 
consequentialist in their dictates, but I do dispute that their moral property, or nature is 
consequentialist, arguing instead that they are recognisably deontological in nature. This is what 
allows me to make a stronger argument than Singer and Lazari-Radek that Sidgwick does actually 
retain a significant degree of consequentialism-exclusion in his own intuitionism. 
Further to the passage at III:I:200, Sidgwick elsewhere states the Intuitional view to refer to the results 
of certain ‘classes’ of actions, in which the nature of the act (as right) has already been determined. It 
is in the case of these actions, such as Truth-speaking, for example, that consequences can be 
disregarded from a moral judgement. This is part of Sidgwick’s delineation between Intuitionism and 
consequentialist based moral systems such as utilitarianism, that he makes in the wake of his point 
that there is no system of morality that does not consider ulterior consequences to some extent 
(I:VIII:96) – and it is important that he does make this clarification. Had he not done so, his statement 
that there is no morality that does not consider consequences to some extent could possibly be read 
as a clandestine assertion that all morality is found to be utilitarian in the end. This is not what 
Sidgwick means here, and his example that one might know that the truth one is about to speak to a 
jury will lead them to the wrong conclusion, and yet still actively believe speaking the truth to be right, 
regardless of that consequence (I:VIII:97), is evidence that Sidgwick sees a clear difference between 
ethical methods that hold actions to be right per se, and those that hold actions to be right by virtue of 
their results.  
387 It is not even as if common sense morality could be thought of here as being a sort of hybrid 
collection of utilitarian and deontological principles, which might make it more understandable that 
Sidgwick would consider this position to best represent the general reality of ordinary morality; 
Sidgwick maintains a clear position that common sense and utilitarianism are very much distinct, and 
that utilitarianism is the alternative to common sense, not a part of it. See I:VI: 83-84, 85-87, and 
I:VIII:101-102). 
388 Despite the general opinion that Sidgwick’s own intuitionistic epistemology is utilitarian, I:VIII 
unequivocally shows Sidgwick arguing that the epistemological method of intuition (that is, intuitionism 
with a small ‘i’ as I have suggested we understand the distinction) does also belong to Intuitionism 
with a capital I – i.e. to the deontological moral view that actions should conform to ‘certain rules or 
dictates of Duty, unconditionally prescribed’ (I:VIII:96). When justifying his particular use of intuition in 
this context (I:VIII:96) Sidgwick does grant that ‘intuitive knowledge’ cannot absolutely discount 
reference to consequences (see fn.24 above), and it is at this point that he goes on to state that as 
‘pleasure as a reasonable ultimate end of human action’ (the belief integral to the Hedonistic view) 
can only be known intuitively and not inductively, then Hedonism can also be called an intuitional 
method (I:VIII:97-98. See also p.102). But Sidgwick then clarifies that for the purposes of ME he is 
going to follow the ‘prevailing opinion of ordinary moral persons, and of most writers who have 
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morality’ suggests even more strongly that this absolute-principle based moral 
position is the most familiar, the most conventional – and the most typical of ordinary 
people389. It should also be noted that thus far in ME there has been a certain 
dominance by the deontological view, and not the utilitarian. This is testimony to my 
argument that ME is not merely a treatise on utilitarianism, and that a significant 
proportion of ME is actually concerned with the opposite position. This is not to say 
positively that Sidgwick is defending the deontological view, or that he does not 
defend the utilitarian view. We have yet to confirm the value that Sidgwick does 
really ascribe to deontological principles – and Sidgwick certainly has not argued that 
common sense morality is a definitive or even entirely dependable system of 
ethics390.  But what is being said, and it appears to be the pertinent time to do so 
given Sidgwick’s long preoccupation with the Intuitional view to which I am drawing 
attention in this chapter, is that the deontological view of morality is important to 
Sidgwick, in one form or another, throughout ME. 
Continuing with the theme of Intuitionism’s importance, Sidgwick asserts at 
I:VI:87 that he will address Intuitive Morality ahead of Utilitarianism on account of its 
being more immediately comprehensible. Having identified that Dogmatic 
Intuitionism, or the morality of common sense, is generally what is meant by the term 
‘Intuitive’ morality, this is the method with which Sidgwick will be concerned in Book 
III. Specifically, this is because these rules require for true precision further 
contemplation and abstract moral consideration (I:VIII:100-101). This contemplation, 
Sidgwick believes, will go some way to removing the doubt and conflict that 
                                                 
maintained the existence of moral intuitions’ (I:VIII:98) in defining Intuitionism as the belief that there 
are certain kinds of actions unconditionally prescribed without regard to ulterior consequences. And 
Sidgwick seems to have no trouble in this chapter with expanding widely on how epistemological 
intuitionism applies specifically to the Intuitional, or deontological, method. Even in I:VI, Sidgwick uses 
‘intuitively’ as the adverb attached to the enunciations of ‘the Common Sense of mankind’ (I:VI:85). It 
may not be absolutely certain that it is Sidgwick’s own view that intuitionism with a small ‘i’ as an 
epistemic device applies predominantly to the deontological position – but it is certain that Sidgwick 
has aligned himself with this position in ME, and that he has called the deontological view after this 
very method. In any case – and more importantly for the later purposes of this thesis - there are 
grounds on which to argue that Sidgwick believes the method of intuitionism to lead to both the 
deontological and the utilitarian positions. It is my view that Sidgwick does hold epistemic intuitionism 
to be relevant to both the deontological and the utilitarian position, as he describes in the PD (this is 
seen below) and that this is a crucial component of the argument that Sidgwick eventually affirmed 
both deontological and utilitarian principles to be intuitive, and essential to morality. It is on this basis 
that I claim, in disagreement with David Phillips, that Sidgwick’s intuitionism is not merely utilitarian.  
389 Sidgwick also considers common sense morality to be the more accessible form of ethics, and the 
least demanding, or confusing, when compared to utilitarianism (I:VI:87), although these are not 
necessarily value judgements of the two positions, but rather observations. 
390 See I:VI:82-83 for example, and I:VIII:100 -103. 
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inevitably (and obviously) occurs between individual moral judgements. For this 
reason, Dogmatic Intuitionism will actually eventually become the third type – 
Philosophical Intuitionism – which accepts the morality of common sense as its 
basis, but searches for a ‘undeniably true and evident’ philosophical basis for it 
which that common sense morality itself does not provide (I:VIII:102). This transition 
from dogmatic to philosophical Intuitionism is precisely the process that Sidgwick 
himself follows, in attempting to elucidate the precepts of the former, and concluding 
that the true self-evident basis for these precepts actually lies elsewhere391. It is to 
that process, through which Sidgwick ascertains the value of Intuitionism, that this 
chapter now turns. But first, we can now conclude more fully on Sidgwick’s 
understanding of deontology as it commonly appears in lived experience, and on the 
importance that Sidgwick considers this method to have for ordinary moral 
reasonings. The ‘distinguishing characteristic’ of Intuitionism, according to Sidgwick, 
is its belief in ‘certain kinds of actions…unconditionally prescribed, without regard to 
ulterior consequences’ – and these actions admit of being perceived, with some 
degree of immediacy, by all people in their general, day to day moral thinking. This is 
where Sidgwick perceives the practical value of Intuitionism to lie, as it stands. It may 
be imperfect, and in need of systemisation – but it is a clear and important point of 
moral reference for all ordinary people. 
 
2.3.b. The Question of Self-Evident Principles: Sidgwick’s Critique of 
Intuitionism  
 
Sidgwick is nothing in ME if not concerned to ascertain what can truly be called 
reasonable, or right to do, and ME’s third book is unambiguously written in the spirit 
of that aim. Having stated that common sense morality, or Dogmatic Intuitionism, is 
                                                 
391 When Sidgwick mentions the ‘loose combination or confusion of methods’ that he proposes best 
represents the moral reasonings of ordinary individuals (I:VIII:102) – it is with surprising indifference 
considering that this will also be at the heart of his own philosophical moral theory. It is true that in the 
context of this chapter Sidgwick is mainly making an observation about how morality is, rather than 
how it ought to be – but he then continues on to outline that ‘most moral men believe that their moral 
sense or instinct in any case will guide them fairly right…still for systematic direction of conduct, we 
require to know on what judgements we are to rely as ultimately valid’ (I:VIII:103). The latter part of 
this sentence is actually the starting point of Sidgwick’s own investigation into how valid the precepts 
of common sense morality really are, from which he will eventually draw the conclusions that make up 
his moral theory (see also III:I:211-215). There is a parallel here then, between how Sidgwick 
perceives ordinary morality ‘to go’, and the normative theory that he will later develop.  
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important in its way, it is now Sidgwick’s aim to assess how far the Intuitional system 
stands up to real scrutiny as an actual system of practical moral guidance. Sidgwick 
speaks of ‘current opinions to which familiarity has given an illusory air of self-
evidence’ (III:I:212), the ‘discrepancies between the judgements of different 
individuals’ (III:I:214), and emphasises the need to ‘eliminate error from our moral 
intuitions’ (III:I:214). It is clear that for Sidgwick the enunciations of Intuitionism are 
going to have to meet an exacting standard392. His conclusions on whether they 
achieve this are not, for the most part, positive, but understanding the reasons for 
this gives in turn the grounds for understanding Sidgwick’s later re-introduction of his 
own concept of duty. For Sidgwick will not find all deontological principles to be 
either invalid, or merely subordinate to another principle, such as utilitarianism. It is a 
combination of these two conclusions on common sense morality that frame 
Sidgwick’s own use of a deontological version of moral duty.  
In III:I, Sidgwick begins laying the groundwork that will justify the meticulous 
and protracted investigation of the Intuitional method that occupies the next eleven 
chapters of ME. He starts with precisely how to identify the moral value, or the formal 
rightness, of an action (III:I:202-207) – and concludes that notions of rightness must 
be limited to what is objectively right393. In this context Sidgwick puts forward one 
very well known standard of objective rightness - Kant’s central axiom of ‘Act as if 
the maxim of thy action were to become…universal law’ – and refutes it.  
It is important to note from the outset here that Sidgwick does recognise the 
importance of Kant’s rule. He draws attention to the difficult problem of objective 
versus subjective rightness, and admits that this is where a maxim such as this is 
needed, in order that it can ‘disperse the false appearance of rightness which our 
strong inclination has given to it’ (III:I:209). So effective is this test in fact, Sidgwick 
                                                 
392 This is not the same thing, Sidgwick points out, as asking whether or not these intuitions actually 
exist (III:I:211). This confusion arises when ‘intuition’ is taken to mean that such a perception is 
actually true. Sidgwick is clear that this is not what he means by the term, and that he only intends it 
to represent the idea that it is known immediately, and not as a result of reasoning. This statement 
may appear to conflict with the point made above that for Sidgwick, Reason and Intuitionism are 
inherently linked by the fact that Reason incurs the ‘ought’, which makes unconditional duties out of 
moral actions – the duties that characterise the Intuitional method. But the crucial difference lies in the 
fact that that earlier discussion of ought appeared in the context of Sidgwick’s normative thought, 
whereas here he is conducting an investigation into what is. At the start of this investigation, all 
‘intuitions’ are in question. Only those that do prove themselves via a process of reasoning do 
become oughts. Sidgwick states himself on p. 211 that he is at this stage currently holding all moral 
intuitions ‘commonly so called’ to possibly be erroneous, or illusory.  
393 Subjective rightness is important to a degree – but, as Sidgwick says, ‘too simple to admit of 
systematic development’ (III:I:208). 
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observes, that Kant elevated it to the point at which it provides the rule for all other 
rules. But Sidgwick undoes Kant’s argument for the the maxim with brutal simplicity. 
The error lies, Sidgwick says, in mistaking ‘Formal Logic’ as being capable of 
providing ‘a complete criterion of truth’. It is not that the test is wrong – certainly a 
rule which does not pass the test is not valid (III:I:210). But it does not necessarily 
follow that all rules that do stand the test are right. This is because it is simply not 
enough that any one individual truly wills that his action in this circumstance be 
universally accepted as the course of action for any similar person in any similar 
circumstances. It is perfectly possible, Sidgwick argues, for an individual to genuinely 
will that their action become universal law, while the action is actually morally 
reprehensible394. Sidgwick therefore refutes the maxim on its own grounds. Rather 
than it solving the problem of gap between objective and subjective rightness, it 
‘obliterates’ that distinction altogether, creating in its place a situation in which 
whatever someone thinks to be right, is so: and as Sidgwick says, ‘…such an 
affirmation is in flagrant conflict with common sense; and would render the 
construction of a scientific code of morality futile: as the very object of such a code is 
to supply a standard for rectifying men’s divergent opinions’ (III:I:210)395. 
Here, then, Sidgwick has parted ways from Kant in one of the most 
fundamental ways possible396. This is not on all counts a complete surprise – 
                                                 
394 Sidgwick reinforces his point with the observation that what people believe to be subjectively right, 
they are also highly likely to believe to be objectively right also. This is basically what is at the heart of 
the ‘conscientious disagreements’ that we ‘continually find’ among people, by which Sidgwick was 
inspired to write ME in the first place (III:I:210). 
395 We should note that despite his simple yet effective challenge to the Kantian maxim, Sidgwick 
does believe that moral intuitions really exist. Sidgwick is himself an intuitionist to a recognisable 
extent (this will be made explicitly clear by the PD, where it will also be shown, as per my overall 
argument, that Sidgwick is an Intuitionist (of the deontological variety) on a very specific, and 
utilitarian, basis). The rules that that intuition produces may not be, in their rawest and most 
immediate form, ultimately self-evident/reasonable and therefore absolutely true as such, but 
Sidgwick is not relinquishing his view that there are some moral premises that are intuitively known to 
be right, independent of consequences. Even when Sidgwick brings this idea together with his views 
on the role of the utilitarian principle, and develops his own intuitions that are self-evident, that basis 
of Intuitionism remains – it is not simply swallowed or overwritten by the utilitarian principle. It is for 
the synthesis to explain this in full in chapter 4, but it is worth noting at this stage for Sidgwick’s 
continued valuing of deontological-based principles.  
396 Sidgwick includes a footnote on p. 210, stating that he is not prepared to accept Kant’s maxim in 
this form, but that he will include qualifications for accepting it in another form later. This particular 
instance proves the importance of the PD, and also demonstrates part of the reason that Sidgwick felt 
compelled to write it. The addition of the PD is thus part of what makes it possible to argue for the 
strong deontological undertone in ME – but it must also be borne in mind that in the PD, Sidgwick is 
explaining the process of thought through which he went before writing ME. The PD is not evidence of 
Sidgwick having ‘changed his mind’, or come to a clearer conclusion since writing ME – it is evidence 
of what was always included in that volume from the beginning. This adds considerable legitimacy to 
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presumably if Sidgwick had thought that Kant had had it entirely right then this would 
have been the angle of ME from the start. But it does seem to now throw the status 
of the traditional deontological position in ME into question. If Kant’s categorical 
imperative does not yield trustworthy results, then what method can be used to 
ascertain unconditional, categorical duties? This is, in fact, if those duties can be 
ultimately established at all. 
As I have elsewhere indicated, Sidgwick will actually revisit his (negatively 
stated) version of Kant’s maxim, and it will, in a way very similar to Kant’s, yield the 
sort of result that Kant originally intended, in Sidgwick’s own theory. Meanwhile, 
Sidgwick now asks that very question of how the property of objective rightness is 
really to be confirmed. The language Sidgwick is using has shifted, away from the 
more general notion of ‘validity’, to precisely what is meant by that term: Self-
evidence (III:I:212, 213)397. Sidgwick returns here to the apparent agreement on 
moral rules that is present in common sense morality. But, as demonstrated by the 
reasons for the fallibility of Kant’s maxim, the process of determining validity must 
be, as far as possible, agent-neutral. The only way then of eliminating error from our 
moral intuitions is to be found in examining these general rules which Sidgwick calls 
the morality of common sense, via a more scientific approach398. It is only through 
this sort of approach that real moral duties can be identified, and through which any 
consistency might ever be reached399.  
                                                 
the argument that Sidgwick had always had the value of deontology in mind, even as he began writing 
in the late 1860s, while still in his twenties.  
397 Sidgwick does not give an exact definition of ‘self-evidence’ in this chapter – this he reserves for 
III:XI, in which he specifically tests the maxims of common sense morality against a criteria for self-
evidence. It can be inferred however that by ‘self-evident’, Sidgwick means something that can be 
found to be ultimately reasonable and absolutely true, or to have the property of ‘ultimate certainty’ 
(III:I:214), independently, and without the need for further reference to any other source, definition, or 
results, for its qualification and justification (see also III:I:200, and III:XI:337). 
398 It is worth quoting Sidgwick in full here: “Hence it seems that if the formulae of Intuitive Morality are 
really to serve as scientific axioms, and to be available in clear and cogent demonstrations, they must 
first be raised – by an effort of reflection which ordinary persons will not make – to a higher degree of 
precision than attached to them in the common thought and discourse of mankind in general. We 
have, in fact, to take up the attempt that Socrates initiated, and endeavour to define satisfactorily the 
general notions of duty and virtue which we all in common use for awarding approbation or 
disapprobation to conduct’ (III:I:215). 
399 Sidgwick once again takes care to state here, at the end of these observations about the fallibility 
of Intuitionism, that he is ‘not trying to prove or disprove Intuitionism, but merely by reflection….to 
obtain as explicit, exact, and coherent a statement as possible of its fundamental rules’ (III:I:216). This 
is the last time he will make such a statement however: The aim has now unmistakably shifted from 
being an investigation into what people do believe, towards an investigation into what people ought to 
believe. I make the case for Sidgwick’s move from his originally intended neutrality to his normative 
argument in chapter 4. 
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From III:II to III:X, Sidgwick is engaged in the somewhat laborious process of 
identifying the commonly received dictates of common sense morality as exactly as 
possible, and examining each in turn in order to ascertain the degree to which they 
admit of being ultimately valid, or self-evident400. In III:XI, Sidgwick introduces the 
four conditions that he argues would establish a self evident principle (III:XI:338-
342), and invites the reader to consider with him how far those principles imparted 
through common sense morality can be ‘classed as Intuitive Truths’ (III:XI:343)401. 
From pp. 344 to 355, Sidgwick uses the criteria to renounce one Intuitional maxim 
after another, denying that they are absolute rules of duty, or self-evident axioms.  
As soon as we attempt to define them as clearly as the scientific method requires, 
we find that there are too many alternative views, too many instances in which a 
definite rule cannot be obtained, too many cases in which the result is so 
complicated that any vestige of self-evidence vanishes (III: XI:342-343). In many 
cases, Sidgwick argues, the principles actually only really point to utilitarianism 
(III:XI: 342, 348, 349, 350, 352, 354)402. Finally, most clearly fail on the fourth 
criterion, the universality of acceptance403. If nothing else, this has been Sidgwick’s 
                                                 
400 Sidgwick claims at III:XI:338 that he has only been endeavouring to ascertain which empirically are 
the general principles or maxims in common sense morality, not necessarily whether or not they 
should be maxims. He has not presumed that just because the moral opinions of ordinary people are 
‘loose and shifting’ that it necessarily follows that no precise principles can be uncovered, and he 
takes great care once again to emphasise that he has not introduced his own view at any point during 
that discussion. This could be read as a very fair approach to the investigation, given that Sidgwick 
has not begun his search from any criteria already imposed by himself. However, it appears evident 
from the text that his claim on p. 338 is not entirely true. He finds wisdom and self-control, for 
example, to be only means to the ulterior end of the ‘performance of Duty’; Laws and Promises are 
only binding on the basis that certain other conditions are fulfilled; Liberality and Generosity actually 
submit to the still greater end of Benevolence. He has been both identifying the maxims of common 
sense morality, and, in some cases, passing judgement on them. In any case, in III:XI he actually 
introduces the criteria for self-evidence. 
401 These criteria are a) the principle must be clear and precise, b) its self-evidence must be 
ascertained by careful reflection, c) the propositions accepted as self-evident must be mutually 
consistent and d) if the proposition is to be considered true, it cannot be capable of being denied by 
another; that is, it must be universally accepted. 
402 Sidgwick does theorise throughout these passages that utilitarianism has sometimes appeared to 
be the more ultimate principle. But he is (at this stage) only observing that the utilitarian formula be 
admitted to be a ‘clear and generally accepted principle’ (III:XI:348). He does not state the utilitarian 
principle to be the answer, only that whereas common sense morality obviously does not accept the 
utilitarian principle (because the utilitarian principle relies on consequences, which Sidgwick has 
argued are not relevant to Intuitive principles), it does not definitely affirm any other (III:XI:349).  
See also IV:III, where Sidgwick talks about the ‘latent Utilitarianism of common sense’ (IV:III:438). I 
argue however that the angle of Book IV needs to be read in the context of his wider argument for the 
negative and positive proof of utilitarianism, that emerges from Book III, and in which it is seen that 
utilitarianism and common sense morality are not actually juxtaposed. This is addressed in the next 
chapter (on Sidgwick’s utilitarianism), and in chapter 4.  
403 Regarding the demand for universal acceptance, Sidgwick experiences something of a quandary. 
He repeats his earlier point that something that is accepted as universal cannot be held on this 
 186 
point all along in ME about the limitations of the Intuitional position to provide a 
complete system of morality; there are simply too many interpretations, too many 
apparent reasonings.  
Sidgwick’s conclusions on common sense morality that he gives at the end of 
III:XI are clear. He believes that as no proposition can be elicited from common 
sense morality that admits of being a scientific axiom, this method of ethics has 
reached the limits of what it can contribute to a systematic co-ordination of moral 
principles. The Intuitional method, that aspect of human morality which apparently 
identifies unconditional, categorical and non-consequentialist duties, is in need of 
‘regulation and limitation which it cannot itself supply’ (III:IX:343). It still has a role; 
Sidgwick is very specific that he is not denying that we have these distinct moral 
impulses, and that they have a certain authority to which there is a rough 
agreement404. But they are inadequate – or even problematic - by themselves. ‘In 
short’, Sidgwick says, ‘the Morality of Common Sense may still be perfectly adequate 
to give practical guidance to common people in common circumstances: but the 
attempt to elevate it into a system of Intuitional Ethics brings its inevitable 
imperfections into prominence without helping us to remove them’ (III:XI:361). 
 
2.4 The Deontological Nature of Justice, Prudence, and Universal Benevolence  
 
The deontological position (i.e. the system of morality that holds to unconditional and 
categorically prescribed duties that are ultimately right without reference to 
consequences, or anything further) has not, then, fared well under Sidgwick’s 
scrutiny. The maxims of common sense morality certainly cannot be understood to 
be duties in an absolute, inviolable, Kantian sense. Even more gravely, they cannot 
be called duties according to Sidgwick’s own definition of moral obligation. In both 
cases, the reason is that they are not self-evident, unconditional, or right without 
reference to anything further. As their ‘rightness’ is not established by what is 
ultimately rational, they do not incur the ‘ought’ which would make them 
unconditional, and categorical. 
                                                 
ground alone to be true, yet he recognises that we allow this weight of agreement in the empirical 
sciences, so agreement must in some form be an ‘indispensable negative condition of the certainty of 
our beliefs’ (III:XI:342).  
404 Later, Sidgwick actually uses the word ‘incontrovertible’ to refer to the principles of ‘current moral 
opinion’ (III:XIII:379). See below. 
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In the wake of this inquiry and its results – and the fact that the utilitarian principle 
has been alluded to as the possible systemiser -  it is understandable why Sidgwick 
is so universally considered to be a utilitarian. But it should immediately be noted 
here that Sidgwick is only contesting the maxims of common sense morality that are 
commonly held to be duties. He is not necessarily contesting the concept of non-
consequentialist duty itself – only that these maxims thus held and expressed do not 
admit of it. This is to say that Sidgwick’s assault on the non-consequentialist duties 
of common sense morality does not mean that this particular concept of duty does 
not have a place in Sidgwick’s work – and it is the remit of this section to now argue 
that it does. As Sidgwick is now asking whether there really is any possibility of 
‘attaining…real ethical axioms – intuitive propositions and real clearness and 
certainty’ (III:XIII:373), III:XIII marks the beginning of Sidgwick’s development of his 
own moral theory, and as such the point at which I argue he begins to draw out the 
aspect of that theory that relies on this deontological version of moral obligation. 
Furthermore, it will be seen that his moral theory actually requires that this 
foundation of duty is established first. That is, the first time that Sidgwick actually 
concludes on his utilitarian principle, it occurs as a necessary aspect of his use of 
deontological concepts. This is due to the fact that Sidgwick’s own ultimate principle 
of Universal Benevolence, which is at the core of his utilitarianism (see chapter 3) – 
is informed by self-evident, non-consequentialist, deontological principles. Chapter 4 
will expound the actual function of these principles within Sidgwick’s moral theory. 
Here, it is their nature that is important, appearing as they do through a process of 
reasoning, in exact accordance with Sidgwick’s own definitions of moral duty as 
unconditional, universal, and right without reference to ulterior results, that were 
given at the start of this chapter. 
 
2.4.a. Philosophical Intuitionism  
 
In III:XIII, Sidgwick returns to the Philosophical Intuitionism that he predicted in I:VIII 
would eventually be required if the morality of common sense is to be accepted405. 
This will provide the ‘philosophic basis’ through which we might obtain principles 
                                                 
405 ‘Is there, then’, Sidgwick asks, ‘no possibility of attaining, by a more profound and discriminating 
examination of our common moral though, to real ethical axioms – intuitive propositions of real 
clearness and clarity?’ (III:XIII:373) 
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which can be called absolutely, undeniably, and evidently true (see I:VIII:102) 406. It 
is important to the argument for Sidgwick’s deontology that he maintains this faith in 
the role of non-consequentialist, absolute-principle intuitions. Despite the 
disappointing results of his investigation in Book III, Sidgwick is reluctant to simply 
surrender the method, stating that ‘it would be disheartening to have to regard as 
altogether illusory the strong instinct of Common Sense that points to the existence 
of such principles’ (III:XIII:379). Sidgwick states that the history of moral philosophy 
shows that philosophers have always been attempting to systemise and correct the 
common moral thought of mankind, but that ‘philosophers have too easily been led 
to satisfy themselves with ethical formulae which implicitly accept the morality of 
Common Sense en bloc, ignoring its defects” (III:XIII:374)407. But Sidgwick’s 
confidence in his own ability to get common sense morality to yield ethical axioms is 
apparently greater – and the statement he makes to this effect is even more 
revealing of the importance Sidgwick attaches to common sense morality (or the 
deontological properties therein): ‘We shall find, I think’, he says, ‘that the truth lies 
between these two conclusions. There are certain absolute practical principles, the 
truth of which, when they are explicitly stated, is manifest; but they are of too 
abstract a nature, and too universal in their scope, to enable us to ascertain by 
immediate application of them what we ought to do in any particular case; particular 
duties have still to be determined by some other method’ (III:XIII:379)408.  
                                                 
406 At a practical level, Sidgwick clearly rejects Dogmatic Intuition as a reliable form of moral 
epistemology on the basis that no fixed or absolute rules can be derived from an intuitional method by 
itself. It would seem as though Sidgwick agrees with Perceptional intuitionism, given he allows that 
immediate and general moral principles can be perceived like this – but these principles remain non-
inferential. (See also Audi, The Good in the Right, p.6). 
407 Caution needs to be applied, he says, by a mind that is ‘earnestly seeking for a philosophical 
synthesis of practical rules’ – there is a need to be wary of principles that appear to be certain and 
self-evident, but are actually just tautological (something Sidgwick rather entertainingly refers to as 
‘sham-axioms’). Sidgwick also swiftly rebuts all other attempts to systemise and understand moral 
thought (III:XIII:377-379). Common sense morality may have continually deceived philosophers into 
believing that they have secured universal principles, but it is plain to Sidgwick that this is not the 
case. The principles remain ‘incontrovertible, but tautological and insignificant’ (III:XIII:379). There is 
an interesting juxtaposition here between the words ‘incontrovertible’ and ‘insignificant’, which is 
indicative of Sidgwick’s emergent idea that the deontological principles of common sense morality are 
irrefutable in their existence, yet in need of something else to give them real weight, applicability, or 
meaning. For the argument that Sidgwick does attribute value to the Intuitional/deontological method 
of ethics, the word ‘incontrovertible’ is imperative. 
408 This is the first of the two passages which I refer to as ‘the connection passages’. The great 
significance of these two passages when taken together is fully addressed in thesis chapters 3 and 4. 
Here, this first connection passage provides the earliest stage of Sidgwick’s own moral theory, and a 
clear indication for my argument that that moral theory is comprised of an amalgamation of 
deontological and utilitarian principles. 
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It is widely held that Sidgwick’s own philosophical intuitionism is utilitarian – 
that the principles he establishes as truly self-evident axioms simply serve the 
purpose of leading to his ultimately utilitarian moral theory – and the passage just 
cited is deployed as evidence of that view. It would certainly seem to support it when 
it is thought that the ‘some other method’ is the utilitarian principle. I do not dispute 
that the principle (Universal Benevolence) Sidgwick will derive from his philosophical 
intuitions is in many ways utilitarian in nature – but I do argue that the true 
significance of that passage lies not in its last words, but in its first – ‘the truth lies 
between these two conclusions; There are certain absolute practical principles…’. 
This indicates that whereas Sidgwick will eventually derive a utilitarian principle from 
philosophical intuitions (as I am about to expound), those self-evident philosophical 
intuitions, which are developed out of Sidgwick’s discussion of common sense 
morality, are actually deontological in nature – and they are prior to any other 
principle. In the following section, I argue for this first of the ‘two conclusions’ - the 
deontological nature of the self-evident philosophical intuitions of Justice and 
Prudence - upon which Sidgwick then builds his moral theory of Universal 
Benevolence.  
 
2.4.b. Justice and Prudence as Deontological Principles 
 
Immediately following his statement about the two conclusions, Sidgwick begins 
developing the self-evident principles that will inform his own normative moral theory 
– and for this he goes straight back to the Kantian maxim as the starting point. It was 
seen above that Sidgwick has already alluded to this principle at I:III:33, where it 
appeared in the context of his agreement with Kant that ‘ought’ directly relates to the 
recognition of rational action. In order for the principle to be made truly self-evident 
however, Sidgwick argues, it must be stated negatively: 
 
‘it cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner in which it would be wrong for B to treat A, merely 
on the ground that they are two different individuals, and without there being any difference 
between the natures or circumstances of the two which can be stated as a reasonable ground for 
difference of treatment’ (III:XIII:380) 409 
                                                 
409 This maxim, Sidgwick admits, is still not complete for guidance, given that an agent must justify a 
treatment applied to another of which he would complain if applied to himself (i.e. agents may still 
have to refer to a further rule). But the terms of statement itself, Sidgwick believes, are self-evident, in 
that it itself does not need to refer to any further rule for its truth.  
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This is the agent-neutral principle of Justice410. And it is, I argue, is a non-
consequentialist maxim. It is self-evident, and therefore ultimately rational, and 
therefore right in Sidgwick’s sense of ‘not fit to an ulterior end’. i.e. the maxim is not 
simply ‘right’ with regard to ulterior results; it is wholly self-referencing, and right 
independently of anything further. Also, given that it is ultimately rational, it incurs – 
as per Sidgwick’s earlier argument for the motivating force of reason – the normative 
‘ought’. It therefore becomes a categorical imperative, again as per Sidgwick’s earlier 
arguments for ‘ought’ and ‘categorically prescribed’, and it is unconditional411. 
Furthermore, the maxim has the element of universalizability. This is not an aspect of 
traditional deontological thought that has featured much in Sidgwick so far, but it is 
clearly present here. Not only then does Sidgwick’s principle of Justice retain all of 
the vital characteristics of Sidgwick’s own definitions of non-consequentialist 
rightness and moral obligation, but it acquires a further deontological characteristic, 
when stated by Sidgwick in this way. Where Sidgwick has pointed out previously that 
Kant’s maxim is not an effective method of establishing truly objective and universal 
duties, Sidgwick’s negative version of that maxim does do this. Here, Sidgwick is 
almost more Kant than Kant. These qualities combined render the principle of 
                                                 
410 There are interesting implications here for the use of Sidgwick and Kant respectively in politics, 
and especially for the topic of social contract theory, and the discussion so prevalent in that area of 
what exactly is meant by ‘liberty’. Where Kant’s positive maxim seems to further the case that liberty 
is to be understood as ‘freedom to’, i.e. as the basis of a rights-based version of liberty, the sort taken 
up by Rawls in his neo-Kantian work on rights, Sidgwick’s maxim supports the argument that liberty 
represents ‘freedom from’ certain treatments. Both interpretations of liberty are essential to a full 
understanding and application of that concept, in much the same way as both deontological and 
utilitarian principles of morality are vital to a full understanding of human morality, especially at the 
level of practical ethics. In both situations, it would seem as though a moderate view is needed of 
each interpretation – that is, a balance is required between their respective components. In this way, 
the central argument of this thesis – that morality is comprised of a delicate balance between two 
apparently conflicting yet simultaneously vital principles – has significant potential for extending into 
political philosophy.  
411 The question arises here as to whether Sidgwick successfully avoids the problem that he sees in 
Kant’s maxim, of it obliterating the distinction between objective and subjective rightness by allowing 
that whatsoever a person genuinely wills become moral law does so, even though he may, objectively 
speaking, actually be in error (see III:I:210). The answer seems to be that Sidgwick does avoid this 
problem, mainly because the negative version is more obviously self-evident in that it cannot be any 
further proven without necessarily referencing itself. It could also be argued that Sidgwick avoids the 
objective/subjective problem here by way of the simple fact that he does not prescribe a rule for 
judging actions themselves, but a broader theory that gives the framework, or terms, that is to be prior 
to any action. This suggests that Sidgwick’s maxim requires expansion if it is to be used as a guide for 
action – something that Sidgwick himself recognises when he states that his principle ‘manifestly does 
not give complete guidance’. 
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Justice a recognisably deontological duty  – and this categorical and unconditional 
duty is one of the bases from which Sidgwick’s whole moral theory proceeds412.  
 The second self-evident principle at which Sidgwick arrives, directly after 
having established Justice, is that of Prudence. In the same way as the principle of 
Justice (or ‘equity’, as Sidgwick describes it here for emphasis of his next point) was 
obtained by considering the similarity of all individuals that make up the whole, so 
too must what is good for an individual be comprised of all the goods, or concerns, 
that make up our ‘conscious life’ (III:XIII:381)413. This includes all future good, as well 
as present ones; thus Prudence represents the notion of temporal impartiality. This, 
Sidgwick believes, is also ultimately self-evident, and reasonable, for one’s own 
good is conceived as a mathematical whole, ‘of which the integrant parts are realised 
in different parts of moments of a lifetime’, and to disregard or sacrifice other parts of 
that whole is unreasonable. 
 
‘…mere difference of priority and posteriority in time is not a reasonable ground for having 
more regard to the consciousness of one moment than to that of another. The form in which it 
practically presents itself to most men is ‘that a smaller present good is not to be preferred to 
a greater future good’...’ (III:XIII:381) 
 
As such, the impartiality principle of Prudence is also, like Justice, a non-
consequentialist principle: It is ultimately rational, and therefore true without 
reference to anything outside of itself. In this meta-ethical context, it is thus also a 
categorical and unconditional duty. 
 It is in this way then that I argue Sidgwick’s philosophical intuitions of Justice 
and Prudence are recognisably deontological in nature. Given that they are self-
evident and thus ultimately reasonable, they are right without reference to any 
consequences that they might bring about. They also, being ultimately reasonable, 
both incur the motivation to action that the recognition of that rationality involves – 
and that motivation to action is the same sort of unconditionally required ‘ought’ that 
is found in the traditional Kantian deontological school. It is true that Sidgwick will 
proceed to also attach this kind of ought to a utilitarian principle – but this does not 
                                                 
412 This is also the building of Sidgwick’s own moral theory of Rational Benevolence, but it is the 
concern of chapter 4 to present this as that theory. Here, the aim is merely to show the predominantly 
deontological character of even the very origins of Sidgwick’s moral theory. 
413 See also I:IX:111-113 
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detract from what I argue to be the deontological origins of these, the very 
foundations of his moral theory. 
 
2.4.c. Universal Benevolence as a Deontological Principle  
 
The last of Sidgwick’s philosophical intuitions is that of Universal Benevolence, and 
in this section I make the case that this too – despite its obvious utilitarian 
connotations – is deontological to some extent. This is because Universal 
Benevolence is derived directly from a sequential linking between Justice and 
Prudence, which I have just argued are recognisably deontological in nature – and 
because Universal Benevolence is also self-evident. As I said above, it is the remit of 
chapter 4 to argue for the function of this deontology in the establishment of 
Sidgwick’s theory of Rational Benevolence, providing as it does one part of the 
synthesis between deontological and utilitarian principles that I believe to be integral 
to that theory. Here however, within the context of this chapter which argues for the 
significant deontological influence in Sidgwick’s thought, a brief overview of how 
Sidgwick arrives at Universal Benevolence via Justice and Prudence is necessary in 
order to demonstrate its partially deontological nature.  
It will be observed – as Sidgwick does - that the first philosophical intuition of 
Justice provides only the terms for action, and not the content. For this reason, that 
maxim cannot itself be considered the kind of duty capable of giving normative 
guidance for actual action (III:XIII:380). Having then established the second principle, 
Prudence, according to a similar ‘mathematical whole’ approach, Sidgwick next 
argues that as this notion of individual good is logically comprised of all of the goods 
that an individual experiences, this same integration of all goods must logically occur 
between all similar human beings, as well as within them (III:XIII:382). That is, 
Justice and Prudence combine to state that as it is irrational to prefer one good over 
another at the individual level, it is also irrational to prefer the good of one individual 
over that of a similar other. Ultimately then, if we ‘ought’ to aim at our own good 
because this is only rational, then we ought to aim at Universal Good, given that this 
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too is rational414. And it is this that yields the ‘point of view of the universe’, or, 
Sidgwick’s self-evident principle of Universal Benevolence: 
 
‘…the good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) 
of the Universe, than the good of any other; unless, that is, there are special grounds…and it is 
evident to me that as a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally…and not merely at a 
particular part of it’ (III:XIII:382) 
 
Sidgwick considers this Universal Benevolence – which states that each person is 
morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own - to be 
the result of self-evident ‘rational intuitions’415. Hence the full term for this position, 
‘Rational Benevolence’.  
Now, we also see the utilitarian character of Benevolence clearly (I will return 
to this aspect of Benevolence shortly) and the argument that it is also in some sense 
deontological does require a strong line of defence416. But it is my view that Sidgwick 
provides that defence, in his definition of rightness not as fit to an ulterior end, which 
– it will be recalled – applies just as much to ends as it does to certain kinds of 
actions. It is only because of Sidgwick’s understanding of right as being that which is 
ultimately rational, and therefore right without reference to ulterior results, that 
Benevolence can be called self-evident at all – once Sidgwick has found it to 
conform to those requirements. Furthermore, I venture to state that Benevolence is 
in fact non-consequentialist. As an immediate qualification to this claim, it is not 
                                                 
414 It is not my concern in this thesis to tackle Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason, but I do believe 
that Sidgwick gave better grounds than he thought he had for arguing that the general good is to be 
more rationally preferred than individual good. As far as I can tell, Rational Benevolence is the best 
example of this.  
415 Sidgwick states that this Benevolence is a ‘necessary inference’ - an efficient alternative way of 
claiming that something is self-evident – an assertion that Sidgwick confirms a few pages later when 
he describes it as ‘an indubitable intuition of the practical Reason’ (III:XIV:400). Sidgwick admits that 
previously, in his investigation into the precepts of common sense morality, Benevolence was not 
found to be self-evident principle. But this may be overcome, he argues, with the inclusion of the 
notion that people ought to aim for the good of as many as are closely connected with them. That is, 
when Benevolence was discussed previously, it was within the context of Sidgwick’s observations 
about the nature of the principles derived from common sense morality as they stand, and not within 
the context of Sidgwick’s argument about which principles people ought to obey.  
See also III:XIII:387, where Sidgwick refers to Rational Benevolence as an axiom, rather than just a 
maxim. 
416 As discussed in chapter 1 (pp.130-134) of this thesis, it is precisely the ‘point of view of the 
universe’ passages that for Peter Singer prove beyond question Sidgwick’s status as a hedonistic 
utilitarian. The utilitarian quality of Universal Benevolence is further explored both in chapter 3, which 
specifically examines Sidgwick’s utilitarianism, and chapter 4, where this point that both deontological 
and utilitarian properties are essential to Universal Benevolence is the central argument.  
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meant that Benevolence is ‘non-consequentialist’ in terms of its dictates; it is a 
utilitarian principle after all, and it will be important to my overall argument for 
Rational Benevolence that it is. But as an end, an ultimate rational end, the 
substance of the principle itself is non-consequentialist, in that it is ‘right’ according to 
Sidgwick’s definition as right without regard for ulterior results. We can certainly say 
that Benevolence is unconditional, in that – again - it is not contingent on anything 
further, and that as a rational end it becomes a categorical imperative, and thus 
incurs the normative ought. It is my view that on these grounds, Benevolence can be 
understood to be, at least in part, a deontological kind of moral duty.  
 Finally, I will add that as the foundations, or the basis, of Benevolence – i.e. 
the principles of Justice and Prudence - are deontological, Benevolence remains 
partly deontological in this way also. Sidgwick is clear in ME that the utilitarian 
principle is in need of a proper basis; Justice and Prudence are the cornerstones of 
that basis - they cannot simply be ignored once Universal Benevolence has been 
derived, or Universal Benevolence will once again be without its proof417. The 
deontological status of Rational Benevolence is thus doubly supported – once by 
having its foundation in deontological principles, and again through its own 
characteristics of being ultimately rational, unconditional, and right without regard to 
ulterior results. 
 
2.4.d. Rational Benevolence as a Deontological Duty 
 
It remains now to assess how far we can call Universal Benevolence a deontological 
duty in a practical sense. It is my view that in Sidgwick’s argument for Rational 
Benevolence, we see the convergence of his various points made throughout ME, 
now cohering to create his fully normative theory – and, as I have argued in this 
chapter, many of these points had recognisably deontological elements. There was 
his theory of moral obligation, in which Sidgwick’s interpretation of ‘right’, or ‘ought’ is 
that it denotes something that is categorically required, purely for the sake of its own 
properties ; there was his recognition of the value of the Intuitional view, defined as 
                                                 
417This idea that the deontological properties of Justice and Prudence are the ‘proof’ of utilitarianism is 
essential to my argument for the synthesis between deontological and utilitarian principles, and is 
expanded upon fully from the end of chapter 3, and throughout chapter 4.  
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the non-consequentialist-duty position, and the common sense morality therein; 
there was the fact that Sidgwick used as the point of departure for his own moral 
theory the search for the self-evident principles which the Intuitional view believes 
itself to hold; there is the fact that Sidgwick’s self-evident principles are ultimately 
reasonable, and thus emerge as ‘right’ in and of themselves; there is, of course, 
Sidgwick’s recognition of the Kantian maxim. All of these points have combined to 
produce Rational Benevolence, and as the theory of Rational Benevolence also 
includes the very normative ought itself which was shown to have deontological 
qualities, it is also normatively deontological. As Sidgwick says at III:XIII:382, we are 
‘morally bound’ to Benevolence: The recognition of this end as ultimately rational 
brings with it the rational impulse and moral obligation to act upon it. But perhaps the 
best evidence that Rational Benevolence can be understood as a deontological sort 
of duty comes from Sidgwick’s direct comparison between Rational Benevolence 
and Kant’s ‘fundamental principle of duty’ (III:XIII:385-386), which he believes to 
‘coincide to a considerable extent, if not completely’, with his own moral theory. ‘We 
find’, Sidgwick says, ‘that when he comes to consider ends….the only really ultimate 
end which he lays down is the object of Rational Benevolence…he regards it as 
evident a priori that each man as a rational agent is bound to aim at the happiness of 
other men…Kant’s conclusion appears to agree to a great extent with the view of the 
duty of Rational Benevolence that I have given’418.  
Lastly on this point, utilitarianism has been conspicuous by its absence so far 
in ME. Whereas this does not in itself necessarily mean that Sidgwick’s moral theory 
has to be deontological, it at least adds to the impression that Sidgwick did not 
                                                 
418 It is extremely illuminating that it is just after his establishment of Rational Benevolence that 
Sidgwick chooses to reference Kant more comprehensively than anywhere else in ME. On account of 
Sidgwick’s also having found Prudence, or Rational Egoism, to be a self-evident principle, Sidgwick is 
forced to admit here that he actually doesn’t agree entirely with the last part of that passage: Sidgwick 
agrees, under the influence of Butler, that ‘one’s own happiness is manifest obligation’. This, of 
course, leads to the Dualism of Practical Reason with which Sidgwick will struggle in the closing 
stages of ME. But here, Sidgwick points to the positive side of the statement – the duty of each 
person – and concludes that Kant’s view seems to agree to a great extent with the view of the duty of 
Rational Benevolence. These passages can be read as Sidgwick arguing that his theory supersedes 
Kant’s, but this is of no consequence. What is important is Sidgwick’s readiness to align his position 
with that of Kant – and even, if it is thought that Sidgwick is arguing for his superiority, to suggest that 
his own theory actually explains Kant’s theory of duty more effectively. 
It should be noted here that it is clear Sidgwick does not believe Kant’s original maxim – ‘act on a 
maxim that one can will to be law universal’ to be the self-evident version of this maxim, and that thus 
phrased this is actually a corollary of the principle of Justice as stated by Sidgwick. But this does not 
affect the deontological quality of that principle of Justice itself.  
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simply begin that theory from a utilitarian position. It is Sidgwick’s methodical 
approach to ‘the methods of ethics’ which in the end yields his own normative theory, 
and he draws the conclusions for that moral theory in part from the deontological 
system which he has been examining in this systematic way. Again, I emphasise that 
I am not denying the utilitarian properties of Rational Benevolence – it is also a 
utilitarian duty. But I maintain that the ‘duty’ here, that which makes Rational 
Benevolence a moral obligation, is closer to the traditional deontological 
interpretation of duty. As to how it can also be utilitarian, this is left to the remit of this 
thesis’ chapters 3 and 4, which explore Sidgwick’s utilitarianism and argue for the 
synthesis between the deontological and utilitarian properties of Rational 
Benevolence respectively.  
 
2.5. Sidgwick’s Intuitionism, and Sidgwick’s intuitionism  
 
In the previous section, I argued that there is a distinct non-consequentialist aspect 
to Sidgwick’s moral theory. It will also be recalled from earlier in the chapter that non-
consequentialism was a part of Sidgwick’s definition of Intuitionism (understood as 
the deontological system of ethics). These, then, are the grounds for my final claim in 
this chapter about Sidgwick’s deontology, which is that part of Sidgwick’s 
understanding of Intuitionism actually appears in his own epistemological 
intuitionism. This means arguing that Sidgwick’s epistemic intuitionism is in fact to 
some extent deontological – and this accords directly with my argument just made 
for the deontological character of the rational intuitions that make up Rational 
Benevolence. But a further and even more specific link can be made between the 
two types – a link that further proves the presence of a deontological element in ME. 
This link comes in the form of Kant’s appearance in Sidgwick’s intuitionism. 
 Sidgwick is not often explicit about the Kantian influence in ME, even during 
his discussion of Reason. He is, however, explicit about it in ‘Professor Sidgwick’s 
Account of the Development of his Ethical View’ – the autobiographical fragment 
once included in the preface to the sixth edition of ME, and referred to here as the 
Personal Document (PD). Here, Sidgwick describes the progression of thought 
through which he passed as he was searching for a viable moral position. At the 
early point at which he was struggling with proving that it is the general happiness 
that is paramount, Sidgwick finally concluded that we must simply see that the 
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general happiness is more important than our own. That is, Sidgwick found himself 
‘forced to recognise the need of a fundamental ethical intuition’ (ME: xvi). From this 
point he describes how he then moved directly back to Kant, where he was 
‘impressed with the truth and importance’ of Kant’s axiom, ‘act from a principle or 
maxim that you can will to be a universal law’ (ME: xvii). This is a self-evident 
principle, that does not refer to consequences. A few paragraphs later, Sidgwick 
again references the notion of ‘a fundamental moral intuition’, this time stating that 
such an intuition is ‘binding’ (ME: xix) 419. On the final page, Sidgwick again refers to 
his acceptance of the Kantian principle (ME: xx), and describes how this principle 
validated and supported the other fundamental intuition, which is the utilitarian 
principle of aiming at the general happiness. That Kantian principle to which 
Sidgwick is referring is Kant’s formulation of the categorical imperative (which in 
Sidgwick’s hands became the principle of Justice). This form of duty, Kant’s 
fundamental maxim, had ‘commended itself’ to Sidgwick’s Reason (ME: xvii), and it 
endures even when the utilitarian principle is added.  
 The PD thus clearly demonstrates that for his own intuitionistic moral 
epistemology, Sidgwick uses a categorical and unconditional principle that is right in 
itself without reference to consequences – that is, that he uses a deontological 
principle. And it is a Kantian principle, no less420. As this non-consequentialism is 
                                                 
419The similar phrase ‘intuitively known to be unconditionally binding’ also appears at I:I:3, and in that 
instance Sidgwick does use it in specific reference to duties, in the same way that he also defines 
Intuitionism within discussions of ‘Duty’ elsewhere (III:I:200). It could be argued however that given 
Sidgwick’s own adherence to intuitionism as an epistemological device, this phrase ‘intuitively known 
to be unconditionally binding’ will eventually, in Sidgwick’s hands, take on a utilitarian form: That is, 
there is nothing to say that that phrase need apply only to deontological systems of ethics (it is on this 
basis that Phillips describes Sidgwick’s position as ‘intuitionistic utilitarianism’. I agree that 
‘intuitionism’ with a small ‘i’ can be removed from the deontological view in Sidgwick’s work and 
applied straight to utilitarianism instead (Sidgwick himself makes this very point) –and that the 
passage on xix seems to suggest that this is the approach Sidgwick has taken. However, I argue, 
contra Phillips, that Sidgwick’s own intuitionism is entirely utilitarian. Firstly,  
Sidgwick’s flexibility with intuitionistic terminology only further supports this thesis’ argument that 
‘intuitively known’ represents for Sidgwick not just the process of reasoning that informs the 
deontological/Intuitional position, but also the process of reasoning which equally informs the 
utilitarian position – and thus his intuitionism can be thought of as representing the shared appeal to 
Reason. Secondly, as it has been argued here, Sidgwick retains an element of the ‘duty’ aspect of 
Intuitionism in his own moral theory, which maintains a deontological influence in that theory. It is on 
this basis that I disagree with Phillips’ description of Sidgwick’s intuitionism (unless it is posited in line 
with this thesis that the ‘intuitionistic’ aspect represents the deontological position, which in Phillips’ 
justification for the phrase it clearly does not). 
420 It seems relevant to ask here whether it has been Kant’s doctrine that Sidgwick has had in mind for 
the non-consequentialist, Intuitional view all along. It might be an advantage if it was. Kant’s version of 
duty is paradigmatic of non-consequentialist duty-based systems of ethics, and especially of the duty-
based systems of ethics that conflict with consequentialist utilitarian systems. As my ultimate aim is to 
show that Sidgwick reconciles this divide by maintaining a recognisably deontological element in a 
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also a fundamental part of how Sidgwick defines the moral-theoretic Intuitional view, 
Sidgwick’s Intuitionism and Sidgwick’s intuitionism thus share this factor in common. 
In order to complete this argument, it is required to be shown that Sidgwick’s 
intuitionism as it appears in his normative moral theory is deontological as well as 
utilitarian - and I believe that I have made that argument above by arguing that 
Sidgwick’s own philosophical intuitions are not entirely utilitarian421. Overall, it is my 
view that as Sidgwick specifically calls the non-consequentialist method 
‘Intuitionism’, and then himself attributes value to both non-consequentialist and 
utilitarian intuitions, this has caused some of the long-running confusion over how 
Sidgwick uses ‘intuitionism’ variously. In Sidgwick’s moral theory, Broad’s 
‘classification’ and ‘epistemic’ types of ‘intuitionism’, coincide, linked by Sidgwick’s 
use of a non-consequentialist form of duty. 
 
2.6. Conclusions on Sidgwick’s Deontology 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to establish that, contrary to the prevailing opinion 
that Sidgwick is a classical utilitarian, deontological principles have a considerable 
presence and active value in Sidgwick’s moral theory. It was observed early on that 
Sidgwick’s thought is very much dominated by rightness, as opposed to the good, 
                                                 
theory that also includes utilitarianism, it is important that Sidgwick can meet deontological theory at 
one of its most influential and renowned sources. It is also the case that the Kantian view of Reason 
and morality was a prevalent version of deontology at Sidgwick’s time, and revealing a Kantian 
influence in Sidgwick’s work would show that Sidgwick recognised its value, despite his ‘utilitarian’ 
status. But these points only really indicate that it would be preferable that it is Kant’s system 
Sidgwick has in mind, and this does not amount to an argument that it actually is Kant’s system. 
(There is also Donagan’s argument – outlined above- that the intuitionist position to which Sidgwick is 
referring actually seems to be Whelwell’s). The only place that it becomes evident that Sidgwick has a 
Kantian ‘intuition’ in mind is in the PD, which tells us that this was the basis for the principle of Justice. 
It is therefore neither certain nor in fact necessary that the Intuitional position is Kantian from the 
beginning. But Sidgwick’s non-consequentialist view is certainly Kantian in the end.    
421 Sidgwick himself supports that argument when he points out that his self-evident principles belong 
as much to Utilitarianism as they do to Intuitionism III:XIII:386-397. 
See also Sidgwick’s comment in the PD (xx) that, at the end of the process he has described in which 
he perceives the lack of opposition between Intuitionism and Utilitarianism, he was ‘…a Utilitarian 
again, but on an Intuitional basis’. At the corresponding point in ME, by the time Sidgwick reaches his 
own moral theory and states that his rational intuitions/self-evident principles furnish Utilitarianism as 
much as they do Intuitional ones, this can already be logically inferred from Sidgwick’s arguments. 
Ironically then, if we track the evolution of Sidgwick’s ‘Intuitionism’ alongside that of his ‘intuitionism’, it 
seems as though there is both a clearer distinction between the two types than Phillips allows, and an 
even less defined one. But Phillips’ argument for the lack of definition between them draws on the 
apparent confusion between Intuitionism as a method and intuitionism as an epistemic device, and 
not, as my argument does here, on the idea that there might actually be less distance between them 
than is commonly thought. 
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and that this pervades ME. In terms of how to define this rightness, for Sidgwick this 
is not ‘fitness to an end’, but what is ultimately rational, whether this be a certain kind 
of action, or an ultimate, rational end. Sidgwick’s concept of ‘ought’, then, pertains to 
what is right in itself without reference to consequences, and I believe that this is a 
predominantly deontological understanding of rightness, and of moral obligation. It 
was also seen that Sidgwick defines Intuitionism as the non-consequentialist view, 
and that Sidgwick believes this method of ethics to actually have some day-to-day 
value, in the form of common sense morality. The self-evidence of its principles, 
however, is only illusory. But self-evidence is of the utmost importance to Sidgwick. 
Self-evident principles will be part of the truth which lies between two conclusions - 
the ‘certain, absolute, practical principles, the truth of which is manifest’. Sidgwick 
argues these to be Justice, Prudence, and Benevolence, and all of them are non-
consequentialist in that they are crucially informed by Sidgwick’s interpretation of 
rightness as being that which is ultimately rational. i.e. these principles are not simply 
right with reference to their ulterior results. Thus, Rational Benevolence – which is 
eventually derived from those philosophical intuitions – is also self-evident and right 
in that same way. It is in this way that the non-consequentialism of the Intuitional 
view appears in Sidgwick’s own intuitionism – a point that is strongly supported by 
Sidgwick’s use of a fundamental intuition from Kant – and that traditional 
deontological concepts can be seen to form a part of Sidgwick’s normative moral 
theory. 
 With these conclusions thus condensed, we can now ask the question that 
has been latent throughout this chapter: Is it possible, in any way, to call Sidgwick a 
deontologist? It is my view that some significant movement can be made towards 
making this argument. Firstly, if Sidgwick’s own intuitionism is fundamentally and 
crucially informed by an intuition from Kant, and if Sidgwick believes Kant’s position 
to be what is a recognisably deontological position in that it is a form of moral 
obligation that depends on duties categorically and unconditionally prescribed, then 
there is a line of Aristotelian logic that allows us to call Sidgwick a deontologist. In 
the PD, Sidgwick himself actually declares outright that he had ‘become….an 
Intuitionist to a certain extent…’422. If it is to be understood, as ME strongly suggests, 
                                                 
422 In addition to the discussion above as to whether Kant is an influence on Sidgwick’s ‘Intuitionism’, 
it can also be noted that Sidgwick demonstrates a peculiar reluctance to directly reference Kant, even 
when discussing the role of motives in morality (Sidgwick simply refers to ‘moralists of influence’ 
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that by Intuitionism Sidgwick means the position that attributes value to non-
consequentialist duty then in the personal document Sidgwick is declaring himself to 
be a deontologist, in some sense. After all, how else do we say what it is ultimately 
right to do? If all morality was contingent on the consequences of actions, Sidgwick 
would be very unlikely to find the answer to his pressing question about ultimately 
right conduct, as he perceives that question to present itself.  
On the other hand, we must obviously take account of the fact that Sidgwick’s 
view of rightness does allow for ought to apply to means to ends to some extent, 
which detracts from the non-consequentialist aspect of the traditional deontological 
understanding of duty. Then of course there is the fact that Rational Benevolence, 
which has at its basis the principle of aiming for Universal Good, is a utilitarian 
principle. For these reasons, Sidgwick’s theory of moral obligation cannot truly be 
called completely deontological. But I do maintain that it is still deontological enough. 
That is, Sidgwick’s particular concept of moral obligation as depending on that which 
is ultimately rational and not simply fit to an ulterior end makes it unconditional and 
non-consequential enough that it retains a character much more akin to the 
deontological understanding than to the utilitarian one. Another way of defending 
Sidgwick’s deontology might be to ask the question from the other side, i.e. ‘is 
Sidgwick’s theory of duty ultimately completely utilitarian?’ For it is clear that this is 
entirely not the case. Sidgwick is not arguing for rightness as simply fit to an ulterior 
end, and his argument that rightness is what is ultimately rational demands that his 
concept of ‘ought’ also be detached from the notion of consequences. And where 
rightness, ought, and duty are applicable to ends, this is precisely why he can 
transcend the boundaries between deontological and utilitarian positions as well as 
                                                 
III:I:204). This admittedly opens up an ambiguity regarding whether or not it is Kant’s understanding of 
moral duty that Sidgwick has in mind in ME. The influence of what Schultz refers to as ‘Germanism’ 
(Eye of the Universe, p.175, by which he means Hegel and Kant) in Sidgwick’s work has been noted 
by both Schultz and J.B. Schneewind, and Schneewind in particular insists that whereas ‘Sidgwick 
himself points out the Kantian affinities of his position, he is by no means a Kantian’ (Sidgwickian 
Ethics, p.286). Schneewind’s position on Sidgwick’s use of Kant is that ‘he is deliberately developing 
a traditional mode of approach to basic axioms. In doing so, he brings out distinctly new possibilities 
within it’. I agree with Schneewind that Sidgwick cannot strictly be called a ‘Kantian’. After all, 
Sidgwick refutes Kant’s own argument for his moral axiom, even though Sidgwick himself adapts and 
then uses that rule. But this does not mean that Sidgwick cannot be called a deontologist (in some 
sense), and nor does it mean that that deontology is not informed by Kant’s doctrine. I believe it is 
important to note here that Sidgwick did not have the term ‘deontology’ – which today is so freely 
associated with Kant - at his disposal. I argue – as I have above - that if Sidgwick had had that 
terminology, the language he uses to describe Intuitionism in these passages soundly suggests that 
he would have directly associated Kant with a ‘deontological’ position, understood as involving non-
consequentialist, unconditional duties. 
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he does – as I will argue later423. Even if Sidgwick’s theory is not deontological in an 
official sense, it is far enough away from a standard utilitarian basis to be able to 
construct a synthesis between deontological and utilitarian principles of morality.  
Overall, we can return to Sidgwick’s own summary of this situation, which is 
that the ‘truth lies between two conclusions’. The self-evident (deontological) 
principles are crucial – but they require something further. Sidgwick’s critique of 
Intuitionism reveals that as important as that method is, it is not adequate for the 
construction of a full system of ethics; this can only be done via ‘some other 
principle’. This other principle is utilitarianism. So here we must follow Sidgwick’s 
lead in stating that he is only a deontologist on a utilitarian basis. It is now the role of 
the next chapter to draw out the nature and place of this utilitarianism in Sidgwick’s 
work, and of the final chapter to explain how the two types of moral principle are, in 
Sidgwick’s theory of Rational Benevolence, inherently connected.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
423 It is true that Sidgwick appropriates Kant for his own cause to an extent – as will be seen he will be 
using this version of duty to argue for the inclusion of a utilitarian principle in his moral theory. But this 
is almost my point; Sidgwick’s notion of duty began life as the Kantian version, and it retains much of 
that character in his own moral theory, which is precisely what allows him to establish that utilitarian 
principle with some kind of true validity.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
BUILDING A SYNTHESIS: SIDGWICK’S ACCOUNT OF UTILITARIANISM 
 
Henry Sidgwick is not always included among those moral philosophers who are 
considered to have offered complete normative moral theories. Where Sidgwick is 
thought to adhere to a particular moral position, it is almost universally accepted that 
it is a classically utilitarian one, in the same line as Bentham and Mill. However, in 
chapter 2 of this thesis I concluded that Sidgwick afforded far greater value to 
deontological principles of morality than is commonly thought, and I argued on this 
basis that traditionally deontological principles form an essential part of Sidgwick’s 
normative ethics. This finding is crucial to my wider argument that Sidgwick’s theory 
of Rational Benevolence offers a synthesis between deontological and utilitarian 
principles. But in order to complete the grounds on which this argument can be 
made, it is still necessary to also gain a full understanding of Sidgwick’s 
utilitarianism. It is the aim of this chapter therefore to explore Sidgwick’s utilitarianism 
as it appears throughout ME. Together, chapters 2 and 3 set up the understandings 
of Sidgwick’s deontology and utilitarianism from which the synthesis between them in 
Rational Benevolence can be developed.  
The utilitarian aspect of Sidgwick’s work is not just crucial to this thesis’ argument 
for the synthesis. There is no doubt that Sidgwick is a utilitarian in some capacity, 
and failure to take account of Sidgwick’s utilitarianism would inarguably lead to an 
unfair and inaccurate representation of ME. However, where the majority of the 
Sidgwick literature has been shown to hold that Sidgwick is a classical utilitarian, my 
argument is that Sidgwick’s utilitarianism is only of a very specific type, in that it 
contains qualities and emphases that are not typical of utilitarianism when standard 
utilitarianism is understood as holding that actions are only morally right when they 
conform to certain ends. Textual analysis of ME quickly reveals Sidgwick’s 
utilitarianism to be more complex than is generally thought: Where Sidgwick’s views 
on deontology are usually easy to identify, and unfold linearly, his discussions of 
utilitarianism are often somewhat more obscure, with some of the key concepts 
appearing in close conjunction – and sometimes even agreement – with concepts 
usually considered to belong to the deontological school. Even Sidgwick’s argument 
for Happiness as a rational, ultimate end is established on grounds that accord more 
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closely with deontology. I am not, then, disputing that Sidgwick is a utilitarian of sorts 
– but I am disputing the opinion that he is simply a traditional utilitarian whose 
version of the doctrine conforms to all criteria of a standard classical utilitarian 
position, and I argue that it is the less typical features of his utilitarianism that make it 
possible, or even necessary, to join his utilitarianism to his deontological principles. 
Most importantly, I argue that the connection is made possible via their shared 
appeal to Reason. I posit that Sidgwick himself perceived this connection, and it is 
this relationship that will be drawn out in chapter 4 when it is argued that Rational 
Benevolence is comprised of that synthesis between the two types of principle. The 
more specific purpose of this chapter therefore is to draw attention to the areas in 
which Sidgwick’s utilitarian position is particularly distinctive, and to where this 
distinctiveness eventually points to a reliance on deontological principles. 
Sidgwick’s utilitarianism can be effectively understood via four defining 
features424. The last three of these provide the stages of the chapter’s investigation, 
but the first point can be made here – and it is that Sidgwick was explicit that he did 
not intend on writing a defence of utilitarianism. Sidgwick’s mission statement in the 
preface to the first edition of ME is the firm assertion that he is only attempting an 
examination, ‘at once expository and critical……of the different methods of obtaining 
reasoned convictions as to what ought to be done which are to be found – either 
                                                 
424 All of these allusions to Sidgwick’s treatment of utilitarianism, and to the more unusual aspects of 
that treatment, can be found in outline in the prefaces to the first two editions of ME. Also in the 
preface to the first edition, Sidgwick writes (continuing the next passage cited in the main text below) 
– ‘I have put aside temporarily the urgent need which we all feel of finding and adopting the true 
method of determining what we ought to do…’ (ME: vi). The appearance of these passages in the first 
two prefaces is in itself significant. Firstly, this is Sidgwick unambiguously stating that ME was never 
meant to be an argument for utilitarianism. It could be supposed from the critics’ responses to the first 
edition of ME, to which Sidgwick is responding in the second preface, that despite Sidgwick’s intention 
to remain neutral, at least the first edition emerged as unmistakably utilitarian. This might then in turn 
reinforce the idea that Sidgwick believed utilitarianism to be the most accurate and valuable method 
of ethics, and that he had, through ME’s investigations, found this conclusion to be unavoidable. But 
Sidgwick stands firm against the critics (namely, Bradley and Collingwood) in the second preface, 
arguing that ME is not simply a defence of utilitarianism and an attack on common sense morality. 
Sidgwick admits that he has criticised common sense morality ‘unsparingly’, but that he considers 
himself to have ‘exposed with equal un-reserve the defects and difficulties of the hedonistic method’ 
(x). Even after prolonged accusations of the very sort that Sidgwick had wished to avoid, Sidgwick 
remains committed to his aim of neutrality. He thus provides his own unequivocal evidence that he 
was not simply justifying utilitarianism.   
Secondly, Sidgwick’s comments in the prefaces – the very earliest stage of ME - demonstrates 
Sidgwick’s willingness to expose his position on certain important aspects of his approach to 
utilitarianism even from the outset. It is undoubtedly detrimental to ME – and to Sidgwick - that in the 
current day, ME is hardly ever published with those prefaces included. Omitting these crucial pieces 
of primary evidence for Sidgwick’s thought is likely to lead if not to a misreading of Sidgwick, then at 
least to a less detailed reading, and this is hardly fair. 
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explicit or implicit….’ (ME: v). That is, he is not aiming to defend any one position; his 
intention is to remain completely neutral as regards which ethical system he himself 
believes to provide the best guidance for moral conduct, or to generate the most 
morally valid results. This is vitally important; it is the first evidence that ME does not 
necessarily present Sidgwick as a utilitarian, and it is Sidgwick himself who makes 
the statement, both early, and emphatically425. 
The second feature is Sidgwick’s understanding of rightness, which includes his 
rejection of rightness being defined as fit to an ulterior end, and his resulting non-
utilitarian position on means to ends. This in turn indicates the need to assess 
Sidgwick’s view of Happiness as an ultimate end, and the complex and often 
conflicting relationship between Sidgwick’s doctrine and that of Bentham’s. It also 
calls into question the teleological nature of utilitarianism in Sidgwick’s work, and the 
Benthamite principle of utility itself.  
The third point is that Sidgwick draws attention to the ‘difficulties and defects’ of 
the utilitarian position (ME: x). This particular view of Sidgwick’s unfolds as ME 
progresses, with his discussions of utilitarianism rarer and often appearing more 
ambiguous than those of other methods (egoism and Intuitionism). Despite this, 
Sidgwick’s utilitarianism is highly sophisticated in its depth, and, vitally, it is the 
proficiency with which Sidgwick handles utilitarian concepts that eventually produces 
his own final version of the doctrine –one that cannot be fully understood without 
reference to certain deontological principles. 
This leads to the fourth and final point, which is that Sidgwick is eventually 
brought to a position, in Book IV of ME, from which he makes the case for the 
utilitarian position. But the material here is explored in terms of the question as to 
how far Sidgwick considers utilitarianism alone to really be capable of serving as a 
complete and holistic theory of human morality. Crucially, the value that Sidgwick 
ascribes to utilitarianism appears not entirely in Book IV (which contains Sidgwick’s 
‘positive’ proof for utilitarianism), but mainly in Book III, where it emerges in inherent 
conjunction with deontological principles (in the form of his ‘negative’ proof). In Book 
IV itself, Sidgwick actually refers the reader back to the conclusions he has drawn in 
Book III on the role of utilitarianism, for a key part of his overall argument for 
                                                 
425 The significance of Sidgwick’s original intended neutrality, and the shift away from this neutrality 
that occurs as ME progresses, is fully addressed in chapter 4. 
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utilitarianism. Given that this very relationship is at the core of the central argument 
of this thesis, this chapter will end not with a discussion of the ultimate value that 
Sidgwick ascribed to utilitarianism (as chapter 2 did for deontology), but rather with 
the conclusion that Sidgwick’s utilitarianism cannot be fully understood without 
reference to his deontological, or Intuitionist, principles. This approach is completely 
supported by Sidgwick and ME, in both structure and substance.  
Overall, where deontological principles of morality were found in chapter 2 to be 
indispensable to Sidgwick’s moral theory, but lacking in their ability to provide a 
complete system of ethics, this chapter ultimately finds utilitarian principles of 
morality to also be essential, but in need of a certain vital informing by deontological 
principles. Chapter 4 will then expound the particulars of this mutually informing 
relationship between deontological and utilitarian principles in full, as it appears 
within Sidgwick’s theory of Rational Benevolence.  
 
3.1. Utilitarianism in I:I : Right, Good, and Happiness  
 
As was outlined in the chapter’s introduction above, one of the most noticeable 
features of Sidgwick’s utilitarianism as it appears at the beginning of ME is that it is 
often subsumed within discussions of other non-utilitarian notions and principles. 
This applies from the very beginning of the book, and most noticeably to Sidgwick’s 
concepts of the cornerstones of absolute-principle based and end based ethical 
positions - ‘right’ and ‘good’ respectively. The preliminary outlines of these ideas 
provide a helpful miniature version of Sidgwick’s later and deeper arguments 
regarding two of the most striking aspects of his version of utilitarianism – his view of 
rightness, and the identity of Happiness as a rational end. The following sections 
examine these early discussions, for their indications of the utilitarian line Sidgwick 
will take.  
 
3.1.a. The Roles of ‘Right’ and ‘Good’ in I:I  
 
It was noted in chapter 2 that early on in ME’s introduction, Sidgwick shows a 
preoccupation with right conduct (I:I:3). Here, the same passage is important for the 
converse reason of the apparently demoting effect that this has on the utilitarian 
concept of aiming at the good. Sidgwick states his position on the place of Ultimate 
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Good succinctly: No matter whether we take the view that good can be assumed of 
any ethical system, or the view (associated with the deontological position) that the 
performance of duty cannot be ‘conditional on knowledge of its conduciveness to 
Happiness’, ‘the concept of Ultimate Good for man’, Sidgwick says, ‘would still not be 
important for the methodical determination of right conduct’ (I:I:4). 
There are two points that emerge here. The first, which is the more remarkable 
for a writer so widely considered to be a utilitarian, is that there is an early separation 
here between right action and the idea of ends – a separation in which ends do not 
necessarily determine the rightness of action, as traditional understandings of 
utilitarianism maintain426. Rightness appears here to be the superior concept for 
ethics, responsible as it is for establishing moral action, and utilitarianism’s traditional 
method of relying on ends or the notion of the good to determine action thus appears 
to be side-lined very early427. The second point is that Sidgwick does hold good to be 
essential. At both the beginning and the end of these paragraphs, Sidgwick writes 
about the fundamental role of the good. It is, in his words, indispensable to the 
completeness of an ethical system (I:I:4).  
This introductory outline of Sidgwick’s understanding of the respective roles of 
right and good in ethics is actually a microcosm of his wider argument made 
throughout ME overall. Sidgwick’s separation between rightness and goodness here 
points to his later emphasis (already discussed in chapter 2) on what is right being 
that which is objectively rational, and his subsequent use of his version of the 
Kantian maxim. His argument for the necessity of good in ethics is indicative of his 
later, more traditionally utilitarian, argument for Happiness. Yet despite this 
separation, ‘right’ and ‘good’ also appear to be in some kind of inextricable 
relationship. These two points together directly support my overall argument that 
                                                 
426 There is nothing immediate here that says that deontological/absolute-principle based systems 
must provide these rules for right conduct, as might be expected from the traditional association 
between such systems and the prioritising of ‘right’ - they could well be the rules of a comprehensive 
utilitarian system. Indeed, in a pre-Methods paper of 1873 paper simply entitled ‘Utilitarianism’ (this 
paper was previously unpublished until Marcus Singer’s (ed.) 2000 volume Essays on Ethics and 
Method (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 2000) pp.3-9 – I will here after refer to this paper as ‘Utilitarianism 
1873’), Sidgwick states that he understands utilitarianism to ‘supply a principle and method for 
determining the objective or material rightness of conduct’.  However, Sidgwick’s point at I:I:3 is that 
good itself is inadequate for determining such rules, and in making this point Sidgwick is still drawing 
a clear division between good, and right conduct. 
427 In his well known paper, ‘Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies’ (Mind, Vol.14, No.56 (1889) 
473-87), Sidgwick summarises this position with the denial that the idea of right can be ‘explicable by 
the idea of good’.  
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both deontological and utilitarian ideas are essential to Sidgwick’s moral theory, and 
that they are somehow inherently connected.  
But, returning to these early pages of ME, the ambiguity in which Sidgwick’s 
actual utilitarianism is often shrouded has already appeared. He initially points to the 
superior importance of good, but then waives it by drawing attention to the 
importance - practical and theoretical -  of rules, and even of unconditional rules. He 
then reinforces the good again, drawing attention back to the significance of good’s 
enduring presence, and the inclusion of Happiness as a vital part of its identity. 
Above all else, it is evident here that Sidgwick’s views on those fundamental 
mainstays of utilitarianism – the notion of good and the idea of simple means to ends 
– are somewhat more flexible than might be expected of a standard utilitarian 
position. 
 
3.1.b. Rightness in I:I: Happiness as a Rational Ultimate End  
 
Continuing to outline the arguments that he will later make in full, Sidgwick’s 
attention turns now to that question which he has already identified to be latent in 
any ethical system – that of why we should do something. The language of ‘good’ 
here disappears, replaced by that of ‘reasonable’, and ‘reasonings’ (I:I:5, 6). That we 
generally pursue courses of action that we deem to be reasonable is of no question 
for Sidgwick, and this connection between Reason and the aim of action appears 
even before he has specifically defined the utilitarian position as being that which 
aims at a certain end. Clearly, the concept of Reason appears fluid enough to 
Sidgwick to apply to the basis of any ethical system. This is of course an early 
indication of the shared appeal to Reason that will inform Sidgwick’s own moral 
theory but for the present discussion which aims to demonstrate the uniqueness of 
Sidgwick’s utilitarianism, it must be noted that the utilitarian principle just defined is 
only developed from Sidgwick’s view on the role of Reason in moral processes.  
This happens as follows. Sidgwick challenges the idea that our most common 
usage of ‘ought’ does not always suppose an ulterior end. In most cases, he states, 
this ought is actually a hypothetical imperative, and the ‘end’ (personal Happiness, in 
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Sidgwick’s example) is merely optional (I:I:6)428. But this, he argues, is not a 
complete account of the notion of ‘ought’ – for we believe that it would be irrational 
not to care about Happiness, which thus makes the rational pursuit of Happiness an 
obligation. ‘Ought’ is now no longer relative; Happiness has become an ultimate end 
prescribed by reason, and as such Happiness is now a categorical imperative, 
‘prescribed…as Kant would say…without any tacit assumption of a still ulterior end’ 
(I:I:7). That is, Happiness as a rational ultimate end has emerged as a non-
consequentialist concept, in that it is itself right without reference to anything 
further429. From here, Sidgwick attaches that ought to the wider general Happiness, 
and thus arrives at his first formal definition of his own utilitarian position, which 
emphasises that general Happiness, rather than private, is this ultimate end 
categorically prescribed (I:I:8)430.  
                                                 
428 Happiness is actually one of two ‘rational ultimate ends’, the other being Perfection, or Excellence 
of human nature (I:I:9). This indicates Sidgwick’s view that rational ends appear in deontological-duty 
or virtue based systems, as well as utilitarian ones, which is in itself an early suggestion of the 
common ground between deontological and utilitarian moral approaches in Sidgwick’s thought. The 
idea of ‘Happiness as a rational ultimate end’ being somehow unique to Sidgwick requires clarification 
however. Obviously, Bentham himself held Happiness to be the rational ultimate end of being, and 
Sidgwick expressly points out that he is working from Bentham’s argument that “the constantly proper 
end of action on the part of any individual…is his real greatest happiness…’ (Bentham, Memoirs (in, 
John Bowring (ed.) The Works of Jeremy Bentham Vol.10 [1839] (London: W.Tait:1843) p.560, in ME, 
I:I:10). A separation between Sidgwick and Bentham must therefore be made, and this is done on two 
counts. The first is by drawing attention to the fact that Sidgwick draws this direct parallel between 
Happiness as an ultimate end and the ‘ought’ that is commonly associated with deontological ethics. 
This produces a far more robust defence of Happiness as an ultimate end than Bentham’s. Secondly, 
Sidgwick’s account of Happiness and the extent of its relationship with the more basic Benthamite 
notion of pleasure is more complex than Bentham’s. This becomes clear as ME progresses, and is 
explored in full below, at 4.2.a. 
429 This establishment of Happiness as a rational, non-consequentialist and ultimate end will be what 
informs the universal good inherent to Sidgwick’s principle of Universal Benevolence, when he finally 
derives Universal Benevolence from his philosophical intuitions in Book III. 
With the examples Sidgwick gives here – of there being a ‘manifest obligation’ to pursue one’s own 
happiness – Sidgwick is clearly establishing the basis of Rational Egoism. This is not problematic 
however, as it is this argument for the reasonableness of Happiness as an ultimate end that Sidgwick 
applies directly to his argument for general Happiness, which is the basis of Rational Benevolence. 
430 Sidgwick’s whole definition of the general utilitarian position is as follows: “It is contested by many 
Utilitarians that all rules of conduct…are really – though in part unconsciously – prescribed as means 
to the general happiness of mankind…; and it is still more widely held by Utilitarian thinkers that such 
rules…are only valid so far as their observance is conducive to the general happiness” (I:I:8). In terms 
of his own view of utilitarianism, Sidgwick adds the qualification that “if the duty of aiming at the 
general Happiness is thus taken to include all other duties as subordinate applications of it, we seem 
to be again led to the notion of Happiness as an ultimate end categorically prescribed, - only it is now 
General Happiness and not the private happiness of any individual. And this is the view that I myself 
take of the Utilitarian principle” (I:I:8). Sidgwick expands on this in III:XIII, and I will return to his 
definition at the relevant point below. Here it is interesting to note Sidgwick’s inclusion of the clause, 
‘though in part unconsciously’ in his wider definition of utilitarianism. This seems to suggest that 
people could actually be following utilitarian principles, even when they feel themselves to be 
following more absolute, fixed principles, and that as such, all morality could eventually be found to be 
at least unconsciously utilitarian. Sidgwick himself considers this very possibility later in ME. I 
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The first time then that the traditionally utilitarian concept of Happiness appears in 
Sidgwick’s work, it appears in inextricable relationship with the traditionally 
deontological categorical idea of ‘ought’. Even more specifically, the end of 
Happiness has been established alongside the traditionally deontological view of 
principles, such as Veracity, which are also prescribed categorically (I:I:8)431. Where 
Sidgwick’s idea of Happiness is recognisably utilitarian then, the process through 
which the idea is established is not432. 
Sidgwick’s references to Utilitarianism throughout the remainder of the 
introduction are rather more standard. He defines as Egoistic and Universalistic 
hedonism ‘the two methods which take happiness as an ultimate end’ (I:I:11), with 
the latter of these being that which is most commonly understood by the term 
‘Utilitarianism’433. He also closes I:I with a series of statements that re-emphasise 
utilitarianism as a vital aspect of morality434. But it is now possible to identify that one 
                                                 
acknowledge that this appears to provide strong support for the common belief that Sidgwick was 
ultimately a utilitarian. However, I also argue that even if the idea that Sidgwick believed all morality to 
be unconsciously utilitarian is maintained, the peculiar nature of that utilitarianism, given to it by its 
dependence on deontological principles, makes it possible to also state that Sidgwick believed all 
morality to be unconsciously deontological. The basis for this claim is made in chapter 4, where it is 
argued that neither utilitarian nor deontological principles are fully functional without crucial reliance 
upon the other. 
431 This is the direct result of Sidgwick’s developing idea that the rational ‘ought’ applies just as much 
to any system of ethics. 
432 On the subject of ends, it must be noted that the idea of ends usually naturally involves the idea of 
means to those ends. This is, of course, a fundamental characteristic of the utilitarian position. 
However, the specific idea of means is conspicuously absent from I:I. This is prophetic of ME as a 
whole (see 4.2 below); Sidgwick is seldom obviously concerned with means, focusing almost entirely 
instead on the actual identity of the ends. There is admittedly, in Sidgwick’s earlier words that in order 
to establish right conduct we must know the end, a latent sense of a utilitarian idea of means (I:I:3). 
This is actually the only place in which the phrase ‘right means to its attainment’ appears, and it does 
appear – as per traditional utilitarian understandings – ahead of ‘right conduct’. But as was seen in 
that part of the discussion, Sidgwick waives the notion of good – which, if made superior, might 
legitimise any action provided it pertained to that good – in favour of the importance of what it is right 
to do. This is then followed of course with Sidgwick’s view on what is meant by ‘ought’, which further 
elevates moral action away from being ‘means’, and towards a status in which the rightness of actions 
is not dictated simply by their conformity to ends. It is certainly not the case that Sidgwick adheres to 
a basic utilitarian standard of arguing that actions are only moral in as far as they are means to non-
moral ends. Where Sidgwick does allow for the idea of means to ends is discussed shortly.  
433 Sidgwick identifies Bentham with the origin of the doctrine for the first time here.  
434 These pages were quoted in the introduction and in chapter 2 as evidence of the extremely similar 
starting points of Sidgwick and this thesis – that both deontological and utilitarian principles of morality 
appear to be relevant to day to day moral decision making, and that they often appear blended and 
sometimes confused – but they are worth quoting again here, for the sake of pointing out Sidgwick’s 
belief that utilitarianism is a fundamental part of ordinary moral reasonings, alongside other ethical 
methods. ‘The truth seems to be that most of the practical principles that have been seriously put 
forward are more or less satisfactory…so long as they have the field to themselves. They all find a 
response in our nature; their fundamental assumptions are all such as we are disposed to 
accept…When I am asked... “Have you not a moral sense?”, “Do you not intuitively pronounce some 
actions to be right and others wrong?” “Do you not acknowledge the general happiness to be a 
paramount end?” I answer ‘yes’ to all these questions” (I:I:14). This passage also reinforces the sense 
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of the most noticeable characteristics of Sidgwick’s particular utilitarianism is his 
emphasis on the role of Reason, and rationality. It is predominantly this that from the 
outset makes his position so distinctive compared to that of Bentham and Mill. Bound 
up with an often deontological, non-consequentialist view on the role of rationality in 
ethics, Sidgwick’s adherence to this particular view is at the core of his two central 
pillars -  his understanding of rightness, as will be seen, and his understanding of the 
general Happiness that is fundamental to utilitarianism. As ME progresses, Sidgwick 
deepens this rationality-based connection, that will serve to close the distance 
between utilitarian and deontological ideas.  
The next section is concerned with where Sidgwick’s view of Reason applies to 
his more detailed interpretation of rightness, the effect that this interpretation has on 
some of the key concepts in utilitarianism in general, and those concepts as they 
appear in Sidgwick’s own utilitarianism. 
 
3.2. The Rejection of Right as ‘fitness to some end’ 
 
Only one short chapter of ME elapses before Sidgwick returns to the idea in I:III of 
what is right also being that which is considered to be reasonable, or rational. As 
was seen in chapter 2, Sidgwick first swiftly dispenses with the idea that ‘the 
fundamental notion represented by the word ‘ought’ or ‘right’’ can be discerned via 
any experience of the physical world (I:III:25). Then, following on from the absence 
of ‘means’ in I:I, Sidgwick also dismisses the idea that rightness can be an attribute 
of means (I:III:26). Again, this point was addressed in chapter 2 when the argument 
was being made that Sidgwick’s is a deontological understanding of rightness, but 
here the passage is examined in terms of what it means for Sidgwick’s utilitarianism. 
For if it is quoted in full, there appears a considerable challenge to a consequentialist 
viewpoint:  
 
‘It is urged that “rightness” is properly an attribute of means, not of ends: so that the 
attribution of it merely implies that the act judged right is the fittest or only fit means to the 
realisation of some end…and similarly that the affirmation that anything ‘ought to be done’ is 
always made with at least tacit reference to some ulterior end…but it seems clear (1) that 
                                                 
that there is a certain closeness between absolute-principle based and end based moral principles, as 
they appear in day to day morality.  
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certain kinds of action…are commonly held to be right unconditionally, without regard to 
ulterior results and (2) that we similarly regard as “right” the adoption of certain ends…In 
either of these cases the interpretation above seems clearly inadmissible’ (I:III:26)  
Sidgwick then makes his statement that ‘we have therefore to find a meaning for 
‘right’ or ‘what ought to be’ other than the notion of fitness to some ulterior end’ 
(I:I:26). 
Sidgwick’s argument that rightness can be found in ends of course accords fully 
with the typical utilitarian position, held by both Bentham and Mill, that value lies in 
ends such as those Sidgwick references here. But the difference between Sidgwick’s 
thought and that of the utilitarianism typical of his time (and of most 20th Century 
utilitarianism) lies in what Sidgwick’s definition of rightness excludes. Sidgwick’s 
mention of the ‘adoption’ of these ends suggests he recognises that means to those 
ends must have a role somewhere- but his uncompromising statement that rightness 
cannot mean ‘fit to an ulterior end’ appears here to preclude the idea that actions can 
have the property of ‘rightness’, merely provided they are pertaining to a certain 
end435. When it is considered then that Sidgwick is held to represent the epitome of 
classical utilitarianism, this position on ‘rightness’ as not applicable to ‘fit to an end’ is 
striking. Sidgwick may be consistent with classical utilitarianism in his recognition of 
ends, but he is apparently not consistent in terms of how he sees the relationship 
between action and those ends. It is only the ends themselves that qualify as ‘right’ 
in this unconditional and categorical sense (which is the same ‘right’ that is used to 
describe certain unconditional and non-consequentialist duties): Means, according to 
Sidgwick at this stage, cannot qualify in the same way. Ultimately, according to 
Sidgwick, ‘ought’ and ‘right’ cannot actually be fully defined in express terms at all 
(I:III:32), let alone be used to describe relative or conditional actions. All this results 
in an extremely unusual position for a utilitarian436. 
                                                 
435 Sidgwick is as good as explicit on the exclusion from his understanding of ‘rightness’ as involving 
means to ends. By including the word ‘similarly’ in his reference to how we regard the adoption of 
certain ends, Sidgwick draws an unequivocal parallel between certain ends – which so commonly 
invoke the notion of means in the utilitarian tradition - and the recognisably deontological view that 
certain actions are right ‘without regard to ulterior results’ (I:I:26). That is, Sidgwick means that these 
certain ends are also considered to be right unconditionally and in themselves.  
436 Sidgwick gives an even more direct defence of his idea of rightness as not simply meaning fit to an 
ulterior end in ‘Fundamental Ethical Controversies’. Here, Sidgwick writes that a ‘‘rational judgement’ 
is normally expressed in the form ‘x is right’, or ‘x ought to be done’; and if the judgement be attained 
by deduction from a principle, such a principle is always capable of being expressed as a proposition 
in which the word ‘right’ or ‘ought’ occurs’ (p.482). He continues, in discourse with Fowler, that he 
believes the notions expressed by ‘ought’ and ‘right’ are ‘ultimate and unanalysable’, and again here 
explicitly rejects the idea, this time put forward by Fowler, that right could mean ‘fit to the realisation of 
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There are further consequences of this view of rightness, for three more of 
traditional utilitarianisms’ most basic components: The principle of utility, the 
consequentialism inherent in that principle, and – overall – utilitarianism’s teleological 
nature. The challenge of Sidgwick’s work to these cornerstones of utilitarianism is 
addressed in the following sections.  
 
3.2.a. The Rejection of Right as ‘fitness to some end’: The Challenge to the 
Principle of Utility 
 
Sidgwick’s exclusion of means from his definition of rightness immediately calls to 
attention a foundational tenet of the classical utilitarianism of Sidgwick’s time - 
Bentham’s principle of utility. This is ‘that principle which approves or disapproves of 
every action according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or 
diminish the happiness of an individual…’437. In other words, actions are to be judged 
morally right or wrong in as far as they are the means to either securing Happiness, 
or avoiding pain. 
Compare the principle of utility to Sidgwick’s words, ‘the attribution of [rightness] 
merely implies that the act judged right is the fittest or only fit means to the 
realisation of some end…’ (I:III:26), and his immediate denial that this emphasis on 
means to ends provides the correct version of rightness (‘…the interpretation above 
suggested seems clearly inadmissible’). The disagreement between the two 
positions is clear. The principle of utility is plainly queried by Sidgwick’s defining right 
not as fit to an end, and by his rejection of the idea that rightness is an attribute of 
means438. If rightness has this absolute, unconditional quality, then actions cannot 
                                                 
some end’. Sidgwick is at his most emphatic when he writes, ‘the approval of the conscious choice of 
another’s greater good in preference to the chooser’s lesser good, is regarded [by Fowler] as a 
normal moral judgement…this judgement must be expressible in the proposition that ‘conscious 
choice &c. is right’, and the word ‘right’ in this proposition cannot mean ‘conducive to the greatest 
good on the whole’. On this basis, Sidgwick concludes, the idea of right cannot ‘be explicable by the 
idea of good’ (p.485). Lastly, and with particular significance for this argument which aims to show 
Sidgwick’s utilitarianism to be unconventional, Sidgwick notices that on this point about rightness, 
other utilitarian writers do not agree with him. 
437 Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789) Ch.1, §4 (in, John 
Bowring (ed.) The Works of Jeremy Bentham Vol.1 [1839] (London: W.Tait:1843)  
438 Sidgwick recognises the difference between his thought and Bentham’s here, and in a footnote to 
his definition of rightness draws a comparison between the two positions himself. Sidgwick’s point in 
the note is that Bentham cannot mean that rightness is simply ‘conducive to general happiness’, as 
this would ‘hardly serve as the fundamental principle of a moral system’ (I:III:26). Sidgwick departs 
significantly from Bentham then, over Bentham’s definition (or lack, thereof) of the kind of rightness 
that Sidgwick argues for in I:III – for it is clear from Bentham’s writing that this is what he meant. 
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simply be called right when they pertain to a certain end, and the fundamental 
precept of utility is refuted.  
In this way, the consequentialism inherent in the principle of utility is also 
contested439. Consequentialism holds that an action can be judged to be right when 
it brings about certain desirable outcomes. It has already been argued in chapter 2 
that as Sidgwick argues for the distinct nature of rational, ultimate ends as being 
right without regard to ulterior results, an ultimate rational end such as Happiness is 
actually in itself non-consequentialist - and here non-consequentialism also seems to 
apply to actions440. Actions that bring about certain outcomes are simply fit to an 
end, and this does not accord with Sidgwick’s definition of rightness.  
                                                 
Bentham says, ‘Of an action conformable to the principle of utility’ (which approves or disapproves 
actions so far as they augment or diminish happiness), ‘one may always say either that it is one that 
ought to be done, or at least that it is not one that ought not to be done. One may say also, that it is 
right it should be done…thus interpreted, the words ought, right, and wrong, and others of that stamp, 
have meaning: when otherwise, they have none’. Bentham does therefore, as Sidgwick suggests, 
hold that by ‘right’ it is meant ‘conducive to the general happiness’. As Ronald D. Milo points out in his 
1974 article ‘Bentham’s Principle’ (Ethics, Vol.84, No.2 (1979) 128-139) it appears here as though 
Bentham is not just proposing a normative test for rightness, but that he is also making a meta-ethical 
statement about what it means to say that an action is right or wrong. (Milo also points out Sidgwick’s 
dispute with Bentham on this point (p.132). On this comparison then, the disagreement between 
Bentham and Sidgwick over what is meant by ‘right’, and an unavoidable subsequent disagreement 
over the accuracy of the principle of utility, becomes clear. 
Sidgwick specifically discusses the principle of utility – and Mill’s defence of it - later in ME 
(III:XIII:387), and does actually offer his own interpretation of the principle. This appears deep within 
the very particular context of Sidgwick’s argument for the proof of the utilitarian principle. See chapter 
4. 
439 Given that consequentialism holds that the morally right action is the one that brings about the best 
overall outcome, and that the rightness of actions is determined by their consequences, 
consequentialism is inherent in the principle of utility.  
It should be noted that consequentialism, as a theory of ethics, is not completely limited to 
utilitarianism (see chapter 1 p.94 of this thesis’ for G.E.M. Anscombe’s first use of the term). The 
basic premise is that the consequences of one’s actions are the ultimate standard for judging 
rightness and wrongness – but consequentialist theories in general do not necessarily contain specific 
definitions of what those consequences are to be. As such, theories such as ethical egoism, in which 
actions may either benefit, disadvantage or be neutral towards others, are not excluded from the 
equation. (Sidgwick’s own exploration of ethical egoism concludes that the consequences of egoistic 
conduct may at times promote the general welfare, but only by proxy). Nor does it exclude ethical 
altruism, in which the consequences of an agent’s actions pertain to everyone except that agent. For 
the present purposes however, the position is taken that utilitarianism is generally considered to be 
the paradigmatic example of a consequentialist ethical theory. 
440 It is also noticeable that specific references to ‘consequences’ are remarkably sparse in ME, 
appearing at only three places in Book I, and often in conjunction with simply defining utilitarianism as 
opposed to Intuitionism. ‘Consequences’ appears at I:I:8, where utilitarianism is being defined 
negatively in relation to deontology; I:III:35, where Sidgwick argues that no-one really means to deny 
that we are obliged to certain actions without any regard to consequences; and I:VI:87, which is the 
only place at which Sidgwick uses the direct phrase ‘utilitarian consequences’. One way in which this 
might be explained is that arguably, the notion of consequences is always implied in Sidgwick’s 
references to actions that pertain to ulterior ends. But Sidgwick’s apparent neglect of this essential 
part of the utilitarian doctrine is perhaps better accounted for in another way, that is more telling of his 
moral theory overall. This is the argument that Sidgwick is purposefully maintaining a slight distance 
between what I will call the ‘pure’ consequentialist idea that consequences – ‘ends’ - are all that 
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It is true that Sidgwick has identified certain ends as being the ultimate reasons 
for acting, and that this could be seen as indirectly maintaining the underlying idea 
that ends must dictate action to some extent. This is explored fully below. But within 
the context of this current discussion which seeks to demonstrate that Sidgwick’s 
utilitarianism is not typical of his time, the classical tradition, or indeed of much 
utilitarianism that has followed, there is strong evidence here for an apparent 
divergence between Sidgwick’s definition of rightness, and the cornerstone of the 
traditional utilitarian doctrine. Phrased in the most extreme terms, it would seem as 
though the role of the principle of utility in determining moral action is, for Sidgwick, 
seriously reduced.  
 
3.2.b. The Rejection of Right’ as ‘fitness to some end’: Sidgwick’s Teleology 
 
If the principle of utility is thus contested, then there emerges a related but wider 
consequence for Sidgwick’s utilitarianism. This is that the entire teleological nature of 
utilitarianism as understood by Sidgwick could be called into question.  
Teleological systems of ethics, of which utilitarianism is the foremost example, 
maintain that moral rightness lies in the bringing about of certain ends. If actions that 
pertain to ends cannot be called ‘right’, then a fundamental part of teleology is 
refuted. This argument does, however, depend on what is meant by ‘teleological’ in 
ethics. If it is taken to mean that the moral rightness of an act is determined by its 
being fit to some end, then Sidgwick’s definition of rightness does disqualify his 
model from being teleological441. This view that the teleology in Sidgwick’s theory is 
brought into question by his understanding of rightness is further supported by his 
Reason-based process of establishing ultimate rational ends, and by the type of 
value that he places on those ends. This is because Sidgwick’s argument for what is 
reasonable being also that which is right shares a striking amount with Kant’s 
prioritising of the right. Even if no connection between Sidgwick and Kant is actually 
                                                 
matter in any situation, and his own emphasis on Happiness as the only true right rational end. This 
further contributes to the impression already developing that Sidgwick is not – and will not be – 
building a version of utilitarianism that simply revolves around the importance of consequences, or the 
bringing about of certain results.  
441 This version is based on understanding ethical teleology in its rawest form, which can be 
represented by the phrase ‘the ends justify the means’. I do not believe that Sidgwick’s concept of 
rightness allows for such an understanding, and that Sidgwick therefore avoids this particularly 
difficult area of utilitarian ethics.  
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made, it still remains that Sidgwick attributes the same kind and degree of rightness 
to Happiness as he recognises to be given to certain moral duties by the Intuitional 
(deontological) position, and in both these cases rightness is wholly independent, 
and cannot be achieved or established by anything conditional. To this 
understanding of teleology in ethics then, Sidgwick does not seem to conform. 
Alternatively, teleology can also be construed as holding that intrinsic value lies in 
(usually non-moral) ends, and that moral obligation can then be derived from these 
ends. This understanding places the emphasis not on the actions, but on the moral 
status of the ends themselves. In this case, Sidgwick’s emphasis on Happiness as 
an ultimate end that is right in itself and rational to pursue does clearly accord with a 
teleological understanding. It is a stricter teleology than the first definition, and it is 
the only one that Sidgwick’s definition of rightness allows - but it is also the route 
through which ‘rightness’ can be extended, on a very specific understanding, to 
actions that pertain to an end442. Sidgwick explains this via his discussion of Truth-
speaking. Here, he allows that means such as Truth-speaking do acquire a certain 
‘ought’, but only by extension of the reasonableness of a rational end (I:III:35-36). To 
expand on this, Sidgwick’s justification of the means of Truth-speaking can only 
happen on the grounds that the end (of preserving society) is first recognised as a 
rational end; as it is only rational for a rational being to aim at rational ends, these 
sorts of means take on the same sort of ‘ought’ (i.e. moral obligation) outlined in I:I 
443. Means are therefore restored, and Sidgwick’s utilitarianism emerges more 
recognisably here, as does a teleological approach444. But the ends must be 
                                                 
442 This is Sidgwick’s reintroduction of means to ends into his definition of rightness, that was 
indicated by chapter 2. 
443  This is the ‘ought’ which is inherently connected to Reason. This ‘ought’, applied now to those 
means, still brings with it the properties peculiar to that notion, of being a dictate of reason, and as 
being something which is only rational for a rational being to pursue. (Sidgwick’s keenness to convey 
the fact that the dictate of Reason applies just as much to means as to ends appears plainly, and with 
a note of frustration: “and the notion of ‘ought’ as used in in either dictate is that which I have been 
trying to make clear”). Sidgwick continues this point on p.35, where it might be argued that his phrase 
‘the recognition of an end as ultimately reasonable involves the recognition of an obligation to do such 
acts as most conduce to the end’ is a clear defence of the utilitarian idea that actions are right in as 
far as they conduce to a certain end. This also seems to be supported by a rather throwaway 
comment from Sidgwick made in the preceding paragraph, in which he states that ‘actions are 
‘reasonable’ or (in an absolute sense), ‘right’). Both of these passages appear to validate the idea that 
Sidgwick believes any reasonable action to be ‘right’, because it is reasonable. But in response to this 
I argue that even this understanding is dependent on the prior establishment of ultimate, rational 
ends.  
444 It is certainly teleological in contrast to pure deontological theories in which an action is held to be 
right (or wrong) regardless of any ulterior results. But the distance between the two positions might be 
reduced again with Sidgwick’s comment that there has never been a type of morality that did not 
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determined first, as Sidgwick’s apparent prioritising of the right outlined above also 
demands - and these ends must possess the specific identity of being ultimate, 
rational ends. The importance of the distance that Sidgwick has maintained between 
his own concept of ultimate, rational ends on the one hand, and the more 
traditionally utilitarian concept of consequences on the other, now becomes evident. 
Consequences and rational, ultimate ends do not have the same moral value in 
Sidgwick’s thought; only ends that have been established rationally have that 
peculiar and absolute non-consequentialist rightness445. The priority of the right 
appears clearly here again, with the usually utilitarian idea of means to ends only 
emerging from a traditionally deontological and non-consequentialist understanding 
of exactly what is meant by the term ‘right’. Means still depend entirely on the prior 
recognition of an ultimate, reasonable end But if rational ends are established 
correctly, means to those ends also acquire an ‘ought’, which denotes rightness446.  
Overall then, Sidgwick’s theory of moral obligation is teleological in that 
obligations can be derived from intrinsically valuable ends. On the other hand, it is 
not teleological in that moral rightness itself cannot be determined purely by what is 
fit to an end. It is my view that Sidgwick’s theory can be described as either 
teleological or non-teleological – and this in itself is not typical of a classically 
utilitarian position.   
                                                 
consider consequences to some extent (I:VIII:96). On this basis, Sidgwick’s argument for rational 
ends is purely a logical result of that observation, and could apply equally to absolute-principle based 
systems – which must also include ends to some degree. 
445 Strictly speaking, Sidgwick does point out that the obligation is not quite unconditional in the same 
way as duties are considered to be unconditional by the Intuitional position. But, he says, the 
obligation in the case of what is conducive to an end does not depend on any non-rational 
desires/aversions (I:III:35). It therefore still falls within the remit that Sidgwick describes at I:III:25 (and 
which he alludes to earlier at I:I:9) of what is meant by the ‘fundamental notion’ of ‘ought’, which has a 
unique character, excludes any reference to sensory/psychical experience, and therefore has that 
‘peculiar significance’ of rightness. 
446 Via the same route, a consequentialist aspect can also be returned to Sidgwick’s theory. As 
consequentialism holds that the consequences of an action are the basis of judgement for the 
rightness of that action, then it can be taken that actions that are imbibed with an ‘ought’ because they 
are aiming at an ultimately reasonable end are right according to a consequentialist viewpoint.   
When this argument is expanded, it can be seen that Sidgwick’s only allowing ‘consequences’ to be 
understood in this way prevents a situation in which any end perceived as positive would justify an 
action. The most obvious example with which to demonstrate this point is that of Nazi Germany. 
There, the idea was conceived and encouraged that mass genocide would be beneficial to the 
country; those beneficial consequences were used as the justification for the actions of the Third 
Reich, when it is clear that such actions do not conform to any objective, rational standard of 
rightness. On Sidgwick’s method of establishing the rational ultimate ends that are to dictate action, 
the broad consequentialist concept that ends simply justify the means is, as Sidgwick would say, 
clearly inadmissible. This limitation to which ends can be considered rational and therefore morally 
right is also relevant to the possible establishing of limitation to action in the context of the Parental 
Predicament, a point that I will explore in the thesis conclusion.  
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3.2.c. Conclusions on Sidgwick’s Definition of Rightness 
 
It was seen in the preceding section that despite Sidgwick’s early denial that right 
means ‘fit to an ulterior end’, Sidgwick’s view of rightness, and how the moral 
obligation established by that view applies to ends, can in some respects be 
described as teleological. But this question regarding the apparently debatable 
status of Sidgwick’s teleology that is raised by his definition of the right seems to be 
a valid one – and, crucially, the responses to it outlined here are important for what 
they reveal about Sidgwick’s emerging utilitarianism. This importance can be 
summarised with the statement that all of the predominantly utilitarian and 
teleological concepts discussed in this section only appear in Sidgwick’s 
understanding in highly specific - and restricted - ways. That is, it is only on a 
particular understanding of certain specifically defined ends that are ultimately 
rational i.e. established as right without reference to ulterior results, that means 
acquire the ‘ought’ that denotes rightness at all. Sidgwick’s teleology is therefore 
highly dependent on his prior view of the right, and his thought here treads a fine and 
sophisticated line between teleological utilitarianism, and a non-consequentialist 
priority of the right. 
As for the principle of utility, Sidgwick’s teleology is not as unmistakeable as 
Bentham’s, or Mill’s - and consequently neither is his use of the principle of utility. 
Whereas reasonable actions that pertain to a reasonable end are found to have 
some kind of moral worth (and although Sidgwick agrees with Bentham that 
Happiness is the rational end in question) the principle of utility simply does not 
seem adequate to capture the precise origin and degree of this worth. It is at best an 
incomplete theory as to how to determine the rightness of actions. In any case, 
Sidgwick certainly offers a more refined account of that principle’s role than either of 
his predecessors.  
This leads to what can be said more positively of the effect that Sidgwick’s 
position on rightness has on his utilitarianism overall. It is still Sidgwick’s view of 
rightness that, it might be better to say, cannot simply be defined as fit to an ulterior 
end that makes his writing here unique. He rejects the standard utilitarian idea that 
rightness is simply fit to an ulterior end, but his particular view of rightness, which 
relies on what can be said about the notion of ‘ought’ eventually allows for a system 
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in which both ultimate rational ends, and certain related rational actions, are right447. 
Phrased in terms that pertain to my argument in this thesis that Sidgwick’s moral 
theory is comprised of both deontological and utilitarian principles, Sidgwick has 
perceived rightness in both approaches, and connected them in an intricate balance 
which is maintained by the precedence of that unconditional and categorical 
rightness. And in the narrower terms of Sidgwick’s utilitarianism - if it can be called 
that at this stage - this position makes it more robust, better supported, and 
ultimately perhaps more morally and philosophically credible than that of his time.  
 
3.3. Happiness and Pleasure as Ultimate Ends 
 
The last issue raised by Sidgwick’s definition of rightness, and his highly specific 
position on the rightness of means to ends, is that of Sidgwick’s views on quite what 
is meant by Happiness as an ultimate end. Specifically, Sidgwick considers how far 
pleasure is to be included in this definition. On this topic, Sidgwick reaches the first 
of the most obvious utilitarian concepts to have appeared in ME448. But here, again, 
Sidgwick is not entirely in line with the traditional utilitarian understandings of the 
classical era. Firstly, and contra Bentham, Sidgwick rejects pleasure as an ultimate 
end. Secondly, he offers a defence of Happiness as an ultimate end that supersedes 
those of both Bentham and Mill- while also bringing him back into line, rather 
surprisingly, with Bentham. These points are explored in turn, in order to ascertain 
Sidgwick’s view on this fundamental utilitarian idea, and the place that he affords it in 
his own version of the doctrine. This will be crucial for the eventual expounding in 
chapter 4 of Sidgwick’s moral theory of Rational Benevolence which depends on 
                                                 
447 As Sidgwick himself says at I:III:32-33, the notion which ‘right’ and ‘ought’ have in common is too 
elementary to admit of any formal definition. It follows, therefore, that Sidgwick should find rightness 
to apply in both deontological and utilitarian viewpoints, as he has done here. Furthermore, Sidgwick 
himself states in ‘Fundamental Ethical Controversies’ that what words such as ‘right’ and ‘ought’ have 
in common is the same in different ethical systems…’ That is, Sidgwick does expressly state his 
recognition that this understanding of rightness transcends the traditional divide between 
deontological/utilitarian understandings of right. 
448 Until this point in ME, utilitarianism has been held in relatively low profile, with concepts primarily 
considered to be deontological often dominating the discussion, and with any utilitarian ideas mainly 
being subsumed therein. Where there has been deeper and prolonged discussion of Sidgwick’s 
utilitarianism, as throughout 4.2., I have raised those questions myself, in order to state what can be 
inferred about his utilitarianism at this stage.  
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Sidgwick’s understanding of Happiness as the good inherent in Universal 
Benevolence. 
 
3.3.a. Sidgwick’s Rejection of Pleasure 
 
It has already been noted above that Sidgwick considers Happiness to be one of 
only two rational ultimate ends (see I:I:9, 11). On this, he is emphatically clear. What 
is often less clear (at least until a complete reading of ME has been made, as argued 
below) is exactly how Sidgwick sees the relationship between the concepts of 
‘Happiness’, which is considered to be a rational ultimate end, ‘hedonism’, which is 
used by Sidgwick to denote those methods that hold Happiness to be an ultimate 
end, and ‘pleasure’, the idea that accompanies hedonism.  For the term ‘hedonism’ 
itself represents the theory that pleasure is intrinsically valuable (and that pain is 
intrinsically non-valuable), and this is the position of Bentham, who famously 
asserted that ‘nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
masters, pain and pleasure’, and that ‘it is for them alone to point out what we ought 
to do, as well as determine what we shall do’449. Bentham then equates this pleasure 
directly with Happiness. In Bentham’s doctrine then, Happiness itself is quite clearly 
the hedonistic understanding of that word – and Sidgwick appears to follow 
Bentham’s lead here in equating the two450. It would appear therefore as though 
Sidgwick is conforming to this idea that pleasure is synonymous with the Happiness 
that is the ultimate end. To some extent, this is Sidgwick’s position. On the other 
hand, he expressly denies that pleasure is an ultimate end. In order to understand 
this complication, and its significance for Sidgwick’s utilitarianism, it is necessary to 
begin with the denial of pleasure as an ultimate end451. 
Sidgwick challenges Bentham’s view that pleasure and pain are the sole 
motivators to voluntary action by pointing out that we frequently act on impulses that 
                                                 
449 Bentham, An Introduction, I:I – italics mine.  
450 At I:VI:41, where Sidgwick embarks on the first discussion of pleasure and desire, Sidgwick 
specifically refers the reader back to his statement in ME’s introduction that he is using the ‘exact 
hedonistic interpretation of ‘happiness’ which Bentham has made current’, and which Sidgwick 
considers to be the ‘most suitable use of the term’ (I:IV:41).  
451 As mentioned in the literature review, there is some debate over whether or not Sidgwick believed 
pleasure to be the end of rational action. Thomas Christiano, for example, accepts without question 
that this is Sidgwick’s position; Roger Crisp express denies it. I am in agreement with Crisp; pleasure 
is an integral part of Happiness, which is the end of rational action, but it is not the end itself, as I will 
argue in this section.  
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are not directly related to pleasure (or relief from pain) – and, conversely, that a very 
part of the pleasure that is in question is actually often brought about by acting on 
those non-pleasure related impulses (I:IV:47-48, 48-49)452. Sidgwick concludes that 
‘the doctrine that pleasure (or the absence of pain) is the end of all human action can 
neither be supported by the results of introspection, nor by the results of external 
observation’ (I:IV:53), and that there is ‘no necessary connection between 
the…proposition that pleasure or absence of pain…is always the actual ultimate end 
of my action, and the ethical proposition that my own greatest happiness or pleasure 
is for me the right [Sidgwick’s italics] ultimate end’ (I:IV:41)453. 
Sidgwick’s claim that pleasure cannot be an ultimate end is not strictly original – 
J.S. Mill had already replaced the language of ‘pleasure’ as the end of human action 
with that of ‘happiness’ in his direct continuation (and defence) of Bentham’s work. 
But Sidgwick’s handling of ‘pleasure’ and ‘happiness’ arguably supersedes Mill’s. It 
is, firstly, a perfect example of Sidgwick’s avoiding of Moore’s ‘naturalistic fallacy’ 
which Bentham was thought to have committed by claiming that because people do 
desire pleasure, people ought to desire pleasure454. But furthermore, it is Sidgwick’s 
interpretation of rightness that allows a far more convincing explanation as to why 
pleasure cannot be the end of human action. Given that ‘rightness’ is derived from 
what is rational, ‘rightness’ is restricted to ends that can be determined via Reason, 
or rationality, only, and thus excludes ends that are derived from sensory 
experience. As Sidgwick himself points out, this necessarily excludes the idea of [the 
                                                 
452 For example, we must avoid over indulging in the pleasure of eating in order to avoid ill-health 
which will not be conducive to real long term happiness, or, conversely, we must pursue certain less 
pleasant activities, such as exercise, for the same reasons. Sidgwick refers to this situation as the 
‘paradox of hedonism’ (I:IV:48, 51, 52). Sidgwick also extends his challenge to pleasure as the sole 
motivator via his observations on sacrifice – namely, than an individual may well recognise that a 
sacrifice will not benefit themselves, and yet still determine that it must be made (I:IV:52).This is a real 
sacrifice, and not a simply exchange of short-term pleasures for long-term ones, as Bentham might 
have interpreted a sacrifice situation.  
453 Even if it can be proven that each individual is led to do what, on his view, would be the most 
conducive to his own happiness, this still does not admit of the quality of ‘rightness’: The individual 
may indeed believe that they are acting reasonably, but they are acting from a psychological law, 
which of course cannot be given the status of being a dictate of Reason (I:IV:41). Sidgwick’s view that 
pleasure is clearly not always the ultimate end, and certainly not the end of right conduct, also 
appears in his paper, ‘Pleasure and Desire’, (The Contemporary Review, Vol. 19 (1872), 662-72). 
454 Mill had famously attempted to overcome the problem of the naturalistic fallacy, but – at least 
according to Moore - very little success. Although Mill has since been largely exonerated of this 
charge, Moore’s influence has lasted in the impression that Sidgwick avoided the naturalistic fallacy 
with considerable more security than Mill. In fact, Moore was ready to claim that by refuting the idea 
that goodness is not definable or analysable, Sidgwick may actually have discovered the fallacy. See 
Moore, Principia Ethica, pp.17, 21. See also Thomas Baldwin, G.E. Moore; The Arguments of the 
Philosophers (Oxford: Routledge:1992) p.53) 
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experience of] pleasure as being, in the moral sense, ‘right’. Sidgwick’s position on 
pleasure stands in stark contrast then to Bentham’s account that it is pleasure and 
pain that are to determine what we normatively ought to do.  
The complication with this rejection begins when it is seen that Sidgwick, in that 
chapter which rejects pleasure as an ultimate end, states that he is using the ‘exact 
hedonistic interpretation of ‘happiness’ which Bentham has made current’ (I:IV:41), 
as he also referenced at I:I:10. It seems that this is done in order to remind the 
reader of the central concepts of the classical, Benthamite utilitarianism to which 
Sidgwick has regularly referred, and with which Sidgwick is working in this exposition 
of the various ‘methods of ethics’455. But re-examining I:I with this possibility in mind 
only exposes the fact that Sidgwick never actually gives Bentham’s interpretation of 
Happiness per se – he only quotes Bentham’s view that Happiness is to be ‘the true 
standard of right and wrong, in the field of morals’ (I:I:10). It can only be surmised 
then that this ‘exact hedonistic interpretation’ to which Sidgwick refers is Bentham’s 
understanding of Happiness. The major problem with this is that Bentham’s definition 
of Happiness as an ultimate end is the pursuit or the attainment of pleasure, and the 
avoidance of pain. But with Sidgwick having specifically denied that 
pleasure/avoidance of pain can be an ultimate end, the Benthamite version of 
Happiness defined as pleasure cannot, by logical extension, be an ultimate end. 
There is, then, a noticeable contradiction here between Sidgwick’s and 
Bentham’s respective interpretations of Happiness, that is then exacerbated by 
Sidgwick’s claim that he himself is using Bentham’s interpretation of ‘hedonism’. So 
how is this rejection of pleasure, which seems to accord so well with Sidgwick’s other 
points made so far, to be reconciled with his use of the Benthamite version of 
hedonism? The answer to this points to a true strength of Sidgwick’s utilitarianism – 
and reveals the interpretation of Happiness that is going to underpin his own moral 
theory. 
 
 
                                                 
455 In another footnote on p.87, Sidgwick reiterates further that he has called the ‘ethical doctrine that 
takes universal happiness as the ultimate end and standard of right conduct by the name of 
Bentham’, because thinkers who have taught the doctrine have most frequently referred to Bentham 
as their master (I:VI:87). Of course, we can agree with Sidgwick that universalistic hedonism is indeed 
Bentham’s doctrine (even if Sidgwick’s interpretation of that doctrine is far more sophisticated and 
complex than Bentham’s), but this does not remove the problem – at this stage of ME at least - of how 
that hedonism is to be defined. 
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3.3.b. Sidgwick’s Interpretation of Happiness as an Ultimate End 
 
In answering the question just posed, it must first be noted that throughout I:IV, 
Sidgwick uses ‘happiness’ and ‘pleasure’ interchangeably (see I:IV:41, 44, 51). This 
implies that Sidgwick does not seem to think that there needs to be a distinction 
between his own version of Happiness and Bentham’s, and further compounds the 
apparent confusion noted above456. There is a degree to which ‘pleasure’ could be 
interpreted as being subsumed within the wider and greater notion of ‘ultimate 
Happiness’ as the individual actions that lead to Happiness, and this would mean 
that Sidgwick is really just using a Benthamite interpretation of Happiness after all. 
But that is not what is at stake at this particular point in the text: Sidgwick is 
specifically discussing the status of pleasure as an ultimate end, and he is rejecting 
this idea.  
The theory that pleasure is included within the ultimate notion of Happiness is, 
however, the key to understanding the apparent contradiction, and is more effective 
if a wider view of ME is taken. To this end, we must accept the last definition of 
‘utilitarianism’ that Sidgwick gives in I:I: “The two methods which take happiness as 
an ultimate end it will be convenient to distinguish as Egoistic and Universalistic 
Hedonism: and it is the latter of these, as taught by Bentham…that is more generally 
understood under the term ‘Utilitarianism’ (I:I:11). The use of ‘hedonism’ here is still 
awkward, in that it invites ideas of pleasure seeking etc. by way of definition. But 
whereas the language of hedonism is often accompanied throughout ME by the 
ideas of ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’, it is always accompanied by the language of 
Happiness (see I:VI:84-85, II:I:120, III:XIV:402, IV:I: 413), which Sidgwick 
convincingly defines as a rational, ultimate end457. As ME progresses therefore, 
                                                 
456 In only two places does he use the terms ‘pleasure’ and ‘happiness’ separately, and even this 
separation is not made in express terms (see I:IV:51,52).  
457 See III:VIII:380-384 (and also III:IV:241) for Sidgwick’s specific defence of Happiness as the true 
rational end. There are also a few sections of ME that can add further weight to the argument being 
made here that it is Happiness and not pleasure that is the ultimate end. Firstly, pleasure is not 
mentioned once in ME’s introduction, where Sidgwick generally does include all of the notions most 
important to both the Intuitionist and the utilitarian points of view. ‘Happiness’, on the other hand, 
appears 17 times in the introduction in the context of being a rational ultimate end, as well as many 
other times as a general word. Even in these ‘general’ uses, Sidgwick never associatively uses the 
word ‘pleasure’. Secondly, Sidgwick’s definition of right can be recalled: Happiness qualifies under 
that definition because it is rational, and not fit to a still ulterior end, whereas pleasure is disqualified 
from the status of rightness on both of those grounds. Thirdly, at I:IX:107, Sidgwick rejects that ‘good’ 
is equivalent to pleasure, and by a process of elimination arrives at the conclusion that the good of 
man is Happiness (when it is not Perfection or Excellence of Human Existence) – not pleasure. Then 
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‘hedonism’ gradually takes on a character in Sidgwick’s work in which pleasure and 
the avoidance of pain are integral parts of Happiness itself, but are not considered to 
be rational ultimate ends. The term ‘hedonism’ still represents Happiness, and by 
extension represents the pleasure that is essential to that Happiness. But, crucially, 
hedonism no longer refers directly to the pleasure itself. This is what distinguishes it 
from Bentham’s use of the word. Bentham’s hedonism holds pleasure as an ultimate 
end, where Sidgwick’s does not.  This explains why Sidgwick can both refer to 
Bentham’s definition of Happiness, as he does in the note on p.87, and reject 
Bentham’s view of pleasure. Sidgwick accepts Bentham’s position that ‘Happiness’ is 
a rational ultimate end, and even that that Happiness involves hedonistic elements in 
its definition. But Sidgwick can differentiate that pleasure has a role/status wherein it 
has instrumental or non-intrinsic value only458. Sidgwick thus retains a form of 
hedonism in which pleasure and Happiness are intrinsically linked, but not strictly 
interchangeable459. 
                                                 
of course there is the passage already cited from I:IV, in which Sidgwick renounces the idea that 
pleasure is not always what amounts to Happiness (see also I:IV:48) As for Sidgwick’s view on the 
true identity and role of pleasure/pain, the protracted discussion of this appears in Book II, which 
addresses egoistic hedonism.  
The details of Sidgwick’s view of pleasure per se need not concern us here, but it is worth noting that 
– somewhat surprisingly - Sidgwick agrees with Bentham and disagrees with Mill that pleasures are to 
be measured quantatively, not qualitatively, as per Mill’s attempt to refine this coarser aspect of 
Bentham’s doctrine (see II:I:120-121, II:II:123-125. See also ‘Utilitarianism 1873’, where Sidgwick 
makes the same argument). This version of commensurability, Sidgwick argues, is necessary if 
Happiness is to be understood as the greatest surplus of pleasure over pain. Because this definition 
presupposes quantity as the standard of measurement, more pleasure must be sought as opposed to 
less regardless of any other qualities that those pleasures may have. His other reason for agreeing 
with Bentham is that for all pleasures to be understood as pleasures in the first place, they must have 
a common property, and that it is therefore possible to weigh amounts of this property. To say that 
something can be ‘the greatest amount’, while denying that the components can be commensurable 
would be, Sidgwick says, ‘a mathematical absurdity’ (IV:I:413).  
458 In addition to his argument in I:IV that pleasure cannot be an ultimate end, and furthering the point 
made above that Sidgwick’s definition of rightness as not fit an ulterior end denies pleasure the status 
of an ultimate end, on p.92 Sidgwick also states that he is rejecting Aristotle’s definition of Happiness 
as ‘eudemonia’, given that this only really translates as ‘well-being’, and well-being could still be 
interpreted to mean a variety of things i.e. it is clearly not an ultimate end. Using these same grounds, 
it is possible to create a greater distance between Happiness and pleasure in Sidgwick’s work: 
Pleasure, like well-being, can still be variably interpreted – it is therefore clearly subordinate to some 
greater and higher principle, which is that of Happiness. 
459 Sidgwick does continue to occasionally use either Happiness or pleasure to refer to the same thing 
(see for example I:VI:78, II:I:120, IV:I:413) and at one point states that “Happiness ( = sum of 
pleasures)” (III:XIV:407). This is also clear in ‘Utilitarianism 1873’, where Sidgwick states that 
‘‘happiness’ must be understood as equivalent to ‘pleasure’’, and that ‘Pleasure cannot be 
distinguished from Happiness’. I believe that this apparent equivalence can be explained however 
when it is borne in mind that pleasure remains the medium through which Happiness is actually 
understood. Sidgwick continues the passage just quoted from ‘Utilitarianism 1873’ with the 
qualification ‘...except that Happiness is rather used to denote a sum or series of those transitory 
feelings each of which we call a Pleasure. The utilitarian, then, aims at making the sum of preferable 
or desirable feelings in the world…as great as possible’. Sidgwick argues that Happiness has to have 
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Adopting a broader textual view of Sidgwick’s notion of pleasure, and its 
relationship to Happiness, thus reveals greater consistency in Sidgwick’s use of 
hedonism than the chapter in which Sidgwick specifically renounces pleasure as an 
ultimate end460. It is seen that Sidgwick both agrees with Bentham, and departs from 
him, on the same topic. Either way, even if it is concluded that Sidgwick is following 
Bentham’s definition of Happiness, his defence of this notion – and his demoting of 
the idea of pleasure as an ultimate master – is a far stronger one. 
Moreover, we can translate Sidgwick’s emphasis on ends and the specific way in 
which actions that pertain to those ends acquire their own reasonableness directly 
                                                 
some defining features, and this does require reference to pleasure; in both ME and ‘Utilitarianism 
1873’, Sidgwick is simple describing what utilitarians actually mean when they describe Happiness. 
What is important to maintain then is that whereas that there is a very close connection between 
happiness and pleasure in Sidgwick’s work, as demonstrated by his willingness to continue 
Bentham’s use of the term ‘hedonism’, pleasure always remains simply a part of what is meant when 
we say Happiness: It does not appear as a rational ultimate end itself, and is therefore not completely 
interchangeable with Happiness. 
Sidgwick himself further validates this view when he states at I:VII:92 that the term ‘Happiness’ is 
indeed ambiguous, and that ‘…it seems to be commonly used in Bentham’s way as convertible with 
pleasure, - or rather as denoting that of which the constituents are pleasures;- and it is in this sense 
that I think it most convenient to use it’ (I:VIII:92). The narrow distance between Bentham and 
Sidgwick’s positions on pleasure is evident here – but according to the rest of the text, and especially 
to I:IV, the more accurate view is conveyed by the ‘rather’ statement, that Happiness is the end, only 
comprised of pleasures. This is particularly evident again in Sidgwick’s discussion of Ultimate Good 
(III:XIV:398-403), where Sidgwick specifically discusses the nature of pleasure, as a separate concept 
to Happiness, within his broader definition of Ultimate Good as ‘Desirable Consciousness’. Bentham, 
on the other hand, is unambiguous that all terms such as ‘good’ and ‘happiness’ can be viewed 
synonymously, when describing his principle of utility: “By utility is meant that property in any object, 
whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness (all this in the present 
case comes to the same thing)’ (Bentham, An Introduction, 1:4). It is this view that Sidgwick rejects.  
460 In terms of the argument that Sidgwick was a classical utilitarianism, perhaps even more in that 
line than Mill, Sidgwick’s rather inconsistent use of Bentham seems to both support that idea, and 
challenge it. Sidgwick is certainly more prepared than Mill to use the language of hedonism, and as 
has been seen here Sidgwick agrees with Bentham’s view that Happiness is the end of moral action. 
In fact, it could be argued that on this point Sidgwick’s actually defends Bentham’s hedonistic doctrine 
more efficiently than even Bentham himself did. He may have renounced the ultimate value of 
pleasure in Bentham’s doctrine, but the result is only a far more convincing case for Happiness. But 
Sidgwick’s reliance on Reason, and the fundamental role that he assigns this concept in his view of 
morality, gives his doctrine far more credibility than those of either Bentham, or Mill.   
The personal document (in which it is important to note that Sidgwick does state that he at least 
began his career in moral philosophy from a utilitarian position) supports the idea that in some ways, 
there is a considerably wider distance between Sidgwick and Bentham than is historically presumed. 
It is actually Mill’s doctrine that Sidgwick cites as his first utilitarian position, as it gave him ‘relief from 
the apparently external and arbitrary pressure of moral rules which I had been educated to obey’ (ME: 
xv). It should be noted that the ‘moral rules’ in question here were Whelwell’s and not Bentham’s, but 
it is still clearly the case that Sidgwick did not consider Bentham’s doctrine to be an adequate 
alternative. This of course immediately then begs the question as to why, if Sidgwick did not consider 
Bentham’s utilitarianism to have been the best alternative to Whelwell and intuitionism, he is 
specifically working from Bentham in ME. The likely answer seems to be that Sidgwick considers 
Bentham’s utilitarianism to be the formal, academic version of the doctrine, and given that ME is 
intended to be an academic study of ‘the methods of ethics’, it is Bentham’s doctrine and not Mill’s 
that is the most appropriate to this purpose.   
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onto the relationship between pleasure and Happiness. Happiness is the rational 
ultimate end, the pursuit of pleasure/avoidance of pain is reasonable in as far as it 
pertains to that end. In this way, Sidgwick’s hedonism will be an essential part of his 
normative ethical theory, in which universalistic hedonism is represented by general 
Happiness. 
 
3.4. Sidgwick’s Utilitarianism 
 
Thus far, Sidgwick’s utilitarianism has been seen to be classical to some extent (in 
its partial agreement with Bentham’s hedonism), but less so in other ways that are 
undeniably significant. On the basis of his understanding of rightness especially, and 
the consequences of that understanding for means and for ends, Sidgwick’s 
approach to the doctrine is particularly distinctive.  
It will also be noticed however that at this stage of ME, Sidgwick’s utilitarianism is 
still rather vague. There has been no protracted discussion of utilitarianism as a 
method of ethics, and where apparently utilitarian principles have appeared they 
have often been bound up with concepts that pertain as much to deontological 
principles. This is primarily because of the emphasis on the Reason that Sidgwick 
believes to be common to all methods, and that has clearly appeared as such in his 
work as explored above. At the beginning of I:VI, the shared appeal to Reason has 
particular prominence. ‘The aim of Ethics’, Sidgwick reminds the reader, ‘is to 
systemise and free from error the apparent cognitions that most men have of the 
rightness of reasonableness of conduct, whether the conduct be considered as right 
in itself, or as the means to some end commonly conceived as ultimately reasonable’ 
(I:VI:77). He also specifically reiterates that there is a ‘threefold difference in the 
conception of the ultimate reason for conduct’ – one of which is Perfection, another 
Duty, and the third Happiness (I:VI:78, italics mine)461. Sidgwick now asks exactly 
what are these ultimately valid reasons for acting. It is in his answers to this question 
that Sidgwick begins to draw sharper and more familiar distinctions between the 
deontological and utilitarian positions – between the ends of action as opposed to 
the execution of duties that are prescribed by unconditional rules – in order that he 
                                                 
461 See also I:VI:83, where Sidgwick takes for granted that all moral viewpoints include a notion of ‘the 
ultimate reason for doing what is concluded to be right’. 
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might investigate each of these independently462. His statement that the two types of 
utilitarianism, egoism and universalistic hedonism, ‘agree in prescribing actions as 
means to an end distinct from, and lying outside the actions; so that they both lay 
down rules which are not absolute but relative, and only valid if they conduce to the 
end’ (I:VI:84) provides both the clearest view of his own understanding of 
utilitarianism, and the most recognisable summary of a standard, characteristically 
utilitarian position thus far463. From this point, it becomes possible determine the 
specifics of Sidgwick’s own understanding of utilitarianism.  
This section continues to follow ME, mainly chronologically, in order to assemble 
and assess the relevant material that contributes to completing that understanding of 
Sidgwick’s utilitarian doctrine. It must be noted from the outset of this part of the 
discussion that, despite my argument for the deontological properties of Sidgwick’s 
philosophical intuitions, I will not simply be denying below that Sidgwick is a 
utilitarian (or, more accurately from the point of view of my overall argument in this 
thesis, that he is also a utilitarian, as well as a kind of deontologist)464. Sidgwick’s 
arguments for utilitarianism cannot and should be ignored, and as will be seen, 
Sidgwick approaches the utilitarian principle in two distinct ways - ‘negatively’, in 
Book III, wherein he will argue that the principles of Dogmatic Intuitionism are 
actually found to be subordinate to utilitarianism, and ‘positively’, in Book IV, where 
he will show how utilitarianism is the systemiser of common sense morality. 
However, I will still be presenting Sidgwick’s utilitarianism as a very specific type, 
and, crucially, as in vital relationship with the deontological properties that inform 
common sense morality. As will become apparent in the following sections (and as is 
directly concurrent with this thesis’ central claim) it is almost impossible to discuss 
the role and value of utilitarianism in Sidgwick’s work without reference to the role 
                                                 
462 As Sidgwick puts it, “in my treatment of the subject, difference of Method is taken as the 
paramount consideration: and it is on this account that I have treated the view in which Perfection is 
taken to be…a variety of the Intuitionism which determines right conduct by reference to axioms of 
duty intuitively known; while I have made as marked a separation as possible between Epicurean and 
Egoistic Hedonism, and the Universalistic or Benthamite Hedonism to which I propose to restrict the 
term Utilitarianism” (I:VI:83-84). 
463 ‘Utilitarianism 1873’ also presents an extremely condensed account of the doctrine as it appears in 
ME. 
464 It is my view that a conclusion on Sidgwick’s status as a utilitarian cannot be fully made until the 
particulars of the mutually informing relationship between utilitarian and deontological principles that 
he perceives and develops in Book III have been properly expounded. For this reason, the real 
conclusion on whether or not Sidgwick is a utilitarian naturally appears in chapter 4 of this thesis, in 
conjunction with the wider claim that he is only a utilitarian on a deontological basis, or vice versa, 
where the argument of chapter 4 makes it possible to argue this point. 
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and value that he assigns to deontological principles – and ME itself affirms this. 
Therefore, only a certain stage in Book IV can be reached before the investigation 
into Sidgwick’s utilitarianism requires that we return to his arguments made in Book 
III – where I argue we see a meeting between Sidgwick’s deontological principles, 
and his utilitarian one465. It is that meeting of utilitarian and deontological principles 
that will then be examined in detail in chapter 4. 
 
3.4.a. ‘Difficult Calculations’ 
 
This investigation into the nature of Sidgwick’s utilitarianism has now reached the 
third feature outlined in the chapter’s introduction, which is that Sidgwick recognises 
early on the ‘defects and difficulties of the hedonistic method’. At I:VI:87, he states 
that he is intentionally leaving his examination of utilitarianism until last, partly 
because it seems simpler that egoistic hedonism should precede universalistic 
hedonism - and partly because it seems as though the claims of the Intuitional 
method should be examined before these are compared ‘with the results of the more 
doubtful and difficult calculations of utilitarian consequences’. 
It is interesting that Sidgwick should take this view of the utilitarian method, and 
even more so that he believes that the Intuitive (or deontological) position should be 
examined first. His saying that it is a more complicated method does not necessarily 
mean that Sidgwick believes utilitarianism to be inferior to Intuitionism, but there is 
certainly a sense here that Sidgwick believes utilitarianism can only be adequately 
understood via some kind of reference to, or relation with, Intuitionism. It is also clear 
from this passage that Sidgwick recognises the difficulties of measuring the 
outcomes that are integral to the utilitarian method. Both of these factors retain a 
high profile throughout Sidgwick’s investigation into utilitarianism. Chapters II, III and 
IV of Book II specifically address the difficulties of outcome measurability as it 
appears in the context of egoistic hedonism466. Book IV of ME then presents 
                                                 
465 Although this non-sequential approach may seem somewhat incoherent, it actually accords directly 
with the structure of Sidgwick’s own approach to utilitarianism, as it develops over Books III and IV. It 
is in Book III that Sidgwick reaches what he considers to be some inevitable conclusions on the role 
of utilitarianism; he then temporarily leaves aside these conclusions for IV:I and IV:II, only picking 
them up again when his own discussion has reached the stage at which it naturally recourses back to 
those conclusions from Book III.  
466 Sidgwick rejects the empirical-reflective method of comparing pleasures and pains, and also casts 
serious doubt on the ability of common sense to do this (II:IV:153-161). These chapters provide a 
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Sidgwick’s exposition proper of the formal model of utilitarianism, understood as 
referring to general Happiness, rather than private. Here, Sidgwick temporarily lays 
aside his own conclusions on utilitarianism drawn in Book III in order define exactly 
what is meant by ‘utilitarianism’ - and he does not delay in drawing attention to those 
difficulties to which he has already alluded. His opening comment is that whereas 
utilitarianism is supposed to be a position with which we are all familiar, on ‘closer 
examination’ it is actually comprised of a number of different theories and concepts 
that are widely diverse, and in some cases even seemingly unrelated (I:IV:411)467. 
For this reason, Sidgwick gives his clearest – and most obviously classical – 
definition of the doctrine so far: ‘By Utilitarianism is here meant the ethical theory, 
that the conduct which, under any given circumstances, is objectively right, is that 
which will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole; that is, taking into 
account all whose happiness is affected by the conduct’468. Sidgwick then proceeds 
to eliminate from the definition some of the most common misperceptions. He 
distinguishes universal hedonism from egoistic hedonism, arguing that the apparent 
affinity between these two positions is nothing more than the result of a confusion469 
; he denies the utilitarian theory that holds that the moral sentiments are derived from 
sensory experience, arguing that this is not adequate proof of the ethical doctrine 
(IV:I:412-413) ; he argues that Universal Benevolence should not be understood as 
providing the only right motive for action (IV:I:413). He then turns to the principle 
                                                 
point of reference for later in ME, when Sidgwick points to the same difficulties as they appear in 
general-Happiness utilitarianism.  
467 Even Sidgwick’s own utilitarianism, as it has appeared so far, is an example of how diverse 
interpretations of this doctrine can be.  
468 Sidgwick states that the term ‘utilitarianism’ can also be used interchangeably with ‘universalistic 
hedonism’. This is significant: The latter phrase is not simply another rendering of the word 
‘utilitarianism’ - rather, the two words together embody the key features of his utilitarianism that 
Happiness is the ultimate rational end, and that this end, being rational, cannot help but convert itself 
from private Happiness to the general Happiness – which is thus itself established as an end, 
universal and unconditional. The details of these claims are part of the very core of this thesis’ 
argument, and Sidgwick’s argument for universalistic hedonism, which appears in Book III of ME, is 
discussed at length in this thesis’ chapter 4. This outline is given here so as to verify that Sidgwick 
has previously given strong grounds for believing utilitarianism to refer to the Happiness of all, and not 
to the private happiness of individuals, and this outline is required to provide a full understanding of 
Sidgwick’s utilitarianism, with which we are concerned here.  
469 This makes it acceptable to entirely omit egoism from Sidgwick’s utilitarianism (see also Sidgwick’s 
express restriction of the term ‘utilitarianism’ to ‘Universal Happiness’ at I:VI:84, II:I:119, and III:I:199). 
Sidgwick declares that the reality of the difference between egoistic and universal Hedonism is ‘so 
obvious and glaring, that…we seem rather called upon to explain how the two ever came to be 
confounded, or in any way included under one notion” (IV:I:412). Sidgwick blames Mill for the 
confusion, and Mill’s unsuccessful argument that because every one does seek his own happiness, it 
is an obvious inference that we ought to seek the happiness of others. The transition from 
psychological to ethical hedonism, Sidgwick argues, can actually only be to the egoistic version. 
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itself, restating what is meant by the term ‘greatest Happiness’ (that it is to be 
understood as the greatest possible surplus of pleasure over pain), and asking 
whose happiness is to be included in the ‘all’ referred to in that principle (IV:I:414).  
The answer to this last question, which Sidgwick gives as ‘any sentient being’, 
throws up its own further complications. As difficult as it already is to scientifically 
compare hedonistic measurements among people, it becomes even more 
problematic when the interests of non humans are also included (IV:414)470. But 
even if we do only account for the happiness of human beings, there are then the 
issues of non-temporality, and posterity. Because happiness cannot be affected by 
the time in which a person lives, it follows that the utilitarian must also be concerned 
with the interests of future human beings. Ultimately, the prescription of happiness 
on the whole seems, to Sidgwick, to require that we increase the population to the 
extent at which the largest number of people possible is sharing the average 
happiness (IV:I:416)471. 
The method of utilitarianism, also, is beset by difficulties. IV:IV details the 
problems involved in accepting utilitarianism as a means of determining right 
conduct, and as a basis from which to gain an adequate system of rules (IV:IV:467). 
Humanity is so vastly diverse that to decide on general rules would seem impossible. 
Life is also constantly subject to change, and in the attempts to systemise this by 
arguing that the ‘Preservation of Society’ should be the ultimate ‘scientific criterion’ of 
                                                 
470 It is arguments such as these that have caused a revival of interest in the work of Sidgwick among 
modern day utilitarians, and that point to Sidgwick’s enduring relevance to modern ethical problems 
such as population ethics, foreign state intervention in warzones, and environmentalism. As seen in 
the literature review, Peter Singer – along with his use of Sidgwick - has specialised in how utilitarian 
considerations apply to animal welfare. In terms of the distribution of happiness, Sidgwick argues in 
the absence of a prescribed mode of distribution, the only principle that it is appropriate to adopt is 
that of ‘pure equality – as given in Bentham’s formula, “everybody to count for one, and nobody for 
more than one’. This emphasises the fact that Sidgwick’s Happiness is highly egalitarian, which is 
why Sidgwick and Rawls can often be united on points of political theory. 
471 This is as opposed to increasing the average happiness. To some extent, Sidgwick is arguing for a 
version of ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’ here, given that he believes the greatest 
number of people possible should be existing to share average happiness. But Sidgwick points out 
something – a problem - that he believes utilitarians to have missed. This is that if utilitarianism 
demands Happiness on the whole, we ought to weigh the amount of Happiness gained by an addition 
to the population against the amount lost by the already existing population. This results in a situation 
in which it is not the average Happiness that is maximised, but rather the number of people living, 
who share in the average Happiness (IV:I:416). Derek Parfit has famously referred to this point as ‘the 
repugnant conclusion’, as it implies that we ought to prefer a society in which there are very many 
people living, but average Happiness is very low, to a society in which there are not as many people, 
but the average Happiness is greater (Reasons and Persons, pp.381-387). Parfit’s ‘repugnant 
conclusion’ is an important aspect of modern day population ethics, and has proved to be something 
of a paradox, which apparently cannot be solved without causing further unacceptable conclusions. 
Sidgwick is arguably the fore-runner of Parfit’s theory. 
 230 
moral rules, Sidgwick can find no real justification (IV:IV:470-473). Ultimately, 
Sidgwick concludes, utilitarianism cannot construct a morality de novo – it must also 
rely on the morality of the existing social order. 
This last point will provide chapter 4 with important evidence for my own ultimate 
argument that utilitarianism must necessarily work with the fundamental 
deontological properties that informed common sense morality -  but here it is 
evidence of Sidgwick’s willingness to observe and admit to the problems involved in 
utilitarianism as a method of ethics. He is certainly not, in these chapters which 
specifically concern utilitarianism, simply advocating or defending it. Overall, 
utilitarianism emerges in Sidgwick’s hands as a complicated, strict, and demanding 
method of ethics, the precepts of which are often paradoxically as incalculable as 
they are necessary. It is also demanding in its scope, applying as it does to 
everything from socio-political concerns, to the interests of future generations. 
Furthermore, as Sidgwick observes, the types of calculation required by the 
implications of utilitarianism for populations are ‘grotesquely incongruous’ with our 
actual ability to execute these calculations in practice, which has an ‘inevitable 
inexactness’. 
Sidgwick’s response to the difficulties, however, is important for an accurate 
understanding of what does become Sidgwick’s own position on the doctrine. This 
response is not just to acknowledge that utilitarianism is a particularly stringent 
method of ethics, but to argue that this stringency must actually be observed. He 
says: ‘that our practical Utilitarian reasonings must necessarily be rough, is no 
reason for not making them as accurate as the case admits; and we shall be more 
likely to succeed in this if we keep before our mind as distinctly as possible the strict 
type of the calculation that we should have to make, if all the relevant considerations 
could be estimated with mathematical precision’ (IV:I:416). 
This adherence to a rigorous and far-reaching version of utilitarianism might 
seem to be at odds with my claim that Sidgwick’s utilitarianism cannot be understood 
without reference to the non-consequentialist aspect of Intuitionism. But there is no 
necessary reason why a stringent view of utilitarianism should not refer to 
deontological principles. In fact, that a doctrine is strict and comprehensive and yet 
still refers to principles outside of its traditional philosophical territory only reinforces 
the argument that this connection is somehow necessary. And this very point 
presents itself in ME - for it is precisely at the stage in ME in which Sidgwick’s 
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utilitarianism is the primary focus that Sidgwick’s references to the common sense 
morality of Intuitionism also begin to appear. Most significantly, this connection 
arises as a result of Sidgwick’s approach to the proof of utilitarianism.  
 
 
3.4.b. Utilitarianism as the Supreme Moral Principle? Positive and Negative 
Proof 
 
It is in the second chapter of Book IV that Sidgwick turns his attention to the long-
standing question of the ‘proof’ of utilitarianism. This proof is, he says, generally 
required in order for minds to accept the principle of aiming at the general 
Happiness, rather than at their own (IV:II:418). For Sidgwick however, the question is 
more profound than this. Whereas common sense morality will not feel it necessary 
to prove the authority of rules that are already commonly accepted as binding, a 
utilitarian who disputes that these rules are binding is by default claiming that their 
moral principle is superior to Intuitionism Utilitarianism cannot simply be accepted as 
just another moral principle: As Sidgwick argues, “the Utilitarian prescriptions of duty 
are prima facie in conflict…both with rules which the Intuitionist regards as self-
evident, and with the dictates of Rational Egoism”. Utilitarianism, then, “if accepted at 
all, must be accepted as overruling Intuitionism and Egoism” (IV:II:419-420) 472.  
 Here, then, we have reached the fourth stage outlined in this chapter’s 
introduction, which is that Sidgwick finally appears here have materialised as a true 
utilitarian. This is in addition to the fact that many of the ‘self-evident’ principles of 
common sense morality were found in Book III to actually point to utilitarianism – and 
that the Universal Benevolence that was derived from Sidgwick’s philosophical 
intuitions is, in many ways, a utilitarian principle, however deontological the 
                                                 
472 This, Sidgwick states, is the real and only method through which an ethical first principle can be 
proven. It is not enough to exhibit a first principle by reference to other principles, because then those 
principles become the premises on which the first depends, and it is no longer then a first principle 
(II:II:419. See also ‘Utilitarianism 1873’, and ‘The Establishment of Ethical First Principles’ (in, Mind, 
Vol.4 (1879) 106-111, p.108). Sidgwick believes this to have been the mistake by Mill. In contrast, 
Sidgwick establishes his own utilitarian principle on what he believes to be an ultimately rational, self-
evident principle. Sidgwick’s approach indisputably avoids the shortfalls of Mill’s, and succeeds in 
defending utilitarianism more adequately than Mill had done. But the establishment of that utilitarian 
principle, and its inherent connection to deontological moral properties, is the concern of chapter 4.  
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foundation of that principle might be473. This is the point at which I do not deny 
Sidgwick’s utilitarian status. But, crucially, this is also the point at which I can begin 
to point to the other conclusion that forms part of the two between which ‘the truth 
lies’, in the connection passage from Book III - the part of the conclusion that reads, 
‘particular duties have still to be determined by some other method’. For a directly 
comparable passage appears here at the beginning of Sidgwick’s discussion of the 
‘proof’ of utilitarianism, that is, on my view, one of the most profoundly important 
statements of ME. It occurs when Sidgwick points out that there is a fundamental 
paradox that arises in ‘proving’ utilitarianism in relation to other moral principles. This 
is that if Intuitionism denies that its own moral principles are valid, thus making the 
way for the ‘proof’, then there is actually no need for that proof in the first place. 
Either Intuitionism believes its rules to be binding, in which case the Intuitionist will 
continue to believe that they are binding – or they concede that they are not, in which 
case there is no need for ‘proof’ of utilitarianism as a first principle. ‘Perhaps we may 
say’, Sidgwick concludes in response to this, ‘that what is needed is a line of 
argument which on the one hand allows the validity, to a certain extent, of the 
maxims already accepted, and on the other hand shows them to be not absolutely 
valid, but needing to be controlled and completed by some more comprehensive 
principle’ (IV:II:420).  
Both of these ‘connection’ passages are representative of the fact that Sidgwick 
perceives there to be some kind of essential relationship between common sense 
morality, and the utilitarian principle474. Clearly, the proof of utilitarianism cannot be 
discussed without reference to the principles of Intuitionism, in some form. But we do 
require to know the nature of that relationship. Sidgwick is, after all, talking about the 
possibility of utilitarianism being the sole and supreme moral principle, and this 
needs to be accounted for in my wider argument that Sidgwick’s moral theory of 
                                                 
473 See this thesis’ chapter 2 for my deontological argument for Universal Benevolence. This 
derivation of Universal Benevolence as a utilitarian ultimate rational end from a primarily deontological 
basis is the focus of chapter 4, and will be discussed at length there accordingly.   
474 I outlined in chapter 2 that I am referring to these two passages as ‘the connection passages’, on 
the basis of their similarity, and for the fact that they both, on my view, indicate Sidgwick’s overall 
position that there is a relationship between deontological and utilitarian moral properties. We might 
call that ‘some kind of essential relationship’ a ‘middle ground’ between deontology and utilitarianism, 
and this is not technically wrong: My argument for Rational Benevolence in chapter 4 can be 
described as creating a middle ground between the two types of principle. However, ‘middle ground’ 
misses the depth, details, and necessity of the relationship, which I will draw out in the next chapter. 
‘Middle ground’ can be used superficially then (as I will occasionally do) but not simply as a substitute 
for Rational Benevolence.   
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Rational Benevolence is not, ultimately, completely utilitarian – or that it is at least a 
very particular kind of utilitarianism. This relationship, outlined in both connection 
passages, is what Sidgwick himself now addresses. How, he asks, in light of this 
paradox, is proof of a principle to be ascertained at all? Sidgwick first reiterates his 
earlier point that if the egoist is to argue that his own happiness is good from the 
point of view of the universe, then it becomes possible (and necessary, on 
Sidgwick’s view) to draw the egoist’s attention to the fact that his happiness cannot 
be any more of an important part of the universal Good than anyone else’s 
(IV:II:421). This was of course part of how Rational Benevolence was established as 
Sidgwick’s normative theory. But Sidgwick observes that this argument is not enough 
to convince the Intuitionist, as it still does not show Utilitarianism to be the sole or 
supreme moral principle (IV:II:421). Utilitarianism must therefore ‘exhibit itself’ in two 
ways to Intuitionism. It must show to the Intuitionist that principles such as Truth and 
Justice etc. have only a dependent and subordinate value and that those notions are 
themselves only vague and in need of further determination; and it must show how 
utilitarianism sustains and supplements the validity of common moral judgements. 
These two approaches are Sidgwick’s ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ exhibitions of the 
proof of utilitarianism. Again, there is a strong impression here in both aspects of this 
double relation that utilitarianism is simply going to be held up as the champion 
moral theory. Sidgwick continues at the end of these passages, ‘If systematic 
reflection upon the morality of Common Sense thus exhibits the Utilitarian principle 
as that to which Common Sense naturally appeals for that further development of its 
system which this same reflection shows to be necessary, the proof of utilitarianism 
seems as complete as it can be made’ (IV:II:422)475. 
But to conclude that Sidgwick now simply supersedes common sense morality – 
and the deontological properties therein – with utilitarianism is, on my view, to miss 
the very particular nature of this two-pronged relationship about which Sidgwick is 
talking. For utilitarianism does not simply emerge as superior, and where it does this 
is only because it was developed out of common sense in the first place. This begins 
to be seen when Sidgwick immediately refers the reader back to his argument in 
III:XIII, stating that he has already in that chapter presented the negative relation of 
                                                 
475 For an alternative view on Sidgwick’s ‘proof’, William Langenfus (‘The Impossibility of Sidgwick’s 
Proof’, in, History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol.17, No.1 (2000), 99-120, p.101) presents a convincing 
argument for why this proof actually fails.  
 234 
utilitarianism to common-sense morality. There, it will be recalled, Sidgwick argued 
that the principles of Intuitionism, or common sense morality, are not self-evident, 
and that in fact they actually often only point to the further utilitarian principle. But it 
will also be recalled Sidgwick did not simply abandon the non-consequentialist, 
deontological basis of common sense morality. In fact, he was concerned to show 
what can truly be called self-evident in this way476. Remaining with the value that he 
could technically see in those deontological properties, provided they were truly 
tested for self-evidence, Sidgwick developed his own philosophical intuitions – which 
I argued retain a visibly non-consequentialist and deontological character. These 
eventually yielded the utilitarian principle of Universal Benevolence – and thus the 
negative relation is finally resolved and embodied by Rational Benevolence477. It is 
therefore, I argue, through that negative argument that Sidgwick developed the 
meta-physical connection between Intuitionism and utilitarianism that allows us to 
understand the positive relation that he now expounds in Book IV478. As utilitarianism 
                                                 
476 Roger Crisp points out that Sidgwick is referring to the fact that principles of common sense 
morality have ‘validity to a certain extent’ because they are independent of inference from self-evident 
principles i.e. they are intuitive only (Cosmos of Duty, pp. 212-213). Where I part ways with Crisp on 
this is that my focus is on the connection between common sense morality and utilitarianism that 
Sidgwick develops because of the self-evidence that he does eventually attribute to Justice, 
Prudence, and Benevolence. It is my view that this connection, embodied by Rational Benevolence, 
makes for a much stronger relationship than one between utilitarianism, and raw intuitions. 
477 J.B. Schneewind, in his in-depth examination of the two proofs, refers to these positions as the 
dependence (negative) argument and the systemisation (positive) argument (Sidgwickian Ethics, 
pp.264-5). These are more immediately helpful terms than Sidgwick’s own, given that they represent 
what each part of the argument is actually doing, but Roger Crisp points out that they might actually 
lead to some confusion (Cosmos of Duty, p.213). This is because part of the positive argument is also 
aimed at showing that it is utilitarianism on which common sense morality depends. However, as 
Crisp also says, Sidgwick himself is not entirely strict about separating the tasks of his negative and 
positive arguments – and Crisp’s point is indicative of a wider discussion about Sidgwick’s proof, that 
is important to my arguments made in this chapter and the next. At the centre of this discussion is the 
confusion over whether Sidgwick’s argument for utilitarianism in Book III is only negative, or whether 
his argument for Rational Benevolence actually falls into the category of sustaining and 
supplementing common moral judgments, in which case this is positive relationship territory. I agree 
that Sidgwick’s argument in Book III does become a positive one, rather than remaining negative – 
especially when we consider the fact that it is in Book III that Sidgwick specifically argues for Rational 
Benevolence as ‘proof’ (III:XIII:387-388). This means, at least on my argument, that Sidgwick never 
actually develops the negative relation at all. And this is vital for my overall argument about the 
interdependent nature of the relationship between utilitarian and deontological principles. See chapter 
4.  
478 As per my point at fn.54 I do not actually believe that this is a negative form of proof. Sidgwick may 
have intended it to be negative, but this is not how it turned out – and this adds to my argument that 
the connection between utilitarian and deontological principles is necessary to the utilitarian principle, 
and therefore not capable of simply being made dependent, and subordinate.  
Sidgwick specifically discusses Rational Benevolence as being the ‘proof’ of the utilitarian principle in 
Book III, at III:XIII:387. As I have said in the main text, it is my view that despite the connotations of 
the word ‘proof’, the particular way in which Sidgwick posits this argument is direct evidence of the 
relationship of the philosophical connection between Intuitionism and utilitarianism, and as this 
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must necessarily include reference to Intuitionist principles in order to prove itself at 
all, the foundations of common sense morality are vital -  and through them 
utilitarianism finds its validation. On the other hand, utilitarianism is also that which 
systemises and regulates common sense morality479. 
It is not part of my argument that Sidgwick now proceeds to show how 
utilitarianism fully explains or completes each of the principles (such as veracity and 
law abiding, for example) denied in Book III. In many of these cases, the various 
rules of common sense morality simply are indistinct and ambiguous, and 
utilitarianism does admittedly emerge as superior480. But it is my argument that the 
                                                 
connection is the very centre of my main argument for the synthesis-specific discussion of that 
connection, or ‘proof’, appears in chapter 4. 
479 There is a degree to which this relationship, as I have described it, may look somewhat like a 
Cartesian Circle, in which each part of the whole presupposes the other. This point is most relevant to 
chapter 4, which argues for the synthesis between utilitarian and deontological moral properties and 
which will have to make sure that synthesis avoids – if it can – becoming a vicious circle of circular 
reasoning. But the point has become relevant here for the fact that this relationship between common 
sense morality and utilitarianism is a direct reflection of that synthesis. The problem might be framed 
like this: Sidgwick relies upon common sense morality to argue for utilitarianism, then claims that 
utilitarianism is the systemiser of that common sense morality. But how can the proof of something 
also be referred to in order to establish that which proves it in the first place?  
 I do think Sidgwick recognised this problem to some extent, albeit in a negative form, when he 
describes the paradox of proof. He says that as a first principle cannot be fully proven, it must have to 
emerge as superior to other principles – on the other hand, if the other principles are not taken as 
themselves valid, then there is no need for the superior proof. But it is my view that the argument 
Sidgwick then goes on to make about the relationship between common sense morality and 
utilitarianism does avoid the problem of the Cartesian Circle.  This is because Sidgwick’s argument is 
not completely circular – it does actually begin from somewhere, and this is that we must accept the 
‘validity to a certain extent’ of common sense morality first. Only then is the utilitarian principle 
revealed. Utilitarianism, for its own validation, depends absolutely on the other principles remaining 
valid. So where utilitarianism is thought to systemise and supplement common sense morality, 
common sense morality must actually retain its own validity in order for utilitarianism to be 
demonstrated in the first place. In both of these ways of putting it, common sense morality (or the 
absolute-principle based/deontological aspect I argued for in chapter 2) emerges as a foundation to 
this connection between utilitarianism and common sense morality (and, as will be seen, to the meta-
ethical connection between deontological and utilitarian properties within Rational Benevolence). This, 
however, would seem to threaten the very core of my argument, which is that there is a [circularly] 
interdependent and mutually informing relationship between the two types of moral property which 
can provide a better explanation for and defence of moral ambivalence. This is not the case however. 
I do argue, as Sidgwick does, first for the deontological basis of morality; without these non-
consequentialist intuitions, the rest of morality could not be established, or identified. But what they 
identify is a second kind of principle, and once this has been revealed, there develops the relationship 
wherein it can be seen that both properties of morality are necessary. Deontological properties are 
required in order to justify utilitarian ones, utilitarian properties then validate those deontological 
properties. Neither is fully understood or justified without reference to the other – and this is what 
creates the synthesis. See chapter 4. 
480 For example, Sidgwick famously states that ‘the Morality of Common Sense may be truly 
represented as at least unconsciously Utilitarian’ (IV:III:424), and that “Utilitarians are called upon to 
show a natural transition from the Morality of Common Sense to Utilitarianism…”. He also refers to 
the ‘latent Utilitarianism’ of Common Sense on more than one occasion, and says that he is seeking 
‘to represent [Common Sense] as inchoately and imperfectly Utilitarian’ (IV:III:IV). Again, Sidgwick’s 
utilitarian status cannot be denied here, and I will address the implications of that for my theory that 
argues for the equal importance of deontological and utilitarian principles in the thesis conclusion. I 
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philosophical connection developed in Book III, between utilitarianism and the 
deontological principles that Sidgwick does consider to avoid this vagueness, is 
directly reflected in Sidgwick’s argument for the ‘positive’ relation that Sidgwick 
explores in Book IV. Here we can see the nature of the relationship as it appears in 
practice, with common sense morality providing the basis and utilitarianism operating 
as the systemiser, and often the confirmation. That is, this is the practical 
demonstration of those passages, which state that ‘the truth lies between between 
these two conclusions’, and that ‘what is needed is a line of argument which allows 
the validity of the maxims already accepted….and shows them to be not absolutely 
valid’. ‘…where the current formula is not sufficiently precise for the guidance of 
conduct’, Sidgwick says, for example, ‘the Utilitarian method solves these difficulties 
and perplexities in general accordance with the vague instincts of Common Sense’ 
(IV:III:425). He also says that the method of utilitarianism ‘supports the generally 
received view of the relative importance of different duties’, and is ‘called in as an 
arbiter’ (IV:III:426), and he draws attention to the fact that in terms of how 
Benevolence appears in Intuitionism and utilitarianism, there is ‘no divergence that 
we need consider’ between the systems (IV:III:430). It will be noted that in all of 
these passages – and in the many other pages in which Sidgwick discusses the 
relationship between common sense principles and utilitarianism – Sidgwick is not 
actually denying or erasing the original deontological nature of common sense 
morality principles481. His approach is not simply to allow utilitarianism to ‘ride 
roughshod’ over deontological values, replacing deontology entirely as a moral 
theory. Sidgwick’s view is merely that utilitarianism is as much a part of the nature of 
this common sense morality as those original rules. As Sidgwick says himself, ‘the 
Utilitarian argument cannot be fairly judged unless we take fully into account the 
cumulative force which it derives from the complex character of the coincidence 
between Utilitarianism and Common Sense’ (IV:III:425). Sidgwick therefore 
unequivocally confirms that deontological rules remain important, as both of the 
connection passages suggested that they will be. It now remains for chapter 4 to 
                                                 
will outline what that response will be here however, and simply state that even if Sidgwick’s system 
does emerge as a kind of utilitarianism, this does not detract from the nature – or the importance – of 
the mutually informing synthesis in Rational Benevolence. 
481 See also especially IV:III:441, 444, 453. 
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expound the exact philosophical basis of that connection, as embodied by Rational 
Benevolence. 
  
3.5. Conclusions on Sidgwick’s Utilitarianism: The ‘friendly alliance’ 
 
There are a further three chapters in ME’s book on utilitarianism that follow 
Sidgwick’s initial discussion of the relationship between utilitarianism and common 
sense morality in IV:III. As was said above however, the end of IV:IV and the 
chapters that follow it are crucial to my argument for the synthesis, and for that 
reason discussion of those chapters is reserved until chapter 4. Here, a concluding 
summary of the findings on Sidgwick’s utilitarianism is required. 
It was stated at the outset of the chapter that Sidgwick’s approach to key 
utilitarian concepts such as rightness, the role of the good, and the issue of ‘means 
to ends’ are atypical of a utilitarian – and especially of a theorist considered to be the 
paradigm of a classical utilitarian, in the line of Bentham and Mill. It was seen that 
there is an early predominance of the idea of ‘rightness’ in Sidgwick’s work, good 
being rejected as an adequate guide for right conduct as early as ME’s introduction. 
This was followed by Sidgwick’s non-traditionally-utilitarian argument that ‘right’ is 
what is ultimately rational, or reasonable, and that this creates a notion of rightness 
wherein it is not dependent on ulterior results. However, although right cannot be an 
attribute of means, and therefore cannot be completely defined as ‘fit to an ulterior 
end’, the ‘ought’ that arises from right being that which is rational makes ‘ought’ a 
categorical imperative, and this applies as much to Happiness as an ultimate end as 
it does to certain actions. This interpretation of rightness, it was seen, causes 
Sidgwick to conflict with the principle of utility, and causes his system to emerge as 
peculiarly both teleological and non-teleological. It was then seen that Sidgwick 
rejects pleasure as an ultimate end, but retains Bentham’s hedonism on the more 
refined basis that this is defined as the rational, ultimate end of Happiness, of which 
pleasure is only a constituent part.  
In terms of Sidgwick’s own utilitarianism, Sidgwick freely admits to the difficulties 
of the doctrine, as they appear in both its requirements and its method, and his 
version of the doctrine is clearly a stringent one. Despite this however, utilitarianism 
must be defined in relation to common sense morality. The positive relation, I 
argued, is made possible on the basis of the philosophical connection between 
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deontological and utilitarian principles that Sidgwick has already shown in Book III. 
The importance of the deontological basis of common sense morality is maintained 
alongside utilitarianism, and the relationship alluded to by the two connection 
passages starts to materialise. Finally, Sidgwick’s discussion of utilitarianism, and 
specifically how its method might be constructed, brings him to a stage at which it 
can go no further without crucial reference to both deontological and utilitarian 
principles. This brings us in an organic way to the point at which the argument in this 
thesis also can go no further without expounding the relationship between those two 
moral properties – which will now be the concern of the next chapter.  
It would seem as though the ultimate conclusion to be had on Sidgwick’s 
utilitarianism requires a combination of the ideas that on one hand Sidgwick is not a 
typical utilitarian, and that on the other hand he is. In many ways – such as his more 
defensible argument for Happiness, his establishment of ‘ought’ and ‘right’ in ends as 
well as certain absolute principles, and his provision of better ‘proof’ than Mill – 
Sidgwick is, as so much of the literature holds, a better utilitarian than either 
Bentham or Mill. It could also perhaps be argued that given his early concern to 
establish ‘right’ as applicable to end based systems as well as absolute-principle 
based ones, Sidgwick is actually building an argument for utilitarianism from the very 
beginning of ME. But I dispute that this is the case. It is my belief, and this is 
supported by Sidgwick’s firm denial that he was intending to defend any one ethical 
position more than another, that Sidgwick approached ME as objectively as possible. 
His conclusions and observations on the identity of the right and the role of 
Happiness are not the result of an ulterior motive, but rather of careful, systematic, 
and neutral examination.  
In any case, it is already becoming clear how Sidgwick challenges the traditional 
divide between deontological and utilitarian principles. As was seen in the previous 
chapter, and emphasised above, Sidgwick does not eradicate the deontological 
basis of common sense morality, and on the contrary incorporates it as a vital part of 
his argument for utilitarianism. And this is not the first time that Sidgwick has referred 
to such a relationship. In I:VI, Sidgwick states that there is actually a greater practical 
affinity between utilitarianism and Intuitionism than there is between egoistic and 
universalistic forms of hedonism (I:IV:85). Despite the two forms of hedonism sharing 
the concept of pleasure, and of actions as means to distinct ends, Sidgwick’s 
rationale for the more unexpected connection is the simple point that moralists who 
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maintain that Intuitionism is the valid method of moral reasoning agree that general 
Happiness is the end for which the rules of morality are the best means (I:VI:85). 
Again, it cannot be denied that utilitarianism appears to be the superior principle 
here, and Sidgwick reinforces this with his observation that even fierce opponents of 
the doctrine will eventually be led to ‘utilitarian considerations’, when attempting to 
establish the real necessity for moral rules (I:VI:86). But in the paragraph 
immediately following, Sidgwick describes how when it first appeared in moral 
philosophy, Utilitarianism was intended to be in ‘friendly alliance’ with Intuitionism 
(I:VI:86), the two forms of morality united against Hobbes’ ‘audacious enunciation of 
Egoism’. It was not to supersede but to support the morality of common sense, 
‘against the dangerous innovations of Hobbes’ that had led Cumberland to state that 
egoism was ‘the common good of all Rationals’, to be the end to which moral rules 
were the means’ (I:VI:86). As in the other places discussed above, Sidgwick is once 
more challenging the idea that actions are valid only in as far as they conduce to an 
end. Then there is Sidgwick’s clear assertion in this passage that utilitarianism was 
not intended to surpass, or overtake common sense morality. When Sidgwick later 
on the page considers the idea that utilitarianism was eventually advanced as the 
superior moral principle, this antagonism too, ‘relates rather to theory and method 
than to practical results’. That is, where Sidgwick recognises the difference in their 
philosophical approaches, he does not believe this difference to lead to any real 
conflict in the practice of each type of morality.  
 Sidgwick may well be a utilitarian then. But I argue that even in his specific 
discussions of utilitarianism, there is substantial evidence that his utilitarianism is of a 
very particular type. It is this type of utilitarianism, that is seen to be in necessary 
meta-ethical relationship with deontological principles, that will now be examined in 
the last of the thesis’ main chapters. It is this type of utilitarianism that will ‘afford a 
principle of synthesis’ (IV:III:422).  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
‘RATIONAL BENEVOLENCE’ 
SIDGWICK’S ACCOUNT OF THE SYNTHESIS BETWEEN DEONTOLOGICAL 
AND UTILITARIAN PRINCIPLES 
 
The findings of chapters 2 and 3, which drew out the deontological and utilitarian 
aspects of Sidgwick’s work respectively, have laid the groundwork from which this, 
the final chapter of the thesis, will build its definitive argument – namely, that Henry 
Sidgwick perceived there to be a necessary and inherent relationship between those 
deontological and utilitarian principles of morality. Sidgwick, I will argue, understood 
this relationship to be a sort of synthesis, by which it is meant that the components, 
in this case the two types of moral value, combine to form something that is more 
meaningful than just a sum of the parts. It falls to this chapter now to complete the 
argument for this particular combination of deontological and utilitarian principles, 
which constitutes Sidgwick’s own moral theory, and is represented by Sidgwick’s 
term, ‘Rational Benevolence’. The chapter will show that Rational Benevolence is 
comprised of neither deontological nor utilitarian principles alone, but of a reciprocal 
co-operation between both types of moral property. It is argued that this co-
operation, or synthesis, offers a reconciliation between traditionally divided utilitarian 
and deontological moral principles, which in turn offers a more accurate and helpful 
understanding of the human moral experience than theories of morality that 
exclusively support either one position or the other. In this way, I argue that Rational 
Benevolence offers a deeper understanding of the moral ambivalence that is often 
experienced in the gravest of ethical dilemmas.  
As regards the structure of this chapter, this is the stage at which all the 
claims made throughout this thesis about Sidgwick’s deontological principles, his 
utilitarianism, and his perception of the relationship between them, culminate. It is 
important therefore that the chapter adheres to a structure that maintains a logical 
and visible progression from what has already been argued in the thesis, and the 
continuation and expansion of those arguments into the full theory here. For this 
reason, the chapter begins with a brief analysis of the terms such as 
‘interdependent’, ‘mutually informing’, ‘reciprocal’ and ‘necessary’ that have been 
been used throughout the thesis to refer to the ‘synthesis’ that I believe to exist 
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between deontological and utilitarian principles of morality, and consequently to the 
relationship that I believe Sidgwick to have expounded in The Methods. This is 
followed by an examination, which relies extensively upon textual analysis, of the 
degree to which Sidgwick himself believed there to be this kind of synthesis between 
the two types of principle. The next section then builds the case that whereas 
Sidgwick states on more than one occasion that it is his intention to remain entirely 
impartial throughout ME, this impartiality can actually be seen to dissolve as 
Sidgwick finds himself unavoidably drawn to certain conclusions, from which he does 
actually construct a moral theory. 
The main discussion is then taken up by a comprehensive analysis of Book 
III, in which Sidgwick uncovers the essential link between the fundamental, self-
evident and primarily deontological principles of Intuitionism that are Justice, 
Prudence, and Universal Benevolence, and the equally utilitarian nature of Universal 
Benevolence. This is the link that is represented by the term ‘Rational Benevolence’. 
At the beginning of this section, the conclusions of the preceding two chapters on 
Sidgwick’s deontology and his utilitarianism are briefly revisited. But this is not simply 
a repetition of points. The earlier investigations into Sidgwick’s deontology and 
utilitarianism drew attention to the nature and moral-philosophical value Sidgwick 
attributed to each type of moral principle independently, and also alluded to the 
areas in which each principle functions to indicate the other. It is specifically this 
latter context in which the respective deontological and utilitarian properties of 
Benevolence will be discussed here, appearing now in crucial roles within the wider 
framework of my argument for that meeting between the principles that creates the 
reconciled and coherent whole that is Rational Benevolence. The argument for this 
whole occupies the central sections of this chapter.  
For further evidence that Sidgwick developed an inherent link between 
deontological and utilitarian principles, the final section of the chapter turns to the 
personal document. Here, Sidgwick explicitly describes his reasons for believing 
there to be no opposition between deontological and utilitarian principles from his 
own individual, rather than purely academic, point of view. Sidgwick’s own 
conclusion on this relationship is thus used in conjunction with mine drawn at the end 
of the chapter.   
The results of this chapter will be assessed in the thesis’ conclusion, where 
they will appear in context of the Parental Predicament that was used at the start of 
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the thesis to demonstrate the serious moral ambivalence that often occurs between 
absolute-principle and outcome based modes of moral reasoning. This will include a 
discussion of how this thesis envisages the synthesis embodied by Rational 
Benevolence to apply in practice, and an assessment of its value for explaining and 
justifying moral ambivalence.  
 
4.1. The Meaning of ‘Synthesis’ 
 
In the thesis introduction, I theorised that the most effective way to address the 
problem of moral ambivalence, which is characterised by the presence of two equally 
reasonable and yet apparently conflicting moral principles, would be to show that the 
two types of moral property are actually inherently connected via that shared 
reasonableness. This, I argued there, would reconcile absolute-principle based 
(deontological) and outcome based (utilitarian) moral properties into a kind of 
dynamic synthesis, in which the reasonableness of each type both validates and 
limits the reasonableness of the other, to an appropriate extent. The various terms 
that I have used to refer to this reconciliation that I claim can be found in Sidgwick’s 
work have all been expressly selected on the basis of their ability to precisely 
describe the nature of that relationship. The vocabulary of ‘interdependent’, 
‘reciprocal’, and ‘mutually informing’, is intended to convey the concept that each 
type of principle – the deontological and the utilitarian – is equal in importance to the 
other, and that they must rely upon each other for their actuality, their recognition, 
and the role that they play in the human moral experience. What exactly is meant by 
each of these qualities must now be examined, in order to generate a series of 
requirements, or criteria, that this chapter must show Sidgwick’s theory to meet, if it 
is to be called a synthesis.  
Beginning with the ‘actuality’ point, what is meant by this is that deontological 
properties are only fully realised and made certain with reference to utilitarian 
properties, and that utilitarian properties are only fully realised with reference to 
deontological principles. The synthesis presents a co-reliant situation in which 
neither principle, despite their obvious differences, can be fully conceived of without 
the other. Whichever principle is taken first, it must automatically indicate the other. 
This naturally implies that both principles must also have a degree of their own 
validity, and thus through that relationship the value of each in its own right is also 
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fully recognised. Again, this is regardless of their opposing natures. When these 
features are combined, and when the relationship is understood positively, the 
inevitable conclusion is that both types of principle must have a vital place within the 
system of human morality, and that at least part of the ‘place’, or role, of each can 
only be understood with reference to the other principle. The converse of that 
situation – or the negative understanding of the relationship – is that if the two 
principles are so divergent and yet both have value, then the recognition of their 
respective values will likely cause each position to have to accept certain limits. 
Taken all together, this series of conditions is what is meant by the expression 
‘mutually informing’, which is ultimately the most effective way to describe overall 
what is meant by a ‘synthesis’ that is not just an amalgamation or a fusion of various 
ideas, but a system in which those ideas exist in a necessary, dynamic relationship.  
In terms of what is meant by the relationship being ‘necessary’, this is on one 
hand a slight extension of the words just described. If one property cannot be fully 
realised without reference to another and vice versa – if each property generates the 
other -  then it is given that in a system in which there is more than one property, 
both are indispensable to that system.  But the term ‘necessary’ is also intended to 
represent something beyond its merely descriptive qualities. The word implies 
‘requirement’, and describing the relationship between deontological and utilitarian 
principles as ‘necessary’, or ‘required’ applies not just to a metaphysical 
understanding of that relationship – it also lends to the theory of that relationship a 
certain impact that it will have on moral philosophy in general. This is because 
stating that a relationship between deontological and utilitarian principles is 
necessary (in order for either to be fully understood), is the strongest and most direct 
challenge to the traditional divide that exists between those principles. As I argued in 
the thesis introduction, this divide is a fundamental problem in moral philosophy, 
inaccurate as it is in reflecting the reality of the human moral experience – and 
bringing some reconciliation to the situation via Sidgwick’s theory of Rational 
Benevolence is the thesis’ principal aim. How far this reconciliation is successful, 
both practically and philosophically, will be assessed in the thesis’ conclusion – but 
here it is important that this potential is understood to be conveyed by the use of the 
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word ‘necessary’ in relation to the connection between deontological and utilitarian 
moral principles482. 
 
4.2. The Possibility of a Synthesis in Sidgwick’s Work  
 
Before it can be argued that a synthesis of the nature just described exists between 
deontological and utilitarian principles in Sidgwick’s work, it is necessary to assess 
whether Sidgwick himself allows that such a thing is possible. Ahead of this even, it 
is also necessary to question whether ME actually offers any kind of moral theory at 
all. It would be unacceptable to try and extract from Sidgwick’s work something that 
he himself would not consider to be valid. It would also very unlikely be a successful 
endeavour. The following sections address Sidgwick’s statements that he himself 
intended to remain impartial in ME as regards an ethical position, and take into 
account the consequences of this for whether a moral theory can be developed from 
ME. But they also employ textual evidence of Sidgwick’s underlying hope – and this 
is his own word – that reconciliation between the principles may be possible. 
 
4.2.a. Sidgwick’s Intended Ethical Neutrality 
 
We cannot, when studying Sidgwick, ignore his repeated claims about the aim of ME 
that it is an investigation into the methods commonly used by ordinary people in their 
moral reasonings, and not a treatise on how ethics ought to be. He is clear about this 
in the preface to the first edition, stating that he has ‘put aside temporarily the urgent 
need which we all feel of finding and adopting the true method of determining what 
we ought to do’, and that ‘all the different methods developed…are expounded and 
criticised from a neutral position, and as impartially as possible’ (ME: vi). He restates 
                                                 
482 Using the word ‘necessary’ to refer to the relationship between deontological and utilitarian 
principles also implies that at the practical level of how morality is lived and experienced, both types of 
morality are necessary. This should not however lead to a situation in which both are enforced. This is 
precisely not the intention of arguing for the indispensable presence of both types of morality: 
‘Necessary’ is not taken here to mean other interpretations of the word, such as ‘compulsory’, or 
‘obligatory’. Rather, it is theorised that if both types of principle are needed, or required, for a full 
understanding of human morality, then both types should be more robustly defended. This point will 
be discussed further in the thesis’ conclusion.  
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this position in the second preface, in response to the ‘fundamental 
misunderstanding’ that ME is primarily a defence of utilitarianism483.  
The fact that Sidgwick is so careful to point out that he should not be understood 
as advocating utilitarianism over any other method is important for two reasons. The 
first, which has been pointed out above, is that it supports the argument that 
Sidgwick’s work is not simply a defence of utilitarianism, as is so often assumed. 
Secondly, it reinforces Sidgwick’s concern to remain himself unbiased towards any 
one ethical position – something that adds further integrity to his investigation and, 
later, to its results. We see continuing references to this neutrality throughout Book I 
– first when Sidgwick outlines his plan for ME in the introduction proper – ‘The 
present book contains neither the exposition of a system, nor a natural or critical 
history…I have attempted to define and unfold not one Method of Ethics, but 
several…’, and next in I:VI when he is summarising the findings of the previous 
chapters – ‘What then do we commonly regard as valid ultimate reasons for acting or 
abstaining? This, as was said, is the starting-point for the discussions of the present 
treatise: which is not primarily concerned with proving or disproving the validity of 
any such reasons, but rather with the critical exposition of the different ‘methods’…’ 
(I:VI:78). But despite the strength of this objectivity, Sidgwick’s impartiality (or, to use 
Sidgwick’s turn of phrase, this ‘disinterested curiosity’) is clearly meant to underpin 
the entirety of the investigation. It would therefore seem to follow that ME is unlikely 
to be offering a moral theory: To do this would necessarily mean ME adhering to and 
supporting a certain position. Sidgwick’s own words maintain a close link between 
his neutrality and the non-normative nature of ME: ‘…we may seek to add to the 
number of these [ethical] systems’, he says, ‘and claim after so many unsuccessful 
efforts to have at last attained the one true theory’ (I:I:12) – but Sidgwick does not 
mean to do this. It is not his ‘primary aim to establish [ethical first] principles’, or to 
‘supply a set of practical directions for conduct’ (I:I:14). Sidgwick is clearest about 
this in the final sentences of the introduction: “I have wished to keep the reader’s 
attention throughout directed to the processes rather than the results of ethical 
thought: and have therefore never stated as my own any positive practical 
                                                 
483 ‘I find’, Sidgwick says, ‘that more than one critic has overlooked or disregarded the account of the 
plan of my treatise, given in the original preface…: and has consequently supposed me to be an 
assailant of two of the methods…and a defender of the third’. Sidgwick also points out that he has 
drawn attention to the defects of all the moral theories, not just those of the morality of common 
sense. 
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conclusions…” (I:I:14). The question becomes then how, in light of this, it could 
possibly be put forward at all that ME offers a moral theory. 
 
4.2.b The Ideas of Reconciliation and Synthesis in I:I 
 
As much as Sidgwick’s declared impartiality casts doubt on ME’s potential to offer a 
moral theory, there are several areas of the text, even at this preliminary stage of 
ME, that support the claim that Sidgwick is to some extent looking towards the idea 
that these contrasting ethical principles could possibly be harmonised. The most 
important of these areas is Sidgwick’s own discussion of the very concept of 
reconciliation, which appears towards the end of the introduction.  Here, Sidgwick 
admits that the idea of reconciliation is attractive. The various methods of ethics 
have, according to Sidgwick, been presented as ‘alternatives between which…the 
human mind seems…necessarily forced to choose’ (I:I:12)484, whereas it seems to 
Sidgwick that the human mind naturally strives for consistency: ‘…because men 
commonly seem to guide themselves by a mixture of different methods, more or less 
disguised under ambiguities of language…along with these claims is felt the need of 
harmonising them…’ (I:I:12). There is, Sidgwick is convinced, a clear impulse on the 
part of human beings towards trying to resolve the problem of apparently valid yet 
conflicting moral principles. What is more, Sidgwick specifically uses the language of 
‘synthesis’. The word appears twice, both times in direct conjunction with the concept 
of that reconciliation between the varying practical maxims individuals encounter in 
their moral thought485. In just these three pages of ME, there is little doubt that 
                                                 
484 This comment also clearly demonstrates Sidgwick’s own recognition of the divide between the 
major schools of moral thought, at which this thesis is aimed on the whole.  
485 It also appears again later at I:VIII:102, when Sidgwick makes the point that Intuitionism 
understood as the deontological system of ethics is ‘in need of rational synthesis’, and later in ME at 
III:XIII:374, IV:II:422, 496, and 497. Most of these examples provide sound evidence that to use the 
language of synthesis in relation to the relationship Sidgwick perceives between utilitarian and 
deontological principles is legitimate. It should be noted that in some of these passages (those on 496 
and 497 especially), Sidgwick is referring to the possibility of a synthesis between Rational Egoism, 
and Rational Benevolence, the antipathy between which of course causes the Dualism of Practical 
Reason. But this is not the only context in which Sidgwick uses the language of synthesis, as 
demonstrated by the other passages. In the introduction in particular, Sidgwick is simply referring to a 
synthesis of the diverse practical maxims accepted by most people, that he represents with his series 
of questions that is designed to show that we ‘answer ‘yes’ to all these’, when their answers are 
actually quite different, and often contradict each other.  There are considerable grounds, then, on 
which to claim that Sidgwick was also imagining a synthesis between absolute-principle based and 
outcome based principles – and as will be seen, there is also substantial evidence that Sidgwick 
believed he had achieved at least this extent of synthesis.  
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Sidgwick is using the term ‘synthesis’ to represent an ideal system, either personal 
or philosophical, in which those practical maxims are somehow combined 
harmoniously - in which they are ‘brought into clear relation to each other’ (I:I:6. See 
also I:I:12-13). 
Sidgwick’s confidence in previous attempts on the part of philosophers to create 
such a synthesis however is low. His opinion is that writers have ‘proceeded to 
synthesis without adequate analysis; the practical demand for the former being more 
urgently felt than the theoretical need of the latter’ (I:I:12). In Sidgwick’s opinion, the 
difficulties of the various ethical treaties have often been overlooked in the interests 
of explaining morality in this way, with the result that those difficulties will only 
reappear the more forcefully later on. Overall, Sidgwick says, ‘we get on the one 
hand vague and hazy reconciliation, on the other loose and random exaggeration of 
discrepancies’ (I:I:13). As apparent as the need for reconciliation between our 
practical moral maxims might be then, Sidgwick’s message is that great caution must 
be applied in attempting it (as his choice to avoid attempting such a thing also 
implies). In Sidgwick’s astute words, ‘the clear indication of an unsolved problem is 
at any rate a step to its solution’ (I:I:13).  
It is in that very ‘unsolved problem’, however, that Sidgwick’s solution itself might 
lie. Sidgwick has already identified and named this problem - it is that of the conflict 
between different principles that are yet apparently both reasonable. This situation is 
for Sidgwick, as outlined above and mirroring exactly that of this thesis, at the very 
heart of the problems in ethical theory: ‘I am myself convinced that this is the main 
explanation of the phenomenon…we cannot, of course, regard as valid reasonings 
that lead to conflicting conclusions’ (I:I:6. See also I:I:12). It is at this point that it 
becomes possible, even this early stage in ME, to perceive the thread in Sidgwick’s 
thought that will, in spite of his clearly stated intentions, lead to Sidgwick creating his 
own reconciliation, and his own ‘synthesis’. That thread is precisely that of the 
equally reasonable status of each type of principle – and I argue that Sidgwick’s 
recognition of this does actually lead him to the ‘solution’ he mentions at I:I:13. 
Rationality was a recurrent theme for those earlier passages taken from the 
prefaces486. The same theme continues in the introduction (see I:I:3, 5-6, 12-14) - 
                                                 
486 Throughout these preface passages, Sidgwick speaks of ‘the methods of obtaining reasoned 
convictions as to what ought to be done” (ME: v), of ‘how conclusions are to be rationally reached’ 
(ME: vi - this phrase appears twice in the exact same wording), and reframes his question as ‘what 
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and both chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis repeatedly drew out Sidgwick’s consistent 
belief in Reason as a common basis to both deontology and utilitarianism487. It is 
clear that for Sidgwick, the moral maxims by which most people abide are united at 
least by the fact that all are generally felt to be reasonable – by which it is meant, 
according to Sidgwick’s own definition, that they are thought to be rational, 
unconditional, self-evident, and not pertaining to a still ulterior end488. It is this theme 
that Sidgwick will carry through ME and into his own conclusions on the role, value, 
and mutual relationship of deontological and utilitarian principles 
To summarise, one of the points made above needs to be recalled – but it also 
needs to be posited alongside an observation on the text that crucially works in 
favour of the argument that Sidgwick does make it possible for a moral theory, and 
even a synthesis between reasonable and yet conflicting principles, to be drawn from 
his work. The point to recall is that Sidgwick himself originally intended to refrain 
from ‘expressly attempting any such complete and final solution of the chief ethical 
difficulties and controversies as would convert this exposition of various methods into 
the development of a harmonious system’ (I:I:13); to ignore this would simply be an 
incomplete reading of the text, which would lead to the de-contextualisation of 
Sidgwick’s arguments. Not only would this weaken any claims made by this thesis, 
but it would actually weaken Sidgwick’s own arguments themselves: Part of the 
strength of Sidgwick’s argument for the reconciliation between utilitarian and 
deontological principles is the very fact that he did not specifically intend to pursue or 
develop such a thing489. But the crucial observation which is to be borne in mind 
                                                 
among the precepts of our common conscience do we really see to be ultimately reasonable?” (ME: 
xi). 
487  In addition to the passages already mentioned in the preceding chapters, Sidgwick’s view that 
Reason is common to all methods of ethics is also evident at I:III:23, I:III:36, I:VI:77, and I:VI:83. 
488 Sidgwick does acknowledge that not all ends are determined or prescribed by Reason (I:I:8), and 
that we only require to assume that an end that dictates ‘right conduct’ is adopted as ultimate and 
paramount on some basis. But to investigate this approach to ethics is, Sidgwick states, untenable. 
The task is only made manageable when we ‘confine ourselves to such ends as the common sense 
of mankind appears to accept as rational’ (I:I:9). But in any case, Sidgwick’s own normative definition 
of rightness being that which is rational supersedes this observation. 
In an interesting contrast with the fact that Sidgwick considers this apparent reasonableness of 
differing principles to be the problem, the way in which he includes the language of rationality when 
he mentions the conclusions to which people are drawn in their moral processes does actually 
suggest that Sidgwick is predicting Reason to be part of the solution in that it remains relevant to all 
the outcomes that will emerge as a result of his investigations in ME (see ME: v, vi). There is an 
impression in those early words that they are prophetic of the conclusions that Sidgwick himself will 
reach by the end of ME – that despite differences in method, the most fundamental moral principles 
have Reason in common. 
489 I will return to this statement shortly.   
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alongside this is taken from the sentence immediately following that passage. Here, 
Sidgwick states that he ‘hopes’ ‘to afford aid towards the construction of such a 
system’ (I:I:13). This hope is of the utmost importance. As the rest of this chapter will 
demonstrate, that hope eventually evolved. Sidgwick’s investigation into the methods 
of ethics led him inexorably to a point at which he was able to make statements 
based on more than just optimism. And Sidgwick himself was entirely aware of this 
particular result of ME. In an astonishingly overlooked passage from the preface to 
the second edition of ME, Sidgwick makes the striking claim that he had found the 
answer to that timeless question of ‘What among the precepts of our common 
conscience do we really see to be ultimately reasonable?” Sidgwick does not expand 
on that answer there (this is for ME itself, and this chapter, to do) – it is what that 
answer represents to which Sidgwick draws attention: “…it supplied the rational 
basis that I had long perceived to be wanting to the Utilitarianism of Bentham, 
regarded as an ethical doctrine: and thus enabled me to transcend the commonly 
received antithesis between Intuitionists and Utilitarians” (ME: xi). The significance of 
this sentence can hardly be overstated. It contains all at once Sidgwick’s adherence 
to the importance of rationality, evidence that Sidgwick was not simply a disciple of 
the utilitarianism of Bentham – and, most importantly of all – a direct statement from 
Sidgwick himself that he had found there to be a means of superseding and 
reconciling the traditional conflict between utilitarianism and deontology. It is, 
essentially, incontestable proof of three of this thesis’ central claims. 
It seems therefore that that ‘hope’ for a reconciliation between reasonable but 
varying moral principles of which Sidgwick speaks in the introduction can legitimately 
be harnessed – and, crucially, developed; Sidgwick’s own words give permission to 
do so490. We can therefore now follow through on that hope for a solution, and 
expound how Sidgwick achieved it.   
                                                 
490 It might reasonable be asked why, if Sidgwick did recognise this particular aspect of ME as the 
second preface suggests he did, it did not appear more prominently in ME itself. The only place in ME 
(until we reach Book III and beyond) that Sidgwick makes reference to the discovery that utilitarianism 
and deontology share such a vital link is in a passing comment that part of his object in the volume is 
to ‘expound as clearly and as fully as my limits will allow the different methods of Ethics….to point out 
their mutual relations’ (I:I:14). Considering that the claim Sidgwick makes in the second preface is a 
monumental one, it seems strange that Sidgwick would not draw more attention to this ‘mutual 
relations’ aspect of his take on ethics – or that he did not revise ME to incorporate it. The prefaces 
show that Sidgwick made various other adjustments to subsequent editions, some of them fairly major 
– so why not this one? It could be theorised that either Sidgwick did not consider the discovery of this 
relationship to be as important as it actually is, or that he thought a degree of relationship between the 
methods was obvious from the start. Both of these are made plausible by ME- and whichever it is, no 
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4.3. The Tone Changes: Enquiry vs. Conclusions, and the Dissolution of 
Sidgwick’s Neutrality 
 
It is clear from ME’s introduction that Sidgwick did at least consider the idea of 
reconciliation between moral principles – but these comments on reconciliation and 
the possible role of Reason do not themselves immediately eliminate the fact of 
Sidgwick’s intended neutrality regarding the various systems of ethics. It is only 
reasonable to assume that Sidgwick went forwards into the rest of ME on the basis 
of that intended impartiality. In order then for my argument that Sidgwick did actually 
produce a reconciliatory moral theory to succeed, it must be shown that there was 
some kind of change in the text, that bridges this gap between Sidgwick’s original 
neutrality and his eventual definite argument for a specific relationship between 
deontological and utilitarian principles. It is my view that such a change does occur, 
gradually unfolding as ME progresses, and that that change is a move on Sidgwick’s 
part away from that emphasis on impartiality. 
 Before that change is examined, it is helpful to assess quite why it might have 
taken place. There are two possible reasons for which such a change might have 
happened. The first is that Sidgwick simply forgot his original intention to remain 
impartial, and wrote the rest of ME insensible of wanting to maintain his 
‘disinterested curiosity’. This, however, is a very unlikely scenario. Sidgwick was 
nothing if not fastidious in his approach to ME – this is part of what has given the 
                                                 
detriment is caused to Sidgwick’s argument for that relationship. He still developed it more thoroughly 
and with greater insight and aptitude than any other philosopher of that time, and in doing so it seems 
that Sidgwick did see if not its tremendous importance for practical ethics in general, then at least its 
necessity for understanding a large part of the confusion between moral principles from which he 
begins his enquiries in ME. 
However, it seems to me that the more likely answer to why Sidgwick did not embrace his 
transcending of the ‘common antithesis between utilitarianism and intuitionism’ lies in the notorious 
Dualism of Practical Reason. For Sidgwick, a complete synthesis between all the reasonable 
principles that an individual is inclined to obey was always going to be impossible for as long as he 
could not reconcile the fundamental contradiction between self-regarding and extra-regarding 
impulses. It is a well-known fact that the problem of the DoPR plagued Sidgwick until his final days; it 
has already been seen that Sidgwick was persuaded to change the final word of ME from ‘failure’, but 
his self-deprecation on this point is at least partially responsible for the reputation that ME still has 
today, of failing its author in yielding an answer to one of morality’s and indeed humankind’s most 
difficult questions. As a result, and ironically also as a result of Sidgwick’s frequent lamenting of the 
point, some of the finer achievements of ME are overlooked – both by its readers, and by its writer. 
The personal document however indicates that later in life at least, Sidgwick was more prepared to 
embrace the fact that he saw a necessary relationship between deontology and utilitarianism, and that 
this relationship was important, even if he could not reconcile self-interest to the equation. The 
importance of this document’s role in demonstrating this relationship, and the significance of the point 
in Sidgwick’s life at which he wrote it, is discussed in full below.  
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volume such enduring fame as one of the best expositions of moral philosophy ever 
written. It would be entirely out of character – both as an academic and as a person 
– for Sidgwick to have simply taken a different direction in ME, with no particular 
reason.  
 The second possibility is that there was an actual reason for Sidgwick moving 
away in ME from that impartiality he was so careful to state in its introduction. This is 
my position. To expand, it will be recalled that it was said above, in 5.2.ii, that part of 
the strength of Sidgwick’s arguments for that reconciliation lies precisely in the fact 
that he did not purposely set out to pursue it. What is specifically meant by this is 
that Sidgwick gradually left his original impartiality behind not explicitly, intentionally 
– and not simply in order to argue for utilitarianism - but as an unavoidable result of 
the conclusions that he saw naturally emerging as he pursued his investigations into 
the two types of morality. It is the purpose of this section to demonstrate how and 
where this change away from the originally intended ethical neutrality of ME occurs. 
By tracking the gradual move away from his impartiality that unfolds as ME 
progresses, Sidgwick’s own aims in ME are brought into alignment with the claim 
made by this thesis that he did eventually arrive at a moral theory, which in turn sets 
up the basis upon which the chapter’s later sections can argue for that moral theory 
itself.  
 
4.3.a. I:III – I:VIII – The Early Influence of Reason on Sidgwick’s Neutrality 
 
The co-existence of the two key features of Sidgwick’s work that were illuminated 
above - his intention to remain impartial, and the prophetic impression of Sidgwick’s 
crucial faith in Reason - can easily be followed throughout the first two books of ME. 
The text here does still largely accord with Sidgwick’s planned neutrality, with 
Sidgwick examining each moral position in turn, drawing out its place in ordinary 
thought, and paying attention to both its legitimacy and its difficulties. The tone is, as 
would be expected, mainly theoretical, and investigative. At the same time, there are 
various topics on which Sidgwick does put forward his own conclusions. This is seen 
in Book I in his rejection of conformity to God’s will as a criterion of rightness 
(I:VI:80), his similar rejection of ‘Nature’ as a guide for action (I:VI:80-81), his 
argument for defining ‘good’ as something other than ‘pleasure’ (I:IX:106-109), and 
in Book II in his statements that whereas the empirical-reflective method does not 
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appear to be a reliable means of establishing ends in egoistic hedonism (II:III:149-
150), it transpires to be the only method available (and even then is still vague and 
uncertain (I:VI:195)). 
Sidgwick is arguably drawing these conclusions for the sake of the clarity that 
will be needed as his enquiry deepens. They are the results of discussions in which 
Sidgwick –in his characteristically rational and methodical manner - establishes the 
outlines and definitions with which he will be working in the investigations proper in 
Book II, III and IV. They are also processes of elimination through which Sidgwick 
creates a framework that roughly resembles what the ordinary person might consider 
to be the subjects and principles most relevant to their moral experiences e.g. 
egoism is discounted as a real method of ethics, whereas the intuitional view and the 
utilitarian view are held up as representing the main body of commonly conceived 
moral doctrines (see I:I:8 ; I:III:36-37 ; I:VI:84-85 ; I:VII:91 ; I:VIII:96 ; esp. II:I:119 ; 
III:I:200).  Certainly many of his conclusions are likely to already be familiar to a 
reader who has some understanding of moral philosophy491.  
Certain other conclusions however, have a different quality. These are 
noticeable by the fact that they are stated more assertively, and – crucially – 
independently of the more familiar conceptions with which Sidgwick is otherwise 
mainly working. The most notable examples are, as has been seen in this thesis’ 
previous two chapters, Sidgwick’s argument for the definition of the right (I:III:26-34), 
his alignment with Kant on what Reason must entail (I:III:33-35), and his rejection of 
pleasure as an ultimate end. Where chapters 2 and 3 covered the details of 
Sidgwick’s positions on these topics, the emphasis here is that all of these 
arguments materialise from what Sidgwick personally considers to be the principles 
and dictates of Reason. This is to say that the conclusions he gives in these areas 
appear to be statements as to what ought to be, as opposed to being concepts or 
theories about what is that Sidgwick is merely exploring as part of ME’s general 
investigations.  
Most significantly, as the the first book of ME progresses Sidgwick’s 
decisiveness on certain subjects that springs from his reliance on Reason makes it 
possible to detect a point at which it actually begins to supersede his impartiality. 
                                                 
491 It is also only reasonable to assume that Sidgwick was going to have to reach a certain amount of 
definite hypotheses, otherwise the entire enterprise of the book would be pointless.  
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This starts to become most apparent in I:VIII, with Sidgwick’s handling of what is 
meant by the term ‘intuitionism’, ahead of his investigation into the Intuitional method 
proper that he will pursue in Book III. Where Sidgwick’s approach was previously 
one of enquiry, here there is a noticeable impression that Sidgwick is purposefully 
setting up his view of the Intuitional position492. This is in part due to Sidgwick’s 
perception that ‘Intuition’ is often used ambiguously, and requires a narrower 
definition (I:VIII:96-98), which he is here endeavouring to give. Arguably, Sidgwick’s 
definitions of the Intuitional method as that ‘which regards as the practically ultimate 
end of moral actions their conformity to certain rules or dictates of Duty 
unconditionally prescribed’ (I:VIII:96) and ‘that certain kinds of actions are 
unconditionally prescribed without regard to ulterior consequences’ (I:VIII:98) are 
simply recognisably standard of the non-utilitarian, non-consequentialist-duty method 
of ethics. But Sidgwick’s subsequent categorising of three types of Intuitionism 
(I:VIII:96-104), leads Sidgwick to state clearly that ‘dogmatic’ Intuitionism, which 
seems to him to be the sort generally intended by the term ‘Intuitive’ morality, cannot 
in fact provide by itself a complete or adequate system of morality. In a rephrasing of 
his earlier observation that we cannot regard as valid reasonings which conflict, this 
inadequacy is due to the fact that the confusion of moral principles and methods that 
make up the predominantly intuitive human moral experience cannot, if it is confused 
in this way, be ultimately reasonable. ‘It is found difficult’, Sidgwick says, ‘to accept 
as scientific first principles the moral generalities that we obtain by reflection on the 
ordinary thought of mankind…even granting that these rules can be so defined as 
perfectly to fit together and over the whole field of human conduct…still the resulting 
code seems an accidental aggregate of precepts, which stands in need of some 
rational synthesis’ (I:VIII:102). For Sidgwick then, what is needed is the philosophical 
why of those moral precepts put forwards by dogmatic Intuitionism. He posits even 
more specifically that one or more principles must be found to be ‘absolutely and 
undeniably true and evident’. In other words, they must be proven to be ultimately 
reasonable.  
                                                 
492 The impression begins early, with Sidgwick’s confident statement that no morality ever existed 
which did not consider consequences to some extent (I:VIII:96). He then goes on to recognise that 
hedonism may to some extent be called a form of Intuitionism, but promptly expels it from his own 
definition (I:VIII:98). Sidgwick’s tone is in general more self-assured in this chapter, as compared to 
the first seven chapters of Book I.   
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It is in this way that Sidgwick’s own philosophic view, which demonstrates his 
confidence in the role and inexorableness of Reason, rises clearly to the fore in 
these pages. For this concern with what can ultimately be called undeniably true and 
evident is actually the outline of the task to which Sidgwick will turn himself, in Book 
III. Here, then, that change in Sidgwick’s intentions for ME that was outlined at the 
start of this section is clearly underway. It is to the completion of that change that the 
next section now turns. 
 
4.3.b. Sidgwick’s Abandonment of Neutrality in Book III 
 
This shift in ME’s tone that has been caused by Sidgwick’s petition to Reason and 
his resulting willingness to draw his own conclusions when he had previously stated 
that this was not his objective, carries directly over to the extended enquiry into 
Intuitionism in Book III. Here - as was seen in chapter 2 (pp.181-186) - Sidgwick 
subjects the commonly held principles of common sense morality to a rigorous 
testing (III:II-X) in which he explores how these principles have come to be, and 
whether or not they are capable of producing any clear and concise guidance for 
moral action. The fact that Sidgwick undertakes this style of investigation into 
common sense morality is admittedly not completely at odds with the aims he stated 
at the beginning of ME: Sidgwick says in the preface to the first edition that ME is an 
exposition into the different methods of obtaining reasoned convictions, and that part 
of its aim is indeed to be critical (ME: v). He was also not wrong when he stated 
earlier at the end of I:VIII (in a passage that acts as a sort of preparation for his 
upcoming investigation in Book III) that ‘for systematic direction of conduct, we 
require to know on what judgements we are to rely as ultimately valid’ (I:VIII:103) - 
this is, after all, only practical. Furthermore, it is only fair to Sidgwick to acknowledge 
that he ends III:I with a reiteration that he is not trying to prove or disprove 
Intuitionism, only to ‘obtain as explicit, exact, and coherent a statement as possible 
of its fundamental rules’ (III:I:216)493.  
But this statement does not seem to agree with his points made in the 
preceding three pages of III:I that we require these moral cognitions to be 
                                                 
493 This is echoed at III:XI:338 when Sidgwick specifically declares again that he wishes it to be 
observed that he has not introduced his own views. 
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systemised, freed from error, corrected, supplemented, and assessed in terms of 
their clearness, precision, and authority494. In all of these ways of handling moral 
cognitions, there must be some actual appraisal involved. It would seem therefore as 
though there are two forms of epistemology in operation here. The first is a purely 
detached sort of epistemology which is concerned only with how we come to know 
moral principles - and this is within the original remit of ME as stated by Sidgwick. 
The second form, which appears in Sidgwick’s queries regarding the truth and limits 
of these principles, is Sidgwick’s own, philosophical and Reason-centric 
epistemological method. In light of this, it can be seen that the key point of departure 
in Sidgwick’ move away from impartiality actually appeared in the preparatory 
passage on page 103, in Sidgwick’s use of the word ‘valid’. To ‘obtain clear and 
coherent facts’ about a situation is not the same as deciding whether or not they are 
‘valid’ - the former is an observation (which is apparently what Sidgwick first 
intended), the latter is, obviously, a value judgement – and in these chapters in Book 
III, Sidgwick is not just exploring how we arrive at the principles on which we place 
value, he is also passing his own judgement on how far these principles are really 
acceptable in their commonly conceived form495. The appearance of Sidgwick’s own 
epistemological method is substantiated further by III:XI, with Sidgwick’s 
retrospective application of his four criteria for self-evidence to the principles that 
                                                 
494 It also does not concur with his statement in the first preface that he is concerned in ME ‘from first 
to last, not on the practical results to which our methods lead, but on the methods themselves’ (vi, 
italics mine). Throughout the entirety of III:I, Sidgwick is assertive in presenting his own views 
(III:I:210; 211; 212 – 213) – and most of these points on which he is unambiguous are specifically 
rules on which, according to Reason, we must all agree. The main examples are his statement that 
‘we cannot judge an action to be right for A and wrong for B, unless we can find in the natures or 
circumstances of the two some difference...’ (III:I:209), his simple yet convincing refutation of Kant on 
the basis that just because an individual can will that their maxim be made universal, that maxim may 
still – objectively – be wrong (III:I:209-210), and his arrival at the position that ‘we have, in fact, to take 
up the attempt that Socrates initiated, and endeavour to define satisfactorily the general notions of 
duty and virtue which we all in common use…’ (III:I:215). It is my view that these points are crucial to 
the argument for Sidgwick’s skill as a philosopher, arising as they do from Sidgwick’s sophisticated 
and highly detailed enquiry– but within the context of the current discussion, they are further evidence 
to support the claim that Sidgwick does, when it comes to Reason, adopt a certain unequivocal 
epistemological view. 
495 This is evident throughout III:I-X. See, for example, his discussion on benevolence (III:IV:246 – 
262) (especially his conclusion on this chapter: ‘…we must admit that while we find a number of broad 
and more or less indefinite rules…laid down by common sense in this department of duty, it is difficult 
or impossible to extract from them, so far as they are commonly accepted, any clear and precise 
principles…’(III:IV:262)) – and his discussion on justice (III:V:287, and III:V:293 – ‘The prominent 
element in justice as ordinarily conceived is a kind of equality…but when we have clearly 
distinguished this element, we see that the definition of the virtue required for practical guidance is left 
obviously incomplete…’. For further examples see also his similar conclusion on the matter of laws 
and promises (III:VI:311), and his throwing doubt on the absolute validity of veracity (III:VII:315). 
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have occupied the previous nine chapters. With most of these principles of course 
failing to meet that criteria, Sidgwick’s own conclusions on this matter now appear 
frequently. There is little doubt by this stage that the reader is receiving Sidgwick’s 
own individual philosophic view496.  
It is, then, this second epistemological method that Sidgwick has gradually 
introduced as ME has progressed – and it is this epistemology from which Sidgwick’s 
moral theory develops. The Reason-centric nature of that epistemology is fully 
revealed here in the conviction with which Sidgwick states the conclusions that it 
yields. Conclusions that are the result of Reason are by default objective, regardless 
of the writer’s opinion. In this way, it doesn’t actually matter if Sidgwick himself 
denies that he has put forward his own views. By implementing this kind of 
systematic and scientific investigation into the rational self-evidence of these 
principles, Sidgwick has committed himself to stating actual decisions on the 
outcomes, whether he intended it or not497. 
Based on this protracted and mostly negative investigation into the real self-
evidence of commonly held moral beliefs, it is understandable that so many of 
Sidgwick’s critics believed him to be attacking common sense morality, with a view to 
arguing for the superiority of utilitarianism. It is crucial to the central argument of this 
thesis however to state that those critics’ interpretation of III:II-X is not completely 
accurate. The purpose of drawing attention to ME’s abandonment of impartiality is 
not to point out that Sidgwick has done this in favour of just one (i.e. utilitarian) 
position, nor to simply point out that Sidgwick seems to have ‘changed his mind’ 
about his aims somewhere along the line. The importance of Sidgwick’s shift away 
from ethical neutrality lies in the very fact that it happens at all. As Sidgwick’s 
position on Reason begins to yield conclusions in I:VIII, and continues to do so with 
even more conviction in Book III - thus dissolving his original neutrality in the process 
- the entire tone of ME changes. This is what was meant when it was said that 
Sidgwick seems to be inevitably led towards the arguments that he will now develop 
                                                 
496 A few pages later, Sidgwick asks the reader to ‘travel with him again’ through those findings of the 
preceding chapters of Book III, this time in order to look at them from the perspective of his criteria for 
self-evidence, and whether or not they really can be stated as truths (III:XI:343). This also strongly 
indicates that by this stage in ME, Sidgwick has his own point that he wishes to impress on the 
reader.  
497 It is of course possible to dispute whether the writer’s Reason-based conclusions are actually 
correct, but this is not the point. The writer presumably believes in the accuracy of the results of their 
process of reasoning, and it is this that commits them to stating those conclusions.  
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throughout Book III. In these chapters, the pace of Sidgwick’s writing picks up, and 
there is a purposeful quality in his writing that suggests that his ideas - underpinned 
by the Reason and rationality that he considered to be so fundamental to any valid 
moral principle – are moving towards something certain, and decisive. This sense of 
purpose pervades the whole of the chapter entitled ‘Review of the Morality of 
Common Sense’, and continues into III:XIII, entitled ‘Philosophical Intuitionism’, as 
Sidgwick reaches his pivotal conclusions on the value, place, and role in human 
morality of both deontological and utilitarian principles498. Arguing these points as 
they do, these crucial chapters of ME are essentially a highly condensed version of 
what has already gone before in the volume, and therefore of this thesis also. It is 
here that Sidgwick, now at his most epistemologically persuasive, points to both the 
shortfalls and the value of the deontological position that he has already loosely 
covered in earlier books in a more exploratory (i.e. less definite) way; it is here that 
Sidgwick will conclude that deontological principles ultimately yield the utilitarian 
principle of Universal Benevolence. It is in these chapters, with their new 
authoritative tone, that Sidgwick will arrive at the conclusion of Rational 
Benevolence, in which deontological and utilitarian principles are bound together in 
his normative moral theory that answers Sidgwick’s ‘hope’ for such a system. 
Sidgwick abandoned neutrality and ‘disinterested curiosity’ not in order to support 
one type of morality over another, but because of an inherent connection between 
them which he saw unavoidably emerging before him. It is to that inherent 
connection that this chapter now turns. 
 
4.4. The Synthesis: Sidgwick’s Moral Theory of Rational Benevolence  
 
This chapter has now arrived at a point at which it is possible to argue for Sidgwick’s 
theory of Rational Benevolence as a means of reconciling deontological and 
utilitarian principles in such a way that they demonstrate themselves to exist in a 
                                                 
498 A particularly noticeable example of Sidgwick being now purposeful, rather than speculative comes 
at the beginning of III:XI when we see that Sidgwick actually considers the task of investigating 
whether it is possible to find ‘real ethical axioms’ of real clearness and certainty’ through philosophical 
intuitionism (III:XIII:373) to be something of a duty. ‘We conceive it as the aim of a philosopher, as 
such, to do somewhat more than define and formulate the common moral opinions of mankind…his 
function is to tell men what they ought to think, rather than what they do think; he is expected to 
transcend common sense in his premises, and is allowed a certain divergence from Common Sense 
in his conclusions’. We could easily excuse this on the basis that he is right that a philosopher can 
transcend commonly held ideas – but this was not the intention of this philosopher! 
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mutually informing relationship that can be thought of as a synthesis. It is the 
purpose of these sections – which form the last and most crucial stage of the thesis 
– to draw out where this relationship emerges, and precisely how the two principles 
cooperate within the normative framework of Rational Benevolence. The aim is to 
bring together and build on those features of Sidgwick’s work – his valuing of the 
deontological position and his particularly nuanced utilitarianism – that have already 
been established by this thesis, and that Sidgwick now makes explicit in Book III.  
The first section of this stage revisits the results of the investigations into 
Sidgwick’s deontology and his utilitarianism respectively, in order to re-emphasise 
precisely these aspects of his work that will now be seen in his theory of Rational 
Benevolence. This is followed with an extensive analysis of Rational Benevolence as 
a moral theory, as it appears in III:XIII. The deontological and utilitarian properties of 
Rational Benevolence are now specifically examined from the perspective of how the 
two types of principle appear together, and, specifically, how they each function to 
contribute to the theory of Rational Benevolence by remaining 
deontological/utilitarian but necessarily referring to each other to form a coherent 
whole. Finally, this specific way in which the deontological and utilitarian components 
are combined will be subjected to the criteria of synthesis given above. Ultimately, it 
is argued that this particular connection between deontological and utilitarian moral 
properties resolves the apparent conflict between them, and thus also removes the 
long-standing divide.  
 
4.4.a. Reiteration of Chapters 2 and 3 
 
In chapter 2 it was argued that the Intuitionism which Sidgwick associates with the 
absolute-principle or duty based method of ethics represents a recognisably non-
consequentialist form of deontology – and that Sidgwick himself follows a central 
tenet of that position in his own interpretation of what is meant by ‘right’. This 
interpretation is that ‘right’, or ‘ought’, pertains to actions that are ultimately 
reasonable, without reference to ulterior results. On this basis they are unconditional 
– or non-consequentialist categorical imperatives. Sidgwick concluded that the 
principles of common sense morality do not admit of self-evidence, and therefore 
cannot by themselves provide a complete system of ethics, but that his own 
principles of Justice, Prudence, and Benevolence do emerge as self-evident, given 
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that they are ultimately rational, and thus right without reference to anything further. 
As such, the Universal Benevolence that is built out of the rational relationship 
between these axioms incurs an unconditional ‘ought’, and also becomes a non-
consequentialist imperative. It was thus concluded that this traditionally deontological 
aspect of morality is, for Sidgwick, integral to the human moral experience, and to a 
system of normative ethics.  
The way in which Sidgwick’s Universal Benevolence acquires its rightness 
leads conveniently on to the findings of chapter 3. For it was noted there that, in 
accordance with my claim that Sidgwick’s utilitarianism is not always typical of his 
time, his reliance on Reason for his notions of ‘right’ and ‘ought’ also applies to the 
establishment and adoption of certain ultimate, rational ends – specifically that of 
Happiness. This Happiness is understood by utilitarianism to be the general 
Happiness, which indicates the principle of Universal Benevolence. It was also seen 
here that Sidgwick’s interpretation of utilitarianism as sustaining the current general 
validity of common sense morality, (i.e. the positive proof) depends on the 
philosophic relationship Sidgwick created as a result of not dismissing the 
deontological basis of common sense morality, but rather pressing that basis for full 
validity. This ‘negative proof’ (although it is not my position that this is actually 
negative proof as Sidgwick intended it) allows for the continued independent value of 
deontology/common sense morality, alongside that of utilitarianism, as opposed to 
simply pointing to the superiority of utilitarianism. It was then observed that as this is 
the case, we require to know that philosophic basis of that relationship, in which 
deontological and utilitarian moral properties are both sustained and validated at the 
meta-ethical level. This is the stage of the thesis’ ultimate investigation to which we 
now turn, as these deontological and utilitarian aspects of Universal Benevolence 
are examined for their combined roles within Sidgwick’s moral theory of Rational 
Benevolence.  
 
4.4.b. The Maxim of Rational Benevolence: Sidgwick’s Moral Theory 
 
The construction of Sidgwick’s moral theory of Rational Benevolence has already 
been partly seen, in chapter 2 where I argued for the deontological nature of the 
philosophic intuitions that inform it, and in chapter 3, where it was confirmed that 
Universal Benevolence is indeed a utilitarian principle. In order to now fully examine 
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the philosophic connection between these deontological and utilitarian properties 
however, the construction of Rational Benevolence must be briefly restated. This is 
partly because the thesis’ ultimate focus has now come to rest exclusively on 
Rational Benevolence as a whole, and partly because we need to clarify that whole 
so that we can assess the respective functions of the deontological and utilitarian 
properties that have been identified within it.  
It is in section 3 of III:XIII (with Sidgwick having made that transition away from 
asking what we do do to asking what we should do, that I have been demonstrating 
above) that Sidgwick finally turns his full attention to developing his own moral 
theory. He first gives that pivotal statement that whereas ‘it would be disheartening to 
have to regard as altogether illusory the strong instinct of Common Sense that points 
to the existence of [self-evident] principles’, the truth lies between the two 
conclusions that there are absolute principles, but they are so abstract and universal 
in scope that we require another method for determining particular duties 
(III:XIII:379). As I have outlined previously, the most significant thing about this 
passage is its indication that this theory is going to involve, in some way, a 
combination of principles. Sidgwick then immediately proceeds to the preliminary 
development of that theory.  
First, Sidgwick reintroduces the Kantian-influenced principle of Justice, negatively 
rephrased in such a way that it avoids Kant’s maxim’s collapse into subjectivity and 
is thus fully self-evident. After Sidgwick’s alteration, this principle (which reads that ‘it 
cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner in which it would be wrong for B to treat 
A, merely on the ground that they are two different individuals, and without there 
being any difference between the natures or circumstances of the two’) still evokes 
the Kantian emphasis on universalizability (III:XIII:380). However, whereas the self-
evident truth of this statement itself is clear, the principle is not, on its own, complete 
as a system of guidance. It provides the framework of how ethical actions are to be 
managed, but no information on what qualities the actions within it are to have. 
Sidgwick therefore continues on to point out that this principle was established on 
the basis of the similarity of individuals that make up a Whole. This Whole is 
represented by the notion of the ‘Good on the Whole’ of an individual (III:XIII:381), 
which is comprised of a temporally neutral consideration of the integrant parts or 
time frames that are realised throughout conscious life – a consideration represented 
by the principle of Prudence. This formula of reasoning through which Sidgwick has 
 261 
arrived at the notion of individual ‘Good on the Whole’ is crucial for how he 
establishes the next and most critical stage in his moral theory, which is his 
movement from the notion of individual good to Universal Good. As an individual’s 
good is comprised of the comparison and integration of all different goods, so 
Universal Good is formed ‘by comparison and integration of the different goods’ of all 
individual human – or sentient – existences (III:XIII:382); and as it is only rational for 
a person to aim at their own good on the whole, the Universal Good, by the same 
logic, must also be an end at which it is rational to aim499. If we ‘ought’ to aim at our 
own whole good because this is only rational, then we ought to aim at Universal 
Good, given that this too is rational. This, Sidgwick states, is also a self-evident 
principle, and he summarises it thus: 
 
‘…the good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view of the 
Universe…than the good of any other; unless, that is, there are special grounds…and it is evident 
to me that as a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally…not merely at a particular part 
of it’ (III:XIII:382).  
 
From these rational intuitions (that the good of no one individual is worth more than 
the good of any other, and that we as rational beings are bound to aim at good in 
general), Sidgwick obtains the maxim of Universal Benevolence, which is that ‘each 
one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own, 
except in so far as he judges it to be less, when impartially viewed’ (III:XIII:382). The 
combination of the ultimately rational and self-evident basis of this principle, with the 
Universal Good that has been logically derived from individual good, produces the 
term ‘Rational Benevolence’. This is, essentially, Sidgwick’s moral theory.  
 Considering the importance of Rational Benevolence, it arrives into the pages 
of ME with surprising brevity. The entirety of the theory’s construction takes up little 
                                                 
499 It is conducive here to recall and emphasise from chapters 2 and 3 the point that Sidgwick 
specifically argues for the notions of ‘ought’ and ‘right’ in I:III:25-35 in such a way that the Reason 
inherent in these terms produces a categorical imperative of moral obligation: Sidgwick is using that 
same basis here. Bearing in mind his own negatively stated version of the categorical imperative that 
‘it cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner in which it would be wrong to treat B, merely on the 
ground that they are two different individuals…’ we see forming on p.382 a coherent whole of certain 
various parts of Sidgwick’s arguments so far, in which the idea of rational ends is combined with the 
rational notion of ‘ought’. 
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more than half a page – just two paragraphs500. It should also be noted that Sidgwick 
himself does not expressly state that this is his moral theory. In fact, he offers little 
explanation of exactly what he means by Rational Benevolence at all; he simply 
capitalises both words, and places the term alongside ‘Justice’ and ‘Prudence’, 
which are the only other principles that have a self-evident element. This does 
suggest however that the conclusion of Rational Benevolence is so obvious to 
Sidgwick that no further explanation is needed.  
 But there is no doubt that Rational Benevolence does constitute a moral 
theory. It gives a framework that establishes a universalising test for all moral 
actions, and then establishes what kind of actions they are to be501. Sidgwick also 
uses the terms ‘morally bound’, and ‘ought’ to denote the type of relationship that is 
to exist between these principles and any acting agent (something that is also 
implied in the very derivation of Rational Benevolence in the first place). This is, 
undoubtedly, a theory as to how morality ought to go – as Sidgwick predicted it 
would be at the beginning of III:XIII. 
 
4.4.c. The Deontology of Rational Benevolence: Deriving Utilitarianism  
 
Having established the formulation of Rational Benevolence, we can now progress to 
examine the roles of its respective deontological and utilitarian properties. The 
function of deontological principles for Rational Benevolence will be examined first; 
this is followed by an examination of the function of utilitarian principles, and these 
two investigations together lead directly to how the two types of property are 
interdependent.  
If we follow the progression of Sidgwick’s ideas as they have been presented 
from the beginning of Book III, it might seem as though Sidgwick is, via his 
philosophical intuitions, simply offering a solution, or an alternative, to the problem of 
non-self-evidence that he has been exposing in dogmatic Intuitionism. It is true that 
                                                 
500 This is partially because Sidgwick has laid the groundwork for its components (i.e. the links 
between self-evidence, Reason, rationality, and ‘ought’) earlier in ME, and is now able to work more 
freely with the concepts here.  
501 It is also possible to actually imagine what Rational Benevolence would look like normatively, in 
practice. Within the conditions that it can never be right for one individual to treat another in a way that 
it would be wrong for the other individual to treat the first, we are then to treat all people in such a way 
as we aim at their good on the whole, and that we can universalise that action. I will return to the 
applicable normative value of Rational Benevolence in the thesis conclusion.  
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Sidgwick presents his three principles as self-evident (i.e. ultimately rational) where 
dogmatic Intuitionism failed to do this, but to see these philosophical intuitions as 
merely a means of Sidgwick supplanting and superseding deontological principles 
with his own principles (which, when it is thought that this is what Sidgwick is doing, 
are presumed to be utilitarian) is, in my view, to produce an error that then leads to 
two further errors. The initial error is that this state of affairs would simply demote 
deontology below utilitarianism. The first of the two resultant errors is that this is then 
to miss the fact that these philosophical intuitions are actually largely deontological in 
nature. The second resultant error, which is the most problematic, is the lack of 
recognition that these deontological properties must and do provide the rational 
foundations of Sidgwick’s entire moral theory, as I will now illustrate502. 
 It was seen in chapter 2 that as Sidgwick’s principle of Justice is self-evident 
and therefore ultimately rational, it is right in Sidgwick’s sense of rightness, which is 
not ‘fit to an ulterior end’. That is, I argued that Justice is a non-consequentialist 
principle. It is not simply right with reference to ulterior results – it is right absolutely, 
categorically, and unconditionally, as per Sidgwick’s earlier conclusions on these 
notions. It is also a universalising principle, laying down equality between individuals 
as a moral dictate. The next axiom, that of Prudence, is also a non-consequentialist 
principle – and this principle, crucially, establishes impartial good as a self-evident 
and rational end in Sidgwick’s theory. This impartial good is obviously supported by 
the equality requisite from Justice. Prudence and Justice’s co-operative argument for 
‘Good on the Whole’ then rationally leads to Universal Good, and thus Benevolence. 
This is to say that Benevolence is only established on the basis of a combination of 
these two prior principles, which I have argued are deontological in nature. It is 
precisely in Sidgwick’s move from individual Good to Universal Good that we see the 
crucial contributions from both the principle of Justice and the principle of Prudence 
to the philosophic structure that supports Benevolence. Justice provides a framework 
of universalising equality; Prudence inserts Good as a rational end into that 
framework. In the end result of this particular combination, which is that as it is 
irrational to aim at one good over another in individual life then it must be irrational to 
                                                 
502 By ‘problematic’ here, I am referring to the idea that not recognising this deontological basis 
obviously poses an obstacle to recognising the possibility that Sidgwick developed a synthesis 
between deontological and utilitarian moral properties. It is my view that Sidgwick’s deontology has 
been largely missed, and that this has indeed prevented his theory from being seen as anything other 
than utilitarianism, albeit a sophisticated form.  
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prefer the good of one individual over the good of other individuals, good is thus 
converted into an impartial and universal form. It is only because Justice and 
Prudence are established as ultimately rational and self-evident that Universal 
Benevolence – and thus Rational Benevolence – is established at all.  
What is most crucial about the deontological properties of Justice and Prudence 
then is that they remain deontological, even as Sidgwick progresses to establish the 
ultimate tenet of his theory, which is commonly thought to be utilitarian503. What this 
ultimately means is that Sidgwick derives his utilitarian principle from a sequential 
linking of Justice and Prudence, which have deontological foundations. Or – more 
concisely – it means that Sidgwick derives the utilitarian principle from a 
deontological viewpoint. If those principles of Justice and Prudence were to lose their 
deontological status i.e. if they were somehow to be seen as merely 
consequentialist, or not right in themselves and simply as means to a further end, 
they would lose the crucial characteristics that together logically reveal Benevolence, 
and Sidgwick would not be able to establish the rational grounds for Universal 
Benevolence in the first place. Moreover, because the Universal Good (of Universal 
Benevolence) has been established as part of this rational process, it too can finally 
be established as a rational, ultimate end, and as such it conforms to Sidgwick’s 
definition of rightness because it is not simply made right via reference to ulterior 
results. The end of Benevolence is therefore also a non-consequentialist end; having 
been established on a self-evident and ultimately rational basis, it retains that 
                                                 
503 Sidgwick does state at III:XIII:386 that ‘the self-evident principles laid down do not specially belong 
to Intuitionism in the restricted sense which, for clear distinction of methods, I gave to this term at the 
outset of our investigation. The axiom of Prudence [is] implied in Rational Egoism…Again, the axiom 
of Justice or Equity as above stated ‘that similar cases ought to be treated similarly’ – belongs in all its 
applications to Utilitarianism as much as to any system commonly called Intuitional: while the axiom of 
Rational Benevolence is, in my view, required as a rational basis for the Utilitarian system’. Sidgwick’s 
last comment here is, I believe, of the utmost importance for understanding the relationship between 
the deontological and utilitarian properties in Rational Benevolence, and for that reason it is discussed 
independently below. As regards the other principles, it is not detrimental to my arguments – either for 
those principles as having a deontological basis, or for the deontological/utilitarian relationship – that 
Sidgwick believes these principles to also apply to utilitarianism. In the fact that Sidgwick deems it 
necessary to make this point in the first place, he is indirectly recognising that they have been 
developed out of the Intuitional method, with Intuitional method (i.e. deontological) characteristics. 
Also, just because these principles can apply as much to utilitarianism as they do to Intuitionism, this 
does not necessarily threaten their deontological basis, which I have argued comes about as a result 
of Sidgwick’s view of non-consequentialist rightness. Finally, that they are applicable to both systems 
of ethics, and that Sidgwick recognises this, only further supports my argument that Sidgwick’s self-
evident principles have vital characteristics that allow them to support both deontological and 
utilitarian moral properties.  
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primary deontological characteristic504. This rationally derived Universal Good is of 
course more conveniently described with the term ‘Rational Benevolence’.  
In light of this argument for the deontological basis of Rational Benevolence, 
deontology may appear to be the dominant moral theory at this stage. We are 
certainly still missing a crucial part of a ‘mutually informing’ relationship between 
utilitarian and deontological principles. It should also be noted that at no point does 
Sidgwick say that utilitarian principles are the answer to the failings of common 
sense morality, or that utilitarianism is simply the better alternative theory – this is not 
the philosophic approach to the solution that he takes, as I have tried to explain 
above, and in the previous chapters505. Having said this, Sidgwick does indisputably 
enter utilitarian territory when he converts the rationality of pursuing individual Good 
into the rationality of pursuing Universal Good: The ‘point of view of the universe’ is 
easily interpreted as representing a version - albeit rather more refined and better 
supported one – of the utilitarian premise of the greatest good for the greatest 
number. The axiom of Benevolence itself is also inherently to do with outcomes – a 
point that is reinforced by Sidgwick’s language of ‘good’ and ‘happiness’, which are 
                                                 
504 To call Benevolence a ‘duty’ then, is to say that it is a duty in the specifically deontological sense of 
that word, in that it is prescribed unconditionally, and without reference to consequences. This is 
supported by Sidgwick’s use of the language ‘morally bound’. Obedience to Benevolence is not 
optional, it is a categorical imperative. Of course, it has already been seen that Sidgwick also deems 
ultimately rational ends to be categorical imperatives (which is a more traditionally utilitarian line), but 
in both cases, as I have argued, both ends and certain duties are only established on the basis of 
Sidgwick’s definition of ‘rightness’ being that which is ultimately reasonable, and therefore 
unconditional, categorically prescribed, and right without reference to ulterior results.  
On the topic of the ‘duty of Benevolence’, this phrase appears in Sidgwick’s admittance that he had 
previously ‘observed that the duty of Benevolence as recognised by common sense seems to fall 
somewhat short [of self-evidence]’ (III:XIII:382), but he resolves this issue here by arguing that this 
new maxim of Benevolence is to be understood as operating within the context of Universal Good, 
which gives a practical ought, and gives this general rule that the good of no individual can be held to 
be more important than the good of any other. This enables Sidgwick, by way of further evidence that 
supports Benevolence as a self-evident principle, to draw on the life observation that ‘the plain man’ 
will ‘unhesitatingly’ agree that it would be morally wrong for him to pursue his own happiness if it 
involved sacrificing the greater happiness of someone else (III:XIII:382). Sidgwick may be guilty of 
employing some optimism here however; somewhat uncharacteristically, he gives no grounds for this 
statement about the plain man’s agreement with this form of Benevolence. 
It is also interesting that Sidgwick is so confident that people will agree that the happiness of other 
people cannot be sacrificed for the sake of their own, given his perpetual struggle with the apparent 
reasonableness of Rational Egoism. It could be argued that to be an egoist does not necessarily 
entail actually sacrificing the happiness of others, but Sidgwick has still always had trouble with the 
fact that it is very difficult to convince an Egoist that he ought to pursue the happiness of others at all. 
Still, it remains my view that in his argument for Rational Benevolence, Sidgwick resolved the DoPR 
in favour of this position (as against Rational Egoism) more effectively than he himself believed.   
505 The specific language of utilitarianism is noticeably absent from the passages in which Sidgwick 
establishes the maxim of Benevolence.  
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of course predominantly utilitarian themes506. I do not disagree with the general 
statement that utilitarianism is present in Rational Benevolence – this point is of 
course vital to my argument that deontological principles are so inherently bound up 
with utilitarian ones that one principle cannot be taken without the other, and the 
function of utilitarianism is discussed presently. To this same end however, I can 
now add the final and most substantial support to my long-running claim in this thesis 
that Sidgwick’s moral theory of Rational Benevolence is not wholly utilitarian. This 
support appears in the fact that, as just explained, utilitarianism is derived from a 
deontological basis. Although utilitarianism itself does acquire a self-evident status, 
as will be seen, Sidgwick does not construct it ex nihilio. It depends entirely on those 
prior deontological principles for its own endorsement – and Sidgwick himself 
confirms this. In a direct reflection of my point that the utilitarian principle is derived 
from the framework that creates Rational Benevolence, Sidgwick points out that ‘the 
axiom of Rational Benevolence is’, in his view, ‘required as a rational basis for the 
Utilitarian system’ (III:XIII:387 – italics mine). This indicates that very function and 
role of the deontological properties of the self-evident principles that I have been 
trying to make clear above – and also indicates that Rational Benevolence is not 
simply ‘utilitarianism’. Sidgwick is clearly drawing a degree of separation between 
them in that passage, and this is because utilitarianism depends on Rational 
Benevolence being established in the way that it is. Sidgwick’s move to utilitarianism 
may be a rational and logical one, but it is not a simple or explicit transition.   
Utilitarianism is not, then, immediately granted the level of supremacy that 
might be expected of the purely utilitarian theory that Sidgwick’s is thought to be507. 
Rather, it emerges here, almost casually, at the end of Sidgwick’s rational-intuitional 
                                                 
506 The fact that the dictates of Benevolence are to do with aiming at this particular end does not 
affect my argument for Benevolence itself being a non-consequentialist end. As I have said 
previously, by ‘non-consequentialist’ I do not mean that the actions Benevolence requires are not 
consequentialist; they clearly are, given that they are aiming at that end of Benevolence. What is 
meant by this is that the nature of the maxim of Benevolence is non-consequentialist, because as a 
rational, ultimate end it is not itself right with regard to ulterior results. As a moral principle, 
Benevolence is absolute, and unconditional.  
However, it was also seen in chapter 3 that Sidgwick’s attributing this kind of rightness to certain ends 
does give to the means to those ends a certain degree of ‘ought’, given that it is only reasonable to do 
what pertains to an end recognised as ultimately reasonable. This is, I argue, one of the principal 
achievements of Rational Benevolence, and one of its finest triumphs – the way in which it 
incorporates both fixed deontological principles and outcome based utilitarian ends, under the same 
definition of rightness, and reasonableness. 
507 It is for this reason that I suggest ‘Rational Benevolence’ is more accurate way of describing 
Sidgwick’s moral theory, as opposed to ‘utilitarianism’.  
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epistemological argument. It is at least certainly clearer here than anywhere else in 
ME that Sidgwick’s intuitionist epistemology, crucially informed by an appeal to 
Reason, extends to both deontological and utilitarian moral principles (see 
III:XIII:386-387), and this is of course important to my wider argument for the link 
between them508. But I conclude this section with the emphasis that the function 
within Rational Benevolence of the rational deontological properties inherent in 
Justice and Prudence is to logically establish and then support and endorse the 
maxim of Benevolence. For the purposes of building a mutually informing synthesis, 
the next stage of the argument assesses where utilitarian properties also are 
indispensable to the establishment of Rational Benevolence.  
 
4.4.d. The Utilitarianism of Rational Benevolence: Contextualising Deontology 
 
I outlined above that Sidgwick is more plainly utilitarian once he has established 
Universal Good, and the maxim of Benevolence, as the ultimately rational end of 
moral action. The end of Universal Good is, of course, a distinctly utilitarian notion – 
and it is this that Rational Benevolence ultimately validates, and represents509. 
Sidgwick, too, is clear that utilitarianism essentially defines his moral position. Having 
just stated that Rational Benevolence is required as the rational basis for the 
utilitarian system, Sidgwick follows this lead and declares, in the very next line, that 
‘Accordingly, I find that I arrive, in my search for really clear and certain ethical 
intuitions, at the fundamental principle of Utilitarianism’ (III:XIII:387). On the next 
                                                 
508 At III:XIII:388, Sidgwick refers to ‘the intuition of Rational Benevolence’. Now that Sidgwick has 
claimed intuitionism with a small ‘i’ as part of his own moral epistemology in these pages, the 
distinction between this type and Intuitionism as representative of the deontological method of ethics 
has largely disappeared. This further supports my argument in chapter 2 that there is a close 
relationship between Sidgwick’s Intuitionism with a capital “I”, and Sidgwick’s own epistemological 
intuitionism – and that this is represented by the philosophical construction of Rational Benevolence, 
which includes deontological-Intuitional elements, and results in utilitarian intuitions.  Ultimately, this 
emerging dissolution of the boundary between Intuitionism and Sidgwick’s own epistemological 
intuitionism demonstrates the dissolution in Sidgwick’s work of the boundary between deontology and 
utilitarianism.  
509 When ‘Good’ is interpreted to be Happiness, as Sidgwick interprets it, and when that Happiness 
includes the notion of pleasure, the result is actually a hedonistic form of utilitarianism. (This is where, 
as seen in chapter 3, Sidgwick qualifies as a Benthamite utilitarian). But Sidgwick maintains the focus 
on Happiness. At the end of III:XIII, Sidgwick exchanges the language of ‘good’ for ‘happiness’ 
(III:XIII:388), and proceeds in III:XIV to explain his reason for this (III:XIV:391-407). Sidgwick 
concludes in that chapter that desirable consciousness can be the only ultimate good, and that this 
can quite simply be described as Happiness (pp. 401-406). This fully explains why Sidgwick refers 
with ease to ‘Happiness’ rather than ‘Good’ as a rational, ultimate end throughout ME, and I have 
therefore followed Sidgwick in doing this in these sections. 
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page, he makes a similar statement: ‘Utilitarianism is thus presented as the final form 
into which Intuitionism tends to pass, when the demand for really self-evident first 
principles is rigorously pressed’ (III:XIII:388).  
This utilitarian aspect is strengthened by Sidgwick’s implementing Rational 
Benevolence as the ‘proof’ of utilitarianism, which is usually taken in the literature to 
quite literally be proof that Sidgwick’s theory is wholly utilitarian. This proof is 
something that he does not consider Mill - who had specifically attempted to give to 
Bentham’s doctrine this authoritative aspect in which it was thought to be in need – 
to have provided (III:XIII:387-388). Sidgwick’s issue with Mill’s argument is that it 
establishes neither an ‘ought’, or even a rational end at which we reasonably ought 
to aim510. His own theory of Rational Benevolence, on the other hand, logically 
establishes the Universal Good, or Happiness, as the rational end, and as an 
immediate result of this also establishes the maxim of Benevolence as a directive 
rule of reasonable, right conduct that as such incurs an ‘ought’. It is this rationally 
derived rightness that Sidgwick considers Mill to have failed to provide, and that 
Sidgwick believes he has constructed via arguing for Rational Benevolence as a 
rational and therefore categorical duty. In Sidgwick’s words, ‘…there is a gap in the 
expressed argument, which can, I think, only be filled by some such proposition as 
that which I have above tried to exhibit as the intuition of Rational Benevolence’ 
(III:XIII:388).  
These conclusions on the utilitarianism of Rational Benevolence might seem to 
throw considerable doubt on my argument that there is a mutually informing 
relationship between deontological and utilitarian principles in that moral theory - and 
on my claim that Rational Benevolence is not entirely utilitarian. They certainly do not 
seem congruent with the conclusion I have just drawn in the preceding section about 
                                                 
510 Sidgwick outlines how Mill reaches the idea that general Happiness is a good to the aggregate of 
persons via the prior idea that each person’s happiness is a good to that person. Sidgwick also points 
out that Mill argues that the only evidence that something is desirable is that it is desired, and that this 
is the only proof that is required as far as the general Happiness is concerned. Sidgwick parts ways 
with Mill most significantly on the next point, related to the previous, which is that Mill has argued that 
the utilitarian principle is a ‘standard of right and wrong’, and a ‘directive rule of conduct’ (III:XIII:388). 
Therefore, by stating that the general happiness is what is desirable on that particular utilitarian 
understanding, Mill must mean that we are morally bound to aim at it – that is, that we ought to aim at 
it. But a simple aggregate of actual desires does not necessarily constitute an actual desire for the 
general happiness – there is no logical or substantive way in which this desire can, to use the 
language of what is sought here, be ‘proven’. If there is no actual desire on the part of an individual 
(or a group of individuals) for the general happiness, then there is not only a lack of an ought – there 
is simply nothing at which we reasonably ought to aim in the first place.  
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the importance of deontological principles. I maintain however that both of those 
claims can still legitimately be made.  
Firstly, the fact that the utilitarian principle is eventually established as self-
evident is actually in itself crucial to the full formulation of Rational Benevolence. It 
was seen in chapter 3 that ultimate, rational ends are also ‘right’ as per Sidgwick’s 
definition, as they are not simply fit to some further end. It was then argued above 
that Universal Good emerges as an ultimately rational end of that kind, on the basis 
of the rational, self-evident principles that inform it. More specifically, once Universal 
Good has been made self-evident through that process, it emerges as the ultimately 
rational end – and once this has been established, Benevolence then assumes its 
own role. This is that it retrospectively binds together and collates the other two 
foundational principles. This, then, is how the function of the self-evident utilitarian 
properties of Rational Benevolence becomes apparent. To expand on the need for 
this function, Sidgwick has already mentioned that the principle of Justice is not by 
itself adequate for the construction of a full system of ethics - and Prudence, by way 
of its own argument for individual good, must logically point to a further good, i.e. the 
general good: The addition of Benevolence as the definitive moral maxim to the 
formula of Sidgwick’s moral theory resolves these shortfalls, by giving those 
principles full context, as part of a comprehensive moral theory. It is most specifically 
this contextualising capacity that is the function of utilitarianism within Rational 
Benevolence. This, I emphasise, does not mean that utilitarianism is somehow 
revising those two principles, or that they have now become mere means to the 
further end of utilitarianism; each principle is still fully independent in terms of its own 
self-evidence, and they are both still ‘right’ in a way that does not involve any results 
that they might bring about. As has already been seen, Justice and Prudence retain 
their deontological status because without that basis the utilitarianism created by 
their logical, sequential linking collapses. Once Universal Benevolence has been 
derived however, those deontological principles do retrospectively become crucial 
components of a utilitarian theory. 
This specific contextualising and validation of Justice and Prudence by the 
utilitarian principle is thus the first way in which a co-operative relationship between 
deontological and utilitarian properties is demonstrated within Rational Benevolence. 
But I said there are two ways in which I believe it is possible to defend the claim that 
Rational Benevolence depends on both self-evident deontological principles and 
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self-evident utilitarian principles – and this second approach is more comprehensive. 
It involves my arguing that an alternative reading of that text in which Sidgwick 
discusses Rational Benevolence as the proof of utilitarianism is possible. This is a 
reading that, unlike the standard one outlined above, does not allow Rational 
Benevolence to be simply subsumed within the utilitarian doctrine. This particular 
reading of Rational Benevolence as utilitarianism’s ‘proof’ is what fully reveals the 
equal and simultaneous necessity of both deontological and utilitarian principles, and 
thus brings together all of the arguments made above into the final argument for the 
mutual relationship between them.  
 
4.4.e. Rational Benevolence as the ‘Proof’ of Utilitarianism: The Equal 
Necessity of Deontological and Utilitarian Principles  
 
Two things have emerged from these respective investigations into the deontological 
and utilitarian properties of Rational Benevolence. One is that the theory’s original 
foundations are deontological. The other is that its ultimate identity is utilitarian. My 
reading of Sidgwick’s proof incorporates and links these two factors by 
demonstrating that a) deontological foundations are key, b) that they retain their 
deontological status, c) that the utilitarian principle can be established as an ultimate 
rational end without this eliminating the deontological properties, and d) that they are 
engaged in a mutual and interdependent co-operation. This is demonstrated by 
assessing two ways in which proof presents itself in Sidgwick’s work – the first as a 
way of establishing the true rightness of a moral theory, and the second as 
Sidgwick’s proposed ‘double relation’ between utilitarianism and the deontological 
basis of common sense morality. 
 
4.4.e.i.  Rational Benevolence as Proof of Utilitarianism’s Rightness 
 
The very fact that Sidgwick was looking for proof of utilitarianism in the first place 
should in itself give pause to the conventional line of thought that Sidgwick was 
purely a utilitarian. For what, exactly, it may be asked, is meant by this term ‘proof’? 
What does it mean to prove something? Proof is definable as ‘confirmation’, 
‘verification’, or ‘substantiation’ – to prove something means to find evidence that 
establishes a fact, or the truth of something. To be the ‘proof’ of something, 
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therefore, is no small role. In Sidgwick’s words on the lack of proof for utilitarianism 
in Mill’s doctrine, he describes the ‘need of some such procedure to complete the 
argument’ as being ‘very plain and palpable’ (III:XIII:387) - and it is not insignificant 
that Sidgwick establishes the rational basis of Rational Benevolence before he 
reaches utilitarianism. Sidgwick makes it clear that he has been searching precisely 
for a vital rational basis for the utilitarian principle, that is, of something to qualify it as 
right, on logical and reasonable grounds511. To utilise the correlation created by 
Sidgwick between the terms ‘rational’ and ‘ought’, utilitarianism requires the rational 
so it may become right in the sense of without reference to ulterior results, and incur 
a true categorical ought – the absence of which was the reason for his criticism of 
Mill’s argument512.  
This ‘proof’, then, allows Sidgwick to establish the utilitarian principle as an 
ultimately rational end - and such a rational end is, according to Sidgwick’s definition 
of rightness, right unconditionally, and not on the basis of its consequences. It is thus 
clear that this ‘proof’ must retain a deontological character, even when it is brought 
into such close connection with utilitarianism – as was said above, if Benevolence 
did not have the sort of rightness in which it is established as a maxim that is right 
categorically and without reference to ulterior results, then Rational Benevolence 
would no longer provide the appropriate rational basis or ‘proof’ for utilitarianism, for 
which Sidgwick was searching513. This understanding also accords with those 
synonyms for ‘proof’ just given, such as ‘verification’, or ‘substantiation’. It further 
confirms the idea that utilitarianism is only truly validated by deontological 
principles514. 
                                                 
511 It has already been noted that Sidgwick leaves the investigation into utilitarianism until the final 
Book of ME (I:VI:87). There, Sidgwick does not state that he is leaving utilitarianism until the end 
because he considers that doctrine to be in want of a real basis, but he does use that language in 
III:XIII, at 387-388.  
512 Even if the proof passage is still read as conveying the notion that Rational Benevolence merely 
fills a gap in the wider, superior notion of utilitarianism, that gap is the rational ‘ought’ – and ‘ought’ is 
fundamental to any morally binding system of normative ethics, as Sidgwick effectively suggests in his 
rejection of Mill’s attempt at proof. On this reading also then, Rational Benevolence remains 
independent of utilitarianism, and indispensable to it. 
513 Sidgwick’s choice of words is also important. Proof, he says, is ‘required’ (III:XIII:387)– that is, it is 
necessary for the confirmation of the utilitarian principle.  
514 This point runs parallel to the argument made at the end of chapter 3 that the method of common 
sense morality provides a foundation from which the method of utilitarianism can proceed. Both 
arguments pertain directly to the ‘middle ground’ between the two methods that Sidgwick alludes to in 
the connection passages.  
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On the other hand, if something is proven, and thus validated in this way, then 
what is proven also receives a degree of authority itself - and this is also extremely 
important. Again as I have shown above, once utilitarianism is recognised via the 
combined rationalities of Justice and Prudence that establishes the ultimate 
rationality of Benevolence, it assumes its own self-evidence and thus its own role in 
the full realisation of Rational Benevolence. Without the Benevolence that Justice 
and Prudence both help to generate, these prior principles are themselves left 
unsubstantiated. Overall, this combination – represented by this reading of the word 
‘proof’ - of deontological properties as the basis of Rational Benevolence and 
utilitarian properties as its result, is a direct demonstration of the true significance of 
Sidgwick’s appeal to Reason to establish the rational and moral rightness of both 
deontological and utilitarian properties. Neither deontological nor utilitarian properties 
lose their fundamental rightness within Rational Benevolence, and neither need do 
so. Even more significantly, neither can be allowed to lose their particular rightness. 
Rational Benevolence as the rational basis – the proof - of utilitarianism is 
confirmation of Sidgwick’s ability to simply transcend that traditional 
deontological/utilitarian divide, in which only one or the other of these types of moral 
property is right515. Both deontological and utilitarian properties are equally 
necessary, in their respective ways, to the full realisation of Rational Benevolence. 
 
4.4.e.ii Negative and/or Positive Proof  
 
Despite my position on the particular and valuable nature of utilitarianism’s ‘proof’ 
just laid out, it would be wrong to ignore the fact that Sidgwick himself also discusses 
the issue of proof at length. This was seen in the previous chapter, where Sidgwick’s 
twofold relation of utilitarianism to Intuitionism brought the chapter to a close 
                                                 
515 It can now also be seen that Sidgwick’s theory of moral obligation, as represented by Rational 
Benevolence as a normative moral theory, includes both the notion that certain actions are right 
without reference to ulterior results, and the idea that certain rational ends are also right in this non-
consequentialist way – as was predicted would be the case in chapter 2. The demands of Justice and 
Prudence are right without reference to consequences – but so too is the maxim of Benevolence, or 
Rational Benevolence. On the other hand, the dictates of Benevolence are, of course, 
consequentialist in nature. They only incur the ‘ought’, however, by extension of Sidgwick’s argument 
for what is right being that which is ultimately rational, even when this is an end. Where non-
consequentialist rightness is the predominant form in Rational Benevolence, ‘means’ are, to some 
extent, also incorporated.  
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because I argued that the positive version of utilitarianism’s proof that Sidgwick 
develops in Book IV of ME cannot be fully understood without first understanding 
what he deemed to be the negative version that he gives in Book III. Sidgwick 
himself referred the reader back to Book III for that negative proof, and I followed 
suit, arguing that the negative proof provides the philosophic connection required for 
that understanding, and thus completes the relationship to which Sidgwick is 
referring in the two connection passages. This chapter has already been developing 
that philosophic connection, and here specific attention is drawn to how it informs 
both of Sidgwick’s versions of proof. The first thing of note however is that the form 
of proof as it appears in Book III for which I have just argued is actually slightly 
different to the form of proof that Sidgwick himself considers Book III to have 
provided. ‘Negative’ proof stipulates that other principles are found to have ‘only a 
dependent and subordinate validity’ to the principle of utilitarianism - and it will be 
immediately clear from my preceding arguments that this is not what I believe 
Sidgwick to have ‘proved’ in Rational Benevolence516. This is, I argue, because 
Sidgwick actually does something different in Book III to that which he claims he has 
done. Sidgwick does not, in Book III, only ‘negatively prove’ utilitarianism, as per his 
own definition: The utilitarian principle of Benevolence may emerge as the rationally 
ultimate principle, but it still remains that Sidgwick derived this principle from other 
already self-evident principles. And where Universal Benevolence may indeed bring 
together and contextualise those other principles, as I have argued it does, they are 
not made subordinate to it, or dependent upon it (at least, not in the way Sidgwick 
means; I argue for a degree of dependency from Justice and Prudence towards 
Benevolence, but only as part of the interdependent relationship in which 
Benevolence is also dependent on Justice and Prudence)517. Sidgwick did not simply 
abandon the non-consequentialist, deontological basis of common sense morality. 
Rather, he maintained and developed it. It is the result of this that offers the 
philosophic connection that I argued in chapter 3 was present in Book III – and this 
                                                 
516 Nor does the sort of negative proof as Sidgwick describes it yield the kind of ‘philosophic 
connection’ between deontological and utilitarian principles that I stated in chapter 3 would provide 
the overarching ‘truth’ that ‘lies between two conclusions’ theory that represents the two connection 
passages. 
517 It is true, however, that the general rules of common sense morality, such as Truth etc. were 
shown to be lacking in self-evidence, and thus dependent on some further principle, which Sidgwick 
of course establishes to be Rational Benevolence. It is Sidgwick’s own philosophical intuitions that I 
argue are not merely made subordinate, or dependent.  
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type of connection would seem to accord more accurately with Sidgwick’s definition 
of the ‘positive’ relation - in which ‘utilitarianism sustains the general validity of the 
current moral judgements’ (IV:II:422)518. This connection then gives us grounds on 
which to explore the full range of ways in which the positive proof appears in Book IV 
– and this exploration is illuminative of the fact that both common sense morality and 
utilitarianism are, in particular ways, present, and active. 
It should be noted that Sidgwick’s conclusions in IV:III (‘Relation of Utilitarianism 
to the Morality of Common Sense’) are initially drawn mainly in favour of 
utilitarianism as the superior principle. He states, for example, that the morality of 
common sense may be truly represented as at least unconsciously utilitarian 
(IV:III:424, see also IV:IV:463), that utilitarians are called upon to show a natural 
transition from common sense morality to utilitarianism (IV:III:425), that utilitarianism 
solves the vagueness of common sense morality (IV:III:425), that common sense is 
‘inchoately and imperfectly utilitarian’ (IV:III:427, see also IV:III:453, 454), and that 
there is a latent utilitarianism in common sense (IV:III:438). These are all clearly 
examples of Sidgwick remaining true to what he projected the ‘positive proof’ of 
utilitarianism would be – that it shows utilitarianism to systemise, cohere, explain, 
and define the imprecise rules of common sense morality. But this is not Sidgwick’s 
ultimate conclusion on the entire relationship. It has already been seen in this thesis’ 
previous chapter that Sidgwick acknowledges the difficulties of utilitarianism as a 
method of ethics, and in IV:IV, where Sidgwick discusses this, he concludes that it is 
not possible to ‘frame with adequate precision a system of rules, constituting the true 
moral code…as deduced from Utilitarian principles’ (IV:IV:467)519. His central 
                                                 
518 This also corresponds with the confusion over whether Sidgwick really is establishing ‘negative 
proof’ in Book III. I suggest that my argument for the incorporation of both deontological properties 
(left over from the investigation into dogmatic Intuitionism, or common sense morality) and utilitarian 
properties into Rational Benevolence might suggest a reason as to why this confusion occurs, even if 
it cannot resolve it (as I agree that Sidgwick is not consistent on what he apparently considers to be 
negative proof). 
519 He also adds that utilitarianism as a system is ‘beset with serious difficulties’ (IV:IV:467), that is 
seems ‘prima facie absurd to lay down a set of ideal utilitarian rules for mankind generally’ (IV:IV:468), 
that humanity is too diverse for any one set of utilitarian rules to apply universally (IV:IV:468,469), and 
that it is not possible to construct ‘a perfect form of society’, which might determine how all action 
ought to go (IV:IV:470).  
Sidgwick clearly reveals himself to be a cultural relativist in these passages. He could perhaps even, 
on these words, be called a moral relativist. But this would seem to be too extreme. If nothing else, 
my argument for the deontological basis of Sidgwick’s moral theory (of Rational Benevolence) has 
shown that Sidgwick does adhere to an understanding of rightness which yields unconditional duties. 
However, his awareness that moral norms may not be completely universal in a practical sense 
actually supports my argument that Sidgwick’s Rational Benevolence offers a more accurate, 
comprehensive and ultimately workable moral theory than those that argue for moral absolutism. This 
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summary is that ‘the utilitarian, in the existing state of our knowledge, cannot 
possibly construct a morality de novo either for man as he is…or for man as he 
ought to be and will be. He must start, speaking broadly, with the existing social 
order, and the existing morality as a part of that order…’ (IV:IV:473-474). The end 
product of the ‘positive proof’ for utilitarianism being held alongside the enduring 
importance of common sense morality in this way is Sidgwick’s statement at the 
beginning of IV:V that we must accept common sense morality as generally 
utilitarian, but also accept that the morality of common sense is the ‘actually 
established machinery for attaining this end, which we cannot replace at once by any 
other’ (IV:V:475). In examining what this system might look like Sidgwick presents a 
fine balance between utilitarianism and common sense morality, in which a utilitarian 
would clearly conform to the ‘the Positive morality of his age and country’, and 
endeavours ‘to promote its development in others’ (IV:V:475). The term Positive 
Morality represents Sidgwick’s view that ‘though the imperfection that we find in all 
the actual conditions of human existence…is ultimately found even in Morality 
itself…still, practically, we are much less concerned with correct and improving than 
we are with realising and enforcing it’. He continues, in clear terms, ‘the Utilitarian 
must repudiate altogether that temper of rebellion against the established 
morality…into which the reflective mind is always apt to fall when it it first conceived 
that the established rules are not intrinsically reasonable’520. To paraphrase 
                                                 
is because where the deontological properties of Rational Benevolence maintain a certain degree of 
absolute rightness, the utilitarian properties allow for a degree of flexibility, that, on Sidgwick’s 
understanding of utilitarianism, are still ‘right’ provided that they remain rational, or reasonable. There 
is a crucial balance between the two types of principle, in which they both justify and limit each other. 
This is precisely the sort of theory that I argue is necessary for situations such as the Parental 
Predicament, and I examine the potential of Rational Benevolence to provide it in the thesis’ 
conclusion.   
520 When considering the relation of utilitarianism to the moral judgements of common sense, 
Sidgwick says, it is convenient to begin with the idea of duty – that to which a man is bound and 
obliged – as this is the ‘more important and indispensable of that morality (IV:V:480). Sidgwick is 
examining here how the utilitarian might respond practically if he concludes that a different rule would 
be more conducive than the rule supported by common consent. But it is significant that Sidgwick 
recognises that aspect of common sense morality to be the more important. For he argues that the 
utilitarian will also feel the effect of breaching those common rules (IV:V:482). If someone is to accept 
a new moral principle, Sidgwick argues, it is likely that his attachment to the previous ‘habits and 
sentiments’ would decay and disappear, and that they would only seem to have relevance in as far as 
they are supported by the sympathy of others. But, Sidgwick points out, this sympathy of others is 
actually hugely important, as this is where individual moral impulses acquire a ‘large part of their 
effective force’. It is difficult to measure exactly how and where such considerations will apply to a 
utilitarian, but the point is, this constitutes ‘an important rational check upon such Utilitarian 
innovations on Common-sense morality as are of the negative or destructive kind’ (IV:V:483). This 
idea of a ‘rational check’ on utilitarianism’s possible modifications of common sense morality is a 
further example of ways in which Sidgwick maintains its vital place, alongside the very particular 
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Sidgwick, utilitarianism may never truly be able to supersede the role of common 
sense morality – and, further, that it perhaps ought not to do so. Despite Sidgwick’s 
discomfort with the idea of enduring moral conflicts, when it comes to the practical 
level of lived morality it must be acknowledged that the two methods of ethics share 
some vital ground.  
It will be noticed that my own argument for the relationship between Intuitionism, 
or common sense morality, does not focus on the practicalities of how the two 
methods work together, but rather states that Sidgwick has used the same 
deontological basis as Intuitionism for his own moral theory, by identifying which of 
its principles can be taken as self-evident, and therefore ultimately reasonable, and 
right. I still maintain this; it is not common sense morality per se that meets with 
utilitarianism. Sidgwick’s argument for the practical relationship is still important 
however, for the fact that it demonstrates a situation in which utilitarianism validates 
and sustains the deontological basis of the latter, but in such a way that this dynamic 
                                                 
utilitarianism that he developed in Book III. Sidgwick also mentions that utilitarianism will more likely 
be required to enforce old rules, rather than introduce new ones, and that when it does come to the 
conflicting codes it may actually be best if there are two opinions as to a course of action, as it may 
well be right that A should do x, while B,C, and D blame him for it (IV:V:491).  
This last point poses an interesting challenge to my argument in this thesis that moral ambivalence 
would be more effectively managed if both courses of action in an ethical dilemma are seen to be 
simultaneously right and reasonable, rather than allowing divergent views to continually conflict. 
Sidgwick, here, appears to stand in direct disagreement with me, first by maintaining that two different 
kinds of conduct cannot be right under the same circumstances, and then by arguing that divergent 
opinion may actually be expedient. At this point I simply have to disagree with Sidgwick, and this is a 
result of my arguing that the equal reasonableness of both deontological and utilitarian principles 
within Rational Benevolence results in a normative theory which specifically legitimises more than one 
course of action (how I envisage this to look in practice is addressed in the thesis conclusion). 
Sidgwick’s own view of the Kantian maxim however, which he states again on p.486 that he accepts 
as self-evident, emerges in comparison as almost more traditional than even my deontological 
argument for it renders it to be, in that Sidgwick adheres to its dictate more rigidly than my theory 
does. The question therefore becomes how is it possible to argue for that non-consequentialist and 
self-evident principle as providing the foundation of Sidgwick’s moral theory, which makes that theory 
both deontological and utilitarian, and then waive it in some way when even Sidgwick himself does 
not. My answer to this is that I see Sidgwick’s theory of Rational Benevolence differently to perhaps 
how Sidgwick did. It is my view that Rational Benevolence does have a recognisably deontological 
basis, and that this combined with the utilitarian principle creates the synthesis for which I am arguing 
overall, and that this could produce a moral theory that normatively allows for both absolute-principle 
based and outcome based moral approaches to be justified. Sidgwick, it perhaps must be admitted, 
did not himself develop this particular understanding of Rational Benevolence, at least explicitly. But I 
do believe that it is a legitimate reading, and I believe that the rest of ME – i.e. Book IV and the 
argument therein that I am drawing out in the main text - demonstrates the very particular nature of 
Sidgwick’s utilitarianism, that is represented by Rational Benevolence. Rational Benevolence is, 
therefore, my reading of Sidgwick’s theory, and my and Sidgwick’s divergence over the issue of 
whether two courses of action can both be justified shows this up. But this does not mean that 
Rational Benevolence itself, in the way that I have described it, is not available from Sidgwick’s 
argument, and that it cannot be used in the exact way that I propose. It is still the case that Sidgwick’s 
construction of the theory offers the particular reading that I have developed.  
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is sometimes limited, and the direction of dependency actually reversed. In this way, 
I argue, ‘positive proof’ is a direct reflection of the argument that I have presented 
above – that the utilitarianism in Rational Benevolence, however prevalent, depends 
on prior principles that have been developed out of the basis of common sense 
morality (even if that method’s principles themselves are inadequate). That was the 
nature of utilitarianism’s proof for which I argued above, and Sidgwick confirms it 
here when he admits that principles outside of utilitarianism are also indispensable. 
Such a positive relation, he says, ‘affords a principle of synthesis, and a method for 
binding the unconnected and occasionally conflicting principles of common moral 
reasoning into a complete and harmonious system’(IV:II:422). That synthesis simply 
is not complete without common sense morality – utilitarianism by itself cannot 
provide a complete account of how to construct a system of ethics. And it is this point 
that I argue can be found in the construction, and in the ‘proof’, of Rational 
Benevolence. 
Finally, Sidgwick closes ME with a chapter that he entitles, ‘The Mutual Relations 
of the Three Methods’. Having completed his ‘pretty full examination of the mutual 
relations of the Intuitional and Utilitarian methods’ (496), Sidgwick concludes that: 
 
‘We have found that the common antithesis between Intuitionists and Utilitarians must be 
entirely discarded: since such abstract moral principles as we can admit to be really self-
evident are not only not incompatible with a Utilitarian system, but even seem required to 
furnish a rational basis for such a system’ (IV:496) 
 
Here, Sidgwick has returned to the concept (including the exact same wording) that 
the only Intuitional principles which we can admit to be self evident provide this 
rational basis for the utilitarian system – and he reaffirms that utilitarianism can only 
be fully comprehended on the basis of those Intuitional principles that can truly be 
called self-evident – as per my argument above. This particular reading of Sidgwick’s 
use of Rational Benevolence as the rational basis, or proof, for Utilitarianism can 
thus challenge the more familiar claim that this is merely evidence of Sidgwick’s 
endeavour to validate the utilitarianism that he believed to be to the supreme moral 
principle521. I agree, as I have stated, that Rational Benevolence does indeed 
                                                 
521 This reading, and also these passages, also demonstrate Sidgwick providing significant evidence 
that he believes there to be no divide between deontological and utilitarian principles.  
 278 
validate utilitarianism, but the alternative reading of Sidgwick’s proof holds that it is 
not simply the role of Rational Benevolence to validate utilitarianism, and then 
disappear into the wake of Sidgwick’s eventual grand argument for utilitarianism as 
the superior moral theory. Utilitarianism itself relies on initial identification and 
endorsement by the deontological properties of Rational Benevolence. Both types of 
moral property are essential – because both share the crucial common ground of 
being ultimately reasonable, and through this they are logically united in such a way 
that each has a role in the validation and sustaining of the other.  
If any further ‘proof’ is needed to support this second reading, Sidgwick 
provides it himself in the preface to the second edition of ME. Here, even having 
been directly challenged on the point, Sidgwick still does not concede to his critics 
that he is defending Utilitarianism over common sense morality (ME: x). All that 
Sidgwick is definite about is the conclusion that the argument above has itself drawn 
out, that the rational basis that informs the absolute-principle based, common sense 
morality position also informs the utilitarian position, and thus unites them: ‘I ask 
myself’, he says, ‘What among the precepts of our common conscience do we really 
see to be ultimately reasonable?...The answer that I found to it supplied the rational 
basis that I had long perceived to be wanting to the Utilitarianism of Bentham, 
regarded as an ethical doctrine: and thus enabled me to transcend the commonly 
received antithesis between Intuitionists and Utilitarians (ME: xi).  
 
4.4.f. The ‘Truth’ Between These Two Conclusions’: Deontological and 
Utilitarian Principles as Mutually Informing in Rational Benevolence  
 
In my argument for Rational Benevolence as the proof of utilitarianism, I have tried to 
show that both types of moral property are necessary in order for that proof to be 
fully realised. I have also argued that this proof is not simply the one-way validation 
of utilitarianism, but actually a more interdependent affair in which this ‘proof’ must 
also retain its deontological properties in order to function in that role. This 
relationship, I believe, is a development of the relationship to which Sidgwick alludes 
in the connection passages, when he states that Intuitionistic self-evident maxims 
must be allowed on one hand, while another method is required to systemise them. It 
will hopefully have become clear by this stage that, according to this argument, the 
different moral properties in Rational Benevolence are engaged in an interdependent 
 279 
relationship, and that both have a role in supporting and substantiating the other. 
This might well be already called a mutually informing relationship, but as this 
relationship is the main focus of this chapter, it will still be conducive to purposely 
examine the system, and its specifics. 
The main tenets of the relationship can be stated quite easily. Justice and 
Prudence have a deontological basis in that they are self-evident and ultimately 
rational, and therefore right without reference to anything further. Through a logical 
sequential process, the respective rationalities of Justice and Prudence together 
provide the structure from which the utilitarian principle of Universal Good, or 
Universal Benevolence, can itself be rationally derived. Deontological principles thus 
crucially endorse the utilitarian principle as a rational, ultimate end, which is also 
right absolutely, and categorically. Once this principle has been derived, and 
revealed as self-evident itself, this utilitarian aspect then contextualises and confirms 
the role of the two deontological principles. In this way, utilitarian principles also 
endorse the deontological ones. The utilitarian principle cannot (and does not), 
however, alter, eradicate, or demote or supersede the two prior principles. If this was 
the case then they would no longer be independently self-evident, and without their 
self-evident and ultimately rational status, there is no basis for the utilitarian principle 
in the first place. On the other hand, it is recognised that without the utilitarian 
principle, Justice and Prudence would remain abstract, and without full meaning. 
Both moral properties are equally important, as neither by themselves are adequate 
to produce a full moral theory. It is essential then that the deontological and utilitarian 
properties within Rational Benevolence retain their own characteristics, while also 
operating as part of this coherent whole. They both contribute independently and 
depend on each other for full realisation. It is this type of connection that is meant by 
the phrase ‘mutually informing relationship’ – and the connection that I suggest can 
be posited directly alongside the mutually exclusive state of affairs between 
deontological and utilitarian positions that has pervaded so much of traditional moral 
discourse522.  
                                                 
522 In both the introduction and chapter 3, I remarked that there was an extent to which this mutually 
informing relationship might look something like a Cartesian circle, in that deontology and 
utilitarianism seem to be defined in terms of each other. It has been said that both types of moral 
property at once validate and depend on each other. But how can something validate something else 
when it refers to that something else for its own validation? This would seem to produce a vicious 
circle of “reasoning”, in which each part of the whole presupposes each other, and thus neither is 
really explained or defined at all. But, as I hope I have made clear, the relationship between 
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Rational Benevolence is the most appropriate and effective representation of that 
relationship, when Rational Benevolence is understood to be a complete moral 
theory that embodies the functions of the essential deontological and utilitarian 
properties of morality. ‘Rational’ represents the rightness, or the Reason, that is 
common to both the deontological concept of absolute duty and the utilitarian end of 
Happiness, as per Sidgwick’s earlier interpretation of rightness; ‘Benevolence’, too, 
is at once an absolute and categorical moral obligation, and representative of the 
utilitarian end of general Happiness. The two words are united because both 
concepts are required in order to create a fully comprehensive moral theory, that 
effectively includes both deontological and utilitarian properties. In creating this 
coherency between deontological and utilitarian principles, Rational Benevolence 
thus accounts for the fact that both types of morality appear in our day-to-day moral 
reasonings. It also reconciles them on the basis that both are established as equally 
reasonable. In fact, this moral theory requires that both are reasonable. The 
reasonableness of the first two non-consequentialist self-evident principles is 
necessary in order for the utilitarian principle to be established; the reasonableness 
of that resulting utilitarian principle is required in order to secure the role of those 
initial principles.  
It is not, then, that there is no difference between the two moral properties. The 
difference between them is vital, not just for the establishment of Rational 
Benevolence, but also for the respective values that they represent in the human 
moral experience. It is rather that there is no longer a divide between the 
                                                 
deontological and utilitarian properties does actually avoid becoming a Cartesian circle, as it is not 
completely circular – at least, not in the way that Rational Benevolence is established, through that 
process of Sidgwick’s philosophical intuitions leading to the utilitarian principle. Those deontological 
foundations must come first. Having an independent starting point allows the relationship to avoid 
being a vicious circle - but this might then seem to threaten the argument that both deontological and 
utilitarian properties have equal status. What I have tried to argue however is that whereas the 
deontological principles are the vital foundation, they are – as Sidgwick says – too abstract. It is only 
the ultimate rational end of Benevolence, once it has been derived, that can give them full meaning. 
Deontological properties justify utilitarian ones, utilitarian properties then secure the role of 
deontological properties within a wider moral theory. This part of the relationship is, I argue, circular, 
as they are independent, and inextricable from each other. Whether we begin with the deontological 
properties or the utilitarian ones, we will be required to reference the other: Deontological properties 
require something further for contextualisation, utilitarian properties require a deontological foundation 
as their ‘rational basis’. But it is only this end result that is circular. The theory was built linearly, and 
this avoids the Cartesian Circle. Also, I argue that the circular relationship is actually part of the 
cogency of Rational Benevolence. There is strength in the unity between deontological and utilitarian 
principle, in the fact that one cannot be taken away without the other collapsing. This, on my view, is 
an effective representation of the permanence of both moral properties in lived moral experience, and 
of the fact that they are inherently connected.  
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principles523. Within Rational Benevolence, deontological and utilitarian properties of 
morality are made indivisible, both practically, and philosophically. Both are also 
made complete. Here, we get the holistic view of the two ‘conclusions’ for which 
Sidgwick argued in the connection passages. The deontological principles would be 
left inadequate without the utilitarian principle because they require that principle to 
give them meaningful value; the utilitarian method of ethics would be incomplete 
because it would be missing the proof of the rational first principle which enables it to 
provide that support in the first place. And this, I argue, is the truth that lies between 
those two conclusions. 
 
4.5. Rational Benevolence as a Synthesis  
 
The principal aims of this thesis are to demonstrate that both deontological and 
utilitarian principles are reasonable aspects of morality, that they are both 
indispensable to a full understanding of morality, and that they are inherently 
connected in such a way that they are no longer mutually exclusive, but actually 
mutually informing. This chapter and the previous two have been engaged with 
developing this understanding exegetically from Sidgwick’s argument for Rational 
Benevolence. This section moves away from the exegetical focus, and concentrates 
now on the capacity of Rational Benevolence to meet those aims. Most specifically, it 
examines whether Rational Benevolence can meet the given criteria of ‘synthesis’, 
                                                 
523 Sidgwick himself has already been quoted above as having observed this dissolution of the 
distance between deontological and utilitarian principles. However, it is conducive here to quote the 
final pages of ME, in which Sidgwick specifically uses the term ‘Rational Benevolence’ for the last 
time, and in a particular way. Here, Sidgwick is discussing some of the more difficult demands of 
Benevolence, such as the relief of distress and calamity, sympathy, and possibilities such as that a 
person may find that they can only promote the general Happiness by working alone, or by grieving 
those they love, or by working towards ends that they themselves might never see realised (IV:503), 
‘In short’, Sidgwick says, ‘there seem to be numberless ways in which the dictates of that Rational 
Benevolence, which as a Utilitarian he is bound absolutely to obey…’ Sidgwick does not exactly 
present Rational Benevolence as a complete system of morality here, but he does present the case 
for Rational Benevolence being understood as the crucial informant of utilitarianism, appearing as it 
does here in its role of providing utilitarianism with the unconditional ought, while also maintaining a 
certain distinction between that deontological basis of Rational Benevolence and the utilitarian 
principle itself. (It should also be noted that that at no point in these pages or anywhere else does 
Sidgwick simply refer to Rational Benevolence as ‘utilitarianism’). It is a perfect example of Sidgwick’s 
having effectively assimilated the deontological properties of Rational Benevolence with his 
utilitarianism; it encapsulates the congruence between the deontological basis of Benevolence, and 
the inherent utilitarianism to which it also points. Sidgwick is right when he says that no-one has 
taught utilitarianism in this way (III:XIII:387). 
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as I argue that a synthesis would be the most effective way of incorporating those 
various understandings of morality into one coherent whole.    
 ‘Synthesis’, it will be recalled, was defined as representing a type of 
relationship in which the components are inextricably and necessarily linked. I 
identified three main features of this connection that summarise its purposes: 
Actuality, recognition, and role. Actuality represents the idea that both moral 
properties refer to each other for their own full realisation – that in this way, the two 
properties are fully established, made real, and justified. Because each property is 
fully realised and justified via reference to the other, both principles must be 
recognised in their own right (i.e. as having their own identity) in order to continue 
being an effective informant to the other. This, in turn, leads to the idea that the role 
of each property for this moral theory can only be understood with reference to the 
other property. Whichever principle is taken first, it indicates the other. When all 
these criteria are met, the result is a mutually informing and dynamic synthesis, in 
which the properties are seen to be inextricably connected because they require 
each other. This requirement also, I suggest, gives that relationship a degree of 
necessity.    
 Beginning with the question of whether the deontological and utilitarian moral 
properties within Rational Benevolence refer to each other for their own full 
realisation and thus actuality, it is clear that they do. Deontological principles provide 
the basis from which the utilitarian principle can be derived – but it is the utilitarian 
principle that gives those deontological principles real applicable value. Each moral 
property is thus responsible for the establishing and validation of the other. As such 
however, and as has been seen, this mutual realising can only happen if both moral 
properties retain their own identities. This is because the deontological and utilitarian 
properties each represent a different and essential part of the human moral 
experience. The deontological properties represent the idea of non-consequentialist 
rightness that does not depend on fitness to an ulterior end, the utilitarian principle 
represents the idea of Universal Good, or Happiness, as the rationally ultimate end 
of moral endeavour. But it is that deontological rightness that establishes the 
utilitarian principle as the rational ultimate end, and the utilitarian principle that 
confirms the need for those deontological principles as its rational basis. In this way, 
each moral property depends on the other for their role in the construction of the 
theory of Rational Benevolence. Whichever principle is taken first, it points to its 
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reliance on the other524. Deontology indicates utilitarianism because the self-evident 
principles of Justice and Prudence logically progress towards the establishment of 
Benevolence as the ultimate maxim; utilitarianism indicates deontology because it 
requires those sorts of principles as its rational basis, or proof.  
 Rational Benevolence then, I argue, offers a moral theory in which 
deontological and utilitarian principles are truly indivisible. The properties are inter-
reliant, interdependent, and necessarily so. Neither deontological properties or 
utilitarian ones are fully complete without reference to the other. Even if the two 
types of property are seen as independently valid, my case for Rational Benevolence 
argues they still refer to each other in some way, for that very validity. Deontology 
and utilitarianism are thus engaged in a dynamic relationship which overrides the 
traditional divide between those two schools of thought. Furthermore, both types of 
principle are present and necessary on account of their equal reasonableness. The 
deontological properties are (as per Sidgwick’s definition of rightness), ultimately 
reasonable – they then rationally lead to the creation of a rational basis from which 
the utilitarian principle can be rationally derived as a rational, ultimate end. Not only, 
then, does this account for the dual reasonableness that I argued in the introduction 
to be necessary for a fully comprehensive and more accurate understanding of the 
reality of human morality, but through Sidgwick’s understanding of the connection 
between Reason and rightness, both deontological and utilitarian considerations are, 
in Rational Benevolence, made right on the basis of their respective rationalities. 
Furthermore, the connection that they share within the synthesis is the direct result 
of this shared appeal to Reason. It is only on the basis of Sidgwick’s particular 
argument for rightness as similarly applicable to both certain duties and ultimately 
rational ends that both components in Rational Benevolence can be established as 
being rationally right in the same way. I argue therefore that Rational Benevolence 
                                                 
524 The ‘role’ aspect of the synthesis also indicates that at a practical level too, absolute rightness and 
outcome based rightness are linked because each depends to some extent on being informed by the 
principles of the other. This is essentially where I believe the true normative value of Rational 
Benevolence to lie. To expand on this, it was said in the introduction that it is easier to conceive of 
how the dual reasonableness of two different moral approaches would lead to a situation in which 
they limit each other, and harder to see immediately how they might inform each other. I therefore 
stated that it would mainly be the purpose of the thesis to demonstrate this mutual informing – and it 
is my view that Rational Benevolence does this effectively. However, it is precisely because of that 
mutual informing that the limits can also be seen. The scope for mutual validation and mutual 
limitation between deontological and utilitarian moral properties is examined in the thesis conclusion, 
where I assess the potential of Rational Benevolence as a theory of normative ethics.  
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offers a sound and effective synthesis between deontological and utilitarian 
principles of morality – and, crucially, that this synthesis depends directly on the fact 
that Rational Benevolence finds both types of moral property to be reasonable. 
Sidgwick’s moral theory could be described as a deontological/utilitarian one, 
or a utilitarian/deontological one. Neither would be inaccurate. But also would neither 
fully capture the distinctive assimilation between those principles, in which both 
deontological and utilitarian principles are rational, self-evident, and right, and in 
which Benevolence has at once a deontological basis, and a utilitarian character. 
Both of those descriptions are also unavoidably awkward. The only term that 
satisfactorily embodies and summarises the very particular relationship between 
deontology and utilitarianism that Sidgwick’s theory demonstrates is, quite simply, 
Rational Benevolence. Only Rational Benevolence embodies the idea that the 
utilitarian and deontological aspects of morality can be reconciled into a coherent 
whole, that accepts both types of moral reasoning, and is thus reflective of the 
human moral experience. 
 
4.6. Sidgwick’s Synthesis, in His Words: ‘Professor Sidgwick’s Account of the 
Development of his Ethical View’ 
 
The preceding sections have, I think, adequately summarised the findings of this 
chapter on Rational Benevolence, and for that reason another conclusion on the 
premises and mechanisms of Rational Benevolence before these points are stated 
again in the thesis’ main conclusion does not seem strictly necessary. However, 
there is a final point that must be addressed, and the discussion of this provides a 
slightly different conclusion on the mutual relationship between deontological and 
utilitarian principles of morality, that is nonetheless just as useful to my argument. 
For this reason, the discussion of this final point will serve as the chapter’s overall 
conclusion on Rational Benevolence as a synthesis. 
The outstanding issue is that Sidgwick stated in the introduction to ME that he 
would not be attempting a synthesis in this volume (I:I:13). He also reiterates in the 
book’s closing chapter that ‘a complete synthesis of these different methods is not 
attempted in the present work’ (IV:496). The questions arise therefore as to whether 
this present work has simply taken liberties with ME, and whether the charge could 
be brought against this theory that to claim that an essential and mutually informing 
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relationship between deontological and utilitarian principles of morality like the one 
described above goes beyond the actual intentions, scope, and indeed results of 
ME. It could be asked whether the theory that Rational Benevolence represents an 
understanding of human morality in which both deontological and utilitarian principles 
are inherently connected is just conjecture – and/or posited that the theory that 
Sidgwick perceived the antipathy between deontological and utilitarian principles to 
have been dissolved has been invented, or forced. Ultimately, it could still, even at 
this stage, be argued that Sidgwick really was a pure utilitarian, and all that ME does 
is prove that he perceived the utilitarianism represented by Universal Benevolence to 
in the end be the supreme moral principle, to which all other moral principles are 
finally found to be subordinate. This last point is particularly important. It is not 
difficult to support it with the text of ME, and even leaving aside the fact that 115 
years of history has almost unanimously labelled Sidgwick as a utilitarian, Sidgwick 
himself did not explicitly dispute that label in his own lifetime. 
Fortunately, however, my claims that Sidgwick is only a utilitarian on a very 
specific basis, and that he did perceive and develop this dissolution of the antithesis 
between Intuitionism (with a capital ‘I’) and utilitarianism, do not rely only my 
arguments put forwards in this thesis. There is also the support of the personal 
document, in which Sidgwick gives his own full account of his moral position. Where 
Sidgwick’s arguments in ME sometimes require some piecing together (his argument 
for utilitarianism, for example, is hardly linear) the PD provides a direct, 
chronological, and unambiguous account of how he developed his moral theory – 
and it concurs precisely with the argument that I have given above, for the inherent 
relation between utilitarianism and deontology. The PD has been discussed in 
previous chapters, but there it was specifically for Sidgwick’s use of Kant, within the 
context of arguing that Sidgwick’s Intuitionism shares crucial characteristics with his 
epistemic intuitionism. Here, it is examined more broadly, for its evidence of the 
mutually informing relationship overall. The document pulls together Sidgwick’s 
utilitarianism, his crucial use of a self-evident deontological principle, and the nature 
of his epistemic intuitionism – and demonstrates the fact that within that intuitionism, 
there exists a close and necessary connection between his utilitarian and 
deontological ideas, which Sidgwick did eventually discover and argue for. 
Sidgwick begins the account by stating that his ‘first adhesion to a definite 
Ethical system was to the Utilitarianism of Mill’ (ME: xv). This was the relief he had 
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been wanting from the ‘apparently external and arbitrary pressure of moral rules’, 
with which he had been brought up. These Intuitionistic rules, he felt, were doubtful, 
confused, unreasoned – and incoherent. Mill’s system gave a place to the concepts 
of pleasure and happiness, which Sidgwick thought to be an entirely natural part of 
human existence. The first problem that Sidgwick encountered with Mill’s system 
however was that it failed to reconcile self-interest and moral duty. At first, this was 
the problem with which Sidgwick was the most concerned (ME: xvi)525. Left with the 
choice between placing either the general happiness or one’s own as the ultimate 
end, Sidgwick perceived that there needed to be grounds on which he could simply 
see that one should sacrifice one’s own happiness for the sake of the general good. 
This need, Sidgwick explains, he equated with the need for there to be (despite his 
initial) aversion to this system - a ‘fundamental ethical intuition’ (ME: xvi). The 
utilitarian system of Mill could not, Sidgwick thought, be made coherent without it.  
 Sidgwick then describes how ‘in this state of mind’, he returned directly to 
Kant’s ethics. This is the first of Sidgwick’s recognitions of the possible respective 
importance of both utilitarian and deontological principles. This time more receptive 
to Kant’s ideas, Sidgwick describes how he was ‘impressed with the truth and 
importance of his fundamental principle; ‘Act from a principle or maxim that you can 
will to be a Universal law’. The importance of this fundamental deontological premise 
– that ‘whatever is right for me must be right for all persons in similar circumstances’ 
-  was, for Sidgwick, the basic intuition of which he had been in search, and was 
concretely established (ME: xvii)526. This maxim, he believed, was both 
fundamentally true, and practically important.  
 Sidgwick then describes, in direct accordance with the relevant pages in ME 
(i.e. III:I) that have been discussed above, how Kant’s principle did not seem capable 
of providing a system of actual, practical duties. At this point, Sidgwick became ‘a 
disciple on the loose’ - and it is here that Sidgwick can be seen to be standing at the 
                                                 
525 Much of the personal document details Sidgwick’s perception of and attempt to resolve the 
Dualism of Practical Reason. This issue is immediately detachable from his conclusion on the 
relationship between utilitarianism and Intuitionism however, which he did find to be one of 
reconciliation.  
526 Again, it is possible to draw attention here to the connection that Sidgwick is creating between 
Kant and intuitionism/Intuitionism, understood both as a method of ethics and as Sidgwick’s own form 
of epistemology. It can also now be seen, in light of my argument for Rational Benevolence, that it 
doesn’t matter that Sidgwick did not agree with the metaphysical basis of Kant’s maxim. Sidgwick 
provides his own epistemological justification for it (in the form of his principle of Justice), which he 
believes to establish its intended objectivity more effectively.  
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intersection between Intuitional ethics (which we now know Sidgwick accepts on the 
basis of Kant’s provision of a fundamental intuition), and utilitarianism. As Sidgwick 
says, ‘…this led me to reconsider my relation to Intuitional Ethics. The strength and 
vehemence of Butler’s condemnation of pure Utilitarianism…naturally impressed me 
much. And I had myself become, as I had to admit to myself, an Intuitionist to a 
certain extent’ (ME: xix). He qualifies this with the immensely important and telling 
statement that ‘the supreme rule of aiming at the general happiness, as I had come 
to see, must rest on a fundamental moral intuition, if I was to recognise it as binding 
at all’. That fundamental moral intuition, it has been seen, Sidgwick had taken 
directly from Kant. In this sentence therefore, there is incontestable proof that 
Sidgwick perceived the utilitarian position to require, as its rational basis, support 
from the Kantian position527. Sidgwick then declares himself have accepted aiming at 
the general happiness only on the basis that it is itself, an intuitional premise (ME: 
xix)528. Both utilitarianism and the Kantian maxim appear before Sidgwick here as 
fundamentally true, and fundamentally important. Sidgwick wondered at this stage 
whether or not he might have ‘a system of moral intuitions’ (ME: xx). This phrase 
‘system of moral intuitions’, appearing as it does after Sidgwick’s recognition that 
intuitionism pertains as much to utilitarianism as it does to Intuitional Ethics, clearly 
represents the fact that within that intuitionism, both utilitarian and Kantian-
deontological principles are included.  
Sidgwick decides that impartial reflection on current opinion would be the 
most effective way to test this system. However, that impartial reflection only 
revealed to Sidgwick the differences between those principles, and his two intuitions 
of the Kantian maxim, and utilitarianism. This latter principle however, Sidgwick 
                                                 
527 This is, translated into the arguments of ME, the stage at which Sidgwick recognises that 
utilitarianism is in need of proof, and that this can only come from the self-evident principles, one of 
which had it origins in Kant. 
528 Here we see clearly the very close relationship between Sidgwick’s own epistemological 
intuitionism and the Intuitionism that he associates with the Kantian position. There is a clearly still a 
distinction in Sidgwick’s mind, given that he refers first to a ‘fundamental moral intuition’ and then 
separately to the ‘Kantian principle’. We also have Sidgwick’s point that to employ intuitionism means 
simply ‘to see’ that something is right – and this is not directly associated with the deontological 
position, Kantian or otherwise understood. However, Sidgwick’s capitalising of ‘Intuitionism’ in these 
pages, his association between his need for a fundamental primary intuition and the Kantian maxim 
on ME: xvii, his second and third references to Kant alongside intuitional ethics (ME: xix, xx) and his 
clear association between Intuitionism and the deontological position that is seen in ME, still reinforce 
my argument that by the time he wrote ME, Kant was a vital part of the ‘Intuitionism’ with which 
Sidgwick describes the non-consequentialist method of ethics. It also supports my further argument 
that the lines between Sidgwick’s own intuitionism and that Kantian influenced Intuitionism are often 
indistinct.  
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states, he found to be ‘in perfect harmony with the Kantian principle’ (ME: xx). Where 
common sense morality itself was not adequate as a system of ethics, and full of 
contradictions and confusions, Sidgwick’s own two intuitions – one deontological in 
its non-consequentialist self-evidence, and one fundamentally utilitarian, combined to 
create a moral theory that Sidgwick could endorse, on both deontological and 
utilitarian grounds. Sidgwick describes how he saw there to be no distance between 
the Kantian maxim that everyone could will their action to be a universal law, and the 
utilitarian principle that this action was to be the pursuit of general happiness, or of 
Benevolence (ME: xx).  ‘In fact’, says Sidgwick, ‘it was the only law that it was 
perfectly clear to me that I could thus decisively will, from a universal point of view’. 
This is a fitting and direct reflection of the argument made above that for Sidgwick, 
utilitarianism can only be fully understood and validated on the basis of premises 
from the Intuitional position. In a very shortened version of the equivalent argument 
in ME, Sidgwick is directly claiming that a version of the deontological Kantian maxim 
of universalizability and the utilitarian maxim of Universal Benevolence are not only 
completely compatible, but actually indivisible from each other, within his moral 
theory. It is at least clear that Sidgwick, despite the decades of argument that he is 
the most classical of the classical utilitarian, was not prepared to accept utilitarianism 
at face value: It required, as he describes in ME, a rational basis – a rational basis 
that could only be provided by a maxim that is recognisably Kantian in both origins, 
and moral-theoretic character. In a poignant and effective summarising statement, 
Sidgwick declares that ‘I was then a Utilitarian again, but on an Intuitional basis’.  
‘In this state of mind’, Sidgwick continues a few lines later, ‘I published my 
book: I tried to say what I had found: that the opposition between Utilitarianism and 
Intuitionism was due to a misunderstanding’. Intuitions are required for the basis of 
Utilitarianism, as we have seen Sidgwick argue in III:XIII. But that Utilitarianism is 
also completely compatible with those Intuitions, or intuitions. The final words here 
must be given by Sidgwick, for no other description or interpretation could do them 
better justice, or better represent the direct correlation between Sidgwick’s own 
thought on his ethical view, and the argument of this present chapter: 
 
‘I could find no real opposition between Intuitionism and Utilitarianism…the Utilitarianism of 
Mill and Bentham seemed to me to want a basis: that basis could only be supplied by a 
fundamental intuition; on the other hand the best examination I could make of the Morality of 
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Common Sense showed me no clear and self-evident principles except such as were 
perfectly consistent with Utilitarianism’ (ME: xxi)  
 
The reciprocal relationship between the deontological and utilitarian properties of 
morality is thus confirmed by Sidgwick himself. Within this relationship, the two moral 
properties are interdependent, and inter-validating. They are, essentially, mutually 
informing.  
There remain now only a few comments with which to draw this chapter to a 
close. They take as their summary the words of E.E. (Emily Elizabeth) Constance 
Jones, Sidgwick’s devotee and one of the people responsible for posthumously 
organising the material for the Methods’ 6th edition. E.E. Constance Jones 
specifically states in her foreword that the personal document manuscript was 
among the material ‘which Professor Sidgwick intended to be referred to, in 
preparing this edition for the press’ (ME: xiv). She describes the document as being 
‘of very exceptional interest’, and refers to his passing as ‘the calamity of his death’. 
In both of these judgements, she is not wrong. The suggestion made by the 
existence of the personal document is that Sidgwick recognised the need to clarify 
this extremely important topic, and had he lived to engage with it, it is likely that there 
would have been at least some discourse on this specific issue of the relationship 
Sidgwick had drawn between deontological and utilitarian premises. From a wider 
historical perspective, if more interest had been shown in the PD, this may well have 
altered the world’s perception of Sidgwick as being a straightforward utilitarian. He 
might also have been credited with offering a strong, rational, and highly 
sophisticated means of understanding how it is that two types of moral principle 
appear to be reasonable, where most of the history of moral philosophy has 
traditionally held them to be divided, and opposed. As it was, Sidgwick died on the 
cusp of those serious changes that were taking place in moral philosophy at the turn 
of the nineteenth century, and his argument for the relationship between 
deontological and utilitarian properties – for this synthesis - was lost. 
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THE PROBLEM OF MORAL AMBIVALENCE 
 
REVISITING HENRY SIDGWICK’S THEORY OF RATIONAL BENEVOLENCE AS 
A BASIS FOR MORAL REASONING, WITH REFERENCE TO PRENATAL 
ETHICAL DILEMMAS 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
5.1. Restatement of the Problem 
 
The thesis’ starting point was the observation of the serious moral ambivalence that 
often occurs in every day moral decision making. I argued that this ambivalence is 
caused by a conflict between two apparently reasonable and yet fundamentally 
opposing types of moral principle – that which holds that there are certain moral 
rules that are absolutely and unconditionally right, and that which holds that it is right 
to do whatever action will secure the best outcome.  
The context of prenatal ethical dilemmas, in which parents are facing a 
decision regarding the future of a very difficult pregnancy, was used in order to 
demonstrate this ambivalence. These parents (excluding those who are of a very 
definitive persuasion either way) are in a position in which both courses of action - 
the continuation and the termination of the pregnancy – appear in some way to be 
‘right’. Continuing the pregnancy would be right on the basis that any human life has 
absolute and unconditional value; ending the pregnancy would be right on the basis 
that to avoid bringing about painful and distressing outcomes also has unconditional 
value. What is most crucial for the point about ambivalence is the fact that both 
courses of action appear to be right, simultaneously, despite the fact that they prima 
facie appear to be mutually exclusive. This creates a complicated situation in which 
each option appears to be morally reasonable, but also morally reprehensible, 
precisely because of the validity of the alternative course of action. I referred to this 
situation as ‘the Parental Predicament’.  
The Parental Predicament also includes the pressure parents often 
experience from societal attitudes to this issue, which directly reflect the same 
ambivalence that occurs at the private level. Where individual autonomy is certainly 
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a vital theoretical framework for protecting parents’ decision from external influences, 
practically speaking it often fails in this remit. Not only does ‘freedom of choice’ not 
prevent pressure from the public sphere, but it also simply continues to embody and 
perpetuate any ambivalence. Freedom of choice does not necessarily make those 
choices easier. I argued in the introduction that for this reason, autonomy itself 
cannot be the solution to situations of grave moral ambivalence, and that instead the 
solution would lie in a better and deeper philosophic understanding of the cause of 
that ambivalence – of the reason why two such different moral impulses exist within 
our moral experiences, and how both could appear to be right simultaneously. I 
theorised that this could be understood if the two positions were no longer defended 
separately on the basis that they are mutually exclusive (which only perpetuates the 
problem), but rather reconciled in such a way that they can be seen as mutually 
informing – the connection being made by their shared appeal to reason. I argued 
that if this sort of understanding of morality could be achieved, both courses of action 
in situations such as the Parental Predicament could be better ethically justified, and 
therefore both more robustly defended at once. 
The obstacle to such a solution was identified as being a fundamental 
problem that exists within moral philosophy (and of which the Parental Predicament 
is a direct representation): The traditional opposition between two major school of 
moral thought, deontology and utilitarianism. Representing non-consequentialist 
absolute principles and consideration of outcomes respectively, the two types of 
principle could be considered to each describe an equally valid aspect of the human 
moral experience. Instead, however, a ‘divide’ between the two types of moral 
principle sprang up in the early era of modern moral philosophy, with the 
deontological tradition’s emphasis on intrinsic rightness of actions being held at 
irreconcilable odds with the utilitarian emphasis on the attainment of certain goods, 
or ends. I argued that this divide – which has continued to pervade much of moral 
philosophy ever since - creates the artificial idea that morality is exclusively either 
one type or the other, when actually it is neither completely. Situations such as the 
Parental Predicament demonstrate that both absolute-based and end/outcome-
based ethical principles have a role in morality – and that a means of understanding 
this to be the case is essential for a more accurate, sensitive, and complete 
comprehension of the human moral experience.   
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5.2. Restatement of the Solution: Henry Sidgwick’s Rational Benevolence  
 
I claimed at the outset of the thesis that Victorian moral philosopher Henry Sidgwick 
recognises the value, and the role, of both deontological and utilitarian properties of 
morality in his work. Sidgwick is almost universally considered to be a utilitarian – 
and often the best utilitarian of the classical era. Whereas I agree that Sidgwick is a 
utilitarian in some sense, it is my belief that his seminal work The Methods of Ethics 
is not simply a defence of utilitarianism. Sidgwick begins ME from observations very 
similar to mine, which are that all individuals incorporate a range of differing moral 
principles within their own private moral processes, and that these principles also 
differ widely between individuals. Pointing out that ‘we cannot regard as valid 
reasonings that lead to conflicting conclusions’ (I:I:3), Sidgwick’s investigations into 
these various reasonings eventually lead him to develop a theory in which both 
deontological and utilitarian principles are necessary for a full understanding of the 
reality of morality.  
To the end of drawing out the process through which Sidgwick arrives at that 
conclusion, I argued first in chapter 2 that there is a distinct presence of non-
consequentialist deontological principles in Sidgwick’s work, and that Sidgwick 
ascribes far greater value to these principles than is commonly thought. I argued that 
his understanding of ‘Intuitionism’ (in the moral-theoretic sense) is that it is the non-
consequentialist absolute-principle based ethical position, and that his view of moral 
rightness is that a) it is determined by what is rational, b) it does not involve 
reference to ulterior results, and c) it takes the form of categorical imperatives. I 
argued further that Sidgwick’s own moral epistemology actually includes these two 
largely deontological notions, of non-consequentialism and the connection between 
rightness, rationality, and ‘ought’. These qualities appear in Sidgwick’s establishing 
of Justice and Prudence as the only moral maxims that really do admit of being 
called self-evident. As such, the deontological ideas of non-consequentialist and 
unconditional moral obligation were found to have a significant role in Sidgwick’s 
establishing of his last self-evident principle – the utilitarian maxim of Universal 
Benevolence, which emerges from the combination of Justice and Prudence.  
It was then argued in chapter 3 that Sidgwick’s utilitarianism is not always 
typical of the utilitarian position, in that he emphasises early on in ME that the same 
concepts of ‘right’ and ‘ought’ apply to ultimate rational ends in exactly the same way 
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as they do to categorical, unconditional duties. Sidgwick argues that rightness does 
not lie simply in teleological means to attaining ends, but in the rationality of ultimate 
ends themselves, which only then brings an ‘ought’ to the means (a situation that is 
directly reflected by the relationship between utilitarian and deontological properties 
in Rational Benevolence). In this way, Sidgwick’s argument for Happiness as a 
rational, ultimate end shares much in common with his argument for non-
consequentialist actions, or absolute duties. In both cases, his argument for moral 
obligation is dependent on the shared notion of rightness being that which is 
ultimately reasonable. It was also found in chapter 3 that Sidgwick’s own position on 
utilitarianism and its dual positive/negative relationship with common sense morality 
required him, in Book IV of ME, to reference the connection between self-evident 
principles and utilitarianism that he had already developed in Book III. This is, I 
argued, a reflection of Sidgwick’s earlier comment regarding the respective roles of 
common sense morality and utilitarianism which read, ‘the truth lies between these 
two conclusions. There are certain absolute practical principles…but they are of too 
abstract a nature....; particular duties have still to be determined by some other 
method’. Sidgwick was seen to rephrase and emphasise this idea in Book IV with the 
second of the connection passages, in which Sidgwick suggests that we need a ‘line 
of argument’ that allows common sense maxims a certain validity, while also 
recognising that a further principle is also required to complete them. 
The philosophical construction of this connection was then pursued in full in 
chapter 4, where the thesis’ central argument was made that Sidgwick’s 
interpretation of rightness, his subsequent argument for a Kantian influenced self-
evident principle, and the logical movement of that principle to the self-evident 
principle of Prudence, combine to create an argument for impartially realised 
Universal Good as a rational ultimate end – a moral theory represented by the term 
‘Rational Benevolence’. In Rational Benevolence, the deontological and utilitarian 
properties of morality are no longer mutually exclusive, but rather mutually informing, 
existing together in an interdependent and reciprocal relationship that I have called a 
‘synthesis’. Sidgwick argues first for the rational, unconditional and non-
consequentialist bases of Justice and Prudence, which makes them right as per his 
earlier definition, and gives the resultant Universal Benevolence a true, rational 
‘ought’. The deontological method through which Benevolence has been derived 
thus ultimately reveals a utilitarian principle. But that utilitarian principle remains 
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dependent upon those self-evident deontological principles for the establishment of 
its own rational basis – that is, for its proof. Equally, the self-evident principles rely 
upon the ultimate utilitarian principle to give them context, and full meaning as part of 
a system of morality. This shared appeal to the role of Reason, in which the 
rationality of deontological properties informs the rationality of utilitarian properties 
and vice versa, reconciles and unites the two types of principle, and is the direct 
result of Sidgwick’s accumulative arguments for reason-based rightness as applying 
similarly to both absolute principles and ultimate ends, as seen throughout chapters 
2 and 3. It is for this reason that I argue Sidgwick’s intuitionistic epistemology to be 
both deontological, (or ‘Intuitional’) and utilitarian, and that his inclusive moral theory 
is most conveniently described with the term ‘Rational Benevolence’.  
Sidgwick’s theory of Rational Benevolence therefore successfully accounts for 
the equally reasonable basis of the two types of moral principle - absolute principle 
based and outcome based- that both seem to be so relevant to the lived experience 
of morality. When Sidgwick remarks that ‘we cannot regard as valid reasonings that 
conflict’, he is still right. But, contrary to his prediction that one view or the other 
would have to be discarded on the basis of its not being reasonable, this was not to 
be Sidgwick’s approach to the problem: Rather, he accepts the rationality of both 
positions, and removes the conflict between them. We need the concept of non-
consequentialist morality, and we need it as Kant so famously established it – on a 
rational basis that can be seen to be self-evident, and thus absolutely applicable. Yet 
ultimately we find, if we pursue that form of morality, that we must logically come to 
the utilitarian principle of Benevolence (i.e. to the aiming at Universal Good). Both of 
these ultimately rational concepts are required for a comprehensive understanding of 
morality. In Sidgwick’s own words, the ‘opposition between Utilitarianism and 
Intuitionism’ is ‘due to a misunderstanding’ (ME: xx) – the misunderstanding that 
there is a fundamental conflict between the ultimately reasonable principle of aiming 
at the general Happiness, and the traditionally deontological idea of morality being 
comprised of ultimately reasonable, absolute, and self-evident principles.  
Ultimately then, ‘we have found that the common antithesis between 
Intuitionists and Utilitarians must be entirely discarded’. This phrase is, in short, 
Sidgwick’s own abolition of that long-standing divide between deontological and 
utilitarian positions that has permeated so much of moral philosophy, and that is 
seen in the lived experience of deep moral ambivalence. Showing that this 
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ambivalence is the result of the equal reasonableness of both deontological and 
utilitarian moral properties, and providing a theory of how the properties are united 
within a coherent whole, is, I believe, the most effective means of challenging that 
divide – and Rational Benevolence can perform both of these roles. I therefore argue 
that Rational Benevolence provides a reconciliatory solution to the philosophical 
debate between deontological and utilitarian moral views, and that subsequently it 
offers a means of understanding and possibly managing moral ambivalence as it is 
actually experienced.  
 
5.3 Using Rational Benevolence as a Moral Theory 
 
It has been the chief aim of this thesis to demonstrate that the human moral 
experience is comprised of neither absolute-principle based or outcome based 
ethical principles exclusively, and that instead both types of moral value are 
reasonable, and important. I theorise that my argument for the mutually informing 
synthesis between deontological and utilitarian properties of morality that is 
embodied by Rational Benevolence mounts a persuasive theoretical case for this 
view, and thus the thesis’ main objective has been met. But this argument for 
Rational Benevolence has, throughout the thesis, been made entirely in conceptual 
terms. In order to truly assess its efficacy, it remains to consider the extent and 
range to which Rational Benevolence can function as an applied moral theory, that 
might be capable of giving actual moral guidance. 
I stated in the introduction that it is beyond the scope of this thesis – and 
certainly of its conclusion – to adequately expound and discuss all the details of how 
Rational Benevolence might apply in practice, as a theory of normative ethics. It is 
however possible, I believe, to at least give some rudimentary outlines of how 
Rational Benevolence seems to qualify as a functional theory. These can be 
presented in two over-arching observations about the theory, that can then be laid 
down as the main lines of enquiry regarding how Rational Benevolence might be 
able to offer something of practical substance.  
Firstly, there is the fact that Rational Benevolence argues comprehensively 
that both deontological and utilitarian moral properties are right because both are 
rational, and that neither type is expendable or in error (when viewed through 
Sidgwick’s own philosophical arguments) – a characteristic that we can call, for ease 
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of reference, ‘dual rationality’. This statement has what I will call immediate 
descriptive value, by which it is meant that this dual rationality is effective in 
describing and explaining the reason for moral ambivalence. Furthermore, this dual 
rationality indicates that the relationship is a dynamic affair, wherein both the 
deontological and utilitarian properties must retain those respective rationalities in 
any given situation in order for that coherent whole of Rational Benevolence which 
makes up ‘morality’ to be maintained. Given that this is a dictate that must be 
observed when making moral decisions according to Rational Benevolence, it is this 
aspect of the synthesis that gives Rational Benevolence a degree of normative 
value. 
The second line of enquiry involves recognising that Rational Benevolence is 
predominantly a theory of rightness, but that it still maintains a secure place for the 
good; the Happiness that Sidgwick considers to be the end of the utilitarian principle 
is, after all, specifically identified by Sidgwick to be that ‘good’ (III:XIII:388 ; 
III:XIV:400, 406-407). The Universal Benevolence of Rational Benevolence therefore 
begs the question (as is the case with any theory that includes the ‘good’) of what 
exactly that good, or Happiness, is – of what it is meant to really look like in real life, 
within the normative framework that is established by dual rationality.  
The remaining sections of this chapter, and of this thesis, are engaged in 
exploring further how the dual rationality aspect of Rational Benevolence, and its 
preservation of the good, contribute to these descriptive and normative functions of 
Rational Benevolence. I return to the Parental Predicament for the purposes of 
demonstration and application, and within this context I aim to explore the 
possibilities, and the limitations, of Rational Benevolence for practical ethics. 
Whereas I have only tentatively posited some of the ideas here, I have indicated 
where further work in this area might lie.  
 
5.3.a. The Descriptive Value of Rational Benevolence 
 
The descriptive value of Rational Benevolence is quite simply that this theory is able 
to more comprehensively explain at a metaphysical level the complex phenomenon 
that is the human moral experience, than theories that claim that morality is 
exclusively either deontological or utilitarian. As I have argued, theories that support 
one viewpoint or another are likely to always be required to defend themselves 
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against the alternatives. Ironically, this often causes an increase in the conflict 
between them, which in turn leads to the perpetuation of that very need for each 
theory to defend itself. Thus, deontological and utilitarian understandings of morality 
are often pushed further, and unhelpfully, apart. Rational Benevolence, on the other 
hand, argues not from one position or the other, but precisely from what I believe to 
be the common ground between them, where properties of both combine to create a 
full understanding of what can be called morally reasonable. 
In order to understand how this is helpful at a practical level, the deontological 
and utilitarian properties of Rational Benevolence require being phrased in terms that 
correspond directly with the ambivalence experienced by parents in the Parental 
Predicament, as follows.  
The deontological aspect of Rational Benevolence - that which upholds the concept 
of absolute, inviolable, and unconditional principles - typically represents and 
supports the strong disposition parents are likely to feel towards wanting to continue 
the pregnancy, regardless of any difficult circumstances. This desire may occur for 
any number of reasons, such as the intense emotional awareness that this is their 
child, some religious tendencies, or indeed a combination of any or all of them – but 
the underlying theme that characterises this position is that this pregnancy has an 
unconditional value, and the continuation of it is therefore unconditionally right. The 
utilitarian aspect of Rational Benevolence – which supports considerations of quality 
of life and the potential for flourishing - typically represents and supports the strong 
disposition parents are also likely to feel towards wanting the best kind of life for their 
child529. This concern for quality of life, and freedom from pain and suffering, is also 
felt to be unconditional. Ambivalence itself is, of course, caused by the apparent 
value of both views and the obvious tension between them. The descriptive function 
of Rational Benevolence first applies when it explains – and justifies - this 
ambivalence by giving greater philosophical support to the argument that both areas 
                                                 
529 I made the point in the thesis introduction that accounts of the two positions such as these I have 
just given are highly simplified, but I feel it is important to emphasise here also. This simplification is 
especially true of the utilitarian aspect. Other outcomes that parents are likely to have to consider 
include the related sense that they are responsible for securing a quality of life for their future child, 
and that this is only compassionate – and also that acting compassionately is itself difficult to define. 
For example, they may also have other lives towards which they also need to act compassionately, 
such as other children, any other sort of dependents for whom they may be carers, and indeed their 
own lives, especially if the physical or mental health of either parent is in question. All of these factors 
however contribute legitimately to what it means to wanting to secure the best kind of life, for any or 
all of the parties involved.  
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of concern, and both courses of action, are indeed as equally valid as they appear. 
Ambivalence is directly reflecting a major aspect of moral reality, which is that 
morality is comprised of this range of considerations, and that both the deontological 
and utilitarian properties can claim to be reasonable, and therefore morally right530. It 
is precisely this situation that is embodied by the dual rationality of Rational 
Benevolence – by its preservation of both deontological and utilitarian considerations 
as ultimately rational, and therefore ultimately moral.  
It might be posited here however that Rational Benevolence still actually 
offers nothing substantially different to other moral theories that defend either course 
of action separately, especially given that many of these theories also utilise 
rationality as a basis for their moral reasoning. By simply claiming that both courses 
of action are reasonable in their own separate and independent ways, this thesis 
would contribute nothing towards reconciling the moral philosophical rift between 
these apparently fundamentally different positions, and would certainly go no way 
towards creating an understanding of ambivalence that could be used to aid the 
private and public pressure that it causes531. I maintain against such objections 
                                                 
530 In this way, Rational Benevolence can also be used to defend the non-ambivalent courses of 
action (termination or continuation), because both absolute-principle based and outcome based moral 
principles are defended independently by Rational Benevolence, as well as together. However, there 
are some important caveats to this claim. Rational Benevolence, it will be seen shortly, does not 
simply justify either course of action, simply because it ‘covers’ both absolute and outcome based 
approaches to a situation. Both of those approaches may well be capable of being proven 
Benevolent, but the whole point of Rational Benevolence is that that Benevolence, and any actions 
that stem from it, are also rational. Thus, limits will start to appear where actions cannot be called 
rational. This very point is accounted for in the discussion of Rational Benevolence’s normative value.  
531 This would also offer no aid to the enduring problem in this context of how to define what is meant 
by concepts such as the absolute value of life, the good life, suffering, or the avoidance of suffering. 
Who is to decide, ultimately, what constitutes suffering, or ‘a good life’? These questions, and related 
ones such as whether or not we have a responsibility towards future children now that certain 
technologies are available, are currently occupying many areas of medical ethics, and the area of 
prenatal testing especially. For excellent discussion of the issues, see Jonathon Glover, What Sort of 
People Should There Be? (London: Penguin Books Ltd:1984), and Choosing Children: Genes, 
Disability, and Design (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2008); Michael Sandel, The Case Against 
Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press: 
2007); David Galton, Eugenics; The Future of Human Life in the 21st Century (London:Abacus:2001); 
Phillip Kitcher, The Lives to Come; The Genetic Revolution and Human Possibilities (London: 
Penguin Books: 1997); John Bryant and John Searle, Life in Our Hands: A Christian Perspective on 
Genetics and Cloning (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press: 2004); John Harris, Enhancing Evolution; The 
Ethical Case for Making Better People (Princeton: Princeton University Press:2007); Tom 
Shakespeare and Ann Kerr, Genetic Politics: From Eugenics to Genome (Cheltenham: New Clarion 
Press: 2002) (other writers and theorists who are also relevant to this area are listed below, within the 
more specific context of Transhumanism). It is beyond the scope of this current work to examine this 
aspect of the debate in detail – however, I do argue below in the discussion on the normative potential 
of Rational Benevolence, that this thesis may offer indications as to how these ideas might be 
defined. 
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however that Sidgwick’s Rational Benevolence attributes rightness to both 
deontological and utilitarian properties of morality more effectively than other 
theories precisely because Rational Benevolence does not simply defend the 
reasonableness of each separately. Rather, it embodies the fact that both types of 
moral property are reasonable, at the same time, within one united theory. This then 
leads to a profounder explanatory advantage of Rational Benevolence, which is that 
it can explain not just the fact that both courses of action are morally right 
simultaneously, but why this is the case. The level of descriptive capacity I have 
already outlined in this section can be referred to as Rational Benevolence’s 
superficial descriptive value, as it explains at a surface level that fact that both 
courses of action are morally right. But this second, deeper, explanatory function of 
the theory – its ability to explain why this is the case – I will call Rational 
Benevolence’s substantive descriptive value. This substantive descriptive value lies 
specifically in the synthesis between utilitarian and deontological moral properties, in 
that it represents the concept that within dual rationality, the rationality of each 
position is inherently connected to the rationality of the other. The substantive 
descriptive level signifies the dynamic nature of the mutually informing synthesis 
between rational deontological and utilitarian principles – which states that both the 
deontological and utilitarian properties of Rational Benevolence must retain those 
properties, and refer to the other, in order for the full definition of what is morally right 
to be achieved. And it is in this way that the substantive descriptive value of Rational 
Benevolence then begins to reveal the normative capacity of the theory. 
 
5.3.b. The Normative Value of Rational Benevolence  
 
It has just been stated that the substantive descriptive value of Rational Benevolence 
leads directly to the potential normative application of the theory, given that the 
mutually informing relationship embodied therein implies that a process must occur 
in which absolute-principle and outcome-based considerations are actively 
maintained while also demonstrating necessary reference to each other - and this in 
turn could apply within a given set of ethical circumstances. I theorise here that this 
normative function of Rational Benevolence could apply both positively, in that it 
could better validate and justify decisions, and negatively, in that it could offer some 
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means of establishing appropriate limits on certain decisions532. The validation of 
action aspect will be discussed first, as it is through the process of validation that the 
matter of limitation to action is naturally raised. Again, I concede from the outset of 
this stage of the investigation that this exploration into the normative value of 
Rational Benevolence is only a cursory one - but the ideas are outlined as 
extensively as is possible in the space available here.  
 
5.3.b.i. Rational Benevolence as Validation of Moral Action 
 
It must first be asked of this claim made by the substantive descriptive value of 
Rational Benevolence that the rationality of each moral property informs the 
rationality of the other in order to make both types right, exactly what it means for 
two positions to be simultaneously right, or rational, when the practical level involves 
two fundamentally different courses of action. Two interpretations can be eliminated 
immediately. Firstly, it does not mean that deontological and utilitarian properties of 
morality are simply the same. The construction of Rational Benevolence at the 
theoretical level has shown that this actually must not be the case - for the validity of 
each moral property depends on the properties of the other - and to say that there is 
no difference between the principles would of course also fail to address the very 
problem of moral ambivalence with which we started, which is precisely the 
existence of two very different and yet apparently valid moral impulses. Secondly, it 
is also not meant by ‘simultaneous rightness’ that both courses of action are an 
‘ought’ – something that could be implied by the role of ‘ought’ in Rational 
Benevolence. As Sidgwick’s Reason-based definition of right generates the notions 
of ought and moral obligation in the way that it does, saying that a course of action 
                                                 
532 It will be recalled from the introduction I argued that equal reasonableness must point both to the 
validation and the limitation of each position. I also stated there that it is easier to establish how two 
reasonable positions might limit each other with their respective reasonable concerns, as opposed to 
how they might validate each other – and that this thesis would be engaged with building the case for 
the latter relationship. Now that this has been done, it will be possible to see in these last sections that 
the mutual validation aspect of the deontological/utilitarian relationship is, in practice, actually easier 
to defend than the mutual limitation aspect. This is especially the case in the context of the Parental 
Predicament, where establishing limits to action could perhaps require either dictating that a 
pregnancy ought to be continued, or that it ought to be ended. The first of these two positions can 
only really be defended tenuously at best, and the second barely at all. This, as I will draw attention to 
in the main text below, is admittedly a challenge to the normative value of Rational Benevolence. On 
the other hand, the potential of Rational Benevolence to justify certain courses of action, and within 
certain parameters that at least indicate where limits should lie, even if they are not enforced, does 
seem to be apparent.  
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can be justified by this understanding of rightness might seem to make that course of 
action appear an inviolable moral obligation; it is, according to Sidgwick, only rational 
– and right - to pursue that which we recognise as rational, and right. Not only is this 
practically paradoxical (it logically cannot be the case that we ‘ought’, on a direct 
understanding of that term, to pursue two entirely different courses of action at 
once), but it would also lead to many morally unacceptable situations in which it 
would seem as though Rational Benevolence is dictating that parents ought to 
continue a pregnancy – or, even more deplorably, that they ought to end it.  
But to give dictates in this way is not how the ‘ought’ in Rational Benevolence 
is intended to operate. The ‘ought’ in this theory is the crucial component of what 
establishes the Benevolence itself as a moral duty. That is, it is the moral obligation 
(or the duty) of Benevolence (which prescribes aiming at the general Happiness) that 
is established on the basis of the ought; Rational Benevolence dictates that we 
‘ought’ to obey the duty of Benevolence. This Benevolence is then, as seen in 
chapter 4, made up of the peculiar balance of deontological and utilitarian properties 
which allows two different courses of action to be right, or rational, or benevolent, 
according to the evidence given by the construction of Rational Benevolence that 
morality exists in both. Benevolence as a moral obligation therefore refers to a class 
of actions, rather than to specific actions themselves533. 
 Attaching the ‘ought’ to the Benevolence that gives actions their moral quality 
leads directly back to the normative question of what exactly these benevolent 
actions are to look like. As Sidgwick said, we ultimately require of a system of ethics 
that it tells us what it is actually right to do. More precisely for the context of Rational 
Benevolence, we require to know how benevolent actions embody the crucial dual 
                                                 
533 Sidgwick himself appears to directly support this interpretation of the relationship between the 
ought that is derived from Reason, and classes of actions, rather than individual actions. At I:III:33-34, 
during his seminal discussion of ‘ought’, Sidgwick points out that by referring judgements of ought to 
‘Reason’, he does not mean to imply that every such judgement is derived from a universal axiom. In 
fact, he says, ‘the moral faculty deals primarily with individual cases as they arise, applying directly to 
each case the general notion of duty, and deciding intuitively what ought to be done by this person in 
these particular circumstances. Sidgwick goes on to explain that he has used ‘Reason’ to denote 
moral cognition as distinct from mere feelings, but then adds, ‘as a further justification of this use’, that 
when we have passed moral judgement on a particular case, we generally ‘regard it as applicable to 
any other action belonging to a certain definable class: so that the moral truth apprehended is 
implicitly conceived to be intrinsically universal’ (I:III:34). This is precisely how the relationship 
between Benevolence and ‘ought’ is envisaged to work. An individual would pass moral judgement on 
a particular case, according to the circumstances of that case, but this moral judgement would be 
seen as belonging to the class of actions defined as benevolent, which is itself universal – and which 
does incur the notions of ‘ought’ and ‘moral obligation’. The particular action is not an ought, but the 
class to which it belongs is.  
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rationality of both deontological and utilitarian moral properties, that defines them as 
benevolent in the first place. For this is the answer to what it means for two different 
courses of action to be right simultaneously534. Dual rationality directly creates dual 
validation via the fact that each principle retains its own inherent reasonableness 
within the synthesis. It is only the deontological properties that can reveal the 
utilitarian principle; it is only the utilitarian properties that then make sense of the 
deontological principles. Because of this, both types of moral property combine to 
actively and respectively validate to a reasonable degree. This means, in theory, that 
even when a particular course of action is followed, the rational moral properties on 
which it is ethically justified (whether they are absolute-principle or outcome based) 
will still be informed by the rational moral properties of the other type of principle. 
This balance thus avoids a simple oscillation between the two positions, and instead 
indicates that an equilibrium between the reasonableness of each principle could be 
established535. Such an equilibrium would signify a morally sound action i.e. a 
‘rationally benevolent’ action.  
                                                 
534 In the thesis introduction, R.M. Hare’s argument that two oughts cannot rationally be oughts at 
once was examined for how Hare approaches moral conflict, and for how this compares to how 
Rational Benevolence approaches it. I argued there that both ‘oughts’ are in fact viable, and that in 
order to argue this, it needed to be shown that this is not actually irrational. This argument I made on 
the basis that the dual reasonableness of the deontological and utilitarian properties that make up the 
Benevolence that is at the heart of ‘rationally benevolent actions’, and thus rationally benevolent 
actions can be found in either course of action, provided they embody that mutually informing 
reasonableness. The argument I am making here is the extended version of that argument, with my 
having added the qualification that those viable ‘oughts’ are not to be seen as specific dictates, but 
rather as embodying the ‘ought’ of Benevolence, from which they are derived.  
535 I do not mean the word ‘equilibrium’ here to have connotations with reflective equilibrium; it is 
meant only to represent a meeting point, or a balance, between two positions. However, I do agree 
that when its practical workings are phrased in this way, Rational Benevolence as a method of ethics 
does bear more than a passing resemblance to reflective equilibrium, as was discussed in the 
literature review. If reflective equilibrium is understood in a very general sense to refer to a process 
through which coherence is sought between a variety of our judgements and beliefs, then Rational 
Benevolence’s normative process of reaching a balance between the various absolute principles and 
outcome-based values qualifies it as a form of that method. However, one of the criticisms that is 
often advanced against reflective equilibrium is that it presumes the non-revisability of certain points, 
and therefore affords these points immediate justification – and because the self-evident 
deontological and utilitarian components through which Rational Benevolence is constructed could 
also be seen as non-revisable, this actually makes Rational Benevolence appear less coherentist 
than some forms of reflective equilibrium. On this basis, Rational Benevolence appears to emerge 
more along the lines of the sort of semi-foundationalist reflective equilibrium, argued for by McMahan 
(see Jeff McMahan, ‘Moral Intuition’, in, Hugh LaFollete (ed.) The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000) pp.92-110). There is also the fact that foundationalist 
approaches to morality tend to emphasise the role of epistemically derived a priori intuitions, and this 
is certainly a crucial part of Sidgwick’s own epistemology. It would seem then as though Rational 
Benevolence can offer no further conclusions on whether or not Sidgwick is a coherentist or a 
foundationalist, or whether or not he is using a form of reflective equilibrium. As was seen in the 
literature review, there are simply too persuasive grounds for both views.   
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5.3.b.ii. ‘Rationally Benevolent’ Actions  
 
In order to examine the specifics of ‘rationally benevolent’ actions, the actively 
normative aspect of dual rationality can now be stated in the contextualising terms of 
the Parental Predicament. Introductory scenario A, in which parents A1 and A2 have 
received a positive result from a test informing them that their child will be severely 
disabled, is revisited here in order to give an example, as follows. It is rational to 
think of a potential/future human life as having unconditional value, and it is equally 
rational to believe that that life should be free from pain and suffering. But where it 
might be more obviously called ‘deontological’ to continue the pregnancy, Rational 
Benevolence states that that ultimately self-evident, rational, and non-
consequentialist principles which sustain the deontological property are what reveal 
the ultimately rational utilitarian principle of Universal Benevolence, or Happiness. 
That is, the action of continuing the pregnancy on apparently deontological grounds 
is only rationally justified in the way that it is, because the end of Happiness is 
rationally embedded within those absolute principles. In this way, the rationality of 
life’s unconditional value and the rationality of freedom from pain are both accounted 
for, to a reasonable extent. Continuing the pregnancy, as parents A1 do, would 
therefore emerge as a rationally benevolent action, according to the way in which 
that Benevolence is vitally constructed of interdependent deontological and utilitarian 
properties. Equally, where it might be more obviously called ‘utilitarian’ to avoid pain 
and suffering, Rational Benevolence states that utilitarian Benevolence can only be 
established according to those prior non-consequentialist, absolute, and 
unconditional principles. That is, the action of ending the pregnancy on apparently 
utilitarian grounds is only rationally justified in the way that it is, because those 
absolute principles are embedded within the establishment of the end of Happiness. 
Again, the rationality of life’s unconditional value and the rationality of freedom from 
pain are both accounted for, to a reasonable extent. Ending the pregnancy, as 
parents A2 do, would also therefore emerge as a rationally benevolent action, on the 
same grounds as A1, which is that Benevolence is vitally constructed of 
interdependent deontological and utilitarian properties.  
This is a perfunctory overview of how the two types of moral value inform each 
other at a practical level; of course, situations will in reality be far more complicated 
than this formula suggests. But I do posit that the formula itself is viable. According 
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to Rational Benevolence, both courses of action, whether apparently ‘deontological’ 
or ‘utilitarian’ at face value, are only made right by the fact that they also refer, for 
that rightness, to the values of the alternative moral property – and this is because 
Happiness, as the ultimate rational end, necessarily includes both absolute and 
outcome based values in a way that they are all unconditional. In these decisions, 
both properties maintain their own identities while also referring to the other for their 
own validation, and each course of action has both the deontological and utilitarian 
properties that together make up the moral rightness of Benevolence. This is, I 
argue, a far more robust explanation for the ending and for the continuation of 
difficult pregnancies, and its strength depends on the fact that it does not discount 
one set of values, but incorporates them both as essential contributors to moral 
reasonableness, or rightness.  
 
5.3.b.iii. Rationally Benevolent Actions and Universalizability 
  
There is also a further possible test for the rational benevolence of actions, which 
arises from the fact that the ultimate moral duty was originally called by Sidgwick 
‘Universal Benevolence’, and on the basis that Sidgwick established Universal 
Benevolence on an adapted Kantian universalisation maxim. This is that rationally 
benevolent actions – courses of action that have been decided upon via the process 
of balancing the deontological and utilitarian properties that was outlined above – 
should, being ultimately rational, technically admit of being universalised. At the 
normative level of how Rational Benevolence provides validation to action however, 
this issue of universalizability is admittedly problematic. On one hand, it could be 
argued that what is being universalised is the Benevolence itself. I actually do 
maintain this, and suggest that it is because it is a class of actions that is being 
universalised that both courses of action can be ‘universalised’ at once, provided the 
course of action is informed by the reasonableness of both types of moral property 
and is rationally benevolent536. However, the concept of universalizability in practice 
                                                 
536 I suggest that the universalisation of Benevolence be established on the following grounds. As has 
been seen in the thesis, Sidgwick underpins his theory of Rational Benevolence with a Kantian-esque 
maxim of universalizability, adapted by Sidgwick on the grounds that Kant’s rule – ‘what I judge to be 
right must….be judged to be so by all rational beings’ (III:I:208), although indispensable to any system 
of rational morality, is not, in that form, capable of producing a complete system of moral duties. On 
Sidgwick’s reasoning, the Kantian maxim must be rephrased as the principle of Justice, and this – 
combined with Prudence – eventually yields the self-evident, rational principle of Benevolence (each 
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seems to demand that each individual course of action prove itself to be 
universalisable, in order to prove itself rational, and therefore right – and this seems 
untenable537. We would have to ask whether parents who decided to terminate on 
the basis of cerebral palsy, for example, could reasonably will that all people in their 
situation do the same, which would incur the idea that all people ought to do the 
same. Whereas it has been argued that this is a viable belief, for most people this is 
likely to still appears to carry a significant amount of what bioconservative writer 
Leon Kass called within bioethics, ‘the wisdom of repugnance’, or, in short, ‘the yuck 
factor’538.  It simply does not feel ethical that such a rule should exist. It certainly 
does not accord with the values of a politically democratic and liberal society that 
only one course of action in such situations be regarded as the correct one.  
The problems with universalizability lead into the territory of the long-running 
philosophical debate over the identity within ethics of ‘the good’. This is because 
there is within Benevolence – which dictates that actions are to aim at the general 
Happiness that Sidgwick also equates with Ultimate Good – an inherent flexibility as 
to how to define that Happiness, or good. Nowhere is this more evident than in the 
context of the Parental Predicament, where the range of opinions on what 
constitutes Happiness vary enormously. Where one family may not consider cerebral 
palsy, or Down’s Syndrome, or blindness (or any condition, in fact) to be a major 
obstacle to the Happiness of any concerned interests, another family may consider 
these conditions to be catastrophic539. This clearly presents a firm challenge to the 
idea that any sort of action under such circumstances could be universalised.  
                                                 
one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own). But that principle 
of universal and equal Justice is a crucial part of the process from which Benevolence has been 
derived, and once Sidgwick has identified Benevolence it retains that universalising contribution from 
Justice. So when the unconditional duty of Benevolence thus demands that ‘benevolent’ actions pass 
the universalisation test, (understood loosely as ‘whatever is right for me must be right for all persons 
in similar circumstances’ (ME: xvii), or in more specific Sidgwickian terms as ‘it cannot be right for A to 
treat B in a manner in which it would be wrong for B to treat A’), it is the production of Universal 
Good/Happiness that is being tested – and that which is being universalised. Again, then, it is the 
maxim of Benevolence, and the class of actions therein, that is capable of being universalised – as 
opposed to individual actions. (There is, perhaps, a direct line of comparison here between this idea 
of universalisable but not independently categorical duties, and Ross’s argument for prima facie 
duties). 
537 Further to my point at fn.8, Sidgwick’s version of universalizability does not at the theoretical level 
generate specific unconditional and inviolable duties in the same way as Kant’s version of the 
categorical imperative, which is why it is difficult to apply it to individual cases.  
538 See Leon Kass, ‘The Wisdom of Repugnance’ (in, The New Republic, Vol.216, No.2 (1997) 17-
26). 
539 The situation is further complicated by other factors such as the current inability of pre-natal 
medicine to detect the actual severity of conditions such as Down’s Syndrome. 
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But equally, nowhere is this flexible notion of Happiness actually more important 
than it is in this context. It is here that the second line of enquiry into how Rational 
Benevolence could apply as a practical moral theory – that which identified that a 
significant place for the good is maintained within Sidgwick’s theory of the right – 
starts to become both relevant, and indispensable. For no two cases in the area of 
the Parental Predicament will ever be the same, and it is vital that this diversity of 
opinion regarding the good is accounted for, particularly within this most sensitive 
field where the autonomy that should allow parents to make their own decisions as to 
what is right for them and the happiness of their own family, so often comes under 
such threat.  The fact that Rational Benevolence, although held up as objectively 
right, can also preserve a place for a degree of subjective goodness means that 
there are few restrictions on exactly what benevolent (or rationally benevolent) 
actions are to look like. It therefore actually works to the enormous advantage of 
Rational Benevolence that it allows for this varied interpretation of goodness, or 
Happiness, despite this posing a challenge to the applicability of universalizability.  
On the other hand, universalizability does maintain a certain vital check upon 
those interpretations of ‘happiness’ and ‘good’. This further delineates the role of the 
good in Sidgwick’s theory, and also lends universalizability a greater degree of 
potential to be incorporated into Rational Benevolence as normative theory. This is, 
once again, the direct result of the rational basis of Benevolence, and the synthesis 
between absolute-principle based and outcome-based concerns that Rational 
Benevolence embodies. As has been said above, this synthesis depends on the 
mutual rationality of both types of moral property. This immediately indicates that if 
either property was to lose its reasonableness, the decision in question would lose 
its moral justification, and a limit would appear to that particular action.  In other 
words, a limit would appear on what can truly be called Benevolent, or good – and 
Universalizability could well be an effective measure of this. It is to the idea of 
Rational Benevolence posing limits to moral action that the next section now turns. 
 
                                                 
On the other hand, there are other extreme examples of the enormous range of ideas about what 
constitutes a good life, such as the community in Maryland, Baltimore in the USA that has been 
affected by profound deafness, and has simply developed their societal norms around it. Within their 
own community, individuals are not ‘disabled’ as other hearing communities would consider them to 
be, and deafness is simply a part of their individual and communal identity, and their ability to belong. 
On this basis, some parents in this community who have had the opportunity to do so have 
specifically selected for deafness. 
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5.3.b.iv. Rational Benevolence as Limitation to Moral Action 
 
Thus far, the discussion of Rational Benevolence as a theory of normative ethics has 
only included the positive angle, of how the mutual reasonableness of both 
deontological and utilitarian properties combine to validate and support courses of 
‘rationally benevolent’ action. But there is an immediate converse to this relationship 
in which two types of property have equal worth, which is the recognition that if each 
property is going to retain its own independent validity and rationality in order to 
sustain and validate the other, then there must come a point at which this validity 
and rationality must impress limits on the validity of the other. Practically speaking, if 
each property can validate certain courses of action to a reasonable degree, then by 
its own reasonableness it must logically be able to limit certain courses of action, 
also to a reasonable degree. If either value (absolute-principle based or out-come 
based) ceases to be present, or rational, this will become apparent by the fact that 
the two properties that make up rationally benevolent actions cannot be seen to be 
mutually supportive in the decision. If this is the case, then the action in question will 
not be rationally benevolent – that is, it will not be right. In the context of prenatal 
medicine in particular, examples of this are not difficult to find. One such example 
might be some terrible scenario – theoretically possible – in which the parent(s) 
intend to continue the pregnancy, despite the fact that the welfare of numerous 
parties with interests connected to the pregnancy (the foetus, the mother, the father, 
any other dependents) would be at serious risk; an example from the other course of 
action could be where parents are determined to end a pregnancy on ethically weak 
grounds, such as sex, or even eye colour540. In the first case, it seems difficult to 
maintain that this decision represents a process in which absolute-principle based 
                                                 
540 With the advent of more and more technologies that are designed to test for traits such as eye and 
hair colour, and even complexion, screening and selection for these traits – and the implications of 
non-selection – are on a steady rise. In relation to this screening for non-medical conditions, assisted 
reproduction companies such as Fertility Institutes in Los Angles have implemented the phrase 
‘severe cosmetic conditions’, and use of these services is growing, both in America, and in the UK. It 
should be noted that this practice is attached to embryo screening, as opposed to natural 
pregnancies, and therefore a ‘termination’ is of a different nature, and according to many theorists – 
and users - not as ethically complex. But whereas pre-implantation genetic diagnosis has been in 
many areas an important tool in the avoidance of certain genetic conditions, it still brings with it its 
own set of ethical concerns, especially now that use of screening has extended to the non-medical – 
and both moral philosophy and applied ethics must keep abreast of the issues. I speculate here that 
Rational Benevolence could be applicable to the implementation of these technologies, although I am 
aware that in this particular field, it may be too late.  
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and outcome-based principles have arrived at an equilibrium, and it appears as 
though the balance has gone in favour of absolute-principle considerations only. The 
equally crucial outcome based aspect of Benevolence has been disregarded, and 
the decision does not therefore emerge as rationally benevolent. In the eye-colour 
scenario, it would seem that the absolute value of human life has been disregarded, 
on grounds that have no moral weight– and again, in the absence of this value, a 
decision to terminate on these grounds cannot be called rationally benevolent541. 
 These two examples have been purposely chosen to represent the extremes 
of possible decision making in this context – because it is in reference to examples 
such as these that the universalising aspect of Rational Benevolence might be more 
applicable. Universalizability struggled in terms of validation to action, because it was 
seen that it would be very difficult in this particular context to justify a course of 
action on the basis that ‘everyone should do x’. In terms of limitation to action 
however, i.e. in dictating what ought not to be done, universalizability appears to 
have a more legitimate role. This is again due to the flexible nature of the ‘good’. 
Where it was seen above that it is to Rational Benevolence’s advantage that it 
protects a varied interpretation of what is good, or Happiness, we know that not all 
interpretations of good are truly benevolent, because not all interpretations of good 
are rational542. Rational Benevolence suggests here that if a ‘benevolent’ action truly 
cannot be universalised, then it is not actually rational, and therefore not actually 
benevolent, and therefore neither morally right, nor good. This holds in the case of 
the eye colour scenario. However much the parents may believe that Happiness is 
only achievable if one has blue eyes, this hardly seems a rational belief. And it does 
not seem rational to universalise that all pregnancies bearing future people with 
                                                 
541 It could be imagined that the parents genuinely believe that life is not worth living unless one has 
blue eyes, and that therefore according to them ending the pregnancy is a genuinely benevolent 
action. But a genuine belief that life is not worth living unless one has blue eyes does not seem to be 
a rational one. It might, in fact, indicate serious issues with the mental health of the parent(s). In this 
case, termination of the pregnancy would probably become rationally benevolent on the basis that the 
parents are not well enough to cope with the pregnancy/baby, and the possibility that the future child 
may not be adequately cared for. In this case however, the ending of the pregnancy has been justified 
i.e. has been made rationally benevolent, on entirely different grounds from that of eye colour, and 
eye colour remains an irrational and non-rationally-benevolent reason for termination. 
542 The most obvious example of the socio-political damage that can be wreaked when ‘good’ is held 
up to the extent to which the concept of objective right – or the human rights therein – is almost 
completely obliterated is that of Nazi Germany. The Third Reich’s systematic and devastating attack 
on the Jews was presented, to the public at least, as necessary for the building of a greater, safer, 
better Germany, complete with a better population. With this posited as an end most important for the 
‘good’ of the country country, mass genocide simply became a means to that end, with little or no 
significance of its own.  
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brown eyes be ended; we could also plausibly universalise the alternative, and say 
that such pregnancies reasonably ought to be continued543. 
The case of the parents who decide to continue despite the serious risks to 
health, however, is a different matter. On the one hand, the most obvious argument 
from Rational Benevolence is that as the child will be born into nothing but pain and 
suffering and will have no chance of flourishing, then the duty of aiming at general 
Happiness seems to have been violated, and this would appear to not be a rationally 
benevolent action. Certainly, this course of action would not seem to be 
universalisable, especially according to Sidgwick’s maxim that ‘it cannot be right for 
A to treat B in a way in which it would be wrong for B to treat A’; as the parents 
would presumably not want to experience such pain and suffering themselves, then 
it does not seem reasonable that they would allow the future child to experience it544.  
But universalisation has once more run into the challenge that it faced in 
validation to action, which is that it is very difficult to attach a true ‘ought’ to that 
course of action. That is, it is very difficult, in this context especially, to dictate what 
ought to count as ‘good’, or Happiness, and for as long as this remains the case, 
universalizability will only have a limited/restricted role545. As for the ability of 
                                                 
543 The grounds against eye-colour selection, for example, include arguments such as a) this would 
lead to a devastating number of terminations, b) it would create a ‘gateway’ situation in which the lines 
as to which conditions can and cannot be selected for become so blurred as to fail to be able to 
implement any policy at all, and, c) that there could quite possibly be a long-term detrimental effect on 
the gene pool, which would now be lacking in the genetic diversity that is crucial for human health, 
and survival.  
544 The rest of the principle of Justice reads ‘without there being any difference between the natures 
or circumstances of the two which can be stated as a reasonable ground for the difference of 
treatment’ (III:XIII:380), and when this caveat is added, it can be seen that the parents – being adults 
and being in a position where they are capable of making informed decisions where the foetus is not – 
probably do have good grounds for this difference in treatment. When this is the case however, the 
issue of universalizability is no longer as relevant, and what is rationally benevolent becomes the 
more significant question.  
545 Universalizability seems to only work in favour of strongly suggesting that a difficult pregnancy be 
continued – this is the only course of action that it would seem ethically acceptable to define as an 
‘ought’. It seems as though cases in which we might be able to say that a pregnancy ought to be 
ended are extremely rare, and even then this does not seem entirely morally sound. Universalisation 
would therefore only seem to apply to prenatal decisions in terms of we ‘could’ universalise either 
course of action, rather than we ‘ought’ to - and it could be argued that this is really no kind of 
universalisation at all. I do argue however that the context of prenatal decision making is a particularly 
sensitive and difficult one. The universalizability aspect of Rational Benevolence could possibly be 
made to apply more effectively in other contexts.  
Further to this, the question arises whether Rational Benevolence’s practical applicability might only 
be relevant to Western values. That is, we might ask if the absolute/outcome balance within Rational 
Benevolence still applies in issues of cultural relativism, where certain practices that the Western 
world would reject on ethical grounds are accepted in certain societies. Again, this is too vast a topic 
to broach here, but I do suggest that Sidgwick’s fundamental Kantian maxim that ‘I must be able to 
judge that what is right for me is right for all other people in this situation, unless there are significantly 
 310 
Rational Benevolence itself to limit action, it is apparent that the limits imposed here 
are actually also relatively few – if they can be discerned at all. This is for the reason 
that was noted in the previous section, that there is a broad spectrum of what can be 
considered reasonable, or benevolent, or good, in many ethical situations – and it is 
vital to a liberal society that this range of interpretations is protected. But although 
Rational Benevolence itself cannot ultimately dictate how good or Happiness should 
be defined, it is able to specifically and peculiarly account for that wide range of 
interpretations of the good – and defend them on the basis that they are all rational, 
provided they conform to some parameters; the definition of a rationally benevolent 
action, as given above. 
 
5.4. Conclusions on Rational Benevolence as a Moral Theory 
 
The purpose of the preceding sections has been to assess the capacity of Rational 
Benevolence as a system of moral guidance – and in terms of Rational 
Benevolence’s value as a theory of normative ethics, it has been seen that major 
ethical obstacles are encountered (especially in the context of prenatal decision 
making), when we assess the extent to which Rational Benevolence is capable of 
identifying individual ‘oughts’. Even though there is a case to be made that Rational 
Benevolence can, in theory, be applied in a normative capacity (extreme decisions 
that are passed through the criteria of Rational Benevolence do emerge as non-
rationally-benevolent), there is still the argument that it ought not to be546. In any 
                                                 
different circumstances’ could allow for cultural relativism, on the basis of that caveat in the last part of 
the maxim. This depends, however, on those cultures being viewed in isolation from the norms of 
other social contexts. When certain practices (such as female genital mutilation (FGM) for example) 
are viewed from a wider or even a global perspective, it would seem as though the universalising 
aspect of Rational Benevolence becomes relevant again in the same way as it does for ethically 
unsound practices such as termination on the basis of eye-colour. Good has to be objective to some 
extent, in order to create rationally benevolent actions – and it appears very hard to argue for the 
rational good in a practice such as FGM. Rational Benevolence may, therefore, be able to establish 
trans-cultural ethical principles. 
 
546 The phrase that seems to materialise as the most helpful way to summarise this is that even 
though what is rational may – according to Rational Benevolence – technically be what is right, this 
might not actually be always what is best. This indicates the latent and immovable presence of the 
‘good’ in the human moral experience, and draws attention to a way in which ‘right’ and ‘good’ still 
often represent fundamentally different concepts. I argue however that Rational Benevolence 
provides an effective means of reconciling ‘good’ and ‘right’ to some extent, and in this way accounts 
precisely for that situation in which ‘what is right is not necessarily what is best’. The ‘right’ in Rational 
Benevolence is formed of both absolute and non-absolute moral properties, and therefore – as 
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case, even if this could legitimately be done, it is so unlikely that two sets of parents 
would ever be in exactly the same situation, with exactly the same problems and 
concerns, that creating an ‘ought’ is simply an unfeasible and pointless task; it might 
never apply again, to anyone, anywhere.  
But I wish to emphasise here that drawing specific oughts out of Rational 
Benevolence was not the specific remit of this thesis. My aim was to explain moral 
ambivalence by arguing that the ambivalence is a natural result of the equal 
reasonableness of the two types of moral principle we find operating in our moral 
experiences, and to develop a theory that demonstrates that equal reasonableness, 
in order that that theory might better justify and support both courses of action 
simultaneously. I argue that Rational Benevolence does offer precisely such a 
theory. This was clearly demonstrated by its descriptive value. The superficial 
descriptive value of Rational Benevolence defends the ambivalence by arguing that 
both the termination or the continuation of a difficult pregnancy is (on a prima facie 
basis) morally reasonable, and its substantive descriptive value defends at a deeper 
level by actively demonstrating how and why each course of action is made morally 
valid by a necessary interdependence between rational utilitarian and deontological 
principles, of which Benevolence is comprised. Where its normative value may be 
somewhat practically limited by the difficulties in establishing universalisable oughts 
in this context, what is more important about Rational Benevolence is that it 
universalises Benevolence (rather than independent actions) and in so doing makes 
this Benevolence (or this good, or Happiness) a) rational, and b) widely applicable. 
By uniting Benevolence with what is rational, the ‘good’ inherent in the concept is 
given a far more robust place in this system of the ‘right’, and in this way, Rational 
Benevolence actually can effectively protect the vast range of decisions that are 
being made in very difficult and morally ambivalent circumstances at the practical 
level. Rationally benevolent actions are both flexible, and, to some extent, limited – 
and this is precisely what is required. 
Here, again, Sidgwick is right when he says that the truth lies between two 
conclusions. In returning to this paradigmatic passage at the end of this discussion 
on how deontological and utilitarian principles work together in practice, hardly any 
                                                 
argued more extensively above– something would not be ‘right’ if it did not include reference to both. 
Ideally, if a course of action did include reference to both, this really would be what is ‘best’. 
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paraphrasing is required: Sidgwick’s very words themselves reflect the conclusions I 
have just drawn. There are certain absolute principles, the truth of which is manifest 
– but as for what we ought to do in any particular case, particular duties have still to 
be determined by some other method. This is directly representative of the fine 
balance between the absolute-principle nature of Benevolence, and its ability to 
accommodate a range of views within one ultimately rational end.  
Now that the mechanisms of Rational Benevolence have been explored from 
both conceptual and practical angles, it only remains to assess where the theory 
could possibly apply at an actual societal level, and where and why as a theory it 
meets certain limitations. These are the concerns of these last two sections, through 
which the final conclusions on Rational Benevolence will be drawn. 
 
5.4.a. Potential Applications of Rational Benevolence: Prenatal Technologies, 
Autonomy, and Political Theory 
 
It was seen above that Rational Benevolence meets certain restrictions in its 
normative capacity, but it was also seen that it does at least indicate where the 
boundaries on rationally benevolent behaviour might be. It could therefore possibly 
be used to better support policy that is already in place on issues such as 
reasonable grounds for termination. i.e. Rational Benevolence may be able to 
provide a stronger moral-philosophic defence of the current reasons for which 
termination is allowed547. This is the most obviously contentious area of prenatal 
medicine, and it is here that ethics has most often to strive to justify the decisions 
being made. As per the above, Rational Benevolence would not be seeking to 
impose ‘oughts’ on any grounds for termination. Interestingly however, there has 
been emerging over the last two decades an area of reproductive ethics which does 
have the propensity to imply such oughts. This is ‘the new eugenics’, and its rather 
more extreme relation, Transhumanism548. Here, theorists argue that reproductive 
                                                 
547 These reasons are mainly a) When the physical or mental health of the mother is under serious 
threat, b) When the child of the pregnancy would have an unacceptable quality of life, and c) Social 
factors, such as extreme poverty, or the parent(s) inability to cope with a(nother) child, leading to a 
serious risk to the wellbeing of the existing and/or future child. 
548 The term ‘new eugenics’ is understood in different ways by different people. For some, it simply 
refers – without any kind of real ethical subtext – to the use of prenatal medicine to ensure that a child 
is born as healthy as possible. Of course, non-medical cosmetic selection is also considered to be a 
form of eugenics, and to this the moral objections are generally stronger. For individuals such as Tom 
Shakespeare and Ann Kerr however, who write on ethics in this context from the point of view of the 
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technology should be used for the avoidance of disabilities – with some even arguing 
that human enhancement is actually a moral duty. This naturally translates into a 
situation in which termination on the basis of disability becomes morally obligatory. It 
would seem as though the response of Rational Benevolence to this would be to 
argue that such an ought could never be imposed; that terminations made on these 
grounds do not show an adequate balancing of the equal absolute-principle based 
and outcome based values that make up a rationally benevolent course of action, 
and that therefore Rational Benevolence must condemn this practice. As was said 
above, not all interpretations of ‘good’ qualify as rationally benevolent. I maintain that 
arguing against obligatory termination for disability, and against the potential for 
extreme forms of human enhancement, is the preferable role of Rational 
Benevolence in this context, and that in this case Rational Benevolence may even 
be able to impose an ‘ought not’ on arguments that claim we should terminate all 
disability affected pregnancies, thus preventing the proliferation of this practice549. 
                                                 
disabled community, the term ‘eugenics’ still carries with it the dangerous connotations of government 
involvement, and negative societal attitudes (see Shakespeare and Kerr, Genetic Politics). According 
to Shakespeare and Kerr et al, any kind of anti-disability prenatal selection is a form of eugenics. This 
argument is made not just on the basis that more and more people are seeking a ‘good birth’, but 
together with the more ominous consequences of these choices for society in general; the less people 
are born with disabilities, the worse the conditions will be for those who are disabled, and the worse 
the stigma attached. The wider socio-political result of those consequences is a society that sends a 
message that it does not tolerate disability. This would obviously be a morally unacceptable situation. 
The concerns of the disabled community in this context are important, and not unfounded. However, 
the practices to which they object can at least (usually) be defended on medical grounds. The other 
interpretation of ‘new eugenics’, or ‘liberal eugenics’ as it often called (see Nicholas Agar, Liberal 
Eugenics: In Defence of Human Enhancement (Oxford: Blackwell: 2004), is that selection is done not 
just for medical purposes, but for specifically enhancing purposes. This ‘enhancement’ can include 
medical aspects such as greater resilience to disease for example, but in its most extreme form 
enhancement entails Transhumanism – a movement that ultimately envisages a time when humans 
are born not just free from painful and debilitating conditions, but with the best physical and mental 
attributes possible. Liberal eugenics still aims to minimise state involvement in its theory, given the 
obvious nefarious results of past governments’ eugenics programs, and Transhumanism is often 
decried by many as mere science fiction. But the fact of the matter is that the technologies supported 
by liberal eugenics are being advanced, and the possibility of society and government having to deal 
with the moral management – the use or restriction – of these technologies is actually very real 
indeed. See John Harris’ provocatively entitled book Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for 
Making Better People, for the best and most concise defence of the Transhumanist position, and the 
ethics it employs. For other notably Transhumanist positions and discussions, see Nick Bostrom and 
Julian Savulescu (eds.) Human Enhancement (Oxford: Oxford University Press:2009); Ronald Bailey, 
Liberation Biology; The Scientific and Moral Case for the Biotech Revolution (New York: Prometheus 
Books: 2005); Gregory R. Hansell and William Grassie (eds.) H+/: Transhumanism and its Critics 
(Philadelphia: Metanexus Institute: 2011); Max More and Natasha Vita-More (eds.), The 
Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology, and 
Philosophy of the Human Future (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell: 2013); Ronald Cole-Turner (ed.) 
Transhumanism and Transcendence; Christian Hope in an Age of Technological Advancement 
(Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press: 2011). 
549 I do not mean to assume here that this use of reproductive technology will simply continue to 
increase unchecked in the absence of Rational Benevolence – there are of course already guidelines 
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However, Harris has used the language of moral duty in relation to our potential to 
‘enhance’ the human race. Although Rational Benevolence maintains that 
Benevolence is the sole duty, as opposed to individual actions, this Benevolence is 
defined as the general Happiness. Harris’ use of ‘duty’ in this context may well 
require Rational Benevolence to reconsider whether this general Happiness inherent 
in Benevolence can in fact be seen to incorporate the apparent ‘benefits’ of 
enhancement, and if necessary defend itself against this interpretation.  
In somewhat less controversial terms of how Rational Benevolence could be 
societally applied, it is my view that this ability of Rational Benevolence to defend 
both the termination and the continuation of difficult pregnancies could go a 
significant way towards strengthening the existing framework of autonomy550. It has 
already been noted in the restatement of the thesis’ main questions above that it is 
no good simply propounding autonomy itself as the answer to moral ambivalence – 
autonomy does not always create an understanding space in which parents can 
make these decisions, and this is, I suggest, largely due to the continual and 
unrelenting conflict between the two viewpoints. As Sidgwick said, in a passage that 
is extraordinarily prophetic of many ethical dilemmas that we see in the modern day 
– ‘if there are different views of the ultimate reasonableness….it is easy to see that 
any single answer to the question “why” will not be completely satisfactory as it will 
be given only from one of these points of view, and will always leave room to ask the 
question from some other’ (I:I:6). If, however, both could be argued to be morally 
reasonable, or, to use the most direct language, if both could be argued to be right, 
then clearly both courses of action could be more robustly defended – both 
theoretically, as was just outlined, and practically, at the level of individual autonomy. 
This will not, of course, prevent the definitely non-ambivalent from having those 
views. It would be a huge overestimation of the capacity of Rational Benevolence to 
claim that it would simply change everyone’s minds, especially on such an ethically 
                                                 
in place that aim to restrict it to within reasonable limits. But it is clear from the volume of literature 
that there has been a movement towards a liberal eugenics/Transhumanist view of disability, and 
exactly what is meant by those ‘reasonable limits’ may well have to be re-addressed. It it to this type 
of discussion that the moral theory of Rational Benevolence could be relevant. 
550 This is of course an extension of the first point, that Rational Benevolence could be used to better 
support the existing reasonable grounds for termination. I argue however that focussing on autonomy 
is probably the more effective method through which this could be done; at the very least, the 
investigation into Rational Benevolence as a theory of normative ethics would also by extension 
defend against the introduction of highly questionable grounds for termination, such as those put 
forwards by extreme Transhumanists.  
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sensitive topic. But if nothing else, the investigation into Rational Benevolence as a 
theory of normative ethics demonstrated that individual choice must, generally, be 
held up as paramount in this context. And if Rational Benevolence was implemented 
correctly - through policy, through relevant healthcare professionals responsible for 
working with parents, perhaps even through raising the profile of such a position on 
social media - a philosophical basis for the equal moral validity of each course of 
action could provide parents who are faced with such decisions with a helpful line of 
defence against those who wish to enforce their alternative views551. 
Lastly on this question of Rational Benevolence’s societal applicability, I 
theorise that Rational Benevolence also has the potential to apply to areas outside of 
prenatal medicine/reproductive technology. Following directly on from the topic of 
individual autonomy, one such area is political theory – and specifically the 
contention between individual liberalism and communitarian concerns that arose with 
Rawls’ utilising of social contract theory to defend the notion of individual rights552. 
                                                 
551 I also speculate here that Rational Benevolence could be highly relevant specifically to the area of 
genetic counselling. It is the task of genetic counsellors to fully inform parents as to the nature of any 
conditions that are discovered prenatally – as to the severity of the condition, the specific care needs, 
and the potential outcome. In many cases, genetic counsellors are performing sensitively, and 
objectively. There is a body of literature however that reports on genetic counsellors who are, whether 
obviously or covertly, imposing their own views on parents who are already experiencing this highly 
distressing situation (see this thesis’ introduction, pp.9-13) Of course, this will be most pertinent to 
parents who are ambivalent; parents who are fully decided in continuing the pregnancy still have 
contact with genetic counsellors in order to prepare them for the future, but any views of those 
counsellors are unlikely to have an impact. There is perhaps however a case to be made that if 
parents are only tentatively decided to continue a pregnancy, and they then encounter a genetic 
counsellor with strong views, this could fundamentally affect their decision. I argue not that Rational 
Benevolence could simply be presented to healthcare professionals who work in this capacity as 
some kind of ‘holy grail’ of how they are to treat their clients, but rather that it could be used at a 
broader level, to ensure a greater awareness of the ethical value of both courses of action.   
552 For a comprehensive overview of the individual liberalism vs communitarianism debate of the 
1970s, 80s, and 90s, see Ronald Dworkin, ‘Liberalism’, in, Stuart Hampshire (ed.) Public and Private 
Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1978); Daniel Bell, Communitarianism and its 
Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1993); Robert B. Thigpen and Lyle A. Downing, ‘Liberalism 
and the Communitarian Critique’, in, American Journal of Political Science, Vol.31, No.2 (1987); Allen 
Buchanan, ‘Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism’, in, Ethics, Vol.99. No.4 (1989), 852-
882; Charles Taylor, ‘Cross-Purposes; The Liberal-Communitarian Debate’, in, Charles Taylor, 
Philosophy and the Human Sciences Vol.2 (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press: 1985); Michael 
Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1982), and 
Liberalism and its Critics (New York: New York University Press: 1982); Richard Rorty, ‘Objectivity, 
Relativism, and Truth’, in, Philosophical Papers Vol.1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 
1991); Will Kymlicka, ‘Liberalism and Communitarianism’, in, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol.18, 
No.2 (1988), 181-204; Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (New 
York: Basic Books: 1983); Jurgen Habermas ‘The Public Sphere’, in, Steven Seidman (ed.) Jurgen 
Habemas on Society and Politics: A Reader (London: Beacon Press: 1989); Alasdair MacIntyre, 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Gerald Duckworth Press Ltd: 1981), among many 
others. I wish to point out here that by ‘communitarianism’, I do not specifically mean the movement of 
that name created by Amitai Etzioni in the 1980s, which may be referred to as ‘responsive 
communitarianism’ and is often criticised for being radically conservative - but rather the position that 
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The central argument here is that this entrenchment of individual rights is ethically at 
odds with an interest in the collective good – and the problem is a familiar one to 
many areas of political philosophy553. It is my view that this contention once again 
demonstrates the traditional divide between deontological and utilitarian moral 
principles, with deontological, absolute-principle based concerns, and utilitarian, 
outcome based concerns representing individual and communitarian interests 
respectively. I argue further that, like in the moral ambivalence demonstrated by the 
Parental Predicament, this conflict is caused by the fact that both positions have 
valid and rational grounds –and that rights of individuals are being unhelpfully held 
as being at odds with the goods of communities, and vice versa. It would seem 
therefore as though a social contract should represent neither individual rights nor 
collective interests exclusively, but an appropriate balance between the two. I 
theorise that the construction of Rational Benevolence, through which non-
consequentialist values are brought into mutual relationship with outcome based 
values, represents a means which the two types of socio-political concerns could be 
reconciled.  
                                                 
holds that individuals do not exist in an ‘atomised’ state, but as integral parts of relationships and 
interactions that are usually informed by the values of the wider social context in which they live. 
Reference to these relationships and to an individual’s role in the wider community are, it is argued by 
communitarians, vital to self-understanding.  For this reason, emphasis on the importance of private 
individual autonomy is naturally reduced which is what brings it into conflict with the liberalist ideology 
that upholds the primacy of the individual, and individual rights.  
Walzer, Sandel, Taylor, and MacIntyre especially do not agree with John Rawls’ model for obtaining 
principles of justice, which Rawls famously argues must be done from behind the veil of ignorance. In 
this imagined state, individuals have no idea what status or role they themselves will have in that 
society and the resulting principles therefore reflect a highly egalitarian system founded on individual 
rights. The communitarian critique of this thought experiment is that it is not possible for individuals to 
exist in the truly un-related, abstract, ‘atomised’ (Taylor, ‘Cross-Purposes’) state that the veil of 
ignorance requires, even in principle, and that even if this was possible it would be undesirable on the 
basis that as soon as we encountered other people in society, the principles would not hold.  
553 It has perhaps become even more important since the rise of the war on terror, and the problems 
experienced by governments over how to manage those individuals who pose such threats to 
communities, but who still do have their own individual rights. Although not current, the case of 
Abdelbaset Al-Megrahi, the Libyan man found guilty of bombing Pan Am Flight 103 over the Scottish 
town of Lockerbie in 1988, provides a clear example of individual rights coming into powerful 
disagreement with a notion of collective justice. Despite being sentenced to life imprisonment, Al-
Megrahi was released after serving only eight years of his sentence, on the compassionate grounds 
that he had terminal cancer. Paradoxically, the political principle of rights that had brought about his 
imprisonment was the very same principle by which he was released. The public protest was severe: 
Al-Megrahi was considered to be responsible for two hundred and seventy deaths, and yet his own 
individual welfare had secured his release from a just sentence. Many citizens considered there to 
have been a flagrant violation of the distress, grief and anger caused by his actions, and of the 
opinions and moral views that are integral to a wider sense of justice, and of what is right. The political 
struggle here between individual and collective interests is, I believe, another example of the 
unhelpful oscillation between the entrenchment of either individualism or collectivism exclusively.  
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Ultimately, the reason for this potential of Rational Benevolence to be applied 
so broadly is that wherever ethical debate is encountered, it so often reveals the 
contention to be between absolute-principle based and outcome based methods of 
ethics. The reason for this, I argue, is that morality quite simply is comprised of both 
moral properties. It is this situation that Sidgwick observed, this situation that was 
revealed by his argument for his own moral principles, and this situation that is 
embodied by Rational Benevolence. Rational Benevolence is, therefore, in the end 
intended mainly to apply to moral philosophy – to the discourse that seeks to work 
on a sort of reconciliatory ‘middle ground’ between deontological and utilitarian 
theories of morality. But Rational Benevolence, I argue, does not just argue for a 
‘middle ground’ that aims to reconcile competing theories by simply allowing them to 
occupy that space at the same time. As noted in the thesis introduction and in the 
literature review, W.D. Ross, William Frankena, R.M. Hare, and Derek Parfit have all 
argued for various alliances between the two types of principle – but none have 
argued for there being a necessary relationship between them, which is made 
evident at a theoretical/meta-ethical level by Sidgwick, and which is embodied by 
Rational Benevolence554. Rational Benevolence argues that this meeting is actually a 
type of synthesis which demonstrates both deontological and utilitarian properties to 
be a part of the whole that is the human moral experience, and reveals that without 
the values of the other, neither is fully functional. Deontological and utilitarian 
principles remain different, but they are no longer divided. For this reason, the 
potential for Rational Benevolence to apply to any situation in which both 
deontological and utilitarian values are required appears highly promising.  
 
5.4.b. Limitations to Rational Benevolence 
 
In the thesis introduction, I projected where and why Rational Benevolence would 
meet certain limits and inadequacies. With the theory now available in full, those 
projections can be revisited, and assessed in light of this information on the theory’s 
nature, composition, and functions. 
                                                 
554 Derek Parfit’s Triple Theory comes closest to establishing this sort of relationship between 
deontological and utilitarian principles. But I argue that Rational Benevolence could possibly be made 
more actively applicable than Triple Theory, in the way I have been describing, and as I outlined in the 
thesis introduction. 
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It must firstly be admitted that Rational Benevolence, for all its potential to 
better defend individual choice, could never truly solve moral ambivalence. Directly 
related to this is the further point that claiming both the ending and the continuing of 
a difficult pregnancy to be morally reasonable will not necessarily make the actual 
decision making in this context easier. Assuming this would be to grossly 
overestimate the ability of Rational Benevolence – but more importantly it would also 
perhaps in itself be unethical. The emotional difficulty of the moral ambivalence 
involved in decisions such as these can not, and should not, be removed by a simple 
theory of any kind, even if the parents were to literally refer to such a theory, which is 
unlikely. If this were possible we would be little more impassive automatons, and in 
this case would no longer require moral dilemmas to be addressed in the first place. 
However we might account for it, or explain it, moral ambivalence is an integral part 
of the human moral experience, precisely for the reasons I have given, which is that 
very often more than one course of actions appears to be the ‘right’ thing to do – and 
this will always be distressing. Short of us all becoming Hare’s archangels, ethical 
debate is always going to continue, and the source of that ethical debate is of course 
the ambivalence between two apparently reasonable and yet fundamentally 
conflicting points of view. Whereas I hope that the kind of approach to ethical conflict 
that I have tried to develop in this thesis might quell the fierce opposition between 
points of view that often increases the distress for individuals who are already 
experiencing that very conflict at a private level, I do not presume that ethical 
dilemmas can or will ever be truly resolved555.  
Further to this point about the irreconcilability of such conflicts, moral 
pluralism (or value pluralism) would perhaps argue here that if utilitarian and 
deontological values are truly equal in the way that they are held to be by Rational 
Benevolence, then a rational choice between the two courses of action is not actually 
possible at all556. However, although it is important to account for this argument from 
moral pluralism - relevant as it is to Rational Benevolence’s claim that deontological 
                                                 
555Isiah Berlin directly agrees with this. In his account of value pluralism, he is clear that moral values 
may be equally valid, and yet incompatible, and exist in certain conflict without there appearing to be 
any resolution (Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks: 1969) p.237). He 
states that moral conflicts are ‘an intrinsic, irremovable element in human life…these collisions of 
values are of the essence of what they are, and of what we are’. For the particular context of prenatal 
decision making, we might want to say that we should never be completely comfortable with the idea 
of terminating any pregnancy, as justifiable as this course of action often is. 
556 Rational Benevolence is certainly a pluralist theory if the alternative is ethical monism. 
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and utilitarian properties of morality are equal in value – several theories have been 
put forwards that address the incommensurability of values, including the idea that 
plural values are actually not incommensurable in the first place, and it would seem 
as though Rational Benevolence could offer a contribution of its own to how these 
values are to be weighed557. Nonetheless, there is still the question of exactly how 
Rational Benevolence could be made active in this way. I suggested above that 
Rational Benevolence could be helpful if implemented as part of current healthcare 
policy, but there does not appear to be an immediately clear way in which this 
assimilation could take place.  
In terms of the more philosophical challenges to the theory, there is the issue 
that Rational Benevolence as a normative theory of ethics appears to be somewhat 
self-defeating. This occurs because on one hand it seems to be able to identify 
where limits to action might lie, and then on the other hand states precisely on the 
basis of its own terms that it is not legitimate to apply these limits. It may well be then 
that Rational Benevolence has superficial descriptive value only, and that its 
substantive descriptive value cannot really yield a normative system at all. But I 
maintain that even just this descriptive value – that which Rational Benevolence is 
saying about the nature of morality – may by itself have real practical worth in better 
protecting decisions, and making more robust the framework of individual autonomy.  
For the rest of the points regarding the possible philosophical challenges 
faced by Rational Benevolence, we must finally return to Henry Sidgwick, and to the 
conclusions that have been drawn from his work. There is, I imagine – especially 
given the vast amount of literature that holds Sidgwick to be a classical utilitarian – 
one particularly outstanding question, that I have not directly addressed (although I 
hope my arguments in the thesis have gone some way towards answering it). This 
                                                 
557 Thomas Nagel provides a helpful summary of how practical wisdom, for example, could possibly 
answer the problem of incommensurability: ‘Provided one has taken the process of practical 
justification as far as it will do in the course of arriving at the conflict’, he writes, 'one may be able to 
proceed without further justification, but without irrationality either. What makes this possible is 
judgement – essentially the faculty Aristotle described as practical wisdom, which reveals itself over 
time in individual decisions rather than in the enunciation of general principles’ (Nagel, Moral 
Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1979) p. 135). Bernard Williams also believes 
that value comparison is possible, because it is not – as pluralism tends to imply – actually impossible 
to weigh two rational considerations against each other without first reducing them to ‘one common 
comparison in terms of which they can be compared’ (Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 
(Cambridge MA: Cambridge University Press: 1985) p.17). It is quite possible, Williams argues, to 
have competing rationalities – a position with which Rational Benevolence directly agrees. See also 
James Griffin, ‘Incommensurability: What’s the Problem?’, in, Ruth Chang, Incommensurability, 
Incomparability, and Practical Reason (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press: 1997).  
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is: Is Rational Benevolence really just utilitarianism? I admit that the question is a 
relevant one, and that it might be phrased in a number of pertinent ways. Is saying 
that ‘Benevolence as a class of actions is universalisable’ essentially just 
utilitarianism, for example. Or, is it the case that the Point of View of the Universe 
simply gives, as Peter Singer would argue, a form of hedonistic utilitarianism, in 
which ultimately we are to aim at the greatest good for the greatest number? Is the 
fact that Universal Benevolence is the only self-evident principle truly capable of 
demanding our moral attention ultimately indicating that all rational moral action is 
essentially utilitarian in nature? Are all ‘rationally benevolent’ actions therefore simply 
utilitarian ones? Is Sidgwick’s quest for ‘proof’ really just evidence that he was aiming 
to establish the utilitarian principle as superior, a task in which Rational Benevolence 
is a mere instrument?  
In first response to these questions, I maintain that in all cases the answer is 
no. Sidgwick is clear that his moral theory is comprised of two fundamental intuitions 
– only one of which is utilitarian. The other, he states both in ME and in the PD, is 
Kantian. In Sidgwick’s hands that particular intuition retains its quality of non-
consequentialist moral rightness – and it is only via this version of rightness, and 
duty, that Sidgwick is able to establish Universal Benevolence in the first place. Even 
from the earlier stages of ME, it is evident that both deontological and utilitarian 
approaches to morality are, to Sidgwick, rationally valid. Sidgwick’s arguments in I:III 
for rightness being that which is rational specifically includes both absolute principles 
and end-based moral positions, and they are posited with very little difference 
between them. This close affinity, maintained by the shared appeal to Reason, is 
precisely what is embodied by Rational Benevolence. In that theory, Sidgwick 
effortlessly and logically combines absolute principles and rational ends to produce a 
system that is as dependent on the idea of non-consequentialism as it is on a 
utilitarian idea of Benevolence. And it is this theory that provides the proof of 
Sidgwick’s utilitarianism. The fact that Sidgwick’s utilitarianism required this particular 
basis as the validation of that utilitarianism – indeed, the fact that it is derived from it 
- is compelling evidence that deontological principles are indispensable. Rational 
Benevolence is not a mere instrument in the qualification of utilitarianism; it is, in its 
own right, the essential foundation of the whole moral system that Sidgwick holds up 
as truth –and for that reason, I argue that it cannot simply be called ‘utilitarianism’. 
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 Having said this, as the second response to those questions I venture to ask 
whether in the end it really matters if Rational Benevolence is ultimately found to be 
a utilitarian theory. Sidgwick does indeed state that his search for clear and ethical 
intuitions has led him to utilitarianism, but given the importance in that process of 
Rational Benevolence – and its deontological properties - Sidgwick’s confirmation of 
the utilitarian principle need not detract from that importance. Sidgwick’s is such a 
nuanced interpretation of utilitarianism, one that depends on non-typical-utilitarian 
interpretations of such fundamental concepts as rightness, that his doctrine emerges 
as one crucially different to most other versions. If, therefore, it was insisted upon 
that we call his theory ‘utilitarianism’, this would be acceptable, provided that it was 
known as Sidgwickian Utilitarianism perhaps, and that this term was recognised as 
including deontological properties in such a way that they are reconciled to that 
utilitarianism. This might at least increase the recognition that Sidgwick’s account of 
utilitarianism has something more philosophically significant to offer than a repetition, 
however sophisticated, of ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’.  
What would be less satisfactory about ‘Sidgwickian Utilitarianism’ however is 
that it allows for the continuation of the term ‘utilitarianism’. After so many decades of 
controversy, debate, and varying popularity, the word would likely retain all those 
trappings and problems that have come to characterise the doctrine – and would, 
subsequently, probably still invoke the old rivalry with deontological viewpoints. The 
crucial details of Sidgwick’s particular reconciliatory version would be lost, and the 
divide between utilitarian and deontological principles of morality would be further 
perpetuated. It has been one of my most specific aims to argue against this conflict, 
representing as it does, in my opinion, an inaccurate picture of human morality which 
Sidgwick’s theory does truly serve to eradicate. So where ‘Sidgwickian utilitarianism’ 
may be acceptable to some extent, I argue that it is ‘Rational Benevolence’, and the 
mutually informing synthesis between deontological and utilitarian moral values 
therein, that provides a more suitable, more exact, and ultimately more powerful 
representation of the human moral experience.  
 
5.4.c. Final Comments  
 
When it comes to how ultimately to understand Sidgwick, and his theory of Rational 
Benevolence, I believe that the truth really does lie between two conclusions. 
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Sidgwick is a utilitarian, but he is also a deontologist. Rational Benevolence is not 
standard utilitarianism, because it depends on a foundation of non-consequentialism 
– but it is not wholly deontological, because what that foundation yields is a utilitarian 
principle. Deontological moral properties are vital, but insufficient by themselves; 
utilitarian properties are vital, but unsubstantiated by themselves. Rational 
Benevolence is objective, but allows for appropriately flexible judgements. Rational 
Benevolence can recognise both the unconditional aspects of human life, and those 
places in which life is affected by interpretations of the good. Whichever one of these 
pairs of statements is chosen, Sidgwick occupies the space between them. That 
space, identified by myself at the start of this thesis and by Sidgwick at the start of 
ME, is the one in which we appear to agree with a range of very valid but very 
different assertions about what is morally reasonable. And in developing a theory 
that accounts for that fact, Sidgwick has created some unity – a position from which 
we need not adhere to either one view or the other, and a position in which the 
traditional divide between deontological and utilitarian values dissolves under an 
acceptance of the rationality of both positions.  
I stated in the thesis introduction that Sidgwick hoped to aid towards the 
construction of a moral system that could bring together the divergent but equally 
defensible moral beliefs that make up the human moral experience. It is my view that 
Rational Benevolence does this. Sidgwick himself was not explicit about that fact in 
ME – but I believe that it is not a great leap to suggest that, by the end of his life, 
Sidgwick did wish to emphasise the affinity between deontological and utilitarian 
moral principles that he had developed in ME. This is, after all, the striking 
conclusion that he draws twice in the personal document – one of the last 
documents that Sidgwick was concerned to disclose at the end of his life. Sidgwick’s 
brother in law, Arthur Balfour, always maintained that he believed Henry Sidgwick to 
have had ‘something important left to say’, that he hadn’t had time to express before 
his untimely death. In my opinion, the personal document, along with ME itself, 
suggests that this argument for the mutual relationship between deontological and 
utilitarian principles might have been it. It is my own hope therefore that the work 
done in this thesis has gone some way to arguing what Sidgwick might have argued 
himself, had he lived to do so. 
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